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Abstract 
This work explores the vulnerable surety phenomenon and the judicial legal structures 
that deal (or try to deal) with it. This area of law is particularly complex since it involves 
striking a balance between two conflicting public policies: the need to protect vulnerable 
sureties from any type of victimisation and the need to preserve the importance of 
securitisation. A central theme in this thesis is that the various legal structures used by 
courts over the years have failed to adequately address the problems of vulnerable 
sureties. Therefore, an alternative doctrine or approach should be followed. This work 
proposes the application of the doctrine of unconscionability. It is argued that this 
doctrine can produce more equitable and economically efficient results than the O'Brien 
rules in the context of suretyship agreements. 
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Suretyship is as ancient as the pyramids; ' in recent years of economic recession though it 
has become particularly problematic. As a result of this it has received the increasing 
attention of judges, academics, law reformers and the government. 2 The problem is 
commonly experienced by spouses and partners (`sureties') who provide third party loan 
security to creditors for the business liabilities of their other spouse or partner (the 
`debtor'). In the typical scenario the wife, 3 under the emotional pressure or 
misunderstanding caused by her husband, signs a charge over the family home in order to 
secure an overdraft or a loan for her husband's business. The crucial legal question asks 
whether the charge should be set aside against the lender under these circumstances. 
Answering the question is a particularly difficult task because it involves balancing the 
conflicting interests of the above trilogy: the surety, the debtor and the creditor. This 
work tries to resolve the complex public policy and legal issues that arise in this area. 
Central to this work is the standpoint that the law (the O'Brien principle of notice) has 
failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of the parties involved, the creditor's 
interests transcending the surety's by far. This view is expressed in the subtitle of the 
work. The second tenet of this work is that the doctrine of unconscionability should be 
adopted in this area, since it can produce more equitable and economically efficient 
results than the status quo. However, having in mind that for the past 25 years English 
courts have been struggling to strike the desired balance between these competing 
1 Phillips, John and O'Donovan, James; The Modern Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2003,3. See generally Morgan, W. D., "The History and Economics of Suretyship" 
(1927) 12 Corn LQ 153. 
2 See 1.5.7. 
3 The wife is used throughout the thesis as the most common example of vulnerable surety. However, this 
does not mean that only wives can be victimised or that all wives are victimised. 
1 
interests, it is acknowledged that it is not possible to find the magic formula to deal with 
the problem. Therefore, it is not advocated that unconscionability solves all the problems 
of the current rules and it would be naive to maintain such an idea; nevertheless, the 
writer insists that unconscionability can improve many of the persisting problems faced 
by judicial thought in this area of law. It is exactly for this reason that the main title is set 
as a question: "Do All Roads Lead to Unconscionability? " The use of a question mark is 
deliberate. Setting the title in a question form warns the reader of the difficulty to reach 
the best allocation of responsibility and cost and places things in a realistic perspective. 
The main thesis is that the current rules dealing with the vulnerable surety phenomenon 
(namely the O'Brien principle) fail because they regard the problem faced by vulnerable 
sureties as being a private issue. As a result of this, the bank is treated as a third party in 
the improper conduct of the husband. So, when being called upon to determine whether 
the charge should be set aside, courts approach the matter as having to resolve it between 
two innocent parties: the surety and the bank. Judges wishing to guard market interests 
tend to decide in favour of banks, as it would be unfair to hold the bank responsible for 
the conduct of the husband. It is submitted though, that if one takes into account the costs 
which sureties and society have to bear in relation to bank possession (which may relate 
to the vulnerable surety phenomenon), it will become obvious that the matter is of 
general concern and can hardly be described as a private issue. Also, having in mind that 
banks contract with sureties directly and gain from suretyship agreements, they cannot be 
discharged from all moral and legal responsibility. The only real victims in this scenario 
are vulnerable sureties and not banks. So, the parties should more appropriately be 
described as "The Good, the Bad and the Ugly". The good being the vulnerable surety- 
wife who risks losing her house, the bad being the husband who exercises undue 
influence, and the ugly being the bank, as a financial institution that stands to gain from 
mortgage transactions on the expense of sureties. This characterisation is reflected within 
the doctrine of unconscionability since it focuses on the unconscionable conduct of the 
bank, which takes advantage of the vulnerability of the surety. 
2 
Below follows an explanation of the vulnerable surety phenomenon, the conflicting 
public policies involved, the costs imposed on sureties and society because of 
possessions, the various statutory and governmental methods available to sureties, the 
objective of the thesis, its structure, its methodology and definitions and important terms 
which are used throughout this work. 
1.2 The Vulnerable Surety-Wife Phenomenon 
The purpose of this section is to provide an explanation of the vulnerable surety-wife 
phenomenon and the ensuing need to provide special protection to women even today. 
Empirical research is incorporated, so as to understand the real circumstances under 
which wives enter into suretyship agreements. 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O'Brien' explained: 
"wealth is now more widely spread. Moreover, a high 
proportion of privately owned wealth is invested in the 
matrimonial home. Because of the recognition by society of the 
equality of the sexes, the majority of matrimonial homes are 
now in the joint names of both spouses. Therefore, in order to 
raise finance for the business enterprises of one or other of the 
spouses, the jointly owned home has become a main source of 
security. The provision of such security requires the consent of 
both spouses"6 
even if the finance is required for the purposes of only one of them. On the other hand, he 
pointed out that: 
4 On the point, Lord Scott in CIBC Mortgages v Pitt [1994] 1 A. C. 200, referred to the law treating married 
women "more tenderly" than others. This approach is based on dicta in early authorities. In Grigby v Cox 
(1750) 1 Ves. Sen. 517, Lord Hardwicke said that a court of equity "will have more jealousy" over 
dispositions by a wife to a husband. In Yerkey v Jones [1939] 63 C. L. R. 649 (HC Aus) Dixon J. refers to 
this "invalidating tendency. " 
3 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HI. ). 
6Aid, 188. 
3 
"in parallel with these financial developments, society's 
recognition of the equality of the sexes has led to a rejection of 
the concept that the wife is subservient to the husband in the 
management of the family's finances. A number of the 
authorities reflect an unwillingness in the court to perpetuate law 
based on this outmoded concept. Yet, although the concept of the 
ignorant wife leaving all financial decisions to the husband is 
outmoded, the practice does not yet coincide with the ideal. In a 
substantial proportion of marriages it is still the husband who 
has the business experience and the wife is willing to follow his 
advice without bringing a truly independent mind and will to 
bear on financial decisions. The number of recent cases in this 
field shows that in practice many wives are still subjected to, 
and yield to, undue influence by their husbands. Such wives can 
reasonably look to the law for some protection when their 
husband have abused the trust and confidence reposed in them. 0 
So, a wife's confidence in her husband gives him the opportunity to unfairly or 
improperly procure her to become surety. 
"Moreover [... ] the informality of business dealings between 
spouses raises a substantial risk that the husband has not 
accurately stated to the wife the nature of the liability she is 
undertaking, i. e., he has misrepresented the position, albeit 
negligently. "' 
1Barclays Bank Plc vO'Brien [1994] 1 AC. 180 (1 L), 188, emphasis added. 
8Ibid, 196. 
4 
In Yerkey v Jones9 Dixon J. said: 
"in my judgment this special tenderness of treatment afforded to 
wives by the courts is properly attributable to two factors. First, 
many cases may well fall into the Class 2B10 category of undue 
influence because the wife demonstrates that she placed trust 
and confidence in her husband in relation to her financial affairs 
and therefore raises a presumption of undue influence. Second, 
the sexual and emotional ties between the parties provide a 
ready weapon for undue influence: a wife's true wishes can 
easily be overborne because of her fear of destroying or 
damaging the wider relationship between her and her husband if 
she opposes his wishes. " 
These statements are supported by empirical research. " Therefore, in order to have a 
realistic picture of the problem, it is important to look at some empirical studies, which 
explain the circumstances under which wives agree to enter into suretyship agreements. 
These studies reveal that there are several types of vulnerability suffered by wives even at 
present day despite the apparent equality of the sexes. These vulnerabilities render them 
particularly susceptible to pressure and misrepresentations coming from their husbands, 
which induce them to sign the suretyship agreement. 
In regards to the management of domestic finances, Wilson's study'2 concluded 
that more men at middle-income level took responsibility for family finances than 
among the lower income families in her sample. A similar finding was reached in 
9 [1939] 63 C. L. R 649,675,677, emphasis added. 
10 Undue influence is divided in two classes. For an explanation see 2.6.12. ii. 
" See Wilson, G.; Money in the Family. Aldershot: Avebury, 1987; Edgell, Stephen; Middle Class 
Couples: A Study of Segregation, Domination and Inequality in Marriage. London: Allen & Unwin, 1980; 
Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997; Pahl, J.; Money and Marriage. London: MacMillan, 1989. 
12 Wilson, G.; Money in the Family. Aldershot: Avebury, 1987. Her study involved an interview of 90 
women and 24 of their husbands who lived in inner city London. 
5 
Edgell's study. 13 Edgell found that, generally speaking, the more important 
decisions (but less frequent) are taken by the husband, while the less important (but 
more frequent) decisions are left to the wife. So, decisions, which involved large 
sums of money or that related to the husband's main role as breadwinner, were 
husband dominated. 14 The lesser financial role of economically dependent women 
in middle-income households suggests the particular vulnerability of surety-wives who 
fall within this economic group. On this point, in Pahl's study" more recently in higher 
income households, which involved non-professional wives who had either not been in 
paid employment throughout most of their married life or had been employed in their 
husband's business, the majority of surety-wives had some management and control over 
family finances, although they generally perceived themselves as ultimately having less 
financial power than debtors. Interestingly, Pahl's study, in a different group comprising 
women in paid employment, who were professionals with university degrees or higher 
education below degree level, found that sureties in this group decided about the amount 
of their personal spending themselves but in the event of disagreement, the debtor's view 
prevailed. So, debtors, even in this group, were viewed as having greater control over 
financial decisions, in spite of the economic independence of sureties. 
This lack of control regarding important matters, according to Pahl, was also carried in 
the family business. This rendered many wives particularly susceptible to pressure to 
provide security. 16 Also, it has to be noted that even if sureties had some role in domestic 
financial decisions, still "the business was always regarded as the province of the 
debtor. s17 
13 Edgell, Stephen; Middle Class Couples: A Study of Segregation, Domination and Inequality in Marriage. 
London: Allen & Unwin, 1980. 
14 Of course, Edgell's research was conducted in the 1970s and so it may not reflect the present social 
reality. 
"Pahl, Jan; Money and Marriage. Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989. 
16 In addition, Singh's study in Australia showed that even if wives control intra-family finances and even if 
they are informed about business finances, yet they do not have a decision-making role regarding the 
business. Singh, S., "For Love not Money: Women, Information and the Family Business" (1995) 
Consumer Advocacy and Financial Counselling Association of Victoria. 
17 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,128. 
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In addition, Fehlberg's study18 revealed differing financial priorities between men and 
women. Surety-wives emphasized that their financial priorities had revolved around the 
well being of the household, while they believed the debtor's financial priorities revolved 
around the business. Importantly, debtor interviewees all expressed the view that the 
business was theirs, rather that a shared or family business. These views reflect social 
perceptions about different gender roles. These cultural expectations were also noted in 
Bernard's study, 19 which concluded that in every marital-union there are two marriages - 
`his' and `hers'. Specifically, Bernard believes that men and women often experience 
marriage in different ways, and often report their experiences differently; husbands 
tended to report having more power in relation to their wives, than they had in reality, 
whereas wives tended to under-estimate their power in relationships. This is attributed, 
according to Bernard, to social expectations of gender inequalities, which men and 
women have learned. This tendency renders women vulnerable to emotional pressure to 
provide security imposed by a male spouse or partner. 
As a result of this attitude, surety-wives involvement in the business is not significant 
Half of the surety sample in Fehlberg's research described themselves as having no role 
in the running of the business. Interestingly, sureties who said they had no role in the 
business were nominal company directors, secretaries, or shareholders. Nevertheless, 
their role on paper did not correspond with their position in reality. 20 Also, it may be 
argued that some wives are not part of the family business at all. It is very likely that they 
are nominally involved for tax reasons. This means that they have no control of the 
business. So, as it appears from empirical research, one reason for entering into the 
suretyship agreement is, apart of the economic dependence of women, their lack of 
control in the business. 
Fehlberg also notes that due to sureties' lack of involvement either in the business at an 
executive level or in planning the transaction, their factual understanding was invariably 
based on information provided by the debtor, which was in many cases inaccurate. Their 
'$ Ibid. 
19 Bernard, J.; The Future ofMarriage. 1a ed Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, reprint 1976. 
20 This is consistent with Singh's Australian research, seen. 16. 
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understanding of the legal effects of the transaction and of the factual situation was very 
broad. So, one cannot argue that these wives were entering into the transaction with 
informed consent or under the desire to selfishly manipulate their environment as free 
moral agents consistent with liberal contract and market theories. 21 Also, given sureties' 
general lack of involvement at a decision-making level within the business, most of them 
said they were not involved in planning the transaction and feeling, that the decision had 
already been made, and some of them not even knowing that they had a choice, entered 
into the suretyship agreement. It was just assumed by themselves and by those around 
them that they would sign. 
In addition, often the self-sacrificing acts of sureties motivated by non-financial factors 
but the desire of wives to support the debtor to realise their dreams were the reason for 
entering into the suretyship agreement. Others agreed to enter into the agreement 
because they were subjected to violence. Their refusal to sign would lead to further 
problems, rather than peace of mind. 
These findings show that many surety-wives do not enter into suretyship agreements with 
free and informed consent out of the desire to advance their welfare as free, autonomous 
and self-maximising individuals. Their economic dependence and emotional commitment 
to their husbands, their lack of involvement in business decisions, including the 
negotiations to provide security and the desire to help their husband fulfil their dreams 
render them vulnerable to misunderstanding the nature of the obligations undertaken. 
Other cases involve complete absence of choice, as some sureties are subjected even to 
duress. Their vulnerability to wrongdoing by the debtor husband can also be explained on 
the basis of social perceptions regarding differing gender roles, under which men are 
regarded as breadwinners and women as responsible for the upbringing of children. Due 
to the nature and the seriousness of the problem, in Australia it has become known as the 
`Sexually Transmitted Debt'. 
21 For a discussion of this issue see chapter 7. 
22 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,131-132. 
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However, finding the best method to protect vulnerable sureties has been proved very 
difficult and complex since it involves balancing conflicting public policies. These public 
policy considerations are explained below. 
1.3 The Battle of Priorities and the Impossible Balance of Conflicting Policies 
This section explains the policy issues at stake. According to Lord Nicholls in Etridge 
(No. 2): 
"The problem considered in the O'Brien's case and raised by the 
present appeals is of comparatively recent origin. It arises out of 
the substantial growth in home ownership over the last 30 or 40 
years and, as part of that development, the great increase in the 
number of homes owned jointly by husbands and wives. More 
than two-thirds of householders in the United Kingdom now own 
their own homes. For most home-owning couples, their homes 
are their most valuable asset. They must surely be free, if they so 
wish, to use this asset as a means of raising money, whether for 
the purpose of the husband's business or for any other purpose. 
Their home is their property. The law should not restrict them in 
the use they may make of it. Bank finance is in fact by far the 
most important source of external capital for small businesses 
with fewer than ten employees. These businesses comprise about 
95% of all businesses in the country, responsible for nearly one- 
third of all employment. Finance raised by second mortgages on 
the principal's home is a significant source of capital for the 
start-up of small businesses. If the freedom of home-owners to 
make economic use of their homes is not to be frustrated, a bank 
must be able to have confidence that a wife's signature of the 
necessary guarantee and charge will be as binding upon her as is 
the signature of anyone else on documents which he or she may 
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sign. Otherwise banks will not be willing to lend money on the 
security of a jointly owned house or flat. At the same time, the 
high degree of trust and confidence and emotional 
interdependence which normally characterises a marriage 
relationship provides scope for abuse. One party may take 
advantage of the other's vulnerability. Unhappily, such abuse 
does occur. Further, it is all too easy for a husband, anxious or 
even desperate for bank finance, to misstate the position in some 
particular or to mislead the wife, wittingly or unwittingly, in 
some other way. The law would be seriously defective if it did 
not recognise these realities. "2' 
A judgment on a suretyship case will inevitably affect the welfare of a surety and her 
immediate family environment, either by allowing her to keep or let go of what is very 
often her most valuable asset. On the other hand, banks need to feel secured and assured 
that they will be able to enforce their security when things reach that point. After all, the 
principal value in being a secured creditor is the ability to realise the property over which 
the security is held, so as to recoup the amount that the creditor is owed. Banks are in a 
money making business and do not just lend out money out of philanthropy. 
Microeconomics prescribe that if banks cannot enforce their security then they will no 
longer see interest in giving out mortgages to couples and will cease from providing 
them. Something like that would be detrimental to young couples, the poor and small and 
medium size business. Hence, a sense of balance is needed when approaching these 
cases, so as to make sure that the "wealth tied up in the matrimonial home does not 
become economically sterile. i24 It is important to keep these considerations in mind, so as 
to place the thesis in a realistic context. 
2i Royal Bank of Scotland Plcv Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, paras 33-36, emphasis added. 24Barclays Bank Plc vO 'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (i L), 189, emphasis added. 
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1.4 Costs on Sureties. Banks. Governments and Society 
The need of drastic improvement within the law and banking practice in the area becomes 
obvious if we take into account some simple statistics. 25 Between 1970 and 1980, the 
number of households who lost their property each year as a result of the lender taking 
into possession ranged between just 3,480 (0.06%) and 4,870 (0.08%). In the early 1990s, 
possessions rose to 75,000 (0.77%). While they have fallen since then, in 1999 they 
reached 30,000, still seven times more the 1980. This means that in the 1990s 1.5 million 
people lost their home. It also means that over 82 households lost their home per day. 26 It 
is hard to regard these figures as temporary setbacks or irrelevancies on the margin. The 
phenomenon takes a social dimension, as it concerns the welfare of a big portion of the 
population, and hence calls for healing measures to be incorporated. These statistics, 
however, do not show the exact number of cases whereby the mortgage was entered into 
as a result of one's undue influence. However, these statistics are not negligible as the 
slightest contribution to the problem makes a difference. In fact, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
emphasised in O'Brien that there exists a significant number of cases where undue 
influence in financial agreements is claimed and hence one cannot shut one's eyes to the 
obvious reality. "The number of recent cases in this field shows that in practice many 
wives are still subjected to, and yield to, undue influence by their husbands. "27 It is thus 
urgent to find a way to eliminate the problems faced by vulnerable sureties and 
consequently limit the number of mortgage possessions and evictions. 
Further more, if one wishes to have a pragmatic appreciation of the problem one must see 
beyond these statistics and inquire into the real implications of the failure of the law. 
Ford, Burrows and Nettleton in their book identify many different types of costs which 
are related to arrears and possession. 28 Theses are: social; psychological; health-related; 
administrative; financial; political; and organisational. Such costs may be experienced by 
25 Ford, Janet; Burrows, Roger, Nettleton, Sarah; Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A Social Analysis of 
MortgageArrears and Possessions. Bristol: Policy Press, 2001,2. 
zb Ibid, 26 and generally chapter 2. 
27 Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL), 188, emphasis added 
28 Ford, Janet; Burrows, Roger, Nettleton, Sarah; Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A Social Analysis of 
Mortgage Arrears and Possessions. Bristol: Policy Press, 2001,26, chapter 2. 
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the following: borrowers; lenders; insurers; central government; local government; 
housing market institutions; labour market institutions; and health services. 
To begin with, empirical research showed that for borrowers unable to sustain home 
ownership, the experience of bank possession is a route to poverty, substantial debt and 
social exclusion. One of the most obvious expressions of it is homelessness. In 
addition, mortgage possession is also likely to have a number of other social, 
psychological and/or health consequences for families. Indeed, Ford in her study of the 
financial consequences of possession found that for the respondents it was the social 
rather than the financial considerations that were often most central. 30 The social 
consequences for families whom had been taken into possession relate to changes in: 
quality of life; social status and identity; personal and family relationships; future 
aspirations; health; and well-being. 31 
Becoming homeless may be accompanied by fundamental changes to the quality of 
people's lives. 32 For instance, there is usually a move to a different type of 
neighbourhood, which is not of their choice and where sometimes there is high level of 
crime and drugs. There is also a reduction in the social activities and social 
participation. For example, people do not have the money to go out and to be able to 
participate in local social life, go on holiday or have trips and treats. Another significant 
consequence concerns learning to live with a new social status. This often resulted in 
feelings of stigma. A further concern about loosing a home and becoming a renter or 
homeless was the associated loss of independence. 
The experience also changed people's personal relationships, especially between 
partners. Peace and harmony in the family as one would expect were replaced with 
29 Ibid, chapter 5. 
30Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Most sureties, in Fehlberg's study described a decline in their economic position as a result of their 
problems and a decline in their standard of living. Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety 
Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997,258,260; Also, see Ford, Janet; Burrows, 
Roger, Nettleton, Sarah; Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A Social Analysis of Mortgage Arrears and 
Possessions. Bristol: The Policy Press, 2001, chapter 5. 
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stress, anxiety and worry and could lead to divorces. Empirical research carried out by 
Felhberg among 20 sureties showed that 11 of them were separated as a result of the 
pressure. 3 To illustrate the point one only needs to remember that Mrs. Aboody's 
marriage broke down during the course of the hearings of her case. 34 
In addition, the experience of possession came with a sense of uncertainty, luck of 
control, insecurity, anxiety, depression, and enduring fear about the future. 35 Many 
people were anxious about their children. Some had chosen to buy their homes in areas 
that had 'good'schools, which they wanted to pass on their homes to their children 36 
In addition, the impact of the experience of mortgage arrears and possession on health 
is very intense. The most common physical health symptoms were headaches, hair loss, 
cirrhosis and high blood pressure; also those who had chronic conditions such as eczema 
and asthma found that their symptoms got worse. 7 Others experienced more acute 
health problems. The example of Mr. Bundy who suffered a heart attack in court is a 
strong example3$ But in all empirical researches people emphasized more the 
physiological implications. "Apart from the death of someone close to us, we found 
the repossession was the most traumatic experience that we have ever been through. 
We would no wish this experience on anybody as it is a stigma that will be for us for 
ever (couple with dependant children, possessed in 1977). "39 
33 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surely Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,253. 
"Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA vAboody [1990] 1 Q. B. 923. 
3s Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,256; Ford, Janet; Burrows, Roger, Nettleton, Sarah; Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A 
Social Analysis ofMortgage Arrears and Possessions. Bristol: Policy Press, 2001, chapter 5. 
36 Fond, Janet; Burrows, Roger, Nettleton, Sarah; Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A Social Analysis of 
Mortgage Arrears and Possessions. Bristol: The Policy Press, 2001, chapter 5. 
37 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,256. 
38 Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] 1 Q13.326 (CA). 
39 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,127. 
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Employment capacity was also reduced because of the health problems, described 
above. 40 Sureties noted that because of lack of choice, state benefits was the only way in 
which they could meet their mortgage obligations 41 
Together with the couple any children of the family are also affected. This is because, as 
empirical research revealed, people have to move to `bad areas' and friends of the 
children do not come to visit because of that. Children's behaviour was altered due to 
the move, there was tension between parents and children and parenting became very 
difficult. Also, they were less able to concentrate on their schoolwork. In addition, the 
experience of mortgage possession had profound consequences for how they came to 
think about themselves or their identity and became more insecure. 42 Generally, they 
become anxious about their parents' well-being, the loss of their `home', the fact that 
they have to change schools and lose their friends, the possibility of repeated moves, 
the fact that they have no control. 43 
Also, persistent poverty, to use an economic terminology, which is something like an 
inherited disease in the sense that children from poor families normally stay poor like 
their parents, is also prolonged. To explain, research has revealed that children who are 
brought up in poor neighbourhoods, where sometimes crime is more widely spread, and 
who do not afford good education have many chances of staying poor, uneducated and 
thus not contributing into the market. 
The problems though do not stop within the immediate family environment. The 
seriousness of the problem becomes even more apparent if one takes into account the 
increased administrative and financial costs resulting from increases in mortgage 
40 Ibid, 259. 
41 Ibid, 259. 
42 Ford, Janet; Burrows, Roger, Nettleton, Sarah; Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A Social Analysis of 
Mortgage Arrears and Possessions. Bristol: Policy Press, 2001,141,148. 
431bid, 141-3. 
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arrears and possessions on: insurance companies, building societies, banks and the 
government. 
44 
For example, if people are forced out of their houses in the street, it means that these 
people will ultimately want to rely on governmental welfarist support programmes. Ford 
explains that local authorities have faced greater administrative and financial costs in 
providing households to people made homeless due to increased levels of possession. 45 
In addition, the growth of mortgagors in receipt of ISMI46 and the shift to direct 
payments have increased the administrative costs for both central government and 
lenders. 47 These administrative burdens, of course, have a financial counterpart. This will 
mean that welfarist spending will increase. Despite the desirability of welfarism in our 
society, it is better if precautions are taken beforehand, so as to avoid rescue operations 
afterwards. There is always a problem with welfarist systems in that if they go too far and 
too deep into the government's pocket, they create situations of dependences rather than 
self-help and ultimately lead to waste of resources and inefficiency. 
In addition, creditors are faced with increased costs. They may face one or more of: 
interests on arrears; administrative charges for correspondence or setting up debt 
collection facilities to ensure practices and procedures are consistent with `mass 
processing'; court charges; charges for essential maintenance post-possession; estate 
44 See Stephens, M., "Institutional Responses to the UK Housing Market Recession" (1996) 33 Urban 
Studies 337. 
45 Ford, J. "Mortgage Arrears, Mortgage Possessions and Homelessness" in Burrows, R.; Pleace, N. 
Quilgars (eds. ) Homelessness and Social Policy. London: Routledge, 1997. It is also worth noting that in 
England, since the start of the 1990s, local authorities have accepted no more than 50% of all 
households experiencing compulsory possession in any one year and in 1999 the figure was 31%. As a 
percentage of all possessions in any one-year, homelessness acceptances as a result of mortgage arrears 
have ranged from 19% to 39% in 1991. A considerable percentage of households therefore have to make 
their own rehousing arrangements. The options are limited. Finding accommodation within the private 
rented sector can prove difficult for those who are already in debt as deposits and payments in advance 
are usually required by landlords. Other options include living with family or friends, trying to buy a new 
home or attempting to secure housing association accommodation: Ford, Janet; Burrows, Roger, Nettleton, 
Sarah; Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A Social Analysis ofMortgage Arrears and Possessions. Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2001,127. 
46 Income Support for Mortgage Interest (ISMI) is a mortgage rescue scheme by the government. 
47 Ford, Janet; Burrows, Roger, Nettleton, Sarah, Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A Social Analysis of 
Mortgage Arrears and Possessions. Bristol: Policy Press, 2001,114. 
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agency fees; and so on. 48 They also have to increase levels of human and capital 
investment to `manage' arrears and possessions. Insurers providing Mortgage Indemnity 
Guarantee (MIG) cover to lenders also face increased levels of `pay-out'. 49 
It is clear that the vulnerable surety phenomenon and the resulting loss of people's home 
can hardly be described as a private matter, the growth of mortgage arrears and 
possessions brings a wide range of costs and a range of different actors. Hence, beyond 
philanthropic and equitable motivations to protect the weak, there are other wider social 
implications that render a more protective approach necessary. These equitable and social 
concerns motivated the writer to undertake the current research in an effort to examine if 
a better protection to sureties and their families can be ensured. 
1.5 Statutory and Governmental Intervention as Methods to deal with the Problem 
of Vulnerable Sureties 
Even though this thesis is primarily concerned with the judicial response to the problem 
of vulnerable sureties, for purposes of completeness within the thesis, this section looks 
at statutory and governmental methods which may be of assistance to vulnerable sureties. 
Since these methods are not the object of discussion within this work, they are not looked 
at in detail. 
1.5.1 Misrepresentation Act 1967 
a) Section 2(1) 
Damages may be obtained against the creditor pursuant to the Misrepresentation Act 
1967, s. 2(1), in respect of a misrepresentation made by the creditor, unless the creditor 
proves that he had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe up to the time the 




the sub-section does not apply when the misrepresentation is made by a third partyS° (for 
example, a husband where the prospective guarantor is his wife), even though the creditor 
has constructive notice of the misrepresentation. So, this section is of no assistance to the 
majority of vulnerable sureties who are usually under the misrepresentation of the debtor. 
b) Section 2(2)- Damages in Lieu of Rescission 
Having in mind the decision in TSB Bank Plc v Camfield, 5' that there is no power to order 
partial rescission in equity, the question is whether the creditor can use s. 2(2) of the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 to achieve partial rescission. 
Under this "where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresentation has been 
made to him otherwise than fraudulently and he would be entitled, by reason of the 
misrepresentation, to rescind the contract" the court has a power to award damages in lieu 
of rescission if it considers it equitable to do so having regard to the nature of the 
representation and the loss that would be caused by it if the contract were upheld, as well 
as to the loss that rescission would cause to the other party. 52 However, it should be stated 
that the measure of damages under the sub-section is the loss caused by the 
misrepresentation as a result of the refusal to allow rescission of the contract S3 On the 
assumption that the law does not permit partial rescission, the loss would be the 
guarantor's total liability under the guarantee not (as the creditor would claim) the 
additional amount in excess of the more limited liability that the creditor misrepresented 
that the guarantor would have. In TSB Bank Plc v Camfield, S4 an award of damages 
under s. 2(2) was dismissed by Roch L. J. as being an `empty remedy' on the ground that 
"the loss to [the wife] by upholding the legal charge in exchange for an award of damages 
against her husband would have far outweighed the loss that rescission would cause to 
50 Unless the third party is the creditor's agent. 
51 [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430. For a discussion of this case see 2.6.4.1 and 5.5.1. 
52 See generally Beatson, J.; Ansons Law of Contract. 28m ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002,253- 
60. 
53 William Sindall Plc v Cambridgeshire County Council [1994] 1 W. L. R. 1016. 
54 [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430. 
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[the husband]. " Hence, s. 2(2) is not applicable in the context of misrepresentation by 
third parties of which the creditor has constructive notice. " 
cl Section 2(3) - Requirement of Reasonableness 
Many forms of guarantee contain clauses, which state that the guarantor acknowledges 
that he/she has not executed the guarantee as a result of any representation or promise by 
or on behalf of the creditor or stating that no servant or employee of the creditor has 
authority to make representations. Now, pursuant to s. 2(3) of the Misrepresentation Act 
1967, such clauses are subject to the requirement of reasonableness in s. 11(1) of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.36 In addition, these clauses are likely to be regarded as 
`unfair' within the meaning of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999, in circumstances where the Regulations apply. The UCTA 1977 and the Consumer 
Contracts Regulation 1999 are examined below. 
1.5.2 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
Many guarantees are entered into "in the course of a business, " 57 so the Unfair Contract 
Terms Act 1977 may be relevant in determining the validity of clauses within the 
standard form guarantee. A number of provisions may apply. Section 2(2) states that a 
person cannot "exclude or restrict his liability for negligence except in so far as the term 
or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. " This, translated in the context of 
guarantee agreements, means that the creditor cannot exclude any liability for the tort of 
negligence arising from his failure to explain the guarantee. However, this section is of 
little help since the creditor owes no such general duty of care. 
ss As Belinda Fehlberg observes, "the lender (as opposed to the misrepresent or husband) cannot invoke s 
2(2) directly as against the wife. This is because the 1967 Act does not expressly concern itself with the 
effect of a misrepresentation on a third party. As between misrepresentee (wife) and third party (bank), the 
law remains that prior to 1967. The result, of course, is anomalous in that the innocent lender may find 
itself in a potentially worse position than the wrongdoer. " Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: 
Surely Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997,171. 




Contracts of guarantee involve the guarantor dealing as a consumer or, more often, on the 
creditor's written standard contract terms. This means that s. 3 may be relevant. Section 
3(2)(a), in the context of guarantees, means that as against the guarantor dealing on the 
creditor's written standard terms of business the creditor cannot when himself in breach 
of contract exclude or restrict any liability of his in respect of the breach. Hence, in order 
for the relevant clause to come within the ambit of s. 3(2)(a) and be subject to the test of 
reasonableness, it must restrict the creditor's liability in respect of the creditor's breach of 
contract. Nevertheless, few of the clauses in standard form guarantees have this effect. 
Usually, they just preserve the guarantor's liability in circumstances when otherwise 
under the general law the guarantor would be discharged; this does not constitute an 
exclusion of liability, 58 so, s. 3(2)(a) does not apply. 
1.5.3 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, implementing the EC 
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, control 
contract terms. Their scope covers consumers only (meaning contracts made between a 
seller or supplier acting in the course of his business and another not so acting, the 
consumer). 59 An unfair term is one, which contrary to the requirements of good faith, 
causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations to the detriment of the 
consumer. 60 Schedule 2 also provides a non-exhaustive list of terms, which may be 
regarded as unfair. A determination that a term is unfair means that it does not bind the 
consumer, although the rest of the contract will continue to be binding upon the parties, if 
it is capable of doing so in the absence of that term. 61 
58 Examples of such clauses are clauses preventing the guarantor being discharged in the event of a 
variation of the principal contract, or if the creditor fails to maintain securities for the benefit of the 
guarantor or releases the principal debtor. 
"Reg. 4(1). 
60 Reg. 51. 
61 Reg. 8. 
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There are two types of analysis regarding the Regulations. 62 Under the second analysis, 
which is the most relevant here, guarantees by individuals are governed by the 
Regulations but only where the guarantee relates to a contract for the supply of goods or 
services to a consumer. This finds some support from the decision of the European Court 
of Justice in Bayerische Hypotheken - and Wechselbank AG v Dietzinger63 where an 
interpretation is given of the Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to 
protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises. The 
European Court of Justice held that the phrase "contracts under which a trader supplied 
goods or services to a consumer" in Art. (1)(1)64 included contracts of guarantee, but only 
where the principal contract itself consisted of a contract under which a trader supplies 
goods or services to a consumer. On this view the Regulation may apply to sureties. Of 
course, the problem with suretyship agreements examined in this thesis does not have to 
do with the unfairness (or the substance) of the terms of the contract but with the 
circumstances (the process) under which the agreement was entered (i. e. as a result of 
misunderstanding or undue influence). So, these Regulations are not of much assistance 
to vulnerable sureties. 
62 See Beale, Hugh; Arrowsmith, Sue (ed. ); Chitty on Contracts. 29"` ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004, 
para. 44-120. Under the first analysis, in the context of guarantees, a guarantor may perhaps be regarded as 
"supplying a service" (although this is not clear from the Regulations themselves) to a creditor since a 
"supplier of services" has been interpreted widely to include other commercial contracts, such as contracts 
of insurance (see Preamble to the EC Directive 93/13/EEC) and contracts for the supply of financial 
services (see also Beale, Hugh; Arrowsmith, Sue (ed. ); Chitty on Contracts. 29th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2004, para. 15-004). But, even if this is the case, views differ as to which types of guarantee 
come within the ambit of the Regulations. One view is that the Regulations apply only in the case where 
the guarantor is acting in the course of a business, but the creditor is not. This interpretation arises because 
the Regulations define "supplier" (that is, in this context, the guarantor) as one, who, "is acting for purposes 
relating to his trade, business or profession" (Reg. 3(1)) and "a consumer" (that is, the creditor) as "any 
natural person who... is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession" (Reg. 
3(1)). Examples in the context of guarantees will be rare since it follows from these definitions that the 
creditor must be a natural person making an advance to a third party, which is then guaranteed by a bank or 
other commercial enterprise. This scenario is very unlikely. In most cases the creditor is acting in the 
course of a business and guarantor is not. So, even though this analysis reflects the literal meaning of the 
Regulation, it is not expected to be of any assistance. 
63 [1998] E. C. R. I-1199. 
64 Article 1 (1) Reads as follows: "This Directive shall apply to contracts under which a trader supplies 
goods or services to a consumer and which are concluded: - during an excursion organized by the trader 
away from his business premises, or-during a visit by a trader (i) to the consumer's home or to that of 
another consumer; (ii) to the consumer's place of work; where the visit does not take place at the express 
request of the consumer. " 
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1.5.4 Consumer Credit Act 1974 
Similarly to the Regulations above, Section 137 of the Act gives the court the power to 
reopen extortionate credit bargains, in order to do justice between the parties. In 
determining whether or not a credit bargain is extortionate, the court is directed by s. 138 
of the Act to have regard to certain criteria. 
In exercising their jurisdiction under these provisions, the courts have shown a 
willingness to uphold bargains where the interest rate on the loan is high. Thus, in Ketley 
v Scott, 6S the court refused to reopen as extortionate a credit bargain where the rate of 
interest was 48% p. a. Similarly, in Petrou v Woodstead Finance, 66 even though the terms 
of the agreement were regarded as `very harsh', an interest rate of 42% p. a. was 
countenanced. An important consideration in refusing to reopen a transaction was that the 
debtor had a very poor record as a repayer of debts and, in consequence, the loan 
arrangement and the interest rate was normal for a risk of this kind. 
The suretyship cases, which reach courts, do not involve such high interest rates. Despite 
this even if the agreements is regarded extortionate, then only the specific provision is set 
aside and not the entire contract. So, liability of the surety remains. Also, the success of 
these statutory provisions in order to prevent the mortgagee from obtaining possession of 
the property will depend, primarily, on adequate resources being available to satisfy 
demands of the mortgagee. 67 So, again this Act cannot deal with the vulnerable surety 
phenomenon. 
1.5.5 Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 
Under s. 1(5) of the Matrimonial Homes Act 1983, payment of mortgage by the 
mortgagor's spouse, who is entitled under the Act to occupy the dwelling-house, is 
regarded as being as good as if made by the mortgagors. However, the problem is that in 
63 [1981] I. C. R. 241. 
66 [1986] F. L. R. 158. 
67 Thompson, Mark, P.; Repossession of Property on Mortgage Default. Croydon: Tolley, 1993,22. 
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suretyship agreements examined in this thesis the wife's income derives from the 
husband's business. In other words, if the husband is unable to repay then so is the wife. 
So, this provision is of no assistance to surety-wives, who want to save their home from 
repossession. 
1.5.6 The Financial Ombudsman Service 
For purposes of completeness within this section, it would be useful to include some 
information about the Financial Ombudsman as an alternative extra judicial route 
available to sureties. 68 
The Financial Ombudsman Service was set up by law69 as an independent public body. 
The role of the service is to settle disputes as an informal alternative to the courts. It 
resolves individual disputes between consumers and financial services firms and can 
consider complaints about a wide range of financial matters - from insurance and 
mortgages to savings and investments. It is very different to courts, as the service does 
not usually have formal hearings or face-to-face cross-examinations. Also, it does not 
entail rigid procedures and it is more flexible and quick than courts. An added advantage 
6s For more information see http: /Avww. financial-ombudsman. org. uk; Boto, Karen; Pullen, Simon, "FSA 
New Mortgage Regulations" (2005) F& CL I (on the right of complaint to the Financial Services 
Ombudsman); Reid, Val, "The FOS - An Example of Good Practice? " (2005) Legal Action 6 (examination 
of the FOS as a method of dispute resolution against the background of the proposal by the Department of 
Constitutional Affairs to reform the tribunal system based on the FOS model); Orton, Simon, "Financial 
Ombudsman Decisions: Beyond Challenge" (2005) 16 PLC 12 (on the discretion of the Ombudsman); 
Wilson, Michael, J., "Stop Bad Banking" (2005) 149 SJ 78 (on the role of the FOS); Merricks, Walter, 
"Just a Phone Call Away" (2005) Tribunals 13 (on the role of the FOS); Kempson, Elaine; Moore, Nick, 
"High Volume, High Quality" (2005) Tribunals 16 (on the efficiency of the FOS); Molloy, Timon, 
"Complaints From the Top" (2004) CM 9 (on the role and jurisdiction of the FOS); Yokoi-Arai, Mamiko, 
"A Comparative Analysis of the Financial Ombudsman Systems in the UK and Japan" (2004) 5 JIBL 333; 
Garon, Anthony, "Doing the Knowledge" (2004) 18 Lawyer 20 (on the role and main features of the FOS); 
Virgo, John, "The Financial Ombudsman Service and Jurisdiction Issues" (2003) CM 8 (on the 
jurisdictions and limits of the FOS); Philip, Morris; Rhoda, James, "The Financial Ombudsman Service: a 
brave new world in "ombudsmanry"? " (2002) PL 640 (on the scope of FOS including institutional 
structure, jurisdiction, independence, accountability, consistency, procedural fairness and informality); 
Reddy, Mike, "Financial Ombudsmen: Swan Songs and the Phoenix" (2001) 1 JAMN 42 (on principles of 
ombudsmanship and statistics on complaints received). 
69 Under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). Part XVI of FSMA provides for a statutory 
ombudsman scheme for fmancial services, and sets out the broad framework for the new scheme and the 
respective responsibilities of the FSA and the Financial Ombudsman Service. 
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is that it is free for customers with direct access. Also, the decision binds only the 
financial institutions but it does not bind customers. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that there are several significant limitations on the 
Ombudsman's power to hear complaints. For example, the Banking Ombudsman has 
wide discretion to reject complaints if it appears to him that it is more appropriate that the 
complaint be dealt with by a court, under another independent complaints or conciliation 
procedure or under an arbitration procedure. In addition, the complaint must be made not 
later than six months after the Bank has informed the complainant that a deadlock has 
been reached. This means that the making of a claim depends on the bank agreeing that 
there is a deadlock. Finally, unless the bank consents in writing, the Banking 
Ombudsman cannot consider the complaint if the subject matter is the subject of any 
proceedings or before any court, tribunal, or arbitrator, or any other independent 
conciliation body. However, sureties normally take action to object liability when the 
lender tries to enforce the relevant charge. So, the written consent of the bank is required 
before the Ombudsman becomes involved. Also, the surety will normally want to set the 
charge aside. So, despite the advantages of the scheme, it is not of particular help to 
sureties. 
1.5.7 Governmental Response 
The Government reacted to the volume of repossessions and made provisions for social 
security payments to be payable directly to qualified lenders under mortgage rescue 
schemes like the Income Support for Mortgage Interest (ISMI). 70 In that period, the 
mortgagor retains possession of the property as the tenant of the Corporation, and thus is 
not rendered homeless. However, "at present, there is little evidence to suggest that such 
schemes are having much effect in stemming the tide of repossessions. "" Also, one would 
agree that it is always better to take preventive measures instead of trying to find cures 
70 For more information see http: //www. xdisk. co. uk/mortgage_protection. htm. 
71 Thompson, Mark, P.; Repossession of Property on Mortgage Default. Croydon: Tolley, 1993,24. 
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afterwards. It thus important to find ways to help vulnerable sureties take the best 
decision for their welfare. 
In addition it should be noted that in 1997, the sustainable home-ownership (SUSHO) 
initiative was launched by the Council of Mortgage Lenders (CML) in partnership with 
the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and the Government. 72 Since its launch, the 
SUSHO initiative has achieved significant success through setting benchmark standards 
for every mortgage payment protection insurance (MPPI) sold; increasing take-up of 
MPPI to 23% of residential mortgages outstanding and to around 27% of new mortgages 
sold. Approximately £300 million per annum is flowing to borrowers in difficulty via 
MPPI alone, with over 85% of claims being paid. In addition to the work on MPPI, the 
initiative has also: published a sample risk assessment for use by lenders/borrowers; 
ensured all lenders ask borrowers in financial difficulties whether they have an insurance 
policy - many borrowers fail to remember policies they have taken out and so benefit 
from them without being actively prompted; published the Repossession Risk Review, a 
half yearly report which examines trends in sustainability indicators; published research 
on safety-nets. Most importantly, recent research undertaken on behalf of the initiative 
concluded that policymakers and the industry should endeavour to: give better protect to 
borrowers in the deferral period of any insurance and the ISMI wait periods; reduce the 
risk of arrears for those in receipt of ISMI; design safety nets that can cover presently 
uncovered risks but most importantly increase borrowers' knowledge of risks and safety- 
net options. 73 These governmental initiatives are welcomed. In the same time they 
illustate the magnitute of the problem and the need for measures. Consistent with the 
findings of the initative above for increasing borrowers' (and surety's) knowledge of 
72 It is managed and co-ordinated by a Partnership steering group (PSG) that has representatives from 
lenders, insurers and mortgage intermediaries, the CML and ABI Secretariats, the Department of Work and 
Pensions, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, HM Treasury and the Financial Services Authority. 
73 For more information see httpJ/www. cmLorg. uk/cml/policy/issues/230. In addition, the issue of making 
rational, affordable and sustainable financial decisions has come to the fore over the last few years as a 
result of increasing worries regarding levels of debt. In response, a variety of initiatives by the Government 
and others have been set up eg, the Financial Services Authority's Financial Capability Initiative, the 
Department for Trade and Industry's Overindebtedness Task Force and with respect to home-ownership, 
the Government's Home-Ownership Task Force and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation inquiry into 
sustainable home-ownership. 
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risks, this thesis tries to find ways to improve the law, so as to give more protection to 
vulnerable sureties. The objective of the thesis is explained below. 
1.6 Objective 
The primary concern of this thesis centres on the vulnerable surety phenomenon. The 
objective is to give cautious answers to this problem. I hope to convince of the efficacy of 
introducing the doctrine of unconscionability within English law in the specialised area of 
suretyship agreements as a replacement to the O'Brien principle of notice. Despite the 
problems and costs described above, there is also the argument that the market, in its 
natural progression, has reached the best allocation that can be achieved even if it is not 
the ideal or the most equitable one, especially for sureties. So, it is important to show that 
the incorporation of unconscionability can achieve more efficient results than the present 
status quo. 
1.7 Structure 
This work comprises seven main chapters apart of the Introduction (chapter 1) and the 
Conclusion (chapter 9). 
Chapter 2 reviews the main legal structures, which were used over the years by English 
courts in their effort to deal with the vulnerable surety phenomenon. The chapter starts 
from the `Romily Heresy', then goes to the `protected class' approach, the agency 
principles, the O'Brien74 principle of notice and the doctrine of inequality of bargaining 
power. Chapter 3 continues the discussion by looking at the decision of House of Lords 
in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2), 75 which reformulated the rules and tests of 
O'Brien. The analysis in these two chapters will reveal that courts, protective of the 
interests of the market, usually take a creditor friendly approach. So, there is the need to 
search for a better method to balance the interests of all the parties involved. 
74 Barclays BankPk vO Brien [1994)1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
75 Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [200212A-C. 773. 
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Chapter 4 describes the doctrine of unconscionability, as applied in England, Ireland, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA Of course, for reasons of lack of space the 
most important cases are selected, which help to define the doctrine. 
Having explained the doctrine of unconscionability in chapter 4, chapter 5 tries to explain 
that unconscionability should replace the 0 Brien principle since it deals with the 
vulnerable surety phenomenon better. 
Chapter 6 is not directly relevant to the thesis, which relates to the vulnerable surety 
phenomenon. This chapter argues that undue influence should be subsumed under the 
wider doctrine of unconscionability as the wider of the two. This will help avoid 
confusion as to which doctrine applies in cases outside the surety context. This chapter is 
included only for reasons of improving the law and for reasons of clarity. 
Chapter 7 is concerned with the doctrine of unconscionability but in a jurisprudential 
way. The thrust of this chapter is to prove that the doctrine fits very well within the 
liberal contract model and that, despite its welfarist nature, it is not contrary to the free 
market system. This discussion will help convince English courts to apply the doctrine in 
the context of suretyship agreements, since it boosts the principle of freedom of contract 
and may promote economic efficiency. 
Chapter 8 examines whether there are any hidden costs with this proposal which will 
have to be solved. Then the overall economic efficiency of the proposal is measured. 
1.8 MethodoloQy 
The basic research method is library and web-based. This area of law has attracted much 
academic debate and judicial activity; so, the writer has had in her disposal many sources 
of information and analysis (mainly academic articles, cases, books, empirical research, 
statistical information and public papers). The thesis also offers some comparative 
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discussion of the position in other legal jurisdictions, which developed the doctrine of 
unconscionability. 
Empirical work was also carried out in the form of discussions with professionals from 
the commercial banking industry. These were useful, so as to understand the driving 
market forces and predict the possible reactions to my propositions. 
Some theoretical discussion was also introduced in relation to liberal contract theories 
and welfarist theories. Microeconomic theories, cost theories, and economic empirical 
examples were also applied. These were deemed essential within a Banking Law Ph. D. 
They aim at giving some scientific certainty into my equitable proposals. With these 
approaches it is intended to present a more complete argument. 
1.9 Definitions and Important Terms 
`Security' 
`Security' means - mortgage, charge, pledge, bond, debenture guarantee, bill, or any 
other right provided by the debtor or hirer, or at his request (express or implied) to secure 
the carrying out of the obligations of the debtor or hirer, or at his request (express or 
implied) to secure the carrying out of the obligations of the debtor or hirer under the 
agreement. 76 
Throughout this work, the term `security' is used to describe contracts for third party loan 
or overdraft security. The types of security that appear in the analysed cases are 
guarantees, mortgages, charges, or joint borrowing (where only one borrower gains the 
primary benefit of the loan). Even though these forms of security have some differences, 
all involve the surety taking on the responsibility to repay someone else's debt. 
76 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modem Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd., 2003,152. 
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'Guarantee' 
A 'guarantee' is a contract under which a person (the `guarantor') agrees to answer for 
some liability of another (the 'debtor') to a third person (the 'lender' or 'creditor'). A 
guarantee is a secondary liability. As a result, if the principal contract is unenforceable 
against the debtor, the guarantor will also be discharged (the 'co-extensiveness 
principle'). Bank guarantees are thus usually structured as guarantees and indemnities (a 
primary liability), although they are invariably referred to as 'guarantees'. 
Mortgage' 
A 'mortgage' is, essentially, a transfer of ownership in property to the lender by way of 
security (although usually providing that the mortgagor can remain in possession), upon 
the express or implied condition that the asset shall be reconveyed to the debtor when the 
sum secured has been paid. 
'Charge' 
A `charge' does not involve the transfer of either possession or ownership to the chargee, 
but gives the lender a right, created either by trust or contract, to have the designated 
asset of the surety (usually, in the cases under discussion, the family home) appropriated 
to discharge the indebtedness. " 
`Joint Borrower' 
A `joint borrower' is a co-debtor, and so is primarily liable to repay the loan from the 
time the money is borrowed. Joint borrowing is not technically a third party security, 
since on the face of the transaction both parties are benefiting. Yet the practical effect of 
a joint borrowing may be that one borrower does not benefit directly from the loan, for 
example, a wife who signs a re-mortgage of the jointly-owned family home in order to 
provide finance for her husband's business venture. The co-owner could be a legal co- 
owner joining in as mortgagor, or merely a beneficial co-owner signing some form of 
consent to the mortgage. 
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`Surety' 
`Surety' means the person by whom any security is provided, or the person to whom his 
rights and duties in relation to the security have passed by assignment or operation of 
law. 78 In other words, a `surety' is a person who mortgages or charges his or her property 
for the liabilities of another. On the other hand, a guarantor provides a personal 
undertaking to repay the liabilities of another but his or her undertaking is not secured by 
any property. However, there is no distinction between guarantors and other sureties, in 
terms of the grounds available for escaping liability. 79 As a result of this, the term 
`surety' is used in this work to include both sureties and guarantors. 
'Surety-Wife' 
The term `surety wife' is used throughout this work since this group is the most common 
example of vulnerable sureties and since most of the reported cases involve wives. Of 
course, the legal principles and proposals presented in the subsequent chapters apply to 
all types of close affiliations where the possibility of abuse of confidence exists. It should 
be noted that Post-O Brien cases extend beyond spouses among partners outside 
marriage, including same sex80 and not cohabiting couples. 8' In addition empirical 
research82 reveals the existence of male sureties. 
`The Family Home' 
Most of the cases examined in this work involve the provision of a facility secured with a 
charge over the family home or a guarantee supported by a charge, 83 to secure the 
debtor's business liabilities. 84 This is usually a second charge over the home, the first 
78 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modern Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd., 2003,152. 
79 Barclays Bank v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL), 197. 
80 Ibid, 198. 
81 Ibid; Massey vMidland Bank Plc [1995] 1 All E. R. 929. 
82 Fehlberg, Belinda, "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" (1996) 59 MLR 
675,675. 
83 e. g. Barclays Bank v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL, ); Barclays Bank v Kennedy (1988) 58 P. & C. R 
221 (CA). 
84 e. g. Barclays Bank v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL); BCCI vAboody [1990] 1 Q. B. 923 (which also 
involved guarantees given by the wife); Barclays Bank v Khaira [1992] 1 WIR. 623; Midland Bank v 
Perry [1988] 1 F. L. R. 161 and Kings North Trust Ltd v Bell [1986] 1 All E. R. 423 (CA). 
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charge securing the purchase of the property. "In practical terms, acting as a guarantor, 
charger or joint borrower may lead to the same result for the surety: loss of the family 
home. " 85 The problem is that the family home is most often the most valuable asset of 
people and loss of it has detrimental consequences upon their finances, health and social 
status. 
A Problem for Banks Rather Than Building Societies' 
As Belinda Felhberg notes, sureties are more likely to be a concern for banks than 
building societies. Generally, building societies lend money for the purchase of 
residential properties, taking a first charge over the property purchased, while the cases 
under examination in this work involve a second charge over the family home for 
commercial purposes. 





Judicial Legal Structures for the 
Protection of Vulnerable Sureties 
Aim: Look at the various legal structures used by courts over the years in their effort to 
deal with the vulnerable surety phenomenon. 
Method: Examination of important case-law 
Conclusion: Courts nearly always reach creditor sympathetic outcomes 
2.1 Introduction 
As already explained in the Introduction of this thesis, finding a solution to the problem 
of vulnerable sureties is not simple, since it involves striking a balance between two 
polarising but equally important public interests. On the one hand, the law aspires to 
protect surety-wives against victimisation and make sure that they act as free agents of 
any kind of wrongdoing (this is treated as synonymous to victimisation) that the borrower 
may be guilty of. On the other hand, the law cannot ignore "the need to ensure that the 
wealth currently tied up in the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile. "' 
The purpose of this first chapter is to go through the various methods used by courts over 
time, which were intended to deal with the problem regarding the vulnerable surety-wife 
phenomenon. The study starts from the 'Romily Heresy', then goes to the `protected 
class' approach, the agency principles, the O'Brien principle of notice and the doctrine 
of inequality of bargaining power. A detailed analysis of all five methods is not 
undertaken for reasons of lack of space but also since these are not the law any more. The 
I Barclays Bank Pk v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HI. ). 
2Ibid. 
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discussion focuses on the most important cases, which highlight shortcomings in the first 
attempts to deal with the problem. The O Brien3 principle of notice is discussed in more 
detail since it constitutes the current position of the law. The discussion on the 0 Brien 
principle of notice stops just before the decision of the House of Lords in Etridge4 (No. 2); 
due to the importance of this case, a different chapter is dedicated to it. 
The central theme throughout this chapter is that the law reflects marker-oriented 
thinking, while no consideration is given to sureties' point of views As a result of this the 
law offers more protection to creditors than sureties. It is submitted that this is the result 
of wrong judicial assumptions regarding the sharing of income in the matrimonial home, 
the power of surety-wives in the family business and the motivations6 behind their 
decision to enter into the suretyship agreement (as being wealth maximization). 7 Below 
follows a discussion on the various judicial attempts to deal with the problem. 
2.2 The "Romily Heresy" 
Under the "Romily Heresy", 8 which derived from Hoghton v Hoghton, 9 a person 
benefiting from a large voluntary disposition bears the burden of establishing that it was 
made fairly and honestly and in full understanding of the nature and consequences of the 
3Ibid. 
4 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
This situation is made more complicated by the propensity of surety-wives themselves to regard their own 
interest as being closely tangled with that of their debtor husband: "If my husband tells me to sign it, it is 
good for the business and indirectly for the good of me. " Mrs. Aboody's evidence as trial, referred to by the 
Court of Appeal (Lord Scarman) in Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1992] 1 
Q. B. 923 (CA), 950. 
6 In the Australian context, see Otto, D., "A Barren Future? Equity's Conscience and Women's Inequality" 
(1992) 18 MULR 808; Baron, B., "The Free Exercise of Her Will: Women and Emotionally Transmitted 
Debt" (1995) 13 Law in Context 23; Howell, N., "Sexually Transmitted Debt": A Feminist Analysis of 
Laws Regulating Guarantors and Co-Borrowers" (1995) 4 Australian Feminist Law Journal 93. 
7 Broadly speaking, this approach would seem consistent with a law and economics approach, which 
emphasizes the welfare or utility benefits of `free' contracting for individuals involved and thus warns 
against the imposition of rules which impede that capacity of individuals, with certain limited exceptions, 
in particular, where choices do not reflect underlying preferences because of `information failure' or 
coercion. For an analysis considering both the strengths and difficulties of an economics and law approach, 
see Richardson, M., "Protecting Women who provide Security for a Husband's Partner's or Child's 
Business Debts: the Value and Limits of an Economic Perspective" (1996) 16 IS 368. This issue is also 
discussed in terms of market failure further in 7.3.2. 
8 Named after Lord Romily who set the idea in Hoghton vHoghton (1852) 15 Beav. 278. 
9Ibid. 
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transaction. Applying this proposition to suretyship cases would mean that virtually every 
suretyship contract could be challenged, since such contracts by their very nature are not 
to the benefit of the surety. This would leave banks in a state of uncertainty. Also, all 
suretyship transactions would have to be explained to sureties, so as to avoid liability. 
This practice could be to the benefit of sureties but on the other hand it would result to an 
increase of costs on banks, which would ultimately translate into higher costs for 
consumers. 10 - 
Not surprisingly, the House of Lords in 0 Brien, in passing, finally laid to rest the 
"Romily Heresy". "The House of Lords restored the previously accepted position in 
England that a surety's lack of understanding will not be a sufficient ground for avoiding 
liability. So, the boundary for creditor responsibility was set at the establishment of a 
recognized legal wrong on the part of the debtor. "" This is discussed further under the 
O'Brien principle. 12 It appears therefore that the approach was followed which serves the 
interests of banks better. 
2.3 Women as a `Protected Class' Approach 
In the Australian High Court decision of Yerkey v Jones13 Dixon J., who, after reviewing 
the historical background to equity's special treatment of surety wives, stated a principle 
under which special protection was given to wives. The effect of this principle was that 
security might be unenforceable, notwithstanding that the bank had no knowledge of, and 
was not responsible for, the debtor's wrongdoing. A security agreement would be 
unenforceable if (i) the relationship between the debtor (husband) and the surety (wife) 
and the consequent likelihood of influence was known to the creditor, (ii) the surety's 
consent was obtained by the undue influence or misrepresentation of the debtor, or 
10 See 8.2.1. 
11 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,39. 
12 See 2.6. 
13 (1939) 63 C. L. R. 649,683, per Dixon J. "[flf a married woman's consent to become a surety for her 
husband's debt is procured by the husband and without understanding its effect in essential respects she 
executes an instrument of suretyship which the creditor accepts without dealing directly with her 
personally, she has a prima facie right to have it set aside. " 
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without `an adequate understanding of the nature and effect of the transaction' and (iii) 
the creditor failed to take reasonable steps to ensure that the surety had given a true and 
informed consent to the transaction. 
This approach is clearly to the interest of surety-wives. However, it has been argued by 
one commentator that such a solution "would do nothing to protect the growing numbers 
who prefer to enjoy a domestic relationship outside marriage. Secondly, it would ignore 
the changing nature of domestic relationships: the parties to a marriage can now fairly be 
said to start and continue on a footing of social, domestic and economic equality. s14 So 
this approach cannot be relied upon to offer protection to all vulnerable sureties. 
This special equity theory was applied by the Court of Appeal in 0 Brien, " where the 
surety-wife won her case. However, this surety sympathetic approach did not last long, as 
the House of Lords in O'Brien16 rejected it. The main reason given was that protection to 
wives could be achieved through rules of general applicability and not necessarily special 
treatment. It was argued that convenience did not prescribe that creditors made sure that 
the wife understood the transaction. To require creditors to prove knowledge and 
understanding by the wife would be to introduce `by the back door' either a presumption 
of undue influence arising as a matter of law (which was rejected as between husband 
and wife) or the 'Romily Heresy'. 17 Hence, this approach was also rejected. As Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson argued, instead of giving special treatment to wives, the public 
interest of making sure that the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile 
carried more weight. '8 
It appears therefore, that creditors' interest once more weighted more. Whether the rules 
of general applicability set by the House of Lords managed in the end to offer protection 
to surety-wives is a different question, which is answered further below. 
14 Cretney, S. M., "The Little Woman and the Big Bad Bank" (1992) 109 LQR 534,537. 
15 Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien [1993] Q. B. 109 (CA). 




2.4 The Agency Theory 
One approach taken in the past, to enable the surety to avoid liability, was by imputing 
the wrongdoing of the husband to the creditor, by treating the husband as the agent of the 
creditor when procuring the wife's consent to act as surety. 19 The rationale of this 
approach was explained in Turnbull & Co v Duval20 by Lord Lindley who said: "It is, in 
their Lordships' opinion, quite clear that Mrs. Duval was pressed by her husband to sign, 
and did sign, the document, which was very different from what she supposed it to be, 
and a document of the true nature of which she had no conception. It is impossible to 
hold that Campbell or Turnbull & Co are unaffected by such pressure and ignorance. 
They left everything to Duval, and must abide the consequences. "21 The argument here 
was that the fact that wives repose trust and confidence in their husband, who might 
adversely persuade them to sign a security document, is well known to banks. Therefore, 
when banks leave everything to the husband means that they are turning a blind eye to the 
possibility of undue influence or misrepresentation (or any other wrong) and this should 
be enough to make them bear the consequences. 
The `Agency Theory' was applied in several Court of Appeal decisions. So, in Chaplin & 
Co Ltd v Brammall' the defendant wife succeeded in a defense based on influence from 
her husband, who had at the request of the plaintiff bank obtained her signature to a 
guarantee upon which the plaintiff sued the wife. The husband was treated as the 
plaintiff's agent and his actions ultimately affected the plaintiff's position towards the 
wife. Apart from spousal relationships, the `Agency Theory' also caught other types of 
affiliations. In Avon Finance Co Ltd v Bridger, 23 the majority of the Court held that a 
transaction was voidable in equity because the plaintiffs had chosen to appoint the son, 
19 On agency see Reynolds, F. M. B.; Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency. 17th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2001. 
20 [1902] A. C. 429,435. 
21 However, Felhberg argues, "the equitable principle applied to reach this conclusion was unclear. There 
was no finding of undue influence against the husband and the transaction was also open to the objection of 
having been gained by a trustee from his beneficiary (the creditor was a trustee for the wife under her 
husband's will)"; Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt. " Surety Experience and English Law. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997,34. 
22 [1908] 1 K. B. 233. 
23 [1985] 2 All E. R. 281. 
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who was the debtor, to procure from his parents the security, which was needed to further 
the transaction between the son and the plaintiffs. 
Up to this point the `Agency Theory' road looks very promising as regards protection to 
vulnerable sureties. However, in reality it did not always prove very popular. In 
Coldunell Ltd v Gallon, 24 there was ample evidence to support a finding that the surety 
father was not properly advised from the solicitor. The son misrepresented to the parents 
that the transaction was just for a short-term finance in the presence of the solicitor. The 
transaction was to the financial disadvantage of the parents. Yet, the court found that the 
creditor was not in this case `leaving it to the son' to obtain the signature, because a 
solicitor was appointed to advise the parties. Despite the seriousness of the facts, the 
father was unable to set aside the charge because of the mere attendance of a solicitor 
who did not even carry out his duties properly, avoiding in this way any imputation of 
wrongdoing to the creditor. This case also shows that the independent legal advice 
requirement, which is satisfied by the mere presence of a solicitor, is really a mechanism 
designed to protect banks. 25 
It is also important to note that the application of the `Agency Theory' differed between 
various cases in terms of stringency and artificiality. In Kings North Trust Ltd v Bell, 27 
the consent of a wife to a mortgagee having priority over her interest in the property was 
held to be void, because of a misrepresentation by her husband, who had obtained her 
consent and was treated as the bank's agent. Here, Dillon L. J. in his judgment merely 
referred to the lender as the principal and to the debtor as the agent 28 Subsequently, in 
Midland Bank Plc v Per,? Fox L. J., as Fehlberg notes, 30 moved towards a "wholesale 
24 [1986] Q. H. 1184. 
25 This tendency of the courts as regards independent legal advice will be witnessed in relation to the 
`constructive notice' requirement as well, showing in this way a continuation of the pro-bank approach of 
the courts. See 2.6.3.3. i. 
26 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,34. 
27 [1986] 1 All E. R. 423 (CA). 
28 Other Court of Appeal cases where the `Agency Theory' was applied include: Shephard v Midland Bank 
Plc [1987) 2 F. L. R. 175; Barclays Bank Plc v Kennedy [1989] 1 F. L. R. 356,364. 
29 (1988) 56 P& CR 202 (CA). See also Bank of Baroda v Shah [1988] 3 All E. R. 24 (CA); and Lloyds 
Bank Plc vEgremont [1990] 2 F. L. R. 351. 
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application of common law agency principles of actual and ostensible authority. After 
BCCI v Aboody, 31 however, it was clear that a true agency `in accord with the approach 
of the general law of principal and agent' had to be established before the creditor would 
be held responsible for the husband's conduct. Applying this inherently commercial 
approach, it was easy to achieve creditor-sympathetic outcomes, as cases in which a 
husband will be strictly regarded as the creditor's agent are rare. " 32 
So, it is not surprising that in Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien, 33 the House of Lords 
specifically rejected the view that the guarantor may set aside the guarantee if the creditor 
has `entrusted' the task of obtaining the guarantor's signature to someone (such as the 
borrower) who was, to the knowledge of the creditor, in a position to influence the 
guarantor and who then procured the signature of the guarantee by undue influence or 
misrepresentation. Nor will the bank's action in giving the guarantee to the husband or 
other third party to obtain the wife's signature clothe the husband with apparent authority 
to act on its behalf. 34 Lord Browne-Wilkinson thought that to apply the law of agency to 
a situation like this was unrealistic and a distortion of the normal rules of agency, so that 
it would only be in very rare cases where it could truly be said that the borrower was the 
agent of the bank. 35 
In addition, the House of Lords in 0 Brien held that the only sound explanation of the 
decision of the Privy Council in Turnbull & Co v Duvat 6 is that it was based on the 
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the mortgagee's manager and the 
mortgagor, giving rise to a conflict between duty and interest requiring the mortgage to 
be set aside; 37 thus, the House disapproved earlier cases to the extent that they explained 
30 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,34. 
31 [1990] 1 Q. B. 923. 
32 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,34-35. 
33 Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (i-lL), 194. 
30 Ibid, 194-195. 
35 Ibid, 193-4. 
36 [1902] A. C. 429. 
37 Lehane agrees with this view; see Lehane, J. R. F., "Undue Influence, Misrepresentation and Third 
Parties" (1994) 110 LQR 167,168. 
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and purported to follow Duval as proceeding on the footing of some extended concept of 
agency. 
On the one hand, it may be argued that the bank should not be allowed to turn a blind eye 
to the possibility of the husband exercising some legal wrong against the wife. So, it 
would be in sureties' interest if the debtor were treated as the creditor's agent. On the 
other hand, the disadvantage of the `Agency Theory' is that it required some wrongdoing 
on behalf of the husband. So, it did not adequately address the need for imposing direct 
and primary liability to creditors. Anyhow, even when the bank does leave everything to 
the husband, it may be argued that it is not right to hold an individual as the bank's agent 
(this can be contrasted with the situation of solicitors acting for the bank which is 
discussed below). So, the `Agency Theory' cannot be relied upon so as to afford 
protection to vulnerable sureties. 
2.5 Solicitor as the Bank's Agent 
The above section concluded that the husband (debtor) who secures his wife's consent to 
act as his surety cannot be regarded as the debtor's agent A different issue relates to the 
position of the solicitor instructed by the bank to advise the surety-wife and whether the 
solicitor is acting as the bank's or the wife's agent. If the first was the case, it would 
mean that any information retained by the solicitor, which indicated the existence of 
undue influence or misrepresentation, would be imputed to the bank, even if the bank had 
no actual knowledge of it. In addition, if the solicitor were considered as the bank's 
agent, this would render the bank responsible for any negligent advice given to the surety 
by the solicitor. 
An example where the agency principle was successfully applied against the bank is 
BCCI v Aboody. 38 Here, the solicitor had knowledge of the actual undue influence 
exerted by the husband over the wife. While the wife was receiving independent legal 
38 [1990] 1 Q. B. 923. See also Lancashire Loans v Black [1934] 1 K. B. 380 and Allied Irish Bank Plc v 
Byrne [1995] 2 F. L. R. 325. 
38 
advice as to the nature of the mortgage and her liability by a solicitor appointed by the 
bank, her husband burst into the room uninvited and after a shouting match took place 
the wife broke into tears and signed the document. The solicitor's attendance note 
recorded Mr. Aboody's rude and overbearing manner and described him as a bully. The 
Court of Appeal decided that the solicitor was acting both for Mrs. Aboody for the 
purpose of giving her independent advice and for the bank for the purpose of reporting 
this fact to them. So, in this case it was the solicitor's knowledge of actual undue 
influence exerted on the wife by her husband which was imputed to the bank. 39 
In Barclays Bank v Thomson40 it was knowledge of the deficient advice that Mrs. 
Thomson received from the solicitors, who acted for all the parties (surety, debtor and 
creditor) that the wife alleged should be imputed to the bank. However in this instance, 
the Court of Appeal observed that, while it was one thing to impute knowledge of undue 
influence, it was quite another to impute notice of an agent's own inadequate advice: "an 
agent is not ... under a duty to report to his principal his own defective advice. "41 It has 
been argued that this approach ignores the bank's duty to rebut a presumption of undue 
influence by ensuring that the surety has received independent advice. "If the bank 
appoints its own agent to dispense that independent advice, rather than relying on other 
evidence, then the usual liability of a principal for his or her agent's negligence should 
follow. "42 
In Halifax Mortgage Services V Stepsky43 details of the purpose of the loan were claimed 
to be imputed. This claim failed but not on the ground that this fact could not be imputed. 
The reason given was that knowledge couldn't be imputed to the principal unless at the 
time the knowledge is acquired the agent was acting for the principal. In Stepsky the 
husband's solicitor was instructed to act for the bank after they acquired knowledge of 
the true purpose of the loan. The Court of Appeal based their rejection of imputed notice 
39 [1990] 1 Q. B. 923,974. 
40 [1997] 4 All E. R. 816. 
111bid, 825. 
42 Nield, Sarah, "Imputed Notice" (2000) Conv 196. 
43 [1996] Ch. 207. 
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on the chronology of the events. They rejected suggestions that the knowledge of the 
purpose of the loan should come again to the solicitors when they were instructed to act 
for the bank. However, "this approach seems somewhat artificial in the event where a 
solicitor is acting for more than one party to a transaction and there is a duty to enquire 
on behalf of one or both clients. If the solicitor already has the requisite knowledge when 
instructions are accepted, he or she is hardly going to take further steps to discharge their 
duty. Indeed clients may be attracted to instruct a certain solicitor because their interests 
are likely to be better served by the knowledge and skills that the solicitor already 
possesses. For instance, lenders may prefer to instruct the buyer's solicitor because title 
to the property to be mortgaged will have already been investigated. s44 
Moving along, in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge4S (No.! ) fresh life had been given 
to this notion of agency, but in Banco Exterior Internacional SA v Thomas46 the Court of 
Appeal held that there was no room for regarding the solicitor as the bank's agent when 
advising the wife. In any event, though, in this case the issue was avoided because of the 
statutory bar under s. 199 (of the Law of Property Act 1925) of any notice on the part of 
the bank in circumstances involving undue influence, since when advising the wife the 
solicitor is not acting as the bank's solicitor but the wife's. Etridge (No. 2) both in the 
Court of Appeal47 and the House of Lords48 has reaffirmed Thomson. 49 So, the law on the 
point is clear so far; the solicitor instructed by the bank to give advice to a prospective 
surety is not to be considered as the bank's agent and hence any information retained by 
the solicitor or negligence will not be imputed to the bank. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to ask here what the Court in 0 Brien disapproved of exactly. 
Those agency cases were different in nature, since they involved the husband who had 
obtained the requisite signatures from the surety. This was regarded as wrong on the basis 
that it was not correct to regard borrowers as being agents of the bank. Surely, as one 
4a Nield, Sarah, "Imputed Notice" (2000) Conv 196. 
"-'[1997] 3 All E. R. 628. 
46 [1997] 1 All ER. 46. 
17 Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Barclays BankPlc v Thomson [1997] 4 All E. R. 816. 
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commentator argues, 30 that is inherently different from a professional appointed or 
employed by the bank to acquire the signatures. 
An added argument contrary to such a notion of agency is that when a solicitor advises 
the wife he/she does so for her benefit only, even though it might act for other parties in 
different capacities. Contrary to this idea, Prices' argues that: "this cessation of agency 
appears to be little more than the modem legal fiction to avoid the consequences of 
agency which might otherwise ensue. In reality, the solicitor acts in a dual capacity, as 
agent of the bank to advise the wife and ad hoc as the wife's agent in giving the advice. " 
In other words, even though the solicitor advising the wife becomes the wife's solicitor, 
still one must acknowledge that when the solicitor is advising he is doing so in order to 
ultimately protect the bank against imputation of notice of any undue influence or 
misrepresentation. To explain, the law under O Brien52 and Etridge33 (No. 2) demands 
that when a bank suspects that a wrong has been committed in obtaining the surety's 
consent, it must take reasonable steps to vitiate the suspicion. The common practice now 
is to insist that the surety takes independent legal advice. "' In some cases, the bank might 
wish to appoint one of its own solicitors to advise the surety. That solicitor is there to 
explain the terms and conditions of the relevant contract to the prospective surety. In this 
he is acting as the surety's solicitor. At the same time though, by making certain that the 
surety is not under undue influence the bank is being protected against any imputation of 
undue influence and this is the initial reason and intention of the appointment of the 
solicitor. 
It appears that the discussion as to whether the solicitor can be regarded as the bank's 
agent can go either way. Once more, the judiciary preferred the option that secures the 
interests of banks better, as their Lordships in Etridge (No. 2)55 abolished the agency 
principle in these circumstances. This development should not surprise, since it is 
Thomson, MP., "Recent Cases; The Independent Legal Advice" (1997) Corry 216,220-1. 
si Price, N. S., "Undue Influence: Finis Litiumi' (1998) 114 LQR 186,188. 
sz Barclays BankPk v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
53 Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
54 Whether that should be adequate is considered elsewhere. 
"Royal Bank of Scotland Pk vEtridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773; see 3.2.4. iii. 
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consistent with the general tendency exhibited by courts in reaching creditor-sympathetic 
decisions regarding suretyship agreements. 
2.6 The O'Brien Principle of Notice 
The previous sections went through the various approaches, which have been used by 
courts over time to find a solution to the problems of sureties. This section focuses on the 
current method used, the O'Brien 56 principle of notice. The case involved the usual 
scenario where the husband (debtor) exercised undue influence and/or misrepresentation 
on the wife (surety), as a result of which she signed a charge over the family home in 
order to secure a loan for the family business. The question was whether the charge 
should be set aside against the bank. 
This section looks at the tests laid down in O'Brien and also at the most important cases 
after it. The discussion stops until the judgement of the House of Lords in Royal Bank of 
Scotland v Etridge (No. 2). 57 There the House of Lords re-examined and reformulated the 
tests of the O'Brien principle and so a separate chapter is dedicated for it. Here, the 
analysis of the case law will show that while the rules, as set in O'Brien, appear to 
balance the interests of sureties and creditors, in post-O'Brien cases they were applied in 
such a way, that creditors won more often than sureties. It will be demonstrated that all 
the legal tests concentrate on how matters appear to the creditor, rather than the surety 
and how to preserve creditors' or market interest rather than how to protect the weak 
against victimisation. Thus, the dominant theme in this section is that the O'Brien 
principle does not balance the interests of the parties involved. SB 
The layout of this section reflects the four-stage process in determining whether or not 
the wife can avoid liability under the guarantee or charge. Under the O'Brien principle, 
56 Barclays BankPk v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (1-IL). 
37 Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 AC. 773. 
ss Commentators who believe that O'Brien strikes a balance favourable to wives include Berg, A., "Wives 
Guarantees - Constructive Knowledge and Undue influence" (1994) LAICLQ 34; Jeremie, J., "Creditors 
Beware: a Wife is not a Surety" (1994) 15 Co Lawyer 137, and Hooley, R, "Taking Security After 
O'Brien" (1995) 3 LMCLQ 346,360. 
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first, the wife must show that the debtor has committed a legal wrong in the formation of 
the contract, which gives to the wife the right to set the contract aside as against him. 
Secondly, the wife must prove that the creditor is fixed with liability for this wrong either 
on the basis of agency (which is now likely to be rare as already explained) or actual or 
constructive notice on the basis that the creditor was put "on inquiry". Thirdly, the lender 
may avoid liability if it can show that it took reasonable steps to make sure that the 
agreement was explained to the wife. Finally, there is the question of what relief should 
be granted to the wife. Immediately below follows an examination of each part of the 
test. 
2.6.1 Establishing a Legal Wrong 
The first requirement that a surety-wife needs to satisfy, so as to avoid liability under 
surety contracts, is the establishment of a legal wrong. The defences usually invoked by 
surety-wives are: (i) misrepresentation, and/or (ii) undue influence. Of course, other 
potential grounds for relief exist such as mistake, 59 forgery, duress and non estfactum. 
However, these doctrines are not considered here, since they have not been claimed in 
English surety cases. Below follows a brief outline of the doctrines of misrepresentation 
and undue influence. The contours, though, of these doctrines are not exhaustively 
detailed, since the focus of this thesis is placed on the mechanisms used by courts to 
impose liability on banks as third parties regarding these legal wrongs. 
2.6.1.1 Misrepresentation 
Although generally a misrepresentation must be made by the creditor, the more usual 
scenario involves some misrepresentation made by her husband, which should be 
s9 The doctrine of mistake applies to contracts generally, but has not usually been relied on in cases 
involving surety wives, probably because the fact situation required for common mistake (which makes a 
contract void at common law and may result in a court setting aside a contract in equity) is rare in the 
context of commercial lenders and sureties. Although the principles of unilateral mistake can apply to 
sureties, the requisite requirements for equitable intervention (in particular, that the creditor knew or had 
reason to know of the surety's mistake) will often be difficult to satisfy: Lloyds Bank Plc v Waterhouse 
[1991] Fam. Law. 23 (CA). 
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imputed to the creditor. 60 The creditor will be bound by a representation by a third party 
in the rare case where he appoints him as agent to procure the guarantor's signature. 61 
Alternatively, and more commonly, where a wife guarantees her husband's debts and is 
induced to execute the guarantee because of the husband's misrepresentations, the 
guarantee will be set aside if the creditor has constructive notice of her husband's 
conduct. 62 The rules applied to impose liability on the creditor are examined in detail in 
the next section, so no more needs to be said here. 
2.6.1.1.1 Requirements for Misrepresentation 
The general rules of the doctrine of misrepresentation apply to guarantees as well. 63 So, 
both fraudulent (made knowingly or recklessly) and non-fraudulent (negligent and 
innocent) misrepresentations may be claimed. In order to establish liability for 
misrepresentation, there must: (i) be a false representation; (ii) the representation must be 
of fact64 rather than opinion65 (but can be express or implied); 66 (iii) it must be addressed 
to the party misled; 67 and (iv) the misrepresentation must induce the contract. 68 
60 e. g. Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL); Midland Bank Plc v Shephard [1988] 3 All 
E. R 17 (CA). 
61 Bacrlays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL), 194A, 195 F-G. 
621bid.; Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
69 Even though the remedies available for a surety are examined further below, it is worth summarising 
them here for purposes of completeness within this section. The existence of misrepresentation gives to the 
misrepresentee a right to refuse to carry out an undertaking, resist any claim for specific performance and, 
if necessary, have the contract set aside by means of the equitable right of rescission. In addition, the 
misrepresentee may sometimes be entitled to damages in respect of any loss, which he/she may have 
sustained as a result of the misrepresentation. Damages for negligent misstatement may also be available. If 
the misrepresentation is fraudulent, damages for deceit can be recovered. 
6° A statement will be treated as true if it is substantially correct and the difference between the statement 
and the truth would not have induced a reasonable person to enter into the contract: Avon Insurance Plc v 
Swire Fraser Ltd [2000] 1 All E. R. 573. 
63 See Bisset v Wilkinson [1927] A. C. 177 (PC); Anderson v Pacific Fire and Marine Insurance Co (1872) 
L. R. 7 C. P. 65; Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc [1998] Q. B. 587; also in National 
Bank of New Zealand v Macintosh (1881) 3 N. Z. L. R 217, a misrepresentation honestly made that the 
principal was "all right and would be able to meet the liabilities" was held to be a statement of opinion. 
See Geest Plc vFyfes Plc [1999] 1 All ER. 672. 
67 See Peek v Gurney (1873) L. R. 6 ILL. 377; applied in Al Nakib Investments Ltd v Longcroft [1990] 1 
W. L. R. 1390. 
68 See Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App. Cas. 187,194. 
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2.6.1.1. ii Misrepresentation - Examples of Material Misrepresentations of Fact in 
the Context of Suretyship Contracts 
In the context of suretyship agreements, the misrepresentation may relate to the financial 
position or state of accounts of the principal, 69 the creditor's policy and intentions as to 
the terms of the principal contract, 70 or the need and purpose of the guarantee. 71 Common 
misrepresentations will also concern the extent of the guarantor's liability under the 
guarantee, for example, a false assertion that the guarantor's liability is limited in 
amount72 or relates only to future indebtedness73 or is not of a personal nature. 74 
Although these statements involve a representation as to the contents of a legal document, 
they will probably still be viewed as representations of fact rather than law. 75 
As already noted above, while the general rules as to misrepresentation apply to 
guarantees, there is some suggestion that the courts will be inclined to allow a guarantor 
to rescind the contract even for the most minor misrepresentations 76 For example, in 
Davies v London & Provincial Marine Insurance Co77 Fry J. said: "there is no 
consideration in this case, as in many cases of suretyship, for the contract so entered into; 
69 Ward v The National Bank of New Zealand [1886] 4 NZ. L. R 35, CA; O'Brien v Australia & New 
Zealand Bank Ltd (1971) 5 S. A. S. R 347; but a statement by the creditor that they had advice that the assets 
of the principal debtor were worth in excess of a certain amount does not amount to a representation that 
the assets are worth more than this amount: Commonwealth Bank ofAustralia v Prentice (unreported, Sup 
Ct, NSW, Barr A. J., December 14,1995) (BC 9506814 at 13). 
70 O'Brien vAustralia & New Zealand BankLtd (1971) 5 SA. SR. 347,353. 
71 Canterbury Farmers' Co-op Association (Ltd) v Lindsay (1910) 29 N. Z. L. R 793; O'Brien vAustralia & 
New Zealand Bank Ltd (1971) 5 S. A. S. R 347. A mere expression of opinion by the creditor or the 
creditor's agent that reliance upon the guarantee was unlikely does not amount to a promise that the 
guarantee would never be enforced: Morris v Wardley Australia Property Management Ltd Court of 
Appeal unreported 17 December 1992. 
Bank of New South Wales v Flack (1984) A. C. L. D. 249. 
O'Brien v Australia & New Zealand Bank (1971) 5 S. A. S. R 347 (misrepresentation that guarantee 
applied only to future indebtedness when in fact it covered past indebtedness); Bank of Nova Scotia v 
Zackheim (1983) 3 DLR. (4th) 760. 
74 BankofA/asia vAdams (1889) 8 N. Z. L. R 119. 
7s See, in other contexts, Hony v Tate & Lyle Refineries [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 416. See generally Beatson, 
J.; Ansons Law of Contract. 28th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002,271. In the context of 
suretyship contracts, Dixon J., in Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 C. L. R. 649, recognized that a wife could be 
misled by her husband without the occurrence of a technical misrepresentation, which depends on far more 
concrete misrepresentations of fact. For example, regarding the amount being secured and the duration of 
the security (e. g. Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (IL), 187. Mr. O'Brien misrepresented 
to Mrs. O'Brien both the amount and the duration of the security). See also Bottomley, A., "Self and 
Subjectives: Languages of Claim in Property Law" (1993) 20 JL & Soc 56,62. 
76 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modern Contract of Guarantee English Edition. Sweet & 
Maxwell Ltd, 2003,172. 
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and therefore I think... it is a contract in respect of which very little is sufficient. Very 
little said which ought not to have been said, and very little not said which ought to have 
been said, would be sufficient to prevent the contract being valid". 78 The approach 
expressed in this extract might be regarded as being contrary to the general contractual 
rule that the misrepresentation must be material. However, it reflects the fact that a 
guarantee, although not a contract uberrimae fdei, imposes a duty on the creditor to 
make disclosure in certain circumstances. 9 
Misrepresentation will not be established, however, if the husband's statement merely the 
hopeful opinion or belief of an optimistic debtor, even if his wife believes him. 80 This 
means that the road to a remedy for many vulnerable sureties is closed from the first 
stage. To explain, empirical research has revealed that wives do not usually play an 
important or executive decision-making role in their husband's business. 81 As a result of 
this, all of the information and understanding they have depends on what is said to them 
by their husbands. The problem with this is that the exact position cannot be objectively 
described, either because of high optimism about the new business or financial 
difficulties, which are not fully revealed to the wife. 82 So, empirical research showed that 
even though most sureties who participated in the research, had some factual 
understanding why security was required and had some understanding of the legal effect 
of the security provided, usually this was very broad and even vague. 83 Also, the surety's 
understanding involved some misunderstanding and confusion of the legal terms of the 
transaction to the extent that they misunderstood the amount being secured. In most of 
these cases, the surety had provided an `all monies' security but had not realized at the 
time of signing that their liability was unlimited. 84 These types of misunderstanding 
77 (1878) L. R. 8 Ch. D. 469. 
78 Jbid 475. See also Bank of New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 C. L. R. 42 (HC Aus), 59-60. 
79 See next section 1.6.1.1. äi. 
8D e. g. Bank Milli Iran v Samadi Rad (Ch D, Judge Robert Walker QC, 9 February 1994), Transcript, 13 
(although the outcome of this case was reversed on appeal: BankMelli Iran v Samadi Rad [1995] 2 F. L. R. 
367 (CA)). 
81 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,164; see Introduction 1.2. 




though do not amount to misrepresentations of fact, so as to establish a prima facie legal 
wrong against the lender, or against the debtor for the purposes of the 0 Brien 
principle. 85 So, many sureties are left unprotected. 
2.6.1.1. iii Misrepresentation - Disclosure of Information 
Unlike contracts of insurance, guarantees87 are not contracts of the utmost good faith88 
(ubeºrimae frdei) imposing a universal obligation of full disclosure of all material facts 
by both parties. Hence, the creditor is not required to disclose all facts relating to their 
dealings with the principal debtor or relating to the debtor's credit. 89 Even though, there 
is no general rule requiring full disclosure, the creditor has a limited duty to disclose 
unusual features, which the guarantor would not naturally expect to exist. 90 So, the 
guarantee will not be voidable where there is undue concealment of matters which are not 
unusual features of the principal transaction, 91 or where there is a non-material 
misrepresentation. 
There are several justifications for this general rule. Reasons of practicalities and 
business efficacy have been expressed 92 The argument is that no creditor could rely on a 
contract of guarantee, unless the creditor had communicated to the proposed sureties 
85 Felhberg notes that in her research "Many sureties suggested that the debtor had misled them, but their 
descriptions rarely focused on any particular statement of fact, necessary to establish misrepresentation. 
[.... ] Most other sureties were generally confused rather than misled about the specific legal implications of 
the documents they had signed, but trusted the optimistic view of the debtor that everything would be all 
right. In such cases, the chances of establishing an actionable misrepresentation were remote. " Ibid, 167. 
sb See Beatson, J.; Ansons Law of Contract. 28th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002,264. 
87 Jbid, 271. 
See generally the formulation of the rule in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] A. C. 
773,812, para. 81, per Lord Nicholls; 848, para. 187 per Lord Scott; Bank of Scotland v Henry Butcher & 
Co [2003] 2 All E. R. (Comm) 691, paras 74-80; Credit Lyonnais Bank NVv Export Credit Guarantee Dept 
[1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 200,225-227; Davies v London & Provincial Marine Insurance Co (1878) L. R. 8 
Ch. D. 469 (1878), 475; Lee v Jones (1864) 17 C. B. (NS) 482,495; see Beatson, J.; Ansons Law of 
Contract. 28th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002,264. 
89 National Mortgage & Agency Co of New Zealand Ltd v Stalker [1933] N. Z. L. R. 1182. 90 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl. & Fin. 109; Goodwin v National Bank of Australasia (1968) 117 
C. L. R. 173; National Provincial Bank of England Ltd v Glanusk [1913] 3 KB 335; Cooper v National 
Provincial Bank Ltd. [1946] KB 1. 
9' Andrews, Geraldine Mary, Millett, Richard; Law and Guarantees. Fourth ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2005. The approach is also contrary to the general approach to misrepresentation. See Avon 
Insurance v Swire Frazer Ltd [2000] 1 All E. R. (Comm. ) 573. 





everything relating to its dealings with the principal debtor. In London General Omnibus 
Co Ltd v Holloway, Farwell L. J. explained that full disclosure of all material facts 
would cause many difficulties; it would be necessary for banks to explain how the 
debtor's account had been kept, whether the debtor was in the habit of overdrawing, 
whether the debtor was punctual in his dealings, and whether the debtor performed his 
promises in an honourable manner. In some cases, such a disclosure by the bank might 
constitute a breach of its duty of confidence. 94 In addition, in Hamilton v Watson, " Lord 
Campbell argued that banks would never obtain securities if full disclosure were 
imposed. 
In order to avoid these problems, the law allows the creditor to assume that the proposed 
surety is acquainted with the principal debtor's position. The surety is presumed to know 
that the guarantee is intended to secure repayment of the principal's debts and that 
dissatisfaction with the principal debtor's account is the probable reason for the creditor's 
insistence that a guarantee be given. It is left to the principal debtor to explain his 
financial position to the prospective surety. In addition, it is expected that the proposed 
sureties will have ready access to the principal debtor and his financial statements so that 
they can assess the risk for themselves. 96 
However, these assumptions do not reflect what is happens in reality. As already 
explained in chapter 1, husbands do not always fully disclose or objectively explain 
information about their business to their wives. What's more, having in mind that surety- 
wives have no control or minimal role in decision-making in the business, it is also 
unlikely that they will even try to assess the risk themselves? 
93 [1912] 2 KB. 72. 
"Tournier v National Provincial & Union Bank of England [1924] 1 K. B. 461. 
9-'(1845) 12 CL & Fin. 109. 
96 Seaton v Heath (1899) 1 Q. B. 782,792; Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd 
(1991) 58 S. A. S. R. 184,195. 
0 See Introduction 1.2. 
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2.6.1.1. iv Misrepresentation - Conclusion and Discussion 
Even though many surety, wives are victimised because of their economic and emotional 
dependence upon their husbands, still they are likely to encounter particular difficulties in 
meeting the requirements of `established' legal grounds for avoiding liability under 
security contracts. This leads to the conclusion that the traditional law of contract is ill- 
suited to long-term relationships, where flexibility needs to be maintained. 98 As Thomson 
argues, the law of contract, while appearing to be a logically coherent, neutral and just set 
of rule, reflects particular (male, market) interest within society, concealing the reality 
that opportunities and choices are not equally available and that exchanges are often far 
from voluntary. 99 In other words, many types of misrepresentations or misunderstandings 
suffered by vulnerable sureties cannot be captured under the rules of misrepresentation 
and as a result of this many sureties may not be able to satisfy the first step of the 
O'Brien formula. 
2.6.1.2 Undue Influence 
The nature of the relationship between husband and wife places the latter into risk of 
being subjected to the undue influence of the first. The doctrine of undue influence, 
which has proven more problematic than the doctrine of misrepresentation, is discussed 
below. 
9s On the more informal bargaining processes between business people, see Macaulay, S., "Non-contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study" (1969) International Journal of the Sociology of Law 195; 
Beale, H.; Dugdale, A., `Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies' 
(1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45. 
99 Thompson, Mark, P.; Repossession of Property on Mortgage Default. Croydon: Tolley, 1993. 
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2.6.1.2. i Undue Influence - Definition 
Undue influence is defined in Snell's Equity, 1°° where it says: 
"It is difficult to distinguish between permissible forms of 
coercion and persuasion on the one hand, and undue 
influence on the other. The line between them is regulated 
by considerations of public policy. When undue pressure is 
carried to the point that the complainant can no longer 
exercise a will of his own amounts to undue influence; but 
even in the absence of such pressure, the influence of the 
wrongdoer may be such that the complainant did not act of 
his own free will. " 
Therefore, if one is to set a short definition of the doctrine of undue influence, it can be 
said that the doctrine refers to types of persuasion that cross beyond the legal permitted 
limits in that they prohibit one party from exercising his/her free will. 101 "Undue 
100 McGhee, John (ed. ); Snell's Equity. 31' ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005, para. 38.10. 
101 The distinction between permissible and unlawful forms of influences was also described in Hall v Hall 
(1868) 1 P. & D. 481,482 where J. P. Wilde said in relation to wills: "To make a good will a man must be a 
free agent. But all influences are not unlawful. Persuasion, appeals to the affection or ties of kindred, to a 
sentiment of gratitude for past services, for future destitution, or the like [... ] These are all legitimate, and 
may be fairly pressed on a testator. On the other hand, pressure of whatever character, whether acting on 
the fears or the hopes, if so exerted as to overpower the volition without convincing the judgment, is a 
species of restraint under which no valid will can be made. Importunity or threats, such as the testator has 
not the courage to resist, moral command asserted and yielded to for the sake of peace and quiet, or of 
escaping from distress of mind or social discomfort, these, if carried to a degree in which the free play of 
the testator's judgment, discretion or wishes, is overborne, will constitute undue influence, though no force 
is either used or threatened. In a word, a testator may be led but not driven. " More recently, Lord Nicholls 
in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773,794-5, para. 7, said: "If the intention 
was produced by unacceptable means, the law will not permit the transaction to stand. The means used are 
regarded as an exercise of improper or `undue' influence, and hence unacceptable whenever the consent 
thus procured ought not fairly to be treated as the expression of a person's free will. It is impossible to be 
more precise or definitive. The circumstances in which one person acquires influence over another, and the 
manner in which influence may be exercised, vary too widely to permit of any more specific criterion. " 
(emphasis added). It is for this reason that "undue influence as such has never been judicially defined, but 
wherein it consists in those cases where it is proved by express evidence is well understood. " per Bridge 
L. J. in Re Brocklehurst [1978] Ch. 14,40. 
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influence means that influence has been misused". 102 To compel a person to do 
something they do not wish or forbid them from acting as they wish is a type of 
exploitation, abuse and victimization. 103 These are considered as serious defaults in the 
contract, which cannot be tolerated, and for this reason the contract may be set aside. 
2.6.1.2. ii Undue Influence - Categorisation: Actual and Presumed 
Undue influence has been classified in two distinct categories as follows. 104 The first, 
class 1, has been termed `actual' undue influence; this is the direct analogue of common 
law duress. The second, class 2, has been termed presumed undue influence; within this 
category the parties are in a relationship which is either in law (class 2(A)) or in the 
special circumstances of the parties' association (class 2(B)), one in which duties of care 
102 Per Lord Nicholls in Etridge, 800, para. 32. This shows that there is a connotation of impropriety. 
However, this is in sharp contrast to other jurisprudence both academic and judicial which had 
distinguished undue influence from unconscionable conduct on the basis that undue influence is concerned 
with the quality of consent, which has been vitiated because of the claimant's dependence upon the 
defendant, not necessarily because of any improper conduct by the defendant. See Birks and Chin, "On the 
Nature of Undue Influence" Beatson, J; Friedman (eds. ); Good Faith and Contract Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995,57. See also on the relationship between unconscionability and undue influence: Thomson, 
M. P. "New Wine from Old Bottles" (1994) Conv 233.; Phang, Andrew, "Undue Influence, Methodology, 
Sources and Linkages" (1995) JBL 552; Capper, David, "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A 
Rationalisation" (1998) 114 LQR. 479; chapter 6. See also on the relationship between undue influence and 
equitable compensation: Ho, "Undue Influence and Equitable Compensation" in Birks, Peter; Rose, 
Francis; Restitution and Equity. London: Mansfield Press, 2000,193. See also: Commercial Bank of 
Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,461 (per Mason J. ) and 474 (per Deane J. ); Morrison v 
Coast Finance Ltd (1965) 55 D. L. R. (3d) 710,713. 
1Q3 Huguening v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves. Jun. 273 is a good authority that equity developed the doctrine of 
undue influence to protect those subjected to victimization. Under the victimization theory emphasis is 
placed on how the transaction was entered into rather than the substance of the transaction itself. In other 
words, it looks to 'procedural unfairness' (meaning the manner in which the transaction was brought into 
existence) and not any 'contractual imbalance', which may be obvious from the terms of the contract 
favouring one party to the disadvantage of the other. Since this doctrine looks to the misconduct of the 
wrongdoer, it has also been explained on the ground of fraud. Indicatively, in Al/card v Skinner (1887) L. R. 
36; Ch. D. 145,183, Lindley L. J. spoke of the equitable doctrine of undue influence as growing out of "the 
necessity of grappling with insidious forms of spiritual tyranny and with the infinite varieties of fraud. " 
Also, in the Court of Appeal in National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1983] 3 All E. R. 85,92, Slade 
L. J. identified the public policy in applying the presumption in undue influence cases as being "to mitigate 
the risk of a particular relationship existing between two parties and the influence arising there from being 
abused. " In CIBC Mortgages Plc v Pin [1993] 4 All E. R. 433 (HL), 439, Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated, 
"Actual undue influence is a species of fraud. Like any other victim of fraud, a person who has been 
induced by undue influence to carry out a transaction which he did not freely and knowingly enter into is 
entitled to have that transaction set aside as of right. " 
10' See Barclays Bank v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL); Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v 
Aboody [1990] 1 Q. B. 923; Tufton v Spernl [1952] 2 T. L. R. 516,520; AlIcard v Skinner (1887) L. R. 36; 
Ch. D. 145; see generally Beatson, J.; Ansons Law of Contract. 28"' ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002,286-293. 
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and confidence are imposed on one party towards the other. The discussion below will 
illustrate that this categorisation of the doctrine does not exist anymore. 
a) Actual Undue Influence 
The first category involves cases in which the court will uphold a plea of undue influence 
only if it is satisfied that such influence has been affirmatively proved on the evidence 
(commonly referred to as cases of "actual undue influence" or as "class 1" cases). 105 
Within this category, claims usually involved circumstances involving overt 
dominance106 and bullying. 107 
b Presumed Undue Influence 
The second category involves cases in which the relationship between the parties will 
lead the court to presume that undue influence has been exerted unless evidence is 
adduced proving the contrary, e. g. by showing that the complaining party has had 
independent advice (these are commonly referred to as cases of "presumed undue 
influence", or as "class 2" cases). 108 
10' Here "the court has been satisfied that the gift was the result of influence expressly used by the donee. 
[... ] This class of cases may be considered as depending on the principle that no one shall be allowed to 
retain any benefit arising from his own fraud or wrongful act. " Per Cotton L. J. in Allcard v Skinner (1887) 
L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145,170. 
1°6 In Norton v Kelly (1764) 2 Eden. 286; 28 E. R. 908, the first case of its kind to come before the English 
courts, a woman, suffering from a religious delusion, was convinced by a Protestant dissenting minister to 
grant him an annuity of £50 (secured on her property). Lord Northington L. C., ordering the cancellation of 
the annuity, proclaimed equity's role to be "a guardian and protector of the weak and helpless of every 
denomination, and the punisher of fraud and imposition in every degree". Also, in Nottidge v Prince (1860) 
2 Gift 246; 66 E. R. 103, a woman of weak intellect was persuaded to transfer the whole of her fortune to 
the defendant, who had exercised a powerful dominion over her mind by making her believe that he had 
supernatural powers. Similarly, in Lynn v Nome (1868) L. R 6 Eq. 655, a widow, aged 75, was induced by 
the defendant, who claimed to be a spiritual medium, to adopt him as her son, make her will in his favour 
and transfer various sums of money to him (believing that she was fulfilling the wishes of her deceased 
husband). The relationship was one of dominion and influence, hence, in the absence of evidence that the 
gifts were the voluntary and understood acts of the widow, they had to be set aside. Again, Morley v 
Loughnan [1893] 1 Ch. 736 was a case where money was obtained by the actual exercise of undue 
influence under the guise of religion. 
107A well-known example is BankojCredit and Commerce International SA vAboody [1990] 1 Q. B. 923. 
10B Here, "the relations between the donor and donee have at or shortly before the execution of the gift been 
such as to raise a presumption that the donee had influence over the donor. In such a case the court sets 
aside the voluntary gift, unless it is proved that in fact the gift was the spontaneous act of the donor acting 
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Within this category there are well-established categories of relationship to which the 
presumption applies automatically as a matter of law (frequently referred to as "class 2A" 
cases). 109 Significantly, however, the relationship of husband and wife does not come 
within this category, 11° nor does the normal relationship of banker and surety. At this 
point the third category comes into play. Here, the relationship is not one which 
automatically gives rise to the presumption, but it can be shown to have become such, so 
as to justify the court in applying the same presumption (commonly referred to as "class 
2B"). In this kind of relationship, the person victimised is "accustomed to repose trust 
and confidence in the wrongdoer", like the position between a husband and wife or other 
types of close affiliations. 
2.6.1.2. iii Undue Influence - Manifest Disadvantage 
At one time, proving either type of undue influence required that the transaction was to 
the manifest disadvantage of the person wishing to rely on the defence. The requirement 
was introduced in National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan. " There, the wife signed a 
charge over the matrimonial house to secure her husband's business ventures. The charge 
was to secure all present or future actual or contingent liabilities of Mr. Morgan to the 
bank. The judge described how the Morgans were looking for a rescue operation to save 
their house for themselves and their children and Mrs. Morgan knew that there was no 
other way to save the house. For this reason, it was held that the mortgage was not to her 
under circumstances which enabled him to exercise an independent will and which justifies the court in 
holding that the gift was the result of a free exercise of the donor's will. [In this] second class of cases the 
court interferes, not on the ground that any wrongful act has in fact been committed by the donee, but on 
the ground of public policy, and to prevent the relations which existed between the parties and the influence 
arising therefrom being abused. " per Cotton L. J. in Allcard v Skinner (1887) LR. 36; Ch. D. 145,171. For 
a critique of the law see Enonchong, Nelson, "Presumed Undue Influence: Continuing Misconceptions" 
(2005) 121 LQR 29. 
109 Relationships where the presumption arises include "religious superior and inferior" (Allcard v Skinner 
(1887) L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145), "spiritual adviser and congregation member" (Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 
Ves. Jun. 273), "solicitor and client" (Rhodes v Bate (1865) L. R. I Ch. App. 252; Barron v Willis [1902] 
A. C. 271 (HL)), "doctor and patient" (Dent v Bennett (1839) 4 My. & Cr. 269; 41 ER 105 and Mitchell v 
Homfray (1881) L. R 8; Q. B. D 587 (CA)), "parent and child" (Wright v Vanderplank (1856) 8 De G. M. & 
G. 133; 44 E. R. 340; Hoghton vHoghton (1852) 15 Beav. 278; 51 E. R. 545; and Powell v Powell [1900] 1 
Ch. 243), "guardian and ward" (Taylor v Johnson (1882) 19 Ch. D. 603; Hatch vHatch (1804) 9 Ves. Jun. 
292; 32 ER. 615). 
"'Howes v Bishop [1909] 2 KB. 390; Bank of Montreal v Stuart [1911] A. C. 120; National Westminster 
BankPlc vMorgan [1985] A. C. 686. 
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disadvantage. With this, "Lord Scarman laid down a totally universal principle, 
applicable to all undue influence cases, namely, that the starting point is a 
disadvantageous transaction. "' 12 It was argued there that the doctrine of undue influence 
is based on unconscionability and there is nothing unconscionable where a person has 
suffered no disadvantage! 13 In other words, his Lordship seems to be saying that there is 
no reason as a matter of law to relieve anyone who has not suffered manifest 
disadvantage, or that a person cannot be victimised unless they suffer some loss. "4 This 
clearly cannot stand. As it was explained earlier, undue influence is concerned with the 
presence of free and informed consent and not with the wisdom of the transaction. It 
simply cannot be asserted as a categorical fact, therefore, that a person who receives a 
commercially fair price must as a result have acted of his own free will. "" For this reason 
the requirement was heavily criticised. 116 
BCCI v Aboody117 is also important. There, the husband forced the Iranian wife, who 
spoke little English, to sign a charge over the matrimonial house to finance the family 
business and his borrowings. While the wife was getting independent legal advice her 
husband rushed in and after a shouting match took place the wife signed the relevant 
documents. The solicitor described him as a "bully". Surprisingly, despite the existence 
of actual knowledge, the charge was upheld because the wife was unable to show 
manifest disadvantage. 
 [1985] A. C. 686 (HL). 12 BCCI vAboody [1990] 1 QB. 923 (CA), 932. 
113 He supported this conclusion by reference to two Privy Council cases, Bank of Montreal v Stuart [1911] 
A. C. 120 and Poosathurai v Kannappa Chettiar [ 1919] L. R. 47 Ind. App. 1 (PC) where the phrases "unfair 
advantage" and "unconscionable" were used. 
11 "This `harm theory', therefore, focuses on the 'nature of the exchange or the terms of the transaction' 
so that a party cannot claim to be victimised in a transaction which provides reasonably equal, 
benefits to both sides. " Callaghan, C., "Manifest Disadvantage in Undue Influence: An Analysis of 
its Role and Necessity" (1995) 25 VUWLR 289,305-06. 
"Tiplady, David, "The Limits of Undue Influence" (1985) 48 MLR 579,583. 
116 See Tiplady, David, "The Limits of Undue Influence" (1985) 48 MLR 579; Callaghan, C., "Manifest 
Disadvantage in Undue Influence: An Analysis of its Role and Necessity" (1995) 25 VUWLR 289. 
117 [1990] 1 Q. H. 923. 
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Fortunately, Pitt118 abolished manifest disadvantage as a requirement for actual undue 
influence. In relation to presumed undue influence the House of Lords in Etridgel 19 
(No. 2) reduced its role to an evidential one, helping to raise the presumption. 
2.6.1.2. iv Undue Influence - Presumed Undue Influence Husband and Wife 
As already explained in the Introduction of this work, the informality of the agreements 
between couples, the economic dependence of many women upon their husband, even 
nowadays, emotional ties and the desire to please their loved one's wishes or to avoid 
fights in the family place many women is a subordinate position compared to their 
husbands. This makes them vulnerable to undue influence. 120 
On this issue, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O'Brien emphasised that the Class 2B 
presumption could arise in favour of a wife who was "able to demonstrate that de facto 
she did leave decisions to her husband. "121 In fact, the plethora of cases reaching courts 
with claims of undue influence in scenarios involving surety-wives proves the 
vulnerability of many wives. The presumption of undue influence will not arise, however, 
simply because the wife would have "liked more time to consider whether or not to 
23 sign»122 or where the guarantor has a "relative naivete" in financial affairs' or where the 
wife is capable of, and does, exercise an independent judgment as to whether to execute 
the guarantee. As an example, in Turner v Barclays Bank plcl2a the wife was a 
"reasonably intelligent and careful person" 2' and "not by any means naive in financial 
matters and quite capable of making up her own mind". 126 She was responsible for the 
family finances and previously worked as a clerical assistant for the Inland Revenue. 127 
"$ C1BC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC. 200 (HI, ). 19 Royal Bank ofScotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773; see 3.2.1. ii. 
'm See Introduction 12. 
'Z' Barclays Bank Pic v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL), 190. 
122 See National Westminster Bank v Gill [2002] 2 A. C. 773 which was one of the appeals decided in 
Etridge, above, para. 4-121, n. 71,865 para. 281. 
'Z' Green King Pk vStanley [2001] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1966. '24 [1998] 1 F. L. R. 276. 




There was no presumption of undue influence, as this wife could take care of her own 
interests. 
Moving along, apart from a relationship of trust and confidence, the second element 
needed, until Etridge (No. 2), in order to raise the presumption of undue influence is the 
requirement of manifest disadvantage. After Etridge (No. 2), manifest disadvantage is not 
a necessary pre-condition but it is a useful evidential tool helping to raise the 
presumption. 128 
In the context of suretyship agreements, in Aboody, 129 it was held that whether the 
transaction is manifestly disadvantageous to the claimant depended on the balance of two 
factors, namely: (1) the seriousness of the risk of enforcement to the claimant, in practical 
terms; and (2) the benefits gained by the claimant. Thus, if the husband is already subject 
to potential liabilities which expose him to the risk of bankruptcy, a substantial increase 
of those liabilities is capable of constituting a manifest disadvantage. For example, in 
Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd v Markou, 130 the wife was at the husband's mercy in 
respect of the management of the business and, in those circumstances, her shareholding 
in the company had little significance. She had exposed the matrimonial home to risk for 
the sake of the company, which had little prospect of prospering. 131 
Lord Nicholls in Etridge (No. 2) expressed the view that a wife's guarantee of her 
husband's bank overdraft secured by means of a charge on her share of the family 
home, should not be regarded as a transaction which, failing proof to the contrary, was 
128 See 3.2.1. ii. 
129Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA vAboody [1990] 1 Q. B. 923. 
10 [1999] 2 All E. R. 707. 
131 In Goode Durmni Administration v Biddulph [1994] 2 F. L. R. 551, the wife had little business 
experience and reposed trust and confidence in her husband in financial matters and relied on him in 
executing the security transaction. Her direct interest in the proposed development arose only from her 
2.5% shareholding in the company. To make herself personally liable for a sum in excess of £300,000, in 
order to have a 2.5% share through the company of any profit was held to be a transaction manifestly 
disadvantageous to her, in Barclays Bank v Coleman [2000] 1 All E. R. 385, the husband's loan was 
secured by a legal charge over the matrimonial home, which was owned jointly by the husband and wife. 
The charge was an `all moneys' charge, securing not only the funding of the property but also any future 
bonnowings by the husband from the bank. The Court of Appeal held that manifest disadvantage did not 
56 
explicable only on the basis that it had been procured by the exercise of the husband's 
undue influence. As he explained, in most cases, there will be good reasons why a 
wife is willing to enter into such a transaction, despite the risks involved for her and her 
family. Of course, his Lordship accepted that, in some exceptional cases, a wife's 
signature of a guarantee will call for an explanation. 
Concluding here, in regards to the position until Etridge (No. 2), raising the presumption 
of undue influence was not easy, since it required proof of manifest disadvantage. The 
132 position of the law after Etridge (No. 2) is examined in chapter 3. 
2.6.1.3 Establishing a Leeal Wrong - Summary 
The previous pages depicted the main elements of the doctrines of misrepresentation and 
undue influence, which are usually claimed by surety-wives (under the first step of the 
O'Brien principle), so as to avoid liability under the suretyship agreement. In the majority 
of cases the wife claims to have been victimised or misled by her husband rather than the 
bank. 133 So, the wife first needs: i) to prove the occurrence of actual undue influence (this 
involves domination, duress or some actual bulling); or ii) to raise the presumption of 
undue influence (by showing that she reposed trust and confidence in the husband or that 
she left financial matters to him, coupled with a manifestly disadvantageous transaction); 
or iii) to prove that her husband has misrepresented some material fact regarding the 
transaction, which caused her to enter into the agreement. In most of the cases before 
English courts, grounds ii and iii are claimed in conjunction. 
It has been argued, that the requirement of a legal wrong is justified on the basis that 
there must be some limitation on creditor responsibility for the actions of the husband 
that evolve privately in the home. 134 "Conversely, the narrow categorization of relevant 
have to be large or even medium sized. It could be small, provided that the disadvantage was clear, obvious 
and more than de minimis (trivial). 132 See 3.2.1. ii. 
133 But see Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] 1 Q. B. 326 (CA). 
134 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,32. 
57 
`legal wrongs' acts as a significant bar to judicial exploration of a well-known reality of 
intimate relationships: that participants who are not obviously vulnerable may 
nevertheless act as a result of subtle and insidious emotional pressure. Such pressure, 
although very real to them, is likely to fall short of a legal wrong recognized at law' . 
'33 
So, it appears that not all vulnerable surety wives will necessarily manage to establish a 
legal wrong (which is the first step of the O'Brien principle). Nevertheless, this is the 
law. 
Having established the existence of a legal wrong, the wife is allowed to set the charge 
aside against the wrongdoer (the husband). This, however, is an empty remedy. It neither 
allows the wife to keep her house nor does it save her from eviction and all the 
traumatizing experiences that come with it. 136 So, the wife will have to prove that the 
conscience of the mortgagee, who is after all entitled to the house on default by the 
principal debtor, is somehow affected by the wrongdoing of the husband. The formula 
invented by courts, so as to impose liability on creditors for the wrongdoing of another is 
examined in detail in the following section. Already, though, things are starting to look 
complicated, since the necessity of imposing liability first against the husband and then 
against the bank signals that sureties have to succeed in a complicated test. 
2.6.2 "On Inauirv" 
The second stage requires imputing knowledge of the husband's wrongdoing to the bank. 
Knowledge may be actual'137 constructive 138 or imputed. Imputed knowledge exists when 
the husband is acting as the bank's agent in obtaining his wife's consent to the contract of 
135 Ibid, 32-33. 
136 See 1.4. 
137 In Woodchester Equipment Leasing Co Ltd v Capital Belts Ltd, Unreported (April 12,1995, CAT No. 
335), a finance company was held to have actual knowledge of facts giving rise to a fraud by the supplier of 
photocopying machines. The finance company was sent a receipt stating that the cost of equipment to be 
paid by the lessee of the equipment under a rental plan was three times that indicated by an earlier 
statement, it also knew that the relevant salesmen were "a pretty dodgy bunch. " The finance company had 
deliberately turned "a blind eye" to the obvious, and the guarantor of payments under the rental plan was 
accordingly discharged. 
138 A narrower view was taken in Scotland: the application of the House of Lords' ruling regarding 
constructive notice in Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL) in Scotland was rejected in 
Smith v Bank ofScotland [1996] 1 F. L. R. 344. 
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guarantee. As already explained, this situation will rarely arise. 139 Also, since actual 
knowledge will be unusual, the focus in this section is on the issue of constructive notice. 
In relation to this requirement, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 0 Brien appeared to have 
offered a simple formula for the circumstances where the bank is "on inquiry". So, "a 
creditor is put on inquiry when a wife offers to stand surety for her husband's debts by 
the combination of two factors: (a) the transaction is on its face not to the financial 
advantage of the wife; and (b) there is a substantial risk in transactions of that kind that, 
in procuring the wife to act as surety, the husband has committed a legal or equitable 
wrong that entitles the wife to set aside the transaction. "140 This looked quite a 
straightforward test for wives. Its application though was proved problematic in many 
respects and did not turn out to be very useful for sureties. 
2.6.2.1 Problems with Terminoloev 
The first point to be made in relation to the "on inquiry" requirement is that the term is a 
misnomer, since there is no duty upon the lender to make inquiries; the doctrine is simply 
a mechanism for fixing the lender with responsibility for wrongful conduct by the 
husband. 141 
In addition, the doctrine of notice, as applied in the context of suretyship agreements, 
caused difficulties even to property lawyers. Specifically, there was confusion as to the 
applicability of the doctrine of notice in the context of registered land. As a result, after 
O'Brien there was an academic debate142 in respect of the inappropriate use of the 
terminology of constructive notice in this context. As Patrick Milne explains, the 
mortgagee cannot be a third party taking subject to a prior proprietary right. This is 
because the wife's right to have the mortgage set aside can hardly precede the mortgage 
139 See 2.4. 
140 Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL), 195. 
141 See Lord Nicholls in Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773; para. 4-121, n. 71, 
para. 39. 
az As described by 0' Sullivan, J. "Undue Influence and Misrepresentation after O'Brien: Making Security 
Secure" in Rose, Francis, D. (ed. ); Restitution and Banking Law. Oxford: Mansfield Press, 1998,42,44-45. 
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itself. Her equity and the bank's interest arise at the same time. 143 The Court of Appeal in 
Etridge explained that, "There is no voidable transaction between husband and wife 
which is prior in time to the security which is impugned. The contract of guarantee or 
collateral charge is entered into by the wife directly with the bank; it is not entered into 
with the husband and later given by him to the bank. Normally [... ] there is only one 
transaction, not two in competition with the other; and there is no question of clearing the 
title, which is the function performed by the bona fide purchaser defence. But the 
transaction is liable to be set aside as against the bank if the bank had notice, actual 
constructive or imputed, that it was procured by improper means. This is not, we think, a 
true application of the bona fide purchaser defence. " 144 
So, constructive notice should not be understood as the constructive notice in property 
law, when a purchaser is treated as having constructive notice of all that a reasonably 
careful purchaser would have discovered. Clearly, constructive notice in the context of 
suretyship agreements is something completely different. It is a new formula invented by 
the House of Lords in O'Brien, which aims to enable sureties to impose liability against 
the bank, so as to set the charge aside. Nevertheless, it has been argued that this 
discussion regarding the right or wrong terminology is rather a sterile academic debate 
about nomenclature rather than substance. 145 What matters is whether constructive notice 
has been proved a useful tool for sureties. Whether this formula actually worked is 
revealed from the discussion 146 
2.6.2.2 The Scope of the Principle 
An important point is that the O'Brien principles are not limited to transactions where the 
wife stands as surety for her husband's debts, but also where the husband stands surety 
143 Milne, Patrick, "Lenders, Co-Owners and Solicitors" (1999) NUPractitioner 168,168. 
144 Royal Bank of Scodland v Etridge (No. 2) [1998] 4 All E. R. 705, para. 28. 
'45 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modem Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd., 2003,228. 
146 For a different academic view on the conceptual basis of O'Brien, see Thomson, M. P. "The 
Enforceability of Mortgages" (1994) Conv 140. Parallels can be drawn between Barclays Bank Plc v 
O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (UL) and Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation 
[1986] Ch. 246 (CA) viz. third party's notice of a director's breach of fiduciary duty or abuse of power. 
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for his wife's debts. They are also applied in the case of unmarried couples (whether 
heterosexual or homosexual), but in the latter case only where the creditor is aware of the 
relationship. Cohabitation is not essential. 147 In addition, they extend to other cases where 
there is an emotional relationship between the parties, for example, personal friends, 
family members and even between employer and employee. 14' Indeed, most recently, in 
the House of Lords in Etridge (No. 2), Lord Nicholls confirmed that the O'Brien decision 
is not confined to sexual relationships. 149 
It has been argued that if the category is not sufficiently defined, it will create problems 
and uncertainty for creditors, since they will be unable to determine which transactions 
will be subject to the relevant procedures. "' However, no case has arisen where a 
creditor was not aware of the emotional relationship between surety and debtor, but it 
seems clear that the creditor's lack of knowledge would act as a limitation on relief. lsl 
This is clearly not to the benefit of vulnerable sureties. It is suggested that the better 
approach would be one that does not look at the relationship between debtor and surety, 
but instead one that looks at the vulnerability of sureties. The same conclusion also 
derives from the rest of the discussion below regarding the O Brien principle. 
2.6.2.3 The Face of the Transaction 
Proceeding to the "on the face of the transaction" element, its inexact meaning gave rise 
to inconsistencies in its interpretation, with cases leaning on the surety-sympathetic side 
and others on the creditor-sympathetic side. 
147 Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773; para. 4-121, n. 71,804 para. 47; in 
Massey v Midland Bank Plc [1995] 1 All E. R. 929,933, Steyn L. J. applied O'Brien in a situation where the 
relevant parties were not cohabitees but were in a stable relationship with two children. 148 Credit Lyonnais BankNederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E. -144 (CA). 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 82; So far as commercial 
relationships are concerned, however, Lord Nicholls was of the view that those engaged in business `can be 
regarded as capable of looking after themselves and understanding the risks involved in the giving of 
guarantees': para. 88, and see, also, Woodchester Equipment Leasing Co Ltd v Capital Belts Ltd 
Unreported (April 12,1995, CAT No. 335). 
130 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,43; Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modern Contract of Guarantee English Edition. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2003,22. 
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On the surety-sympathetic side is Allied Irish Bank v Byrne, '32 where Ferris J. held that a 
mortgage by Mr. and Mrs. Greene in order to provide security for Mr. Greene's business 
debts was not "on its face" a joint borrowing, since the bank was aware of the purpose of 
the loan. Again, in Midland Bank Plc v Greene'53 Judge Rich QC held that although Mrs. 
Green was technically a joint borrower of the matrimonial home the bank knew that the 
loan was going to be used for the husband's business debts. In Goode Durrant 
Administration v Biddulph'54 Rich J. reached a similar conclusion. 155 There, Rich J. 
imposed an onus on the creditor to inquire as to the actual level of involvement of the 
wife in the company, of which she was a joint borrower and director together with her 
husband. '56 It was held that, as the bank had dealt exclusively with Mr. Biddulph and 
treated Mrs. Biddulph as a `mere automatic part of the transaction', the bank could not 
assume that the transaction was to her financial advantage. The Bank was thus put "on 
inquiry". '57 With this the judge expanded the "face of the transaction" test. The case is 
important because it looks at the transaction from sureties' point of view. The case is also 
consistent with empirical research, which reveals that "a discrepancy often exists in 
family businesses between formal position and real power. " 58 
Despite the above encouraging cases for sureties, creditor-sympathetic decisions have 
also been reached. Equity and Law Life Assurance Society plc v McGrath'59 is in sharp 
contrast with Goode Durrant Administration v Biddulph above. Here, again the wife, 
Mrs. McGrath was an equal shareholder with her husband and also a company director 
and the company secretary. However, in reality even though she played a day-to-day role 
151 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,43. 
'52 [1995] 2 F. L. R. 325. 
133 [1994] 2 F. L. R 827. 
154 [1994] 2 F. L. R 551. 
"' In Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem [1998] 3 All E. R. 876 the bank was put on inquiry because it knew that 
the funds were to be applied for the substantial benefit of the husband. 156 [1994] 2 F. L. R. 551,554-5 
157 Jbid, 555. 
138 Fehlberg, Belinda, "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" (1996) 59 MLR 
675,680. 
159 Court of Appeal, Stuart Smith and Morritt L. J. J., 9 May 1995 (Lexis transcript). See also Halifax 
Mortgage Services (formerly BNP Mortgages Lid) v Siepsky [1996] 2 All E. R. 277 (CA) (to the effect that 
in joint borrowing cases where the same solicitor acts for the borrowers and the lender, knowledge of a lack 
of benefit or advantage to one joint borrower acquired by that solicitor or even the solicitor's knowledge 
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in the business and was familiar with its financial position, she did not play an executive 
role and did not have any saying regarding important financial decisions such as 
borrowing. Contrary to the conclusion in Biddulph, here the "face of the transaction" was 
construed in a way which assumed that a day-to-day role and financial awareness 
necessarily indicated equal decision-making power within the business, rather than in 
light of the practical reality accepted in Biddulph that sureties often have little real power 
in the family business. 
Apart from joint loans for the purposes of funding the family business, a joint loan 
supposedly for personal use of the couple creates more difficulties. To explain, in some 
cases courts recognized that a formal position in the family business does not necessarily 
connote an important role in decision-making and as a result of this the "face of the 
transaction" requirement was satisfied. In cases, however, where the joint loan is 
supposedly for personal use of the couple (for example to buy a car, buy a holiday home, 
go on vacation etc. ) it is even more difficult to hold that the bank is "on inquiry". In such 
cases, the "face of the transaction" requirement was very narrowly and artificially 
applied. The most relevant case on the point is Pitt, 160 which is worth discussing and 
comparing together with O'Brien. 161 Both cases involved wives who charged their 
matrimonial homes after being induced by some wrongful conduct of their husbands. The 
cases, though, were different in one respect, which proved crucial to the final decision. In 
O'Brien, the wife charged the matrimonial home to back the overdraft facilities to a 
business in which her husband had an interest but she did not Because of this the bank 
was put "on inquiry". Perhaps the only indirect interest she had was that the family 
income earned by her husband derived from that business. The House of Lords did not 
think that that was a reason to hold that the transaction was "on its face" to the advantage 
of the wife. In Pitt, 162 again the husband pressurised his wife to sign a charge over the 
matrimonial house to secure a loan made both to her and her husband, in order to 
supposedly buy a holiday house. Instead, he invested and lost all the money to the stock 
market. Contrary to the outcome in O Brien, the charge here was upheld because the 
160 CIBC Mortgages Plc v Pitt [ 1994] 1 A. C. 200 (HI, ). 
161 Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
16z In this case the requirement of manifest disadvantage was abolished. 
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lenders were not put "on inquiry", as the loan appeared to be to the benefit of the couple 
(they were buying a holiday house); so, there was no actual or constructive notice. These 
cases show the imbalance with which the law treats sureties. To clarify, Mrs. Pitt did not 
do anything without her husband's permission and yet failed to set the charge aside; 
comparatively though, in O'Brien the wife, who was a businesswoman and quite 
independent, had the charge set aside. This does not seem to be fair. The law should 
incorporate different tests (like the doctrine of unconscionability), 163 so that the truly 
vulnerable sureties are provided with more protection. 
A recent case that again shows the imbalance of the "on inquiry" requirement is 
Woolwich PLC v Lorna Margaret Gomm! " The facts of this case are interesting. Mr. 
and Mrs. Gomm were married in 1975, separated in 1983 and divorced in 1985. Shortly 
after the separation the wife was admitted to a psychiatric clinic. In 1989 Mrs. Gomm 
was diagnosed as schizophrenic and she was eventually discharged in 1993 but still 
remained on medication. The matrimonial home was registered in the sole name of Mrs. 
Gomm and the separation agreement provided that Mr. Gomm was to pay the mortgage 
installments. In 1990 Mr. Gomm established a relationship with the manager of one of 
the plaintiff's branches, which allowed him to introduce potential borrowers. Mr. Gomm 
told the senior manager of the bank, the plaintiff, that the property was being re- 
mortgaged because his ex-wife Mrs. Gomm, the defendant, was setting up a home with 
the second defendant and that the divorce settlement provided that Mr. Gomm could 
receive his share in those circumstances. In fact, the second defendant never met Mrs. 
Gomm and neither did Mrs. Gomm nor the second defendant ever meet the solicitor who 
was acting for them in the mortgage. The judge found that Mrs. Gomm signed the re- 
mortgage agreement as a result of Mr. Gomm's undue influence, as she reposed trust and 
confidence in him and the transaction was to her manifest disadvantage. However, the 
charge could not be set aside on the O'Brien principles because the transaction looked to 
be to the interest of Mrs. Gomm and because a solicitor was acting on behalf of her. In 
" For a description of a doctrine see chapter 4, for the advantages of the doctrine in the context of 
suretyship agreements see chapter 5, for a discussion on the similarities of unconscionability with undue 
influence see chapter 6, for a jurisprudential and economic analysis of the doctrine see chapter 7. 
164 (1999) 96(34) L. S. G. 33. 
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the appeal of Mrs. Gomm, the Court agreed with the judge and also found that the 
transaction "on its face" did not look to be detrimental to the defendant as there was 
nothing to indicate that the money was being advanced for Mr. Gomm's purposes. The 
appeal of Mrs. Gomm was dismissed and the charge upheld. Once more, the "on inquiry" 
requirement proved very technical and as a result practical justice was not done. 
The cases of Pitt and Gomm reveal that the "on the face of the transaction" requirement 
ignores the fundamental problem that a wife who provides security as a result of her 
husband's pressure is unlikely to have much control over how she appears in the 
documentation. Thus, as Fehlberg165 explains, Mrs. Pitt signed the relevant charges 
because of her husband's undue influence and as a result appeared as a joint borrower for 
a holiday home on "the face of the transaction". In reality, Mrs. Pitt and Mrs. Gomm had 
no control over the family expenditure. Admittedly, not only is it unfair but also ironic, 
that the "face of the transaction", being a matter beyond the control of the wife, should 
form the basis for denying her relief and especially given their Lordships' 
acknowledgement of the substantial risk of the abuse of trust and confidence in emotional 
relationships. Thus, this element fails to address the problems of vulnerable sureties. 
2.6.2.4 Financial Benefit 
Moving along, the financial benefit element has also been proven problematic. "The 
uneasy interaction between `private' spousal relationships and `public' third party 
security transactions generally, remain problematic after O Brien' and Pitt. 167is'68 In the 
latter category, it is not immediately apparent how a person (not in an emotional 
relationship with the debtor, for example an employee) can benefit from the transaction, 
the logical consequence of this being that the bank should be alert against the possibility 
of undue influence. The position of the wife, offering security is somewhat different On 
165 Fehlberg, Belinda (1996), "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" 59 MLR 
675. 
166 Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
167 CIBCMortgages Plc v Pitt [1994] 1 A. C. 200 (HL). 
168 Fehlberg, Belinda, "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" (1996) 59 MLR 
675. 
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the one hand, she stands to gain from her husband's business and on the other hand 
because of her close relationship with her husband she is more vulnerable to his undue 
influence. So, in imputing the presumption of undue influence to the bank, the question 
asks how relevant the fact is to an outsider, like the bank, that the wife may have stood to 
gain or lose from entering into the transaction. 
With this we are brought to the next important case on the matter, Bank of Scotland v 
Bennett. 169 Here, Mrs. Bennett was the sole owner of the matrimonial house. She 
executed a letter of guarantee and then a legal charge to support the loan of all monies to 
support a company to which her husband was both a director and shareholder. At the time 
when the guarantee was signed, Mrs. Bennett herself owned 11.8% of the ordinary share 
capital (her husband owned over 40%); when she signed the charge the position had 
moved on and she held 83% of the shares in the company jointly with her husband. The 
bank was aware that Mr. and Mrs. Bennett had solicitors acting for them in respect of 
these transactions but the solicitors did not provide Mrs. Bennett with substantial advice 
in respect of her position. 
Having found that Mrs. Bennett was subject to her husband's undue influence, the trial 
judge went on to find that, notwithstanding Mrs. Bennett's considerable interest in the 
company the transaction was not, on its face, to her advantage; in particular, the judge 
was impressed by the fact that Mr. Bennett had not committed any security to the 
transaction. The bank was therefore "on inquiry". However, the Court of Appeal not only 
rejected this analysis but also went further. The correct approach, according to the Court, 
to the question of whether a bank was "on inquiry" was to look at the circumstances of 
the transaction through the bank's eyes. So, only if there was some real risk that the 
wife's consent had been obtained by some improper conduct on the part of her husband 
was the bank "on inquiry". Lord Browne-Wilkinson's dicta in O'Brien certainly applied 
to the circumstances where all that the bank knew was that the wife was providing 
security for her husband's business and did not have an interest in it. It is important to 
underline here that in O'Brien the fact that the wife indirectly gained from the husband's 
" [1991] 1 F. L. R. 1151. 
66 
business ventures was unimportant However, in Bank of Scotland v Bennett170 the Court 
appeared to suggest, that a transaction by which a wife provides security for loans of the 
business from which the family derives its income cannot be said to be extravagantly 
improvident and may well not be improvident at all. If the bank had knowledge of this, it 
might well not be "on inquiry". 
In most cases actually encountered, the substantial part of the family income derives from 
the husband's business. In making the usual inquiries before a loan, a bank is likely to 
learn this. If Bennett is correct, it presents a virtually insuperable barrier for the vast 
majority of cases that the 0 Brien defence applies. Ironically, the starting point for the 
development of the O'Brien principle was the court's special tenderness towards wives, 
whose emotional ties with and economic dependence on their husbands was recognized 
as a source of special vulnerability deserving protection. If banks are entitled to rely on 
that same economic dependence as absolving them from being "on inquiry", it is difficult 
to see how O'Brien gives vulnerable wives effective protection. 
In addition, it has to be noted that the assumption that the wife gains equally with her 
husband from the security transaction is inconsistent with reality, even if the wife is a 
shareholder of the family company. So, the ideal perception of equal sharing in 
households does not stand. This is supported by empirical research. 171 Many sociologists 
have concluded that women receive the lesser share. For example, Volgerin noted that 
"the orthodox model of households as egalitarian decision-making units, within which 
resources are shared equally" applied to only one-fifth of the 1,211 households in her 
sample. More recently, Felhberg observed that due to dependence of women who do not 
work, the extent to which sharing of financial resources occurred was at the total 
discretion of the husband, which in most cases involved unequal sharing. Also, unequal 
sharing resulted from both women's economically weaker position compared with their 
breadwinning partners, but also from an ethic of self-sacrifice and support for the family 
10 ibid.. 
171 See Introduction 1.2. 
172 Volger, C., "Money in the Household" in Anderson, M.; Bechhofer, F.; Gershuny, J. (eds. ); The Social 
and Political Economy of the Household. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994,224. 
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evident among surety women. 173 This attitude is also present in the perceptions of 
sureties; as one surety-wife said, "When I was being paid more money in recent years, I 
did not think it was `mine' because it was the money that [my husband] would have given 
himself; but because of the tax, I had it. "174 In the same research, debtor interviewees all 
expressed the view that the business was theirs, rather than a shared or family. 171 
Felhberg's study showed that sureties were unequal partners when it came to business 
decisions, even if the wife was a shareholder or a partner in the business. "This finding 
suggests that the judicial approach of measuring the strength of a surety's case by the 
extent to which she was involved in or benefited from the business is too simplistic, as it 
ignores a fundamental aspect of the position of sureties: their lack of power over the way 
in which the business was conducted and therefore of access to that benefit. "176 
On the other hand, it has been argued that Goode Durant Administration v Biddulph" 
"has the advantage of not assuming that Mrs. Biddulph would enjoy a financial benefit 
beyond her shareholding as a result of being Mr. Biddulph's wife [... ]. Even Biddulph, 
however, does not go as far acknowledging that even when a benefit is technically 
available, underlying power Mrs. Biddulph's shareholding would translate into any 
dividend-seeking motivation, even if those assumptions were only for the purposes of 
making hypothetical profit calculations. Empirical research indicates that the role of 
surety wives within businesses is likely to be a support role for which payment is non- 
existent or token, and not the motivating factor. s178 
The paragraphs above showed that the interpretation of financial benefit requirement has 
been inconsistent and that most cases did not address the problems of vulnerable sureties 
adequately. 





177 [1994] 2 F. L. R 551. 
178 Fehlberg, Belinda, "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" (1996) 59 MLR 
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2.6.2.5 Some Hone for Sureties after Burch? 
The cases above show a divergence of authority regarding the "on inquiry" requirement 
with some cases leaning towards the surety-sympathetic side and others on the creditor- 
sympathetic side. The case of Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch, analysed 
here, is on the surety-sympathetic side. It is considered by this writer to incorporate many 
innovative ideas that overcome the limitations of "constructive notice". The decision may 
herald a drift towards the concept of unconscionability, which is supported by this writer. 
That is why a special section is dedicated for this case. 
Starting with the facts, the defendant, an 18-year-old secretary, worked for the debtor's, 
Mr. Pelosi's, company. They had a close relationship but not one of a sexual nature and 
she used to visit him and his family in his house in Italy. Mr. Pelosi asked her to provide 
a personal covenant and to charge her apartment as security for an overdraft, which the 
bank extended to his company. The bank's solicitors took the precaution of advising the 
defendant to seek independent advice and highlighted to her that the arrangement was 
unlimited both in time and amount secured. Then Mr. Pelosi told her to write back to the 
bank to say that she understood the nature and extent of the obligations she was 
undertaking; soon after she executed the agreement. When the company went into 
liquidation, the bank issued proceedings for possession and payment against the 
defendant. At trial the guarantee and charge were set aside on the basis that there existed 
between Mr. Pelosi and the defendant such a relationship of trust and confidence as to 
raise the presumption of undue influence, and that the bank was put "on inquiry", having 
known that the defendant was only an employee for whom the transaction conferred no 
benefit. Applying O'Brien, it was held that the bank had not taken reasonable steps to 
satisfy itself that her consent was freely given, not having informed her that the security 
was needed specifically to increase the company's overdraft limit from £250,000 to 
£270,000 or that the current borrowings already stood at £160,000; nor did she in fact 
receive any independent advice. 
69 
Although, unconscionability (unfairness within the terms of the contract) had not been 
pleaded in the first instance, Nourse L. J. assumed its relevance as an underlying principle 
in the question of whether the bank had constructive notice of the undue influence 
exercised on the defendant. So, the bank should have been alerted by the nature of the 
whole transaction and the position of the parties. The surety was a junior secretary in the 
company and the flat was her only valuable asset. There existed no reasonable 
justification, apart from that of undue influence, why she being a junior secretary should 
provide security for the company she was working for. The unfairness or 
unconscionability of the terms of the transaction (the guarantee being unlimited both in 
time and extent) helped to raise the presumption and to put the bank "on inquiry". Hence, 
the constructive notice requirement was not given a technical application and the court 
with the aid of the doctrine of unconscionability179 achieved practical justice for a 
vulnerable surety. 
The support of the doctrine of unconscionability is the most important feature of this 
case. Unfortunately, it was not followed in subsequent cases, as its scope was limited to 
its extreme facts. Such a case is Barclay's Bank Plc v Goff. ' 80 Here again, the appeal was 
concerned with the right of a wife, Mrs. Goff, to set aside a legal charge against her home 
given as security for a debt to a bank and said to have been entered into as a result of the 
husband's misrepresentations and/or undue influence, and also with the effect of a 
subsequent agreement purporting to affirm the mortgage. The loan in question was for the 
business venture of Mr. Goff and his son from a previous marriage. Mrs. Goff was 
reluctant to agree because in due course the house was intended for her son and was the 
only valuable asset she owned. Eventually though, she was persuaded by her husband's 
assurance that the £10.000 would never be called in and agreed to the charge on that 
basis. In fact, the charge was for all moneys limited only to the value of the property. The 
bank wrote to a solicitor Mrs. Lewis asking her to advise Mrs. Goff clearly because she 
had no interest in the transaction and was at risk of losing her home. The argument put 
forward on behalf of Mrs. Goff at the appeal was that the bank was not allowed to rely on 
179 For a description of a doctrine see chapter 4. 
180 [2001] E. W. C. A. Civ. 635 before the decision of the HL in Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) 
[2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
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the solicitor's advice because they knew that the husband was present in the meeting and 
the transaction was not one that a competent solicitor would advise her to enter, as Mrs. 
Goff had no financial interest in the transaction but was placed under great risk. The 
Court of Appeal was not very keen to apply Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v 
Burch, 181 arguing that unconscionability arises only in limited cases and extreme facts. 
The facts of this case were not deemed to be so extreme as the facts in Credit Lyonnais 
Bank Nederland NV v Burch. It was argued that in Burch it should be obvious to the bank 
that the secretary did not stand to benefit from the loan. On the contrary, in this case it 
was not very keen to apply Burch, arguing that unconscionability arises only in limited 
cases and extreme facts. The facts of this case were not deemed to be so extreme as the 
facts in Burch. It was argued that in Burch it should be obvious to the bank that the 
secretary did not stand to benefit from the loan. On the contrary, in this case it was 
argued that it was not destined that the venture would fail but if it succeeded the wife 
would benefit from it. The transaction thus appeared to be to the benefit of the wife. 
The position after these cases is that an employee will be protected but not a surety-wife. 
This is not encouraging at all having in mind that wives are the most common example of 
vulnerable sureties. Also, the presumption that surety wives benefit from the suretyship 
transaction equally with the husband does not reflect reality. 182 
2.6.2.6 Summarv 
Concluding here, the "on inquiry" requirement was proved problematic. Divergent 
authority existed which complicated the law. From the sureties' point of view the test is 
useless for many reasons. What matters is how the transaction appeared to the bank 
instead of what happened in reality. In particular, the test ignores the fact that a wife who 
signs as a result of undue influence by her husband is also unlikely to have much, if any, 
control over how she appears "on the face" of the transaction. Secondly, the condition 
that the transaction must not be to the financial benefit of the wife is to all intents and 
181 [1997] 1 All E. R. 144. 
182 See 1.4. 
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purposes the requirement of manifest disadvantage, which was condemned earlier in this 
chapter, "' since a person may still be victimised even if they do not suffer material harm. 
What's more, Bank of Scotland v Bennett' 84 has made the position of the surety-wife even 
more difficult. The surety's indirect benefit from the husband's business makes the loan 
to her financial advantage. As a result, the financial dependence on her husband is proved 
a double curse to her. It initially puts her in an unavoidable position to place a mortgage 
over her house and then prohibits her from using her equitable defence to set the charge 
aside. '85 The similarity of most of the cases is that they are based on the wrong 
assumptions regarding the real circumstances under which a surety-wife enters into the 
agreement, their power and control regarding decision making in the family business and 
their share of benefit from it. 
An important surety-friendly case was Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch . 
186 
In this case the Court of Appeal surpassed the problems of putting the bank on inquiry, 
by looking directly at the agreement between the bank and the surety. Unfortunately 
though, subsequent cases did not follow the decision in Burch. 
Its follows, therefore, that even if the wife manages to raise the presumption of undue 
influence or proves some other wrong, it does not necessarily mean that the bank is 
affected by this. The wife will then have to impute notice of this wrong to the bank. This 
however is not easy, since courts have often taken a pro-bank approach by limiting the 
circumstances in which the bank will be held to be "on inquiry". Once, the wife succeeds 
in showing that the bank was "on inquiry", then it is up to the bank to rebut the 
presumption by proving that it took all the reasonable steps to bring home to the surety 
the risk she is running. It is not surprising that the courts construed very widely what 
could be regarded as reasonable steps, so, it was in many cases, very easy for banks to 
rebut the presumption. This discussion is carried out in the next section. 
183 See 2.6.1.2. iii. 
184 [1999] 1 F. L. R. 1151. 
'5 This problem has been solved in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) (2002) 2 A. C. 773; see 
32.1. ü. 
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2.6.3 Rebutting the Presumption - Reasonable Steps for Banks 
Moving now further, we are brought to the steps that the bank needs to take in order to 
protect itself In Barclays Bank Plc v0 Brien'" it was suggested that banks should, at a 
private meeting with the wife, encourage her to obtain independent legal advice. These 
obligations provide an exception to the general rule that there is no duty on creditors, in 
the normal course of events, to provide explanations, or to advise sureties to seek 
independent advice. 188 These reasonable steps set in O Brien are discussed one at a time 
below. The analysis will show that their effectiveness as a risk management device is 
limited, especially when seen in the light of post-O'Brien cases, which strongly suggest a 
whittling down of the requirements to the detriment of sureties. As one commentator put 
it, "the process of explanation and advice often circumvents in legal terms, rather than 
resolves, the `private' problems faced by surety wives, providing more effective 
protections for creditors than sureties and a particularly effective boundary of creditor 
responsibility. " 189 
2.6.3.1 Private Meeting with the Prospective Surety 
The general position that creditors are under no duty to advise or explain is consistent 
with the generally accepted principle that a surety is owed no general duty of 
disclosure190 except for highly unusual matters, which the surety would not naturally 
expect. 191 
186 [1997] 1 All E. R. 144. 
's' [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (I-IL). 
1ss Small v Curry (1853) 2 Drewy's 102,114; 61 E. R. 657,662 (Kindersley V. C. ). In Barclays Bank PIc v 
Khaira [1992] 1 W. L. R. 623, Thomas Morison Q. C., sitting as a deputy High Court Judge, considered dicta 
in Lloyds BankLtd v Bundy [1975] 1 Q. B. 326,347 (Sachs L. J. ) and Cornish vMidland Bank [1985] 3 All 
E. R. 513,521 (Kerr L. J. ) suggesting that lenders' duties of explanation existed in relation to sureties. 1ß Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,56. 
190 e. g. Lloyds Bank Plc vEgremont [1990] 2 F. L. R. 351; see 2.6.1.1. iii. Another basis for claiming a duty 
of disclosure is a fiduciary relationship, giving rise to duties to behave with fairness and care and to avoid 
conflicts of duty and interest: Boardma v Phipps [1967] 2 A. C. 46 (HL). A fiduciary relationship, however, 
does not usually arise between banker and customer, which apart from any special confidence is a 
relationship of debtor and creditor. Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1981] 125 S. J. 528 (HI. ). A 
fiduciary relationship will not necessary be created where a lender explains a security to a surety, whether 
that person is a customer of the bank or not: National Westmister Bank Pk vMorgan [1985] 1 A. C. 686, 
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The unwillingness of courts, before O'Brien, to impose a duty upon creditors to provide 
explanations to sureties was understandable, having in mind the risks involved when 
giving such advice. To explain, a creditor who meets with a surety will be in a position to 
exert actual undue influence over the surety or may misstate a material fact. These in 
effect may render the security unenforceable. In addition, if the surety is also a customer 
of the creditor or the creditor assumes the role of adviser, the creditor may be found to 
owe a contractual or tortious duty of care and be liable to pay damages. 
Despite these risks faced by creditors when giving advice, and although the Banking 
Code does not require creditors to hold such interviews, the House of Lords in O Brien 
imposed an obligation to hold a private meeting with the surety. The need for such a 
meeting was regarded as essential due to surety non-involvement in loan/security 
negotiations, as sureties are usually brought in at a very late stage when all the 
negotiations are over as a result of which they may feel obliged to sign. In addition, there 
is the risk of the documents being intercepted by the debtor, 192 the risks of relying on 
debtors for information, or of the risk of the surety not reading written warnings. '93 
Private meetings are important, so as to eliminate these risks and offer an opportunity for 
sureties to ask questions and clarify misunderstandings. On the other hand, it has been 
argued that the requirement to meet with the surety privately failed to anticipate the 
growth in telephone and Internet banking. ý94 
Nevertheless, despite the advantages and disadvantages of the requirement, banks 
avoided meeting with the wife personally and the reasonable steps requirement was 
707 (Lord Scarman). However, a fiduciary duty may arise where a bank gives advice to its customer (and 
thus a duty to avoid a conflict of duty and interest) or where a banker is in a special relationship of trust and 
confidence with its customer: Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [1975] 1 Q. B. 326,340 (Sachs L. J. ). See further 
Clayton, Nigel, A., "Banks as Fiduciaries: The UK Position" (1922) 7 JIBL 315, on contractual non- 
disclosure generally. 
191 Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 Cl. & Fin. 109; 8 E. R 1339, e. g. Levert v Barclays Bank Plc [1995] 2 All 
E. R. 615. 
192 As it happened in Coldunell Ltd v Gallon [1986] Q. B. 1184. 
193 Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL), 198. 
194 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,231. 
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satisfied by the bank merely suggesting to the surety (not even insisting) that she should 
receive independent legal advice. This is discussed further. 
2.6.3.2 Duty to Disclose Information 
The general position, as already stated, is that there is no general duty on creditors of 
disclosure, except for highly unusual matters, which the surety would not naturally 
expect. 195 According to Hirst L. J. in Bank of Baroda v Rayarel, l96 the duty of disclosure 
does not apply and is no part of the O'Brien doctrine. Indeed, in Midland Bank Plc v 
Kidwai, 197 Morritt L. J. thought that such disclosure "might be positively misleading". On 
the other hand, in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch, 198 according to Nourse 
L. J. the surety should be told of the company's borrowings and overdraft limit. It is 
submitted that the approach in Burch should be preferred. 199 
The importance of such a requirement is that sureties will be given the opportunity to 
know what they are getting involved in; this is desirable from an ethical point of view and 
fair if we consider that the debtor and creditor possess the relevant information. 
Disclosure to sureties will enable them to make an informed decision and exercise their 
free will as individuals and self-efficiency-maximizing beings; so, disclosure is also 
desirable from an efficiency point ofview. 200 
On the other hand, Hooley201 argues that if a bank is required to pass on information 
about the debtor's financial position, this will not only place a heavy burden on banks but 
also raises two problems: 1) what information should be passed on to the surety? and 2) 
the issue of confidentiality towards the debtor. In relation to the first question, the answer 
'93 See 2.6.1.1. äi. 
'96 [1995] 2 F. L. R. 376, para. 13. 
'9' [1995] N. P. C. 81. 
''8 [1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA). 
199 Nor does Scots law impose a duty of disclosure (Mumford v Bank of Scotland [1995] S. C. L. R. 839). By 
way of comparison, the principle of unconscionability accommodates the disclosure of facts pertaining to 
the credit status of the principal debtor. 
200 See 7.4.1 & 7.4.2.2. 
201 Hooley, Richard, "Bankers' References and the Bank's Duty of Confidentiality: When Practice Does 
Not Make Perfect" (2000) 59 CLI21. 
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would be all the information that the bank has about the debtor. In this way the potential 
liability of the bank in failing to provide all the necessary information is diminished. 
In relation to the second opposing ground to disclosure, the duty of confidentiality, it 
should be noted that there are exceptions to the duty set in Tournier v National Provincial 
Bank. 202 Since Tournier was decided the duty of confidentiality has undergone a dramatic 
curtailment. The duty was diminished for the benefit of banks; having that in mind there 
seems to be no reason why more disclosure should not be allowed, which will be for the 
benefit of individuals. In conclusion, it is important to note that the House of Lords has 
finally imposed such a duty of disclosure in Etridge (No. 2); this case as well as the 
provisions of the Banking Code are discussed in the next chapter. 203 
2.6.3.3 Su22estion to Receive Independent Letal Advice 
Under Barclays Bank Pic v0 'Brien, 204 the requirement that creditors should insist that 
sureties receive independent advice arises in cases where undue influence is 
`probable' 203 However, it should be noted that there is disagreement, between equity and 
common law judges, as to whether independent legal advice is required to rebut the 
presumption of undue influence. The first insist upon it and the latter regard it as 
important but not necessary. 206 Apart from this divergence of opinion, the requirement in 
post-O'Brien cases creates even more confusion. To explain, a series of Court of Appeal 
authorities has reduced the burden to a mere formality; these cases suggest that creditors 
202 [1924] 1 K. B. 461. 
203 See 3.2.3. iii. 
204 [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (IlL). 
205Ibid, 197. 
206 Meagher, R. P.; Gummow, W. M. C.; Lehane, J. R. F.; Equity Doctrines and Remedies. Third ed. London: 
Butterworths, 1992, para. 1527, referring to Lancashire Loans Ltd v Black [1934] 1 K. B. 380. In Inche 
Noriah vShaikAllie Bin Omar [1929] A. C. 127, the Privy Council took the latter view. The same approach 
has been followed in Australia (see Union Fidelity Trustee Co ofAustralia Ltd v Gibson [1971] V. R. 573, 
577-8 (Vic. S. C. )) and in New Zealand (see NZ Bank of New Zealand v Maas-Geesteranus [1991] 3 
N. Z. B. L. C. 102,180 (CA)). Even though independent advice is not essential, it is viewed as a possible cure 
for surety transactions, which would otherwise be impeachable. See further Ogilvie, M., "To Be or Not to 
Be (A Fiduciary): Bertolo v Bank of Montreal" [1987-88] 2 BFLR 256; Hasson, R., "Darkness at Noon -A Comment on the Consumer Guarantee Law in Ontario" (1994) 11 BFLR 141; see Pasparakis, 0.; Dasilva, 
P., "Independent Legal Advice in Canada" (1996) 3 JIBL 91. 
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are merely required to mention to the sureties the need to take independent legal advice, 
but not to enquire into the substance of the advice given or if it was ever in fact given. On 
the other hand, under Burch, 207 urging the surety to receive independent legal advice is 
not always enough. These polarising authorities are discussed below. 
2.6.3.3.1 Suggestion to receive Independent Legal Advice - 
Creditor-Sympathetic Authorities 
The cases to be explored here involve pre-O'Brien transactions and were left to be 
decided on a case-by-case basis. This was because the House of Lords in O'Brien did not 
want to impose on banks any retrospective laws. Despite this, the approach of the Court 
of Appeal as to the conclusiveness of the recommendation to take independent legal 
advice is useful in understanding judicial thinking. 
Starting with Barclays Bank plc v Thomson, 208 the wife signed a security that was a legal 
charge over the matrimonial home, so as to provide an overdraft for her husband's 
company. The title of the house was in the wife's name and the husband had a beneficial 
interest in it. The charge was to secure all monies owed by the company for an unlimited 
period. When the bank sought to call in its security the wife claimed that she did not 
appreciate the nature of the charge and that her husband had misrepresented it to her. It 
was accepted, for the purposes of the appeal, that the loan was to her manifest 
disadvantage, so that a presumption arose that she was subject to either undue influence 
(Class 2B) or misrepresentation by her husband. The remaining issue to be considered 
was whether the bank had constructive notice, which, in turn, depended upon the 
adequacy of the precautions taken when obtaining the wife's signature to the legal 
documents. Mrs. Thomson saw a solicitor who just advised her that it was a standard 
form issued by the bank and that was putting her house on security. There was no 
explanation that the charge was for "all monies". After this advice the bank wrote to 
206 Hasson, R., "Darkness at Noon -A Comment on the Consumer Guarantee Law in Ontario" (1994) 11 BFLR 141. 
207 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA). 
208 [1996] 146 N. L. J. 1778. 
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another firm of solicitors, who generally acted for her husband, to advise the wife and to 
act for the bank in respect of the mortgage. According to the wife, the second advice was 
never given. Accepting this to be the factual position, the question remained as to 
whether the steps taken by the bank were adequate. The Court of Appeal found that they 
were and upheld the mortgage unanimously. 
Similarly, in Banco Exterior International vMann, 209 a company controlled by Mr. Mann 
borrowed £175,000 from the bank, the loan being secured against the Manns' 
matrimonial home. The solicitor who saw Mrs. Mann was the company's solicitor. The 
Court of Appeal, Hobhouse L. J. dissenting with much force, held that the bank did not 
have constructive knowledge of the undue influence. The bank was entitled to assume 
that the solicitor had performed his professional duty so that, if a conflict of interest had 
arisen between the husband and the wife, he would feel obliged to make way for another 
solicitor. Sir Thomas Bingham M. R210 held that the fact that that had not occurred was 
indicative of the absence of any such conflict and as a result the bank did not have notice 
of any undue influence. In addition, "from the bank's perspective, it was not relevant that 
Mrs. Mann did not regard the solicitor as independent. Nor was it relevant that she 
thought she had no choice in the matter, and that independent advice might have 
persuaded her otherwise, "211 "for the true question is not how Mrs. Mann regarded the 
transaction, but how it appeared to the Bank and whether the Bank should have taken 
further or other steps. "212 The selected extracts illustrate the creditor-sympathetic 
approach of the Court of Appeal. 
Much the same approach was followed in the Midland Bank Plc v Serter. 213 Here, the 
couple was separated and the wife was then living in Holland. The husband's solicitor, 
who was also acting for the bank to register the charge, explained the charge to the wife 
over a telephone conversation and certified to the bank that the document had been 
explained to her. It was held that the bank was entitled to rely on this. The bank did not 
209 [1995] 1 All E. R 936. 
210 Ibid, 950. 
211 Ellinger, E. P.; Tjio, Hans, "British Business Law" (1996) JBL 266,267. 
212 Banco Exterior International vMann [1995] 1 All E. R. 936,944. 
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have to instruct the solicitor as to how to give advice and carry out his duties. The 
solicitor was held not to be acting for the bank in any other respect but only to register the 
charge and any knowledge retained by him was not therefore imputed to the bank. 
Again in Bank of Baroda v Rayarel, zi4 the same solicitor to the bank's knowledge had 
advised all three parties to the charge. This, once more, was held not to put the bank on 
notice of undue influence, the reason being that the solicitor was expected to do his job 
properly and furnish proper separate advice. 
Finally, in Halifax Mortgage Services Ltd v Stepsky, 215 the husband and wife applied for a 
second loan on the house for £128,000. The stated purpose was to buy family shares in 
the business but the truth was that the money was to pay the previous mortgage and 
discharge his business debts. The solicitor acting for them knew the truth. Later the same 
solicitor was asked to act for the lender but did not reveal this information. The Court of 
Appeal held in favour of the bank; the information retained by the solicitor was not 
imputed to the bank and thus the bank was not on notice. Morritt L. J. giving the leading 
judgment pointed carefully to the chronology of the events. So, the knowledge of the 
solicitor was not to be imputed to the bank had it been acquired before the solicitor 
started to act for the bank. Simon Brown L. J. regarded the chronology of the events as 
unimportant; this is rather puzzling when it is an important part of the reasoning as to 
why the knowledge of the solicitor was not imputed to his principal by dint of s. 199 of 
the Law of Property Act 1925. Unfortunately, Morritt L. J. did not comment on this. 
The case of Midland Bank Plc vMassey 16 produced a similar outcome. There the parties 
involved were not married but had a long-term emotional relationship. Miss Massey 
provided a legal charge over her house to finance Mr. Potts's business. The bank advised 
her to seek independent legal advice and so she visited a reputable solicitor accompanied 
by Mr. Potts. He explained the charge to her and she understood it. The judge found that 
213 [1995] 1 F. L. R 1034 (CA). 
214 (1995) 2 F. L. R. 376. 
215 [1996] Ch. 207. 
216 [1995] 1 A11E. R. 929. 
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she signed the relevant charge as a result of Mr. Potts's undue influence and 
misrepresentations but he was not acting as the bank's agent, so his wrongdoing was not 
imputed to the bank. Also, it was held that it was sufficient for the bank that the wife saw 
a solicitor and that the bank should not be required to get involved with the solicitor's 
advice. 
The cases described concerned the nature of the precautions that a lending institution has 
to take to rebut the presumption. The approach of the Court of Appeal is 
characteristically favourable to banks. The common feature of these cases is that the 
lender will not be fixed with constructive notice if the wife is seen by the solicitor who 
acts primarily for the other party to the transaction or even for the bank itself. 217 
Moving further, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Banco Exterior Internacional SA v 
Thomas218 is even more creditor-sympathetic. There, the widow guarantor, who had no 
assets other than a house and was having difficulty "making ends meet", agreed to 
guarantee advances made by the bank to a close personal friend for the expansion of his 
second business. The guarantor also agreed to mortgage her house as additional security, 
with her liability under the guarantee being limited to £75,000. In exchange, the friend 
agreed to provide her with a regular income. The guarantor received independent legal 
advice from a solicitor and subsequently prior to the completion of the transaction she 
received advice by a second solicitor. The second solicitor told her that the transaction 
was highly improvident from her point of view and that she should not proceed in signing 
217 A different view was taken in Allied Irish Bank v Byrne [1995] 2 F. L. R. 325 and in Bank Melli Iran v 
Samadi-Rad, unreported, February 1,1994 (although the outcome was reversed on appeal: [1994] 1 F. L. R. 
367). Both cases suggest that, where the same solicitor was to act for the surety and the creditor and/or 
debtor, the independent legal advice requirement may not be complied with, as there is the potential for 
conflict of interest, which will render it difficult for the solicitor to be sufficiently independent. TSB Bank 
Plc v Camfield [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430 is also important. There, the lender, which nominated solicitors to act 
for the surety-wife in the transaction, wrote to the solicitors asking that the wife be given independent legal 
advice by a separate person within the firm. The legal executive within the firm confirmed that the wife 
was not advised separately from her husband. Nourse L. J. agreed with the trial judge's findings that the 
case fell within O'Brien, and that the bank had not taken reasonable steps even though the bank manager 
had acted responsibly. The Court of Appeal relied on Allied Irish Banks Plc v Byrne [1995] 2 F. L. R. 325, 
held that the mortgage would be set aside, "this conclusion is not one which need strike terror into the hearts of banks and other lenders, for they can avoid a situation where their legal charge is liable to be 
rescinded by taking the simple steps indicated in O'Brien's case; in other words, by following good banking practice". 
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it. The crucial fact is that the bank was informed of this. The trial judge held that a 
presumption of undue influence arose in favour of the guarantor and that the bank was 
put on notice by the second solicitor. His phone-call should have been enough to alert the 
bank to make inquiries about the relationship of the guarantor and her friend. This way, 
the guarantor's impecuniosities would be revealed. The Court of Appeal, though, allowed 
the appeal of the bank and held that the guarantee and mortgage were fully enforceable. 
Sir Richard Scott V. C., giving the leading judgment, relied heavily on the fact that the 
guarantor received independent advice from two solicitors, and argued that as a result she 
understood the nature of the transaction. 
With respect, this argument is wrong. The purpose of independent advice should be to 
rebut the presumption of undue influence. In this case this did not happen. On the 
contrary, the solicitor informed the bank of his opinion that the guarantor should not sign. 
This is more than enough to raise the presumption. What more was there for the solicitor 
to do to alert the bank? The only thing left was perhaps to spell out to the bank not to 
accept that person as a guarantor because it is obvious that she was under undue 
influence. The facts of the case and the unfairness of the contract showed, as in Burch, 219 
that she was utterly under the influence of her friend. It should also be remembered how 
Millett L. J. argued that in situations when no competent solicitor could have advised the 
surety to enter the guarantee on the specific terms, as happened in this case, the bank is 
warned of the undue influence. In John Phillips' words "after this case the test of 
presumption is turned into an irrefutable conclusion of influence"220 and the bank is 
allowed to unload all of its responsibilities to a solicitor. This is not good law and as Hans 
Tjio argues "it is morally hazardous if the bank is permitted to abdicate its responsibilities 
completely in the hope that a nominated solicitor immunizes a transaction that is 
218 [1997] 1 All E. R. 46. 
219 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E. R. 144. 
22° Phillips, John, "Guarantees and Undue Influence - Confusing Signals from the Court of Appeal" 
(1997/8) KCLJ 139. 
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ultimately in its favour. "221 The opinion of the trial judge is thus to be preferred over the 
judgment of the Court of Appeal. 222 
To review, all the preceding cases take a very narrow interpretation of O'Brien. They 
suggest that merely advising the surety of the need to take independent legal advice frees 
the bank from the potential imputation of constructive notice of undue influence. This is 
also the case even if the solicitor alerts the bank or acts for the bank as well. These 
cases assume that the solicitor as a professional will carry out his duty properly. 224 It has 
been argued that this approach should be preferred, because it would not be fair on 
creditors if they should be required to "second-guess" the advice by the solicitor to the 
surety. 225 This is justified by the economic importance of these transactions, particularly 
in the funding of small businesses, which requires that lending institutions should be able 
to rely on a set procedure to secure the validity of the transaction. The concern of the 
courts not to want to impose unbearable burdens on the creditors is understandable. On 
the other hand though, the requirement of independent legal advice ended up being a 
mere formality. As a result sureties are not protected. So, the law does not strike the 
desired balance. 
221 Tjio, Hans, "O'Brien and Unconscionability" (1997) 113 LQR 10. 
222 Very shortly, we pause here to note the attitude followed in Scotland as to what the bank is required to 
do, so as to avoid being fixed with constructive notice, since the O'Brien principle is applied there as well. 
In Wright v Cotias Investments Inc [2000] S. C. L. R. 324 (Outer House), it was held that the bank only needs 
to advise a person to seek independent legal advice; only in very rare situations should the bank be required 
to do more (in situations where the transaction is not one that a competent solicitor would advise one to 
enter). It is unfortunate that an analogous view was taken because this strengthens the position of English 
courts that this writer wants to alter so as to give more protection to sureties. 
223 See Reid, Kenneth, G. C.; Gretton, George L.; Conveyancing. Avizandum Publishing Ltd, 2005, on this 
issue. Professors Gretton and Reid take the view that the only safe course for a solicitor is not to act for all 
parties and to insist that the wife take independent advice. 
24 Wong, Simone, "No Man Can Serve Two Masters: Independent Legal Advice and Solicitor's Duty of 
Confidentiality" (1998) Conv 457,458. 
22 Gross, Felicia, "Enforcing Security Against a Surety: Matters Left Unresolved by the House of Lords in 
Barclays Bank Pk v O'Brien" (1994) BJIBFL 265. 
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2.6.3.3. ii Suggestion to Receive Independent Legal Advice - Some Hope for Sureties 
after Burch? 
Comparing now Burch with the cases succeeding O'Brien, 226 it appears that it does not fit 
very well with them. As a reminder, according to those cases Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
O'Brien only expected a creditor, at a private meeting, to urge the surety to seek 
independent legal advice. These cases pronounced very clearly that informing the surety 
of the need to receive independent legal advice relieved the bank of further responsibility, 
even when the advice, if obtained at all, was not in fact independent. Here, on the 
contrary, the bank only saying that the surety should take independent legal advice was 
not enough to rebut the presumption. Millett L. J. considered that `normally' a bank is 
entitled to assume that a solicitor has properly discharged his or her duty, although not 
where the bank should have known that `no competent solicitor' could advise the 
guarantor to enter into a guarantee in those terms. ' This depended on the nature of the 
whole transaction, in other words to the existence of unconscionability. The development 
should be welcomed. This approach imposes a heavier duty on banks as to the reasonable 
steps they have to take to the effect that they really rebut the presumption. As the law 
stood with the previous cases, the reasonable steps the bank had to take provided only 
apparent neutrality. Despite the encouraging decision in Burch, unfortunately the decision 
was limited to its extreme facts in subsequent cases. 
Woods v Scotlife House Loans"' confirmed that the bank would ordinarily be regarded 
as having discharged its obligations if a solicitor had confirmed that he had brought 
home to her the risk she was running by standing as surety and added that in considering 
if the bank had had constructive notice, all the information available to the bank would be 
considered. One circumstance where the creditor should realise from the information 
known to it that the advice may not be adequate is where the transaction is structured in 
such a way that it is not clear on the documentation that one party to the transaction is a 
226 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 OIL). 271 Noticeably, this exception is not referred to in Banco Exterior International SA v Thomas [1997] 1 All E. R. 46 even though the transaction might have been regarded as coming within this category,, certainty the 
second solicitor who gave advice appeared to view the arrangement in that way. 
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surety. In Northern Rock Building Society v Archer, '29 Mrs. Archer mortgaged her 
property for a loan in order to enable her brother to set up a law office. Even though Mrs. 
Archer could not meet the repayments (and it was intended that the responsibility for the 
repayments should be that of her brother) Mrs. Archer was named in the documentation 
as the borrower with her brother named as the guarantor. This was therefore the reverse 
of the true position. As a result the lender was not entitled to assume that the solicitor 
would know that Mrs. Archer should receive advice appropriate to her actual status as 
guarantor. 
In Bank Melli Iran v Samadi RacP° the creditor did not oblige the solicitor to provide a 
certificate that appropriate advice had been given before the loan was made, but simply 
relied upon a letter forwarded seven days after completion, stating that the advice had 
been given. It was held that this procedure was insufficient. 231 On the other hand, in 
Scottish Equitable Life Plc v Virdee232 it was held to be an adequate confirmation when 
the creditor was informed by the husband's solicitor that another solicitor had advised the 
wife, without any confirmation being received directly from the wife's solicitor. 233 
The next relevant case is National Westminster Bank Plc v Leggatt. '4 There, the issue 
was whether Mrs. Leggatt could set the charge aside as against the bank on the principles 
of O Brien. The facts were as follows; a partnership was formed between Mr. Leggatt 
and Mr. Jiggins but Mrs. Leggatt was never a partner in nor was she ever employed by 
the partnership. The bank received a confirmation from the solicitor that he had explained 
the terms of the deed to the wife and she appeared to understand them. The question was 
2 (No-2) December 13, (2000) unreported 
229 [1999] Lloyd's Rep Bank 32. 
X70 [1995] 2 F. L. R. 367. 
23' Morritt L. J. said: "I should be most reluctant to conclude that a lender might rely alone on the 
undertaking of a solicitor that the surety would be separately advised by an unidentified solicitor, when 
there is no apparent difficulty in requiring and being given at the time of completion a specific assurance or 
warranty that she has been advised by a named solicitor, for it is a commonplace experience that "there's 
many a slip twixt cup and lip! " [1995] 2 F. L. R 367,375 232 [1999] 1 F. L. R. 863. 
233 But the mere witnessing of a signature by a solicitor would not relieve the lender from having 
constructive notice of the husband's undue influence (see Scottish Equitable Life Pk v Virdee [1999] 1 
F. L. R. 863,867). 
234 [2001] 1 F. L. R. 563. 
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whether the bank had constructive notice of the existence of undue influence. The 
solicitor who advised the wife was under the mistaken impression that the loan was for 
future purposes and not for past indebtedness. This was due to an accidental 
misrepresentation by the bank on the papers of the transaction. The wife argued that had 
the solicitor known this he would have acquired further information from the bank in 
order to give full advice to the wife. The bank knew that he did not have this information 
and hence was not entitled to rely on his confirmation that he had advised her properly. 
The Court of Appeal held that whatever the reason for the loan the solicitors, in order to 
discharge their duty to their client, should have investigated the history of the partnership. 
It was also decided that the fact that the solicitors failed to discharge their duty could not 
be "laid at the door of the bank. "235 For this reason the charge was not set aside, despite 
the fact that the bank should have known that the advice was not sufficient. Here we have 
an obvious retreat of the Court back to a superficial application of the independent legal 
requirement as the situation was before Burch. 
However, Burch was followed in National Westminster Bank Plc v Breeds Breeds. 236 
There Mrs. Breeds had executed a second mortgage as a result of misrepresentations and 
improper pressure by her husband. The charge secured all present, future, actual or 
contingent liabilities of Mr. Breeds. She was not a partner or a shareholder in her 
husband's company and did not work in the company. She had the responsibility of 
bringing up their four children. Mrs. Breeds appealed from the decision on the ground 
that the judge wrongly decided that the bank had taken such steps as were effective to 
avoid being fixed with constructive notice of Mrs. Breed's right to set aside the 
transaction. The High Court had to decide in the light of the facts known to the bank. The 
principal question was whether the bank was entitled to rely on the confirmation of the 
solicitor that the wife had properly been advised, when the solicitor was not only her 
husband's and the borrowing company's solicitor but shockingly the company secretary 
and an active participant in its quest for finance. The High Court found that the case at 
hand came very close to what Millets L. J. said in Burch? of a bank not being entitled to 
233 [2001] 1 F. L. R. 563,569. 
z [2001] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 98. 
231 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E. R 144,156. 
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assume that the solicitor has discharged his duty if it knows or ought to know that its 
assumption is false. Here, the bank knew that the company was desperate for cash and 
was aware of the solicitor's position. The case clearly pointed to the strong probability of 
real conflict of interest. The appeal was allowed. Despite the surety-sympathetic 
approach of this case, the case involved extreme facts and did not prove very helpful to 
vulnerable sureties. 238 
2.6.3.4 Reasonable Steps for Banks - Summary 
The divergence of opinion as to the reasonable steps a bank is required to take has been 
illustrated above. A series of Court of Appeal cases reduced the steps that a creditor had 
to take to a mere formality. The steps, as interpreted in those cases, were designed to 
protect creditors instead of vulnerable sureties. On the other hand, the Court of Appeal 
tried to break new ground in Burch by imposing more duties upon banks. However, 
Burch was not followed in subsequent cases and as a result banks could easily discharge 
their duties by merely informing the surety to receive independent legal advice, without 
the need to inquire whether the advice was ever given. This approach has been criticised 
since it does not ensure that sureties are in fact advised by anyone. However, even if one 
assumes that the wife reads written warning and her husband does not object with her 
seeing a solicitor, there is also the crucial issue of the substance of the advice. As one 
commentator put it "it is important to distinguish between the fact that a meeting 
occurred (form) and what actually occurred at that meeting (substance). For example, in 
Lloyds Bank plc v Wright-BaileiR9 the Court referred to Mrs. Wright Bailey's trial 
evidence that when she wished to read the whole security document, the solicitor said 
words to the effect of: "Good heavens, we will have to be here all day if you want to read 
all this lot.... "m Unfortunately, as it will be illustrated, courts do not consider these 
realities when applying the law in this area. In addition, `independent legal advice' has 
238 For a discussion of this case see Williamson, Sharon, "Recent Developments in Contentious Banking 
Law" (2001) 16 JIBL 299. 
239 (1995) unreported 
240 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,61. 
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been rightly criticized as not addressing the need of many sureties of business or 
accounting advice. 24' These issues are addressed immediately below. 
2.6.3.5 The Solicitor's Role 
It has been explained above that the position of banks is very advantageous in relation to 
that of sureties. The courts have shown incredible firmness not to impose intolerable 
burdens upon them. In fact, they have acquitted them from any. Correctly or not, neither 
the husband nor the solicitor acting for the transaction is treated as the bank's agent, so 
their actions cannot be imputed to the bank. Further, the bank even if put "on inquiry", 
this being a misnomer, is not really required to do anything but just to wait for the 
solicitor's confirmation and can rely on it without questioning its sufficiency. The 
insistence of the courts to make things easy for banks by discharging their duties through 
the appointment of a solicitor leads to an analysis of solicitors' duties when giving such 
advice and whether at least this is adequate to protect vulnerable sureties. Unfortunately, 
the effectiveness of the independent legal advice requirement as a risk management 
device has been questioned242 and the reasons are explained below. 
2.6.3.5.1 What is the Solicitor Required to do? 
It has been explained that the burden of advice is shifted to solicitors. This, however, 
does not come with the full package of responsibilities, as one would expect. The cases 
"show a lack of consensus on whether independent advice is limited to merely giving an 
explanation of the nature and effect of the transaction or entails a heavier burden of 
covering an assessment of the validity of the transaction and whether it is in the surety's 
interest to sign". 43 
241 Hasson, R. "Darkness at Noon -A Comment on the Consumer Guarantee Law in Ontario" (1994) 11 
BFLR 141. 
242 Wong, Simone, "Revisiting Barclays Bank v O'Brien and Independent Legal Advice for Vulnerable 
Sureties" (2002) JBL 439,457. 
243 Wong, Simone, "No Man Can Serve Two Masters: Independent Legal Advice and Solicitor's Duty of 
Confidentiality" (1998) Conv 457,460. 
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Under Etridge244 (No. 2), the solicitor is not required to advise on the wisdom of the 
transaction but just explain its nature and effect and cannot veto the decision of the wife. 
In this way, it is not guaranteed that the surety enters into the transaction with a free 
mind. 
Contrary to Etridge (No. 2), it has been argued that the solicitor does not only have a duty 
to advise the surety on the terms of the contract and the financial implications in the event 
of default by the husband. Stirling L. J. in Wright v Carter245 said that the solicitor 
advising a client who may be subject to undue influence "takes upon himself no light or 
easy task. t9246 It is the duty of the person advising the person at risk from undue influence 
"to satisfy himself that his client was free from improper influence. , 247 This entails 
refusing to act if dissatisfied that the surety could sensibly be advised to enter the 
transaction free from such influence (per Farwell J. in Powel1J248 and informing the other 
parties that as a result of his advice to the client, he is declining to act any further in the 
matter. A more recent dictum of Millett L. J., in Burch, 249 is in favour of this idea. He 
argues that when no competent solicitor would have advised the employee to enter into 
the agreement but she persists in doing so, the solicitor was expected to discharge 
himself. The solicitor in this case was also expected to suggest reasonable alternatives 
such as a limited guarantee to secure the marginal increase in the overdraft limit. In 
addition, Lord Justice Stuart-Smith, whilst appreciating the unwillingness of banks' to 
adopt Lord Browne-Wilkinson's suggestion of a personal interview (due to its potential 
to expose it to claims for misrepresentation, undue influence and negligence 25) no such 
sympathy was extended towards solicitors. The protection of the vulnerable spouses rests 
in their hands. So, in giving such advice, the solicitor should consider whether the 
transaction is one the surety sensibly be advised to enter if free from undue influence and 
whether the surety understands the full nature of the transaction. 
244 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773 
245 [1903] 1 Ch. 27. 
246 Wright v Carter [1903] 1 Ch. 27,57. 
247 Ibid. 
21 Powell v Powell [ 1900] 1 Ch. 243. 
249 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E. R. 144. 
250 This could be claimed under Hedley Byrne vHeller [1964] A. C. 465 for negligent misstatements by the 
bank when it explains the transaction to the wife. 
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However, before Burch only Farwell L. J. in Powell231 actually suggested that a solicitor 
is expected to advise against a transaction and to discharge himself if the advice is 
ignored. Millett L. J. did not consider the opposing dicta of Fletcher Moulton L. J. in 
Coomber232 that there is no duty to advise against the transaction. More recently, in 
Banco Exterior Internacional v Mann233 Sir Thomas Bingham MR said that it was no 
part of the solicitor's duty to advise the surety not to sign. There is also direct authority in 
Clark Boyce v Mouatu4 that there would be "intolerable burdens on the solicitors" should 
they be required to advise an intelligent client of the "wisdom of the transaction". It has 
been argueds that the duty imposes a considerable burden on the solicitors' profession 
particularly in the light of the Court of Appeal's comment that the solicitor's duty of care 
may extend to the bank, even where there is no relationship of agency, presumably under 
the extended Hedley Byrne v Heller256 duty of care. Finally, as already pointed out above, 
Etridge (No. 2) came to reaffirm that such a duty does not exist 2sß 
Even in cases when the surety understands the nature of the transaction and the extent of 
their liability, still this does not mean that they cannot be subjected to undue influence. 
Using an old example, one who gives his money under the threat of a gun knows exactly 
what he is doing, but cannot exercise his free will. Similarly, in the cases we are 
concerned with here, the surety could very well understand what she is signing but has no 
other choice but to agree due to her husband's pressure. So, "the effects of undue 
influence are just as real in surety cases as in two-party cases and the purpose on 
independent legal advice is, likewise, to protect the surety against advantage-taking. This 
can only be achieved if the surety is given partisan advice, which covers the viability of 
the transaction. This suggests that a higher standard of advice is required. This will shift 
the focus to whether the advice provides the surety with not only a full understanding of 
the terms of the transaction and the risks she runs in giving the security, but also that she 
251 Powell vPowell [1900] 1 Ch. 243. 
252 Coomber v Coomber [1911 ]1 Ch. 723. 
253 [1995] 1 All E. R. 936. 
254 [1994] 1 A. C. 428. 
255 Paula, "Barclays Bank v O'Brien Revisited: What a Difference Five Years Can Make" (1999) 62 MLR 
609,612. 
256 [1964] A. C. 465. 
25' See 3.2.4. i. 
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has a choice so that the surety may be said to be truly exercising her independent free will 
in giving the security. i238 The purpose of independent advice should be dual. It should be 
there to empower the vulnerable surety with the relevant knowledge about the transaction 
and that knowledge in effect empowers her to get into the agreement by her free will. If 
this cannot be achieved and the charge is nevertheless signed then the wife should have 
bigger chances than those presently given by the law to set it aside. So, the search for 
effective and all-embracing protection of all sureties continues. 
The conclusion is that, along with banks, solicitors are exempted from much 
responsibility too. They only need to explain to the surety in clear words the meaning of 
the transaction, which with a bit of luck will help her to enter into the transaction with 
free mind. Even if the solicitor is not satisfied to this effect he/she needs to do nothing 
further about it. Yet, the bank is allowed to rely on the confirmation he/she sends. This 
means that the surety might be left with no protection at all. This is illustrated 
immediately below. 
2.6.3.5. ii Is it Worth Suing the Solicitor? 
The conclusion extracted from the above paragraph makes one wonder whether it is 
really worth suing the solicitor since his duties are limited. The relevant case here is 
Etridge v Pritchard Englefieldu9 that dismissed the surety's claim against her negligent 
solicitor who advised her on the mortgage transaction. The story or even more accurately 
the Odyssey of Mrs. Etridge is well known by legal academics and students. In this case, 
Mrs. Etridge sued the solicitor who had acted for her when she signed the relevant 
charges with the bank to secure her husband's business debts. The solicitor admitted that 
he had given no advice at all in relation to signing the charges and had falsely certified to 
the bank that he had. However, he argued that his negligence had caused no loss to Mrs. 
Etridge because she would have signed the charges in any event, as the influence of her 
husband was that strong. The judge described his action as disgraceful. Nevertheless, he 
258 Wong, Simone, "No Man Can Serve Two Masters: Independent Legal Advice and Solicitor's Duty of 
Confidentiality" (1998) Corry 457,462. 
259 [1999] Lloyd's Rep. P. N. 702 
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accepted the argument on causation and the Court of Appeal agreeing with him dismissed 
the appeal of Mrs. Etridge. 
Here, we need to pause and note that, in a separate legal proceeding260 with the Bank, 
Mrs. Etridge's appeal against the possession order on the grounds of the O'Brien261 
principle was also unsuccessful. She could not set the charge aside because the bank had 
done what was reasonably required by law (O'Brien) by advising her to take independent 
legal advice. So, Mrs. Etridge could neither bring a successful claim against her negligent 
solicitor nor against the bank. To the eyes of an every day person the Odyssey of Mrs. 
Etridge is shocking and indeed morally unacceptable. Mrs. Etridge suffered a big 
economic loss, not by her own fault, and yet the law was not able to help her. Neither 
practical justice nor the principle of freedom of contract were served. In an era where 
increasingly more reliance is placed on lawyers for protection for nearly all aspects of our 
lives, it is a very strong thing that they can be set free to act negligently with no penalties 
imposed. This constitutes a social problem and not only one of Mrs. Etridge's. A solution 
so as to avoid a similar scenario in the future is thus urgent. 
A possible solution can be found in a duty upon the solicitor to advise on the wisdom of 
the contract and a further duty to discharge himself if his advice is not followed. So, how 
would this be of any help to Mrs. Etridge and any other surety in her position? In the case 
at hand the solicitor did not satisfy himself that Mrs. Etridge was not under undue 
influence. Alarmingly, he was aware of it but said nothing to the bank. If we assume that 
the duty existed, it becomes apparent that there would be a separate breach of the second 
duty here to discharge himself. Had the bank known of his discharge, it would also 
suspect the truth about the undue influence on Mrs. Etridge by her husband. Then having 
been placed "on inquiry" the bank would have taken further steps to ensure that she was 
signing the relevant charges by her free will; if the bank was not satisfied to that end then 
it could not validly have accepted her as a surety. In this way, Mrs. Etridge would be 
protected. By recognizing this duty it is not the husband's undue influence that causes the 
260 Royal Bank of Scoland v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
261 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
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surety's loss any more but the solicitor's failure to inform the bank about that influence. 
The proposition though, is unlikely to be followed bearing in mind the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Banco Exterior Internacional SA v Thomas. 262 It should be recalled 
that even though the solicitor alerted the bank, the bank took no further measures but still 
it was protected as the surety was represented by a solicitor. 
However, issues of confidentiality between solicitor and client are raised, in the event 
that the client refuses to let the solicitor inform the bank of his discharge. In these 
circumstances though, the breach of the duty of confidentiality is not serious, as the 
solicitor is not required to inform the bank of the reasons of his discharge. 263 
On the other hand, a duty to inform the bank does not come trouble free. Firstly, it would 
be very difficult to define where it stops. The issue here is to whom the duty is owed 
exactly? The bank or the surety? The banks will want to argue that such a duty is owed to 
them as well. If the duty is owed to the bank as well, then the bank can come after the 
solicitor who failed to inform the bank of his discharge, so as to be warned of the 
existence of the surety's equity. Such a duty though does not exist. So, the search for 
surety protection measures continues. 
2.6.3.5. iii The Incompetence of Independent Legal Advice 
A very crucial question regarding legal advice asks whether it is suitable for banking or 
financial contracts. If the answer is negative, then arguably, banks should not be allowed 
to rely on the advice of the solicitor at all. 
The reasoning in Inche Noviah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar264 in the Privy Council is 
important here. There it was stated that: "the nature and effect of the transaction had been 
fully explained to the donor (or in our case surety) by some independent qualified person 
262 [1997] 1 W. L. R. 221 
263 At least now, after Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773 the bank cannot proceed 
without the certificate of the solicitor. 
264 [1929] AC. 127,135 per Lord Hailsham L. C. 
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so as to satisfy the court that the donor was acting independently of any influence and 
with the full appreciation of what he was doing. " If it is true that reasonable steps require 
that the transaction be "executed under the advice of a competent adviser capable of 
surveying the whole field with an absolutely independent outlook"265 then it is 
questionable whether the solicitor can be such an adviser. As one commentator266 argues, 
one does not go to the solicitor to obtain financial advice on the financial prospects of a 
company, nor does one approach a corporate analyst to obtain a legal advice. 267 Not many 
solicitors have the necessary skills and expertise to advise the surety on the "whole 
field" 268 This was also recognised by the Privy Council in Clark Boyce v Mouat. 269 This 
is especially the case when the loan is for the purposes of starting a new business but this 
is a small percentage of surety cases. It should be noted though that, most-problematic 
security, as empirical research showed, was often provided to rescue an existing business 
in trouble or to maintain lender support for an existing business (which also suggest 
financial trouble); 270 in these cases it is easy for a solicitor to read a balance sheet and see 
if the business is doing well. In such clear cases a financial advisor is not necessary. 
In relation to difficult cases, where a solicitor cannot furnish full advice, it has been 
suggested that the problem can be surmounted if the creditor requires that the surety 
seeks advice from a firm with expertise on such transactions or from a financial adviser 
as well. However, this does not come trouble-free. Many sureties may not have the 
economic means to pay for such advice. The surety should not have to pay for the 
privilege of doing debtor a favour. In such a case, perhaps the debtor should pay for this 
advice or the bank could pay for external advice. However, it is unlikely that banks 
would consent to that 271 
263 Bullock v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1995] Ch. 317,326. 
266 Chandler, Adrian, "Undue Influence and the Function of Independent Advice" (1995) 111 LQR 51,53. 
267 Also, Fehlberg, Belinda, "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" (1996) 59 
MLR 675,688 notes "Even if truly independent advice is sought, solicitors are unlikely to view themselves 
as being in a position to provide financial or accounting advice to sureties, due to their lack of appropriate 
qualifications and their lack of information about the business for which the security is provided. " 
In Belinda's Empirical research, none of the sureties interviewed said that they had received non-legal 
professional independent advice, for example, from an accountant. 
w [1994] 1 AC. 428,438B. 
270 Fehlberg, Belinda, "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" (1996) 59 MLR 
675. 
271 This is resolved in chapter 8. 
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Apart from the problems with legal advice explained above, it has to be noted that even if 
the courts may be categorising the advice from the solicitor as `independent advice', 
nevertheless it was not perceived by sureties as such at the time by the actors as involving 
any more than the witnessing of a signature 272 Also, in other cases, wives do not confide 
to the solicitor any problems within the relationship or any fears they have. 273 
Another problem with the inadequacy of independent legal advice has to do with the fact 
that wives do not view themselves as having the power to make decisions in the family 
business, 274 even if they are aware of the legal implications of the security agreement. 
This suggests that even truly independent advice may not help wives to decide for 
themselves. 275 
So, it appears that equity is not necessarily served even with a solicitor's involvement 
2.6.3.5. iv The Solicitor's Role - Summary 
The analysis in the paragraphs above revealed that along with banks, solicitors are 
exempted from much responsibility too. They only need to explain to the surety in clear 
words the meaning of the transaction, which with a bit of luck will help her to enter into 
the transaction with free mind. Even if the solicitor is not satisfied to this effect he/she 
needs to do nothing further about it The solicitor is not required to make sure that the 
surety enters into the agreement freely, so the surety is not necessarily protected against 
the possibility of undue influence. In addition, it has been questioned whether solicitors 
are capable to give advice on the whole filed of the transaction. Yet, the bank is allowed 
to rely on the confirmation he/she sends. This means that the surety might be left with no 
protection at all. 
2n Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,171. 
273 "The desire to preserve the impression of relationship unity and not to `air the dirty linen' was strong, 
with the result that [... ] neither the solicitor nor the lender realized the emotional pressure influencing her 
decision. " Ibid, 179. 
274 According to Fehlberg's empirical study, Ibid. 
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The victim of undue influence (whether actual or presumed) or misrepresentation" has 
the right to set the transaction aside as against the wrongdoer. 278 The relevant question, in 
the sphere of the tripartite scenarios with which this thesis is concerned, asks what 
consequences follow from a finding that a third party (a creditor) has notice (whether 
actual, constructive or imputed) of the wrongdoing? Specifically, "three issues have 
arisen in this context: (i) whether in misrepresentation cases the wife can avoid the entire 
transaction or will be bound to repay the creditor the amount she believed she was 
signing for, (ii) whether the wife should be obliged to repay to the creditor any sums of 
money from which she had `benefited' and (iii) the extent to which other legal rules 
unrelated to the O'Brien claim may be applied to reduce or eliminate relief. s279 It has 
been argued, that the Courts have shown willingness at the stage of formulation of 
remedies to reduce the victory of the surety under the O'Brien principle. "While issue (i) 
has been resolved in favour of sureties, (ii) and (iii) still operate as potential limitations 
on O'Brien relief. 9,280 These issues are examined one at a time below. 
2.6.4.1 Rescission on Terms or in Toto? 
The normal remedy in finding that a creditor had notice of the surety's equity is the 
setting aside of the transaction; 281 but to what extent can the transaction be set aside on 
terms? This confusion began at the Court of Appeal in O'Brien, when Scott L. J. held that 
the security was not enforceable against Mrs. O'Brien, save to the extent of £60,000 
which Barclays had already recovered on its charge. The uncertainty was resolved in the 
27 The relevant provisions of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 are presented in the Introduction 1.5.1. 
278 Also, if the guarantor can prove that a misrepresentation is fraudulent, the creditor may be liable in the 
tort of deceit (Deny v Peek (1889) 5 T. L. R. 625. A fraudulent misrepresentation involves a false statement 
made knowingly or recklessly, with the intention that the person to whom it was addressed should act on it: 
Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No. 2) [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 218,224. As to 
exemplary damages in cases of deceit, see Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 
2 A. C. 122. It may, however, be possible to award compound interest on damages for fraud: ClefAquitaine 
SARL vLaporte Materials (Barrow) Ltd [2001] Q. B. 488). For example, the creditor insists that the signing 
of the guarantee is a formality and its enforcement may never be required even though he knows that the 
principal debtor will unavoidably become insolvent (Canterbury Farmers Co-op Assoc Ltd v Lindsay 
[1910] 29 N. Z. L. R. 793). 
279 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,70. 
280 Ibid. 
Court of Appeal cases of Allied Irish Bank v Byrne282 and TSB Bank Plc v Camfield, 283 
where the transactions were set a aside in toto and the possibility of partial rescission was 
denied 284 Belinda Fehlberg, in her book, argues that the decision in Camfield should be 
seen as a victory of sureties. 285 However, even though, this view appears to be correct at 
first glance, a microeconomic analysis suggests otherwise. This discussion is carried out 
in chapter 5, so no more needs to be said at this point 286 
2.6.4.2 Counter Restitution 
As explained in the previous section, the wife has an `equity' to have the transaction set 
aside against her husband, which is capable of enforcement against third parties with 
notice (actual, constructive or imputed) of the equity. The transaction will usually be 
rescinded in its entirety where the wife obtained no benefit for herself from the 
transaction. This was the case in Camfield, 287 where the wife did not obtain any benefit 
from the transaction. 288 In cases, however, where the wife has received a benefit, the right 
to rescission has been held to be conditional upon her making restitutio in integrem or 
counter-restitution. This was held by the Court of Appeal in Dunbar Bank Plc v 
Nadeem 289 It should be noted that the decision does not impugn the principle in Camfield 
since a different issue is raised. 
In Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem, the husband applied to the bank for further funds to 
purchase, jointly with his wife, a new leasehold of the matrimonial property of which he 
was at that time the sole lessee. The bank made the advance to them, which was secured 
281 The right to have the transaction set aside may, of course, be barred by undue delay, acquiescence, 
affirmation, estoppel, or ratification: Allcard v Skinner (1887) L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145 (CA). 
282 [1995] 2 F. L. R. 325 (CA). 
283 [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430. 
284 However, in BankMelli Iran v Samadi-Rad [1995] 2 F. L. R. 367 (CA) the court emphasised the inherent 
flexibility of equity and the mortgage was partially enforced to the extent that the co-habitee had consented. 28s Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surely Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,70. 
286 See 5.5. 
28' TSB Bank Plc v Camfield [1995] 1 All E. R. 951 (CA). 
288 There was nothing for the wife to give back and no cause for her to make restitution as a condition of 
granting relief: see, also, MacKenzie v Royal Bank of Canada [1934] A. C. 468 (PC), 476. 
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by an `all moneys' charge against the property under which the wife became liable, not 
only for her joint debts with the husband but also for his personal debts to the bank. The 
judge had held that the transaction should be set aside because the bank had constructive 
notice of the presumed undue influence of the husband. However, he ordered the wife to 
repay the bank half of the money advanced plus interest. The Court of Appeal decided 
that there had in fact been no undue influence, but nevertheless went on to consider the 
issue of counter-restitution. It had been argued that the imposition of any terms upon a 
setting aside would be wrong in principle and contrary to the decision in Camfield; but, as 
Millet L. J. pointed out, Camfield was different since no benefit had been obtained by the 
wife as a result of the transaction, and it was well established that a party seeking 
rescission must be in a position to make counter-restitution (Erlanger v New Sombrero 
Phosphate Co 290). Also, when the court orders restitution, the basic objective is to restore 
the parties, as closely as possible, to their original positions consequent upon cancelling 
the transaction (Cheese v Thomas). 291 This meant restoring, as a condition of rescission, 
the beneficial interest in the lease, which was the advance acquired by her from the 
transaction and not a proportion of the debt secured by the legal charge. 
An analysis of the facts showed that two transactions existed in this case. The first was an 
agreement between the husband and wife whereby the former agreed to purchase for his 
wife a half interest in the property on terms that she join with him in charging the 
property. As a result of this she obtained a half interest in the equity of redemption 
subject to the bank's charge over the property. The second was an agreement between the 
couple and the bank whereby the wife obtained (jointly with her husband) an advance of 
£260,000 on the terms that £210,000 would be used for the specific purpose of acquiring 
a leasehold interest in the property. The extent, therefore, of her enrichment (in the event 
of the legal charge being set aside) was not the money which was advanced jointly to her 
289 [1998] 3 All E. R. 876 (CA). 
290 (1877) L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1218. 
291 [1994] 1 All E. R. 35 (CA). 
292 This case suggests that benefit in this context falls to be fairly narrowly construed as meaning 
something received directly under the contract to be set aside or one inextricably linked with it, as opposed 
to an indirect benefit such as that received by a wife through the successful operation of her husband's 
business for a period before the creditor sought to enforce the charge: Beale, Hugh; Arrowsmith, Sue (ed. ); 
Chilly on Contracts. 29" ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004,446. 
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and her husband, but the interest in the equity of redemption which she obtained by the 
use of the bank's money. In the instant case, however, the matter was further complicated 
by the fact that there was a subsequent valid charge over the property granted by the 
husband and wife in favour of another bank, which rendered it impossible for the wife to 
restore to her husband the unencumbered interest, which she had obtained from him 
under the first agreement. Had she been able to do so, however, then her beneficial 
interest should vest in the husband. The bank would then have been able to enforce the 
mortgage in priority to the husband's interest, without the wife being in a position to 
assert any interest, which might defeat the bank's claim for possession. In the words of 
Morritt L. J., this would have produced a `just result' because: "The wife's personal 
liability would be extinguished in exchange for the removal of her beneficial interest, 
being the two consequences to her of the two transactions [... ] But the further 
consequence would be that the wife could have no defence to the claim of the bank made 
against her for possession of the property comprised in the lease and charged to the 
bank. "293 
An added illustration of the court's power to set aside a transaction on terms that the 
complainant make counter-restitution as a condition of relief is to be found in Cheese v 
Thomas. 294 In this case, the claimant and the defendant (his great nephew) agreed to buy 
a house for £83,000. The claimant contributed £43,000 towards the purchase price and 
the defendant contributed £40,000, by means of a building society mortgage. The house 
was purchased in the defendant's sole name and it was agreed that the claimant would 
live there until his death and it would thereafter belong to the defendant. When the 
defendant failed to keep up the mortgage payments, the claimant brought proceedings 
seeking rescission of the transaction on the ground of undue influence and repayment of 
the £43,000. The trial judge ordered that the house should be sold and the proceeds of 
sale divided between the parties in the same proportions as they had contributed to the 
purchase price before the building society mortgage was repaid. The difficulty, however, 
was that the house was sold for only £55,000, resulting in a loss of over £27,000 on the 
293 DunbarBankPlc vNadeem [1998] 3 All E. R. 876 (CA), 887-88. 
294 [1994] 1 All E. R 35 (CA). 
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purchase price. The claimant, therefore, argued that he should be entitled to recover the 
whole of the £43,000 paid to the defendant regardless of the fall in the value of the 
property. The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed, holding that the defendant should not 
be required to bear the whole of the loss brought about by the fall in market value and, 
accordingly, upheld the judge's order that each party should get back a proportionate 
share of the net proceeds of sale of the house and thereby shoulder the loss in value 
equally. Sir Donald Nicholls VC set out the governing principles in this way: 
"If the transaction is set aside, the plaintiff also must return what 
he received. Each party must hand back what he obtained under 
the contract. There has to be a giving back and a taking back on 
both sides [... ] It is well established that a court of equity grants 
this type of relief even when it cannot restore the parties 
precisely to the state they were in before the contract. The court 
will grant relief whenever, by directing accounts and making 
allowances, it can do what is practically just [... ] As with the 
jurisdiction to grant relief, so with the precise form of the relief 
to be granted, equity as a court of conscience will look at all the 
"2circumstances and do what fairness requires. " 
Here, the transaction could not be viewed simply as a transfer of £43,000 by the claimant 
to the defendant in return for the right to live in the house. If that were the case, there 
would have been a strong case for ordering repayment of £43,000 regardless of the 
subsequent fall in the value of the house. In those circumstances, a straightforward 
return of the benefits received under the impugned transaction would have been 
appropriate. However, according to Sir Donald Nicholls VC, the transaction was not 
one of simple exchange, but joint venture for the purchase of a property in which both 
parties would contribute and have rights. Therefore, restoring the parties to their original 
295 Cheese v Thomas [1994J I All E. R. 35 (CA), 40,41,42. 
2`6 Ibid, 40. 
291 Newbiggin vAdam (1886) 34 Ch. D. 582 (CA), 595, per Bowen L. J. ("there ought ... to 
be a giving back 
and a taking back on both sides"). 
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positions meant selling the house and returning to each a proportionate share of the net 
proceeds at the date the transaction is set aside. 298 In particular, the court concluded that it 
would be harsh to require the defendant, who had been anxious to provide his great uncle 
with a home, to bear "he whole of the loss flowing from the problems which have beset 
the residential property market for the last year or two. s299 
It is has to be noted that the decision in Cheese v Thomas300 is not an authority for loss 
apportionment. It should be considered as an illustration of a restitutionary claim for the 
value of the benefit conferred. 301 This approach was, in fact, taken in Langton v 
Langton, 302 where the deputy judge, in setting aside a gift, considered whether it would 
be appropriate to compensate the wrongdoer for any expenditure he had incurred in 
pursuance of the transaction as part of the process of restoring the status quo between the 
parties. In this connection, the defendants had sought to recover half of their expenditure 
in respect of the property since the execution of the deed of gift. This, however, fell to be 
balanced against the attendance allowance, which the claimant gave to the defendants for 
looking after him since the date of the gift. The total of such payments was well in excess 
of the expenditure claimed by the defendants and, hence, the deputy judge held it would 
not be practically just to make any payment to the defendants in respect of their 
expenditure on the property. 
Finally, it should be noted that where counter restitution is impossible, the court seeks to 
do what is practically just in all the circumstances and may order the complainant to 
make counter restitution by means of a monetary equivalent. For example, in Midland 
Bank Plc v Greene, 303 the couple held jointly the matrimonial home. They mortgaged the 
property to the bank with an `all moneys' security provision. The major part of the 
298 It has been argued that the Court of Appeal was prompted to reach this conclusion because of the 
absence of any wrongdoing by the defendant: see Chen-Wishart, M., "Loss Sharing, Undue Influence and 
Manifest Disadvantage" (1994) 110 LQR 173,176, who highlights that the defendant was characterised as 
an 'innocent fiduciary' in this case. 
299 Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 All E. R. 35 (CA), 43. See, also, Dixon, M., "Looking up a Remedy for 
Inequitable Conduct" [1994] CLJ 232, fora critique of the decision. 
300 [1994] 1 All E. R 35 (CA). 
301 Goff, Robert, L. A.; Jones, Gareth; Law ofRestitution. Sixth ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002. 
302 [1995] 2 F. L. R. 890. 
303 [1994] 2 F. L. R. 827 
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borrowing was for the purpose of purchasing a leasehold interest, but the charge also 
secured any future debts of the husband. The parties later decided to improve the house 
and obtained from the bank a mortgage advance supported by the earlier security. In this 
case, it would have been inequitable for the wife to be able to avoid the mortgage without 
discharging the debts which she had incurred in order to procure her interest in the 
property. Moreover, the later loan supported by the same mortgage was held to be to the 
wife's advantage and was, therefore, not voidable, on the same basis as the earlier charge. 
The court, therefore, ordered the wife to pay a sum corresponding to the sums due on the 
home loan account established under the later mortgage as a condition of setting aside 
that transaction. It has been argued that this approach gives the court considerable 
flexibility to rewrite the terms of the transaction and to permit a range of remedial 
devices to be used in balancing the interests of the parties. 
2.6.4.3 Severance 
Although the court will not partially set aside a charge, it does have power to order 
severance of distinctly separate guarantees. This issue was introduced in Barclays Bank v 
Calpan. 304 The case involved three distinct documents executed to facilitate a security for 
a loan. The first was a standard `all moneys' charge signed by Mr. and Mrs. Calpan. The 
second was the letter of the offer containing an undertaking from the bank that the charge 
would be limited to the recovery of the home mortgage moneys. These two documents 
were signed together in 1986. A year latter Mr. and Mrs. Calpan signed a side-letter by 
which they agreed to waive that limitation. A solicitor's confirmation existed regarding 
the original charge, but there was no evidence that independent legal advice was given in 
respect of the subsequent side-letter. The question, in this case, asked whether Mrs. 
Calpan was entitled to have the transaction set aside in toto, or only to the extent that the 
1987 side-letter exceeded the terms of the 1986 agreement. Jonathan Sumption Q. C. held 
that the additional liabilities secured by the 1987 side letter could be severed from the rest 
of the transaction with the result that the liabilities initially agreed with the bank in 1986 
304 [1998] 1 F. L. R. 532. 
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could be enforced against the wife whilst the further liabilities (added a year later) could 
not. 
Therefore, although in the majority of cases, the setting aside of the charge is an `all or 
nothing process', this may not always be the case where the objectionable features of the 
document can readily be severed from the rest without rewriting it 30 So, "if, in 
Camfield, the wife had initially executed a limited guarantee, but subsequently the bank 
had sought to extend its effect, the bank could have continued to rely on the original 
security notwithstanding the setting aside of the subsequent agreement "M6 
Some commentators have welcomed this decision arguing that "the harsh consequences 
of Camfield may now be avoided where different transactions can be identified and 
s3o' severed. 
2.6.4.4 Subrogation and Costs 
Of particular interest is the Court of Appeal case of Castle Phillips Finance v 
Piddington, 308 where the "court deployed costs rules and the doctrine of subrogation309 to 
reduce Mrs. Piddington's victory. P2310 
In this case there were three charges over Mrs. Piddington's home. The first charge was 
provided to Lloyds Bank in order to secure Mr. Piddington's debts; subsequently upon 
payment of the debts by Barclays, a second charge was created; then, Castle Phillips (in 
the course of taking its charge) paid out the Barclays charge. The Castle Phillips' security 
305 Barclays BankvCalpan [1998] 1 F. L. R. 532,546. 
306 Wilson, Ian, "The Taking of Security over Domestic Properties in the U. K. -Royal Bank of Scotland v 
Etridge (No. 2)" (1999) JIBL 115,121. 
307 Ibid. 
308 (1995) 70 P. & C. R. 592 (CA). 
309 Which in the context of payment out of prior securities applies to the effect that a third party who pays 
off a mortgage is presumed to intend that the mortgage shall be kept alive for her or his own benefit, 
subject to evidence to the contrary: see Butler v Rice [1910] 2 Ch. 277; Ghana Commercial Bank v 
Chandiram [1960] A. C. 732 (PC), 745 (Lord Jenkins). 
310 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,73. 
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was held void against the wife because of Mr. Piddington's forgery. However, it was held 
that Castle Phillips was subrogated to the earlier Barclays charge and could, thus, demand 
enforcement of that charge to the extent of the sum paid by Barclays to Lloyds. The 
reason given for this decision was that Mrs. Piddington would otherwise receive `a 
windfall benefit'. The second point of interest in this case has to do with the trial judge's 
order, which was upheld by the Court, that Mrs. Piddington pay 35 per cent of Castle 
Phillips' costs on the basis of its subrogation win. 
Belinda Fehlberg, in her book, argues that this case is pro-bank because it provides 
"two further, possible avenues for creditors to avoid the full-scale application of 
O'Brien: namely, costs orders and by establishing that the creditor is subrogated to 
a previous creditor with an enforceable security. , 311 
2.6.4.5 Remedies - Summary 
This section explained the remedies of sureties who succeed on the O'Brien principle of 
notice. A successful surety has the right to set the charge aside in toto. This has been seen 
as a victory of sureties. However, it was illustrated that courts find other ways to reduce 
this victory by way counter restitution for funds received by the wife, severance, 
subrogation and costs. It may be argued that this reflects the judicial creditor-sympathetic 
approach which was exhibited throughout this entire chapter. 
2.6.5 Summary of Defects within the O'Brien Principles 
With the analysis above, the study of the evolution of the law until the decision of the 
House of Lords in Etridge312 (No-2) is complete. Before moving to study the new rules as 
set by the House of Lords, it is necessary shortly to repeat and bring together the 
weakness of the law that Etridge (No. 2) wanted to refine. 
31' Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,74. 
312 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
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Under the O'Brien 313 principle it is difficult for a surety-wife to avoid liability under the 
charge, since she needs to satisfy a four-stage test. Establishing liability against the bank 
involved an indirect method by applying an obscure doctrine of notice of the husband's 
wrongdoing upon the bank. 
Under the first step, establishing a legal wrong against the husband is not particularly 
easy, since traditional doctrines (of misrepresentation and undue influence) are not 
designed specifically to capture within their ambit the vulnerability of sureties. 
Also, placing the bank "on inquiry" was proven problematic for sureties. According to 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, the bank is put "on inquiry" when the transaction is not "on its 
face" to the financial advantage of the wife; and there "is a substantial risk in transactions 
of this kind that, in procuring the wife to act as surety, the husband committed a legal or 
an equitable wrong that entitles the wife to set aside the transaction. , 314 Taking first the 
"on its face" element, this proved very artificial, technical and did not concentrate on 
substance. The requirement focused on the on how the transaction appeared to the bank 
rather than what happened in reality. Cases like CIBC Mortgages Plc V Pitt 315 and 
Woohvich Plc v Gomm316 "demonstrate the superficiality of the "on its face" 
requirement. 9,317 Both cases involved extreme examples of vulnerability; in the first case, 
the wife could not do anything without her husband's permission and in the second case, 
the wife was at some point after the separation admitted to a psychiatric clinic. In these 
cases, the surety underwent her husband's undue influence but still she was unable to set 
the charge aside as the transaction appeared in the bank's eyes to be in her interest. 
Ironically, Mrs. O'Brien who was a businesswoman managed to set the charge aside. 
Fehlberg318 very accurately spotted that people who give security as a result of undue 
influence are unlikely to have any control as to how they appear in the documentation. 
313 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
3141bid, 196. 
316 [1993] 4 All E. R. 433. 
316 (2000) 79 P. & C. R. 61 (CA). 
317 Wong, Simone, "Revisiting Barclays Bank v O'Brien and Independent Legal Advice for Vulnerable 
Sureties" (2002) JBL 439,443. 
318 Fehlberg, Belinda, "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" (1996) 59 MLR 
675,675. 
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So, the test fails to trace and cure undue influence. So, the primary objective of the law 
"to protect people from being forced, tricked or misled in any way by others parting with 
their property" 319 is not achieved. Equity is not served and surely one cannot suggest that 
practical justice is achieved. 
Secondly, the condition that the transaction must not be to the financial benefit of the 
wife is to all intents and purposes the requirement of `manifest disadvantage'. So, until 
the judgment of the House of Lords in Etridge320 (No. 2), manifest disadvantage had a 
double role; it helped to raise the presumption of undue influence and to place the bank 
"on inquiry". This label has been used in a narrow sense to refer to a transaction that is 
disadvantageous to the surety on a financial basis only. 321 What is more, Bennetr322 made 
the position of the surety-wife even more difficult. Her indirect benefit from the 
husband's business made the loan to her financial advantage. As a result, the financial 
dependence on her husband is proved a double curse to her. It initially puts her in an 
unavoidable position in placing a mortgage over her house and then prohibits her from 
using her equitable defence to set the charge aside. 
Moving now further, the reasonable steps a bank had to take to avoid constructive notice 
as set by Lord Browne-Wilkinson was also proven problematic. Once the bank is put on 
notice, "the bank rebuts the notice of the vitiating factor if it insists that the wife attends a 
prior meeting (in the absence of her husband) with a representative of the creditor at 
which she is told the extent of her liability as a surety, warned of the risk she is running 
and urged to take legal advice . 
023 However, in practice banks avoided meeting the wife 
privately, as prescribed in O'Brien, because this would expose them to greater risks of 
liability. So, they were usually advising the prospective surety to take independent legal 
advice, without inquiring later into the advice given or if it was ever actually given, 
unloading in this way the burden on solicitors to bear. 
319 A1lcard v Skinner (1887) L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145,182 per Lindley L. J. 
320 Royal Bank ofScotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
321 Wong, Simone, "Revisiting Barclays Bank v O'Brien and Independent Legal Advice for Vulnerable 
Sureties" (2002) JBL 439,443. 
322Bank ofScotland v Bennett [1999] 1 F. L. R. 1151. 
323 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL), 196. 
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This practice has caused much controversy of opinions in various cases as to the role of 
the requirement to take independent legal advice. On the one hand, cases such as Banco 
Exterior International v Mann, 324 Massey v Midland Bank PIc, 325 Midland Bank v 
Serter, 326 Barclays Bank Plc v Thomson, 327 and Banco Exterior International v Thomas328 
take a very narrow interpretation of O'Brien. In these cases, the independent legal advice 
requirement was treated as a formality, which could easily be satisfied by the bank 
merely telling the surety to seek such advice, without questioning later the quality of the 
advice. This is also the case even if the solicitor alerts the bank or acts for the bank as 
well. So, even though O'Brien proposed for a higher level of investigation when security 
is given for the husband's business than for domestic reasons, later cases minimised what 
the bank was required to do. On the other hand, Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v 
Burch329 took a more stringent approach by requiring high standards of advice so as to 
ensure that the surety enters the transaction with independent and informed consent. Due 
to the confusion caused by the above conflicting opinions, the Court of Appeal in 
Etridge330 (No. 2) tried to give clear guidelines. The requirements placed upon the 
solicitors were characterized as too burdensome. Given these problems and controversies 
within the law, the House of Lords' job, aiming to find the correct formula so as to set 
clear rules and satisfy the needs all the parties involved, was not an easy one. 
Coming now to the solicitor's role, it has been seriously questioned whether a solicitor is 
the appropriate party to explain to a surety the nature of the transaction, as this task 
should clearly involve financial, economic and business expertise, which is not normally 
within the province of the legal profession. Furthermore, even if solicitors possess the 
appropriate skill to give such advice, it is doubted that all sureties can afford the fees of 
such a solicitor. Also, in the absence of a duty to disclose information about the debtor's 
financial position, even financially inclined solicitors cannot logically give satisfactory 
324 [1995] 1 A11E. R 936. 
325 [1995] 1 AllE. R. 929. 
326 [1995] 1 F. L. R. 1034. 
327 [1997] 4 All E. R. 816. 
328 [1997] 1 All E. R. 46. 
329 [1997] 1 All E. R. 144. 
330 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [1998] 4 All E. R 705. 
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advice to sureties. In addition, even if one assumes that the surety receives the best 
possible advice and understands the nature and effect of the transaction with the aid of a 
suitable solicitor, it does not follow that the surety cannot be subjected to undue 
influence. The core of the problem of most undue influence cases has to do not with lack 
of understanding but with lack of consent and free will. The example of the gunman 
illustrated the point very well. This problem is not effectively dealt with. This is apparent 
if one considers that many cases were of the view that solicitors are not required to advise 
about the wisdom of the transaction nor to veto a surety's decision. As a result even if a 
solicitor realises that undue influence exists still the solicitor is not required to do 
anything more and the surety will move along with the transaction. As it appears not only 
banks but also solicitors are exempted from liability. 
2.7 Inequality of Bareainin2 Power 
Moving now a bit further in the various approaches taken by the courts, the case of 
Lloyds Bank v Bundy331 is very important. There Lord Denning MR tried to formulate a 
wide doctrine of inequality of bargaining power; 332 this would be capable to capture 
many different cases, which were treated under separate doctrines. 
In that case the surety was an old farmer, naive in business who executed a mortgage 
over his farm, his only valuable asset, to secure an overdraft facility for his son's 
company. The bank manager did not explain to him the extent of his son's financial 
position and his commitment and did not advise him to take independent legal advice. 
The old man "just sat down and did as he was told". The Court of Appeal set the charge 
aside against the bank. In short, the reasons for this decision were that there was reliance 
that created a fiduciary relationship between the bank and the surety, the bank knew 
about it and the bank could obtain interest from the transaction. Lord Denning M. R 
stated that the guarantee and charge in that case could be set aside not only on the basis of 
undue influence, but, alternatively, on the broader ground of "inequality of bargaining 
331 (1975) 1 Q. B. 326 (CA). 
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power". This ground, according to Lord Denning M. R, could be regarded as embracing 
the intervention of equity in cases of duress of goods, "colore officii, " unconscionable 
transactions, undue influence, undue pressure and salvage agreements. Referring to the 
doctrine, Lord Denning M. R. said: 
"there are cases in our books in which the courts will set aside a 
contract, or a transfer of property, when the parties have not met 
on equal terms - when the one is so strong in bargaining power 
and the other so weak - that, as a matter of common fairness, it 
is not right that the strong should be allowed to push the weak to 
the wall. Hitherto those exceptional cases have been treated each 
as a separate category in itself. But I think the time has come 
when we should seek to find a principle to unite them. , 333 
Such a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power would be to the benefit of sureties. 
Banks, when dealing with prospective sureties, would have a duty to ensure that they are 
not taking advantage of the inequality of bargaining power between themselves and the 
sureties. Nevertheless, despite the vigorous attempt to establish a wide all embracing 
doctrine of inequality of bargaining power, this general principle was rejected in National 
Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan, 334 so that inequality of bargaining power cannot now be 
regarded as a basis for setting aside guarantees. 
Lord Scarman in Morgan rejecting the proposition of Lord Denning M. R. for a wider 
doctrine of inequality of bargaining power said, "the fact of an unequal bargain will, of 
course, be a relevant feature in some cases of undue influence. But it can never become 
an appropriate basis of principle of an equitable doctrine which is concerned with 
transactions not to be reasonably accounted for on the ground of friendship, relationship, 
charity, or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act and even in the field of 
332 See generally Beatson, J.; Ansons Law of Contract. 28th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002,298- 
300. 
333 Lloyds Bankv Bundy (1975) 1 Q. B. 326 (CA), 336-7, emphasis added. 334 National Westminster Bank PlcvMorgan [1985] A. C. 686. 
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contract I question whether there is any need in the modem law to erect a general 
principle of relief against inequality of bargaining power. Parliament"' has undertaken 
the task - and it is essentially a legislative task - of enacting such restrictions upon 
freedom of contract as are in its judgment necessary to relieve against the mischief. "336 
So, it appears once more that courts preferred the creditor-sympathetic approach. 
2.8 Conclusion 
The effort in this chapter was to look at the various mechanisms used by courts over the 
years in their effort to help vulnerable sureties to set aside security agreements, which 
were entered into as a result of some legal wrong (such as undue influence or 
misrepresentation). The conclusion is that none of these principles can adequately deal 
with the special problems of vulnerable sureties. Also, it appeared that English courts 
systematically take the approach that serves the interests of banks better. 
The "Romily Heresy"337 was first looked at. Under this method the charge could be set 
aside against the creditor if the surety entered into the agreement without full 
understanding of the terms and the implications of the deed. Unfortunately, this method 
was rejected by the House of Lords in 0 Brien. 338 A surety's lack of understanding was 
not seen as a sufficient ground for avoiding liability. Then the Australian case of Yerkey v 
Jones339 was looked at. This case treated women as a special protected class. The effect 
of this principle was that security might be unenforceable, notwithstanding that the bank 
333 For example, the hire-purchase and consumer protection legislation, of which the Supply of Goods 
(Implied Terms) Act 1973, Consumer Credit Act 1974, Consumer Safety Act 1978, Supply of Goods and 
Services Act 1982 and Insurance Companies Act 1982 are examples. I doubt whether the courts should 
assume the burden of formulating further restrictions. 
336 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] A. C. 686,708, emphasis added. " `Inequality of 
bargaining power' has been dismissed as an underpinning principle in the case law - rightly, as it cannot 
explain the need for special disadvantage and the relevance of the terms of the transaction": Bamforth, 
Nicholas, "Unconscionability as a Vitiating Factor" (1995) 4 LMCLQ 538,555. 
337 Named after Lord Romilly who set the idea in Hoghton vHoghton (1852) 15 Beav. 278. 
338 Barclays BankPk v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
339 (1939) 63 C. L. R. 649,683 "[1]f a married woman's consent to become a surety for her husband's debt is 
procured by the husband and without understanding its effect in essential respects she executes an 
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had no knowledge of, and was not responsible for, the debtor's wrongdoing. Again, this 
principle was rejected by the House of Lords in 0 Brien 340 Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
argued that instead of giving special treatment to wives the public interest of making sure 
that the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile carried more weight 341 
However, empirical research revealed that even today women are in need of protection, 
despite the apparent equality of the sexes and hence special protection should be afforded 
to them. 
Then the route of agency by treating the husband as the creditor's agent was examined. 
This was also rejected. This may be justified since it does not seem appropriate to hold an 
individual as an agent of the bank. But of course one cannot deny that if the bank leaves 
everything to the husband, then it is really turning a blind eye to an obvious reality and it 
would be wrong not to hold the bank morally and legally liable for this. But once more 
the courts applied a creditor-sympathetic approach and as a result it is very difficult to 
prove agency between the debtor and the creditor. 
The agency principle in relation to the solicitor acting for the wife was also examined. 
Under this method, if the solicitor realised when advising the wife that she was acting 
under undue influence, this knowledge was imputed to the bank, so that the bank could 
not rely on its security. Also, negligent advice given by the solicitor rendered the security 
unenforceable, since the solicitor was acting as the bank's agent. Price, 342 arguing in 
favour of the agency principle, expressed the opinion that, "in reality, the solicitor acts in 
a dual capacity, as agent of the bank to advise the wife and ad hoc as the wife's agent in 
giving the advice. " However, their Lordships in Etridge (No. 2)343 abolished the agency 
principle. Once more, the judiciary preferred the option that secures the interests of banks 
better. 
instrument of suretyship which the creditor accepts without dealing directly with her personally, she has a 
prima facie right to have it set aside. " 
40 [19941 1 AC 180,195. 
34' Ibid, 188. 
342 Price, N. S., "Undue Influence: Finis Litium? " (1998) 114 LQR 186,188. 
343 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
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Then the 0 Brien344 principle of notice was examined. This technique also turned out to 
be problematic, while many issues needed clarification. Under the O'Brien principle, it is 
difficult for a surety-wife to avoid liability under the charge, since she needs to satisfy a 
four-stage test. The problems of each step were summarized in a previous section, so in 
order to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to the discussion there. 345 
Finally, the inequality of bargaining power doctrine, which Lord Denning M. R tried to 
formulate in Lloyds Bank v Bundy, 346 was looked at There Lord Denning MR tried to 
formulate a wide doctrine of inequality of bargaining power; this would be capable of 
capturing or grouping many different cases, which were treated under separate doctrines. 
Such a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power would be to the benefit of sureties. 
Banks, when dealing with prospective sureties, would have a duty to ensure that they are 
not taking advantage of the inequality of bargaining power between themselves and the 
sureties. However, this idea did not prosper either. So, it appears that English courts, in 
their desire to protect market interest always preferred creditor-sympathetic outcomes. 
So, it appears that adequate protection was not given to sureties and the law was in need 
of much clarification. The main problem relates to the fact that establishing liability 
against the bank involved an indirect method of applying an obscure doctrine of notice of 
the husband's wrongdoing upon the bank. But one may question this approach. Is it really 
right to treat banks as third parties when in fact they contract with sureties directly and 
gain from these transactions? If the bank enters into a contract with the surety in unfair 
circumstances (the surety being under undue influence, misrepresentations, 
misunderstandings) and accepts a benefit (the security agreement), why should the bank 
be treated as a third party? So, one may ask if the surety is in need of protection only 
against the husband's wrongdoing. If the bank fails to discharge its duties towards the 
surety, to have the surety independently advised, then why should the surety have to 
establish wrongdoing on behalf of her husband first before imposing liability against the 
bank? The courts have not provided an answer to this question. Instead they took a 
"« Barclays Bank Pic v O'Brien [199411 A. C. 180 (HL). 
'45 See 2.6.5. 
3'6(1975) 1 Q. B. 326 (CA). 
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creditor-sympathetic approach by treating the creditor as a third party to the debtor's 
wrong. The better approach would be to focus directly on the conduct of the creditor. 
Also, there is the question of what type of protection sureties need. It is usually assumed 
that legal advice should be given. However, in this chapter it was seriously questioned 
whether a solicitor is the appropriate professional to provide advice since the task 
requires financial, economic and business expertise, which is not normally within the 
province of the legal profession. So, advice may need to be financial or a mixture of both. 
Also, in the absence of a duty on the creditor to disclose information about the debtor's 
financial position the advisor cannot logically give satisfactory advice to sureties. 
Furthermore, there is also the issue of who will pay for all this advice. Should the surety 
have to pay for making the debtor a favour? In addition, even if one assumes that the 
surety receives the best possible advice and understands the nature and effect of the 
transaction with the aid of a suitable professional it does not follow that the surety cannot 
be subjected to undue influence. What happens between the couple behind closed doors is 
beyond the power of any independent advisor. These questions need to be addressed and 
considered with care, having in mind the need for protection of sureties on the one hand 
and the need to preserve the importance of suretyship on the other. The next chapter 
continues the same discussion with an examination of the judgment of the House of 
Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2), 347 which reformulated the tests of 
the O Brien principle of notice. It will be interesting to see if the House of Lords 
managed to give answers to these questions and to finally solve the problems of the 
O'Brien principle. 
347 [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
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Chapter 3 
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) 
Aim: Assess as to what extent their Lordships managed to clarify the law and whether this 
law strikes the desired balance between the interests of sureties, debtors and creditors 
Method: Deconstruction of the judgment in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) and 
case-law analysis 
Conclusion: Despite the improvement of the law, still the desired balance is not achieved 
3.1 Introduction 
The thrust of this chapter is to discuss the decision of the House of Lords in Royal Bank 
of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2)1 and examine whether the problems of the O'Brien principle 
have been resolved. 
It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that the Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien2 
principle proved very complicated. "Particular problems had arisen with the meaning of 
presumed undue influence and the role of manifest disadvantage, the concept of notice or 
inquiry, the steps which a lender had to take to ward off the undue influence [... ] and the 
impact of a solicitor's failure to give adequate advice. In other words, hardly anyone 
knew what the law required. )93 Judging from the above, the decision of the House of 
Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) had been anxiously awaited for a long 
time both by those directly affected (banks, solicitors and sureties) and academic writers. 
'Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
s Barclays Bank Plc vO Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
3 Dixon, Martin, "The Limits of Undue Influence Explained (again)" (2002) 35 SL Rev 59. 
4 In October 2001, their Lordships dealt with eight conjoint appeals, all concerning the commonplace 
security offered by wives to their husband's or his company's indebtedness by charging the matrimonial 
home. As the money lent by the creditor was advanced only to the husband, the wife was thus a guarantor 
(a surety). In seven of the appeals, the wife sought to set the charge aside against the bank. In the eighth 
appeal, she sought damages from the solicitor who had advised her before she entered the mortgage. The 
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Generally, the underlying principles and the substance of the law as laid down in 0 Brien 
remained untouched. The practical steps a bank and a solicitor need to take have been 
altered. The aim of the House of Lords was to clear all misunderstandings and 
misconceptions and reformulate the tests laid down in O'Brien with simple and 
practically operable steps for banks and solicitors to follow. In setting these new rules, 
the goal, as always, was to achieve a fair balance between the interests of all parties 
involved. 
The object of discussion here is tripartite; first, to describe the new rules; second, to 
examine how they were applied in subsequent cases; and third, to assess as to what extent 
their Lordships managed to clarify the law and whether this law strikes the desired 
balance between the interests of sureties debtors and creditors. 
3.2 Analysis of Etridge No. 2) 
In examining the new rules, the judgment can be divided under four broad headings, 
which represent the four stages of a successful claim to avoid liability under the charge. 
These are: 1) Establishing a Legal Wrong; 2) "On inquiry"; 3) Reasonable Steps for 
Banks; and 4) The Solicitor's Role. Other emerging sub-themes are also examined. It 
should be noted that the position regarding rescission will not be analysed here having 
been fully presented in the previous chapter. 
3.2.1 Establishing a Legal Wrong 
3.2.1. i Burden of Proof and Presumptions 
"Whether a transaction was brought about by the exercise of undue influence is a 
question of fact. Here, as elsewhere, the general principle is that he who asserts a wrong 
has been committed must prove it. The burden of proving an allegation of undue 
significance of this decision though lies less in the facts of each case but in the dicta of the redefined 
principles. 
115 
influence rests upon the person who claims to have been wronged. This is the general 
rule. The evidence required to discharge the burden of proof depends on the nature of the 
alleged undue influence, the personality of the parties, their relationship, the extent to 
which the transaction cannot readily be accounted for by the ordinary motives of ordinary 
persons in that relationship, and all the circumstances of the case. "5 With this Lord 
Nicholls is not adding anything new but just restating the general exposition of the 
doctrine. He then went on to consider the situation when the burden of proof reverses 
from the claimant, wife, to the other party. "Proof that the complainant placed trust and 
confidence in the other party in relation to the management of the complainant's financial 
affairs, coupled with a transaction which calls for explanation, will normally be 
sufficient, failing satisfactory evidence to the contrary, to discharge the burden of proof. 
On proof of these two matters the stage is set for the court to infer that, in the absence of 
a satisfactory explanation, the transaction can only have been procured by undue 
influence. In other words, proof of these two facts is prima facie evidence that the 
defendant abused the influence he acquired in the parties' relationship. He preferred his 
own interests. He did not behave fairly to the other. So, the evidential burden then shifts 
to him. It is for him to produce evidence to counter the inference which otherwise should 
be drawn. 956 As it appears, a wife will have to show that the allegation of undue influence 
is well founded. 
His Lordship was at pains to explain that not every transaction of people in a relationship 
of trust and confidence raises the presumption of undue influence. He argues that "It 
would be absurd for the law to presume that every gift by a child to a parent, or every 
transaction between a client and his solicitor or between a patient and his doctor, was 
brought about by undue influence unless the contrary is affirmatively proved. Such a 
presumption would be too far-reaching. The law would be out of touch with everyday life 
if the presumption were to apply to every Christmas or birthday gift by a child to a 
parent, or to an agreement whereby a client or patient agrees to be responsible for the 
reasonable fees of his legal or medical adviser. The law would be rightly open to ridicule, 
'Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, per Lord Nicholls, para. 13. 6Ibid. 14. 
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for transactions such as these are unexceptionable. 997 In effect, his Lordship is saying that 
not every transaction between members of a family, whether these are parent and child 
(formerly described as class 2A) or husband and wife (formerly described as class 2B), 
will be liable to be set aside. In order to raise the presumption something more is needed, 
something which calls for explanation. "When that something more is present, the greater 
the disadvantage to the vulnerable person, the more cogent must be the explanation 
before the presumption will be regarded as rebutted.. "s The last factor can be said to be 
the equitable counterpart of the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The selected 
passages show that his Lordship acknowledges the possibility of people getting into 
transactions as a type of favour or expression of love and affection without there being 
any procedural impropriety involved. It is for this reason that in order to raise a 
presumption of undue influence one needs to prove two criteria even if a case would once 
fall under class 2A. This in effect can mean only one thing that "as no presumption of 
wrongdoing can now arise merely from the relationship of the parties' class 2B 
necessarily stands redundant s9 So, the pointless and confusing split of presumed undue 
influence in two subcategories is now gone as these categories are now merged into one. 
This is a positive step because as their Lordships rightly observed the various 
classifications added mystery rather than illumination. "However the jettisoning of this 
taxonomy is in large a cosmetic measure. The three strands (actual undue 
influence/protected relationship undue influence/undue influence presumed on the facts) 
remain. What is emphasised is the difficulty in raising the presumption outside of certain 
cases of protected relationships and furthermore the fact that the presumption can always 
be rebutted by evidence that influence was not exerted or that the wife exercised 
independent judgment It seems safe to predict that it should be more difficult to impugn 
a transaction on the grounds of undue influence in the future. "10 
7 Ibid, 24. 
8lbid, 24. 
9 Haley, Michael, "Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2). The O'Brien Defence -a Compromise Reworked? " (2002)14 CFLQ 93,96. 
10 McMeel, Gerard, "England and Wales" (2002)10 RLR 162,177-180. 
117 
3.2.1. ii Manifest Disadvantage 
It is thus clear that even though the relationship of husband and wife or parent and child 
is one of trust and confidence, it is not in itself enough to raise the presumption. 
Something else is needed which does not relate to the nature of their relationship but to 
the nature of the transaction. This is where the role of manifest disadvantage comes into 
play, which was redefined and confirmed by Lord Nicholls. 
As already explained, the complainant surety must prove: 1) the existence of a 
relationship of trust and confidence in the other party (the debtor); and 2) a transaction 
that "calls for an explanation. " He thought the second requirement as a necessary 
limitation upon the width of the first prerequisite. " So, really this second prerequisite 
replaces manifest disadvantage. However, it should be noted that, although manifest 
disadvantage is no longer a precondition for the cause of action in presumed undue 
influence, it is still useful as an evidential tool. Arguably, by reducing the role of manifest 
disadvantage, the Etridge12 (No-2) case provides wider discretion to judges to scrutinise 
whether advantage has been taken of the surety by shifting the focus away from the 
financial disadvantage of the transaction. This is clearly a positive test. It should be noted 
though that their Lordships specified that normally a security by a wife in support of her 
husband's business is not a transaction, which calls for explanation. 
3.2.2 "On Inquiry" 
Moving now a step further, once the surety manages to establish her equitable right to set 
the charge aside the next question remains as to whether the bank has notice of this 
equity. The "on inquiry" element, as applied after O Brien, 13 attracted much criticism. 
So, according to Lord Nicholls the test for determining whether the bank is put "on 
inquiry" must be simple, clear, and easy to apply. It would not have to be necessary every 
time a couple approaches a bank for a loan to investigate into their relationship. So, the 
11 Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002]2 A. C. 773, para. 24. 121bid. 
13 Barclays BankPk v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
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House of Lords rejected that for a lender to be "on inquiry" it had to be aware that the 
parties were cohabiting or that the surety put faith in the principal debtor's financial 
position. Instead, their Lordships prescribed a new easier formula. 
Lord Nicholls redefined the test which was laid down by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
O'Brien where he said: "Therefore in my judgment a creditor is put on inquiry when a 
wife offers to stand surety for her husband's debts by the combination of two factors: (a) 
the transaction is on its face not to the financial advantage of the wife; and (b) there is a 
substantial risk in transactions of that kind that, in procuring the wife to act as surety, the 
husband has committed a legal or equitable wrong that entitles the wife to set aside the 
transaction! " Lord Nicholls then summarised this passage to be taken to simply mean 
that a bank is put "on inquiry" whenever a wife offers to stand surety for her husband's 
debts. 15 This way he is placing the threshold test lower than in previous cases. He 
explained that in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge16 "the Court of Appeal, 
comprising of Stuart-Smith, Millett and Morritt L. Js, interpreted this passage more 
restrictively. The threshold, the court said, is somewhat higher. Where condition (a) is 
satisfied, the bank is put on inquiry if, but only if, the bank is aware that the parties are 
cohabiting or that the particular surety places implicit trust and confidence in the 
principal debtor in relation to her financial affairs. 9917 He then went on to disagree with 
the Court of Appeal and stated that "I do not read (a) and (b) as factual conditions which 
must be proved in each case before a bank is put on inquiry. I do not understand Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson to have been saying that, in husband and wife cases, whether the bank 
is put on inquiry depends on its state of knowledge of the parties' marriage, or of the 
degree of trust and confidence the particular wife places in her husband in relation to her 
financial affairs. "" This is because as he explains "that would leave banks in a state of 
considerable uncertainty in a situation where it is important they should know clearly 
where they stand. The test should be simple, clear and easy to apply in a wide range of 
circumstances. I read (a) and (b) as Lord Browne-Wilkinson's broad explanation of the 
14Ibid. 196. 
1s Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 44. 
16 Royal Bank of Scodland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [1998] 4 All E. R. 705. "Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 45. 18lbid, para. 46. 
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reason why a creditor is put "on inquiry" when a wife offers to stand surety for her 
husband's debts. These are the two factors which, taken together, constitute the 
underlying rationale. "19 So, the only practical way forward is to regard banks as put "on 
inquiry" in every case where the relationship between the surety and the debtor is non- 
commercial. i20 So, to take the example of Lord Nicholls, in the case where a father puts 
forward his daughter as a surety for his business overdraft, banks need not evaluate 
highly personal matters such as the degree of trust and confidence between them. 
Knowledge by the bank of the relationship of father and daughter alone should suffice to 
put the bank "on inquiry". So, when the bank knows of the relationship, it must then take 
reasonable steps to ensure the daughter knows what she is letting herself into. 21 
With this analysis of O'Brien, Lord Nicholls sets a clear test for banks enabling them to 
identify easily when they are put "on inquiry". 22 
The position regarding sureties is clear. "On the other side of the line is the case where 
money is being advanced, or has been advanced, to husband and wife jointly. In such a 
case the bank is not put "on inquiry", unless the bank is aware the loan is being made for 
the husband's purposes, as distinct from their joint purposes. "'' The hesitation of the 
Court to impose constructive notice in such a case is understandable, as unnecessary 
obstacles would be imposed to couples borrowing money jointly. Still, the possibility of 
undue influence is still present as the vulnerable surety will have no say or control as to 
how she appears on the documentation. So, a joint mortgage may appear to be intended to 
finance a joint venture or buy a new family car, when in fact it is intended to be used for 
a spouse's unilateral purposes. This is what happened in CIBC Mortgages v Pitt, where 
the loan was advanced presumably to buy a holiday home for the family but instead the 
husband used and lost it all to buy shares in the stock market. In such cases the mortgage 
will ironically stand. 
19Ibid, para. 46. 
20 Royal Bank ofScotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 87. 
21 Ibid, para. 84. 
u He then went on to add that "the position is likewise if the husband stands surety for his wife's debts. 
Similarly, in the case of unmarried couples, whether heterosexual or homosexual, where the bank is aware 
of the relationship, Ibid, para. 47. 
231bid, para. 48. 
24 [1994] 1 A. C. 200. 
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Paradoxically though, the bank is put "on inquiry" when the wife becomes surety for the 
debts of a company in which she has shares even if she is a secretary or director. Lord 
Nicholls explained that "her shareholding may be nominal, or she may have a minority 
shareholding or an equal shareholding with her husband. In my view the bank is put on 
inquiry in such cases, even when the wife is a director or secretary of the company. Such 
cases cannot be equated with joint loans. The shareholding interests, and the identity of 
the directors, are not a reliable guide to the identity of the persons who actually have the 
conduct of the company's business. "u 
Obviously, the new formula prescribed by the House of Lords places the threshold much 
lower than the O'Brien 26 test. This new principle, as their Lordships themselves 
acknowledged, 27 moves the law beyond arbitrary boundaries and closer to decisions like 
Burch. 28 The decision is thus very valuable for the purposes of this thesis as it takes a step 
closer to unconscionability. However, joint borrowers are still not protected. Most 
importantly liability against the bank is still imposed indirectly. 
3.2.3 Reasonable Stens for Banks 
3.2.3. i Private Meetin! 
Moving now a step further, once the bank is put "on inquiry", it can avoid being fixed 
with constructive notice if it takes sufficient steps to ensure that the wife understands the 
transaction. 
Regarding this point, Lord Nicholls, acknowledged that "the practice of the banks 
involved in the present cases, and it seems reasonable to assume this is the practice of 
banks generally, is not to have a private meeting with the wife. Nor do the banks 
themselves take any other steps to bring home to the wife the risk she is running. This has 
zs Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 49. 
'Barclays BankPk v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
2' Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. para. 85. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA). 
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continued to be the practice since the decision in O'Brien's case. Banks consider they 
would stand to lose more than they would gain by holding a private meeting with the 
wife. They are, apparently, unwilling to assume the responsibility of advising the wife at 
such a meeting. Instead, the banking practice remains, as before, that in general the bank 
requires a wife to seek legal advice. The bank seeks written confirmation from a solicitor 
that he has explained the nature and effect of the documents to the wife. 9%29 He then went 
on to add that "it is plainly neither desirable nor practicable that banks should be required 
to attempt to discover for themselves whether a wife's consent is being procured by the 
exercise of undue influence of her husband. This is not a step the banks should be 
expected to take. Nor, further, is it desirable or practicable that banks should be expected 
to insist on confirmation from a solicitor that the solicitor has satisfied himself that the 
wife's consent has not been procured by undue influence. As already noted, the 
circumstances in which banks are put "on inquiry" are extremely wide. They embrace 
every case where a wife is entering into a suretyship transaction in respect of her 
husband's debts. Many, if not most, wives would be understandably outraged by having 
to respond to the sort of questioning which would be appropriate before a responsible 
solicitor could give such a confirmation. In any event, solicitors are not equipped to carry 
out such an exercise in any really worthwhile way, and they will usually lack the 
necessary materials. Moreover, the legal costs involved, which would inevitably fall on 
the husband who is seeking financial assistance from the bank, would be substantial. To 
require such an intrusive, inconclusive and expensive exercise in every case would be an 
altogether disproportionate response to the need to protect those cases, presumably a 
small minority, where a wife is being wronged. )M So, "the furthest a bank can be 
expected to go is to take reasonable steps to satisfy itself that the wife has had brought 
home to her, in a meaningful way, the practical implications of the proposed transaction. 
This does not wholly eliminate the risk of undue influence or misrepresentation. But it 
does mean that a wife enters into a transaction with her eyes open so far as the basic 
elements of the transaction are concemed. s31 So, the House of Lords in Etridge (No. 2) 
z9 Roy+al Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 51. 301bid, para. 53. 
31 Ibid, para. 54. 
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recognized that banks are justified in resisting meetings with the surety. 32 For this reason, 
their Lordships formulated an additional and alternative route by which banks may 
discharge their obligations. 
3.2.3. ii Solicitor's Confirmation 
Now the bank must communicate directly with the wife and obtain from her the name of 
the solicitor she wishes to act for her. 33 She must be told: 
1. that the bank will require, for its own protection, written confirmation from a 
solicitor that he has fully explained the nature of the documents and the practical 
implications they will have for her; 
2. that the purpose of this requirement is that later she will not be able to dispute that 
she is legally bound; and 
3. she may be advised by the same solicitor as her husband but she may nominate a 
different one if she wishes. 
The House of Lords prescribed that the bank must not proceed with the transaction until 
it has received the relevant written confirmation from the solicitor. 34 The bank is allowed 
to rely on this certificate even if the solicitor advised negligently. This is because the 
solicitor is not acting as the bank's agent. In addition, the House of Lords specifically 
rejected3S Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch36 that if the transaction is "one 
into which no competent solicitor could properly advise the wife to enter"37, confirmation 
that legal advice has been given by a solicitor will be insufficient to avoid the creditor 
being fixed with constructive notice. These steps are quite clear. 
However, it is apparent that they are reformulated in such a way that the bank may avoid 
being fixed with constructive notice easily, as it is not really required to provide any 
321bid, Lord Clyde expressed the same opinion, para. 95. 
331bid, para. 79. 
341bid, para. 79. 
33 Ibid, para. 63. 
36 (1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA). 
37 Ibid, 157. 
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explanation itself. An added "criticism of this well-intentioned procedure is that it is 
hardly likely to induce the wife to instruct an independent solicitor. It is almost inevitable 
that this direct communication becomes a matter of family discussion (or husband's 
persuasion). Indeed the explicit statement informing the wife that `if she wishes' her 
solicitor may be the same as the solicitor acting for her husband will invariably point the 
wife decisively in that direction. No specific guidance is given by the House of Lords as 
to the result if the wife responds to this communication by stating that she does not wish 
s3 to take legal advice at all. 8 
The bank is allowed to rely on the solicitor's confirmation, provided that the solicitor is 
acting as the wife's solicitor, even if a solicitor is also acting for the creditor (on its 
instructions) in the matter of the conveyancing, when he gives advice to the wife he will 
be acting solely as the wife's solicitor. If, however, it emerges "that the solicitor never 
acted for the wife at all in giving her advice, then the solicitor's failure to give any advice 
will be the bank's failure, pursuant to s. 199(1)(ii)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925 
since the solicitor is then acting for the bank alone. This is so despite any erroneous 
confirmation by the solicitor that he has given the wife a sufficient explanation of the 
transaction. ', 39 This occurred in Midland Bank Plc v Wallace. 40 Lord Nicholls explained 
that Mrs. Wallace could not be bound by the acts of `a stranger'. 41 The solicitor never 
became the wife's solicitor. This of course will be a question of fact. 
38 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modem Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd., 2003,240-1. 
391bid, 236. 
40 [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
41 "The bank was put on inquiry, because this was a case of a wife standing as surety for her husband's 
debts. As the evidence stands at present, Mr. Samson's participation in the transaction does not assist the 
bank. He was not Mrs. Wallace's solicitor. Deficiencies in the advice given by a solicitor do not normally 
concern the bank. That is the position where the solicitor is acting for the wife, or where the solicitor has 
been held out by the wife to the bank as her solicitor. But where the solicitor was not acting for the wife, 
the bank is in the same position as any person who deals with another in the belief that the latter is acting 
on behalf of a third party principal when in truth he is not. Leaving aside questions of ostensible authority 
or the like, the alleged principal is not bound or affected by the acts of such a stranger. Earlier authority 
Bank of Baroda v Shah [1988] 3 All E. R. 24. The remedy of the bank lies against the (unauthorized) agent. 
If the bank has suffered provable loss, it has a claim for damages for breach of implied warranty of 
authority. " Ibid, para. 365-6. 
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3.2.3. iii Duty to Disclose Information 
Moving further, if the bank wants to rely on the solicitor's confirmation, it must provide 
the solicitor with the financial information needed to advise the wife, including details of 
the debtor's current indebtedness, current overdraft facilities, and the amount and terms 
of the proposed new facility. 42 This requires the debtor's consent, if this consent is not 
offered the bank should not proceed with the transaction. Information is treated by their 
Lordships as very important; it allows full consideration of all facts before making any 
decision. It has been argued though that this requirement of Etridge43 (No. 2) is dangerous 
as it involves the much-debated issue of bank-customer confidentiality. Despite this view, 
this writer welcomes the development as it subtracts some of the inequality of bargaining 
power between the parties, providing the surety with much needed protection. Such a 
requirement is only fair bearing in mind that all other parties (creditor and debtor) have 
the information except the surety who is risking her property with no benefit. It is 
regrettable that their Lordships did not insist on a private meeting between the surety and 
the creditor to discuss alternative methods of security. This would have helped sureties to 
take the best decision for themselves. Remaining in this field, their Lordships submitted 
that the disclosure does not add to the general disclosure obligation owed by creditors to 
sureties (i. e. unexpected facts), nor does it involve the performance of a duty owed by the 
bank to the wife. 44 
3.2.3. iv The Banking Code 
At this point it is useful to insert the relevant Code provisions in the context of securities. 
The Banking Code sets standards of good banking practice for financial institutions to 
follow when they are dealing with individual customers. Significantly, the Code is not 
legally binding upon the institutions that have signed it. 45 
42 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 79. 
43 ibid. 
44lbid, para. 114,183 -189. 45 On the contrary, the Australian Code is also contractually enforceable, but surety spouses are excluded, 
since they are not always customers of the lender. 
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Under paragraph 13.4 of the latest edition of the Code, which came into force on the I 't 
of March 2005, before a private individual gives third party security, the bank will ask for 
the permission of the principal debtor to give confidential information about his finances. 
The bank will also encourage the prospective surety to take independent legal advice and 
inform them that they could become liable as well as or instead of the principal debtor 
and advise them about the limit of their liability. Significantly, under the same paragraph 
the bank will not take unlimited liability. However, the effectiveness of paragraph 13.4 is 
reduced by the fact that the Code does not require that the bank meet privately with the 
surety in order to give the aforesaid recommendations. So, the likelihood that the wife 
will not read the warning remains. 
Added to this criticism, the previous Banking Ombudsman, Mr. Laurence Shurman, 
expressed the view that the Code does not go far enough in relation to sureties. ` 
Additional protections should include: 
1. a warning that the guarantee will continue until terminated; 
2. an explanation of the method of termination; 
3. a warning that there will be continuing liability on the part of the guarantor after 
termination for all liabilities guaranteed prior to termination. 
3.2.4 The Solicitor's Role 
3.2.4.1 The Solicitor's Duties 
The analysis above brings us to the solicitor's duties. It has to be emphasised that many 
of the disputed cases involved allegations of extremely poor legal advice. Based on this, 
the House of Lords recognised that the role of the solicitor should be more important than 
a mere formality. Also, there has been some disagreement as to what exactly was 
required from the solicitor. For this reason, ' their Lordships gave clear directions as to 
how legal advice should be given. 
' Shurman, L., "A Fair Banking Code? " (1991) The Chartered Institute of Bankers, Ernest Sykes 
Memorial Lecture, 5; "The Banking Ombudsman Scheme Annual Report" Financial Ombudsman Service 
(1992-3), para. 6.9. 
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The House of Lords disagreed with the Court of Appeal that the solicitor's duties include 
the obligation to give advice to the wife not to enter into the agreement and to refuse to 
act further if she persists in setting into a disadvantageous agreement, expressing the 
opinion that such a duty would be too much. 47 Lord Nicholls adopted what Fletcher 
Moulton L. J. said in Coomber v Coomber: 48 
"All that is necessary is that some independent person, free from any 
taint of the relationship, or of the consideration of interest which 
would affect the act, should put clearly before the person what are 
the nature and the consequences of the act. It is for adult persons of 
competent mind to decide whether they will do an act, and I do not 
think that independent and competent advice means independent and 
competent approval. It simply means that the advice shall be 
removed entirely from the suspected atmosphere; and that from the 
clear language of an independent mind, they should know precisely 
what they are doing. "49 "Thus, in the present type of case it is not for 
the solicitor to veto the transaction by declining to confirm to the 
bank that he has explained the documents to the wife and the risks 
she is taking upon herself. If the solicitor considers the transaction is 
not in the wife's best interests, he will give reasoned advice to the 
wife to that effect. But at the end of the day the decision on whether 
to proceed is the decision of the client, not the solicitor. A wife is not 
to be precluded from entering into a financially unwise transaction if, 
for her own reasons, she wishes to do so"so 
Lord Nicholls recognised that this is the general rule but noted that exceptions in rare and 
extreme circumstances could exist where the solicitor should decline to act further. 5' 
47 Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 58,59. 
48[ 191111 Ch. 723. 
49 Ibid, 730. 
Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 61, emphasis added. si Ibid, para. 62, emphasis added. 
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He then turned to consider the scope of the responsibilities of a solicitor who is advising 
the wife. First, it should be stated that whatever advice is given, the solicitor must use 
suitably non-technical language at a face-to face meeting in the absence of the principal 
debtor and creditor. 52 
"In identifying what are the solicitor's responsibilities the starting 
point must always be the solicitor's retainer. What has he been 
retained to do? As a general proposition, the scope of a solicitor's 
duties is dictated by the terms, whether express or implied, of his 
retainer. In the type of case now under consideration the relevant 
retainer stems from the bank's concern to receive confirmation from 
the solicitor that, in short, the solicitor has brought home to the wife 
the risks involved in the proposed transaction. As a first step the 
solicitor will need to explain to the wife the purpose for which he has 
become involved at all. He should explain that, should it ever 
become necessary, the bank will rely upon his involvement to counter 
any suggestion that the wife was overborne by her husband or that 
she did not properly understand the implications of the transaction. 
The solicitor will need to obtain confirmation from the wife that she 
wishes him to act for her in the matter and to advise her on the legal 
and practical implications of the proposed transaction. " 53 
Regarding the content of the advice required from a solicitor this should cover the 
following matters as the core minimum: sa 
1. He will need to explain the nature of the documents and the practical 
consequences these will have for the wife if she signs them. She could lose her 
home if her husband's business does not prosper. Her home may be her only 
substantial asset, as well as the family's home. She could be made bankrupt. 
52Ibid, para. 66. 
331bid, para. 64, emphasis added. 
54Ibid, para. 65. 
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2. He will need to point out the seriousness of the risks involved. The wife should be 
told the purpose of the proposed new facility, the amount and principal terms of 
the new facility, and that the bank might increase the amount of the facility, or 
change its terms, or grant a new facility, without reference to her. She should be 
told the amount of her liability under her guarantee. The solicitor should discuss 
the wife's financial means, including her understanding of the value of the 
property being charged. The solicitor should discuss whether the wife or her 
husband has any other assets out of which repayment could be made if the 
husband's business should fail. These matters are relevant to the seriousness of 
the risks involved. 
3. The solicitor will need to state clearly that the wife has a choice. The decision is 
hers and hers alone. Explanation of the choice facing the wife will call for some 
discussion of the present financial position, including the amount of the husband's 
present indebtedness, and the amount of his current overdraft facility. 
4. The solicitor should check whether the wife wishes to proceed. She should be 
asked whether she is content that the solicitor should write to the bank confirming 
he has explained to her the nature of the documents and the practical implications 
they may have for her, or whether, for instance, she would prefer him to negotiate 
with the bank on the terms of the transaction. Matters for negotiation could 
include the sequence in which the various securities will be called upon or a 
specific or lower limit to her liabilities. The solicitor should not give any 
confirmation to the bank without the wife's authority. Finally, in order to give 
such advice "the solicitor should obtain from the bank any information he needs. 
If the bank fails for any reason to provide information requested by the solicitor, 
the solicitor should decline to provide the confirmation sought by the bank. "55 
Their Lordships all agreed on the importance of informed consent and adopted Lord 
Nicholls' approach. Lord Scott, on the other hand, takes a somewhat different approach 
in regards to the solicitor's duties. The solicitor's duties will basically be to provide an 
explanation to the surety as to the nature and effect of the transaction, including the steps 
55 Ibid, para. 67, emphasis added. 
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to take to carry out the security, the extent of her liability, the duration of the security, 
ascertain whether the wife is aware of any existing indebtedness that can be secured and 
that he may need to give confirmation to the bank with her consent that he duly advised 
her on these matters. S6 Lord Nicholls's guidelines suggest that advice should go further, 
explain to her that she has a choice and ask her if she would prefer the solicitor to re- 
negotiate the transaction. For this reason his approach is preferred. Where the opinions of 
the two Lords are tangent though is that they do not impose a duty on the solicitor to 
satisfy himself of the absence of undue influence. " 
Once more, their Lordships deserve our congratulations for the clarity of their guidelines. 
What they fail to explain though is how a lawyer is expected to assess the financial 
information offered by the bank, discuss the resources of the wife and understand 
whether the principal debtor can repay the debt, so as to furnish proper advice. 
Accordingly, it is not guaranteed that the wife will receive appropriate advice. 
What is more, if the solicitor fails to advise the surety properly, knowledge of this 
negligence is not imputed to the bank since the solicitor is not acting as the bank's agent. 
A claim against the bank, provided the bank had no reason to question the inadequacy of 
advice, is out of the question. An action for negligence may be brought against the 
solicitor. However, this might not be appropriate in all cases to secure a remedy in 
damages for sureties. If the solicitor proves that the undue influence was so great that 
notwithstanding his negligent advice the surety would have entered the agreement 
anyway, then the surety's action against the solicitor will also fail. In such cases nobody 
will take the blame and the surety is left exposed to bear the loss of her house. 
3.2.4. ii Independence of Solicitor 
From O'Brien onwards, an issue that attracted much discussion relates to the role of the 
independent legal advisor. The independence and impartiality of a solicitor acting both 
56Ibid, para. 169. 
17 Ibid, per Lord Scott, para. 182. 
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for the surety and the principal debtor or even the creditor, has been seriously questioned. 
Lord Nicholls addressed this issue and resolved any uncertainty. 
Regarding this matter, arguments can go both ways. Lord Nicholls acknowledged, 
"sometimes a solicitor whose main client is the husband may not, in practice, give the 
same single-minded attention to the wife's position as would a solicitor acting solely for 
the wife. Her interests may rank lower in the solicitor's scale of priorities, perhaps 
unconsciously, than the interests of the husband. Instances of incompetent advice, or 
worse, which have come before the court might perhaps be less likely to recur if a 
solicitor were instructed to act for the wife alone and gave advice solely to her. As a 
matter of general understanding, independent advice would suggest that the solicitor 
should not be acting in the same transaction for the person who, if there is any undue 
influence, is the source of that influence. "" On the other hand though, there is also the 
argument that "the solicitor may also act for the husband or the bank, provided the 
solicitor is satisfied that this is in the wife's best interests and satisfied also that this will 
not give rise to any conflicts of duty or interest. The principal factors favouring this 
approach are as follows. A requirement that a wife should receive advice from a solicitor 
acting solely for her will frequently add significantly to the legal costs. Sometimes a wife 
will be happier to be advised by a family solicitor known to her than by a complete 
stranger. Sometimes a solicitor who knows both husband and wife and their histories will 
be better placed to advise than a solicitor who is a complete stranger. s59 His Lordship 
thought that the latter factors weighed more than the former. 
The House of Lords, therefore, unequivocally rejected the argument that the solicitor 
advising the wife must act for the wife alone. It has been argued though, that the reasons 
given for this are not persuasive. 60 
sa 1bid, para. 72. 
39Ibid, para. 73. 
60 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modem Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd., 2003,233. 
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The first argument regarding costs, which will be imposed upon customers if a different 
solicitor is required to advise the wife, has been questioned. It has been argued that 
"where the husband has extensive business interests these costs will be absorbed by the 
borrowing companies themselves. It is true that in other cases the costs will be borne by 
the husband directly (and probably indirectly by the family as a whole), but even here it 
is doubtful that this concern should take precedence over the wife's entitlement to truly 
independent advice. In any event, it is probable that the additional costs involved will not 
be excessive. s61 
In addition, the weight of the argument that the wife will be `happier' if advised by a 
family solicitor has also been doubted. The emotional contentment during the course of 
the meeting is surely less important than the potential disadvantage (which Lord 
Nicholl's himself admits "that [the wife's] interests may rank lower in the solicitor's 
scale of priorities, perhaps unconsciously, than the interests of her husband"6). As one 
academic put it, "Do we willingly choose a medical practitioner who has a comforting 
`bedside manner' even though there is a possibility that he is not the best person to make 
a correct diagnosis? Indeed, the solicitor's knowledge of the husband's `history', 
especially if it is littered with ill-considered business decisions, may make him the least 
suitable person to advise. "63 
Lord Nicholls accepts that "in every case the solicitor must consider carefully whether 
there is any conflict of duty or interest and, more widely, whether it would be in the best 
interests of the wife for him to accept instructions from her", 64 but in truth there is always 
a conflict of interest. It is unrealistic to expect that a solicitor, who acts for a number of 
parties with different interests, can possibly give independent advice to all those parties. 
"This is acknowledged by the solicitor's professional conduct rules themselves, which 
prevent solicitors acting for more than one party where there is a risk of a conflict of 
61 Ibid. 
62Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 4-121, n. 71, para. 72. 63 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modem Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd., 2003,233. 
64 Royal Bank of Scotland PIc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 4.121, n. 71, para. 74. 
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interest6S and also by the judicial rejection of the device of `Chinese Walls', which 
purport to divide a solicitor's firm into separate sections when the firm is acting for 
clients with conflicting interests. 66 It is not insignificant that in other Commonwealth 
countries the courts have insisted that the solicitor must act and be understood to act 
solely for the guarantor. Indeed, this was the view of some earlier English authority. 67" 68 
Despite these arguments, the law on the point is clear, the same solicitor may act for all 
the parties involved. 
3.2.4. iii Ai! encv 
The question of the solicitor being regarded as the agent of the bank was also addressed 
with Lord Nicholls rejecting such a contention. Again, there are arguments for both sides. 
At the one end of the spectrum there is the argument that "the bank requires the solicitor 
to advise the wife, not for her benefit, but for the benefit and protection of the bank. Any 
deficiencies in the advice given to the wife should be attributed to the bank. In this regard 
[... ] the solicitor's knowledge is to be imputed to the bank. A certificate furnished by the 
solicitor to the bank should not prejudice the position of the wife when, as happened in 
several cases, the contents of the certificate are untrue. If the solicitor has not given the 
wife any advice, her rights should not be diminished by the solicitor telling the bank that 
she has been fully advised. "69 Contrary to this idea, Lord Nicholls said: "Confirmation 
from the solicitor that he has advised the wife is one of the bank's preconditions for 
completion of the transaction. But it is central to this arrangement that in advising the 
wife the solicitor is acting for the wife and no one else. The bank does not have, and is 
intended not to have any knowledge of or control over the advice the solicitor gives the 
wife. The solicitor is not accountable to the bank for the advice he gives to the wife. To 
65 See Sullivan, J., "Undue Influence and Misrepresentation after O'Brien: Making Security Secure" in 
Rose, Francis, D. (ed. ); Restitution and Banking Law. Oxford: Mansfield Press, 1998,42,60-61. 
66 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modem Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd., 2003,233-4. 
67 Like Powell v Powell [1900] 1 Ch. 243; Re Coomber [1911] 1 Ch. 723. 
68 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modern Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd., 2003,233-4. 
69 Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 76. 
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impute to the bank knowledge of what passed between the solicitor and the wife would 
contradict this essential feature of the arrangement. The mere fact that, for its own 
purposes, the bank asked the solicitor to advise the wife does not make the solicitor the 
bank's agent in giving that advice. s70 "In the ordinary case, therefore, deficiencies in the 
advice given are a matter between the wife and her solicitor. The bank is entitled to 
proceed on the assumption that a solicitor advising the wife has done his job properly. 1971 
In practice this in effect means that sureties will first try to set the charge aside against 
the bank so as to save their property and if this proves unsuccessful to turn their fire 
against the solicitor. 
3.3 Cases After Etridee (No. 2) 
Having analysed the rewording and reformulation of the law it is imperative to examine 
how the specific norms and criteria were applied in subsequent cases. 
An interesting case as to how the presumption can be raised after Etridge72 (No. 2) is 
Padgham v Rochelle 7 There, the deceased gave to his son a full agricultural tenancy for 
the house, land and buildings at a low rent. In the last years of the deceased's life he 
became increasingly dependent on his son, who would visit daily and help with the 
domestic matters. The son argued that the transaction just confirmed the status quo and 
that it was a way to ensure an income in case of his father's death. A lawyer was not 
involved because it was viewed as a transaction between father and son. The court, 
repeating Osborn, 74 said that there need not be anything sinister or a relationship of 
dominance to raise the presumption. 75 So, the relationship of father and son together with 
the seriousness and harshness of the transaction raised the presumption. 
701bid, para. 77; Lord Scott agreed, para. 178. 
71 Ibid, para. 78. 
72 Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
73 [2002] W. T. L. R. 1483. 
74 Hammond v Osborn [2002] E. W. CA. Civ. 885. 
75 This was also held in Goldsworthy v Brickell [19.87] Ch. 378. 
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Similarly, in Jennings v Cairns, 76 the relationship of dependence between an old and ill 
lady with her niece, even though no abusive conduct took place, together with a gift 
unfavourable to the donor, raised the presumption. So, in these cases, the inequality 
between the parties and harsh terms to the weak party were enough. 77 The presumption 
was not rebutted in either case because the donee failed to show that the transaction was 
entered with free will; the donor did not receive independent legal advice. 
Regarding the "on inquiry" test, after Etridge78 (No. 2), it is very easy for the bank to 
know when it is "on inquiry". In relation to wives specifically, the bank is put "on 
inquiry" whenever it knows that a wife offers to stand as a surety for her husband's debts 
or more generally when the surety is not commercially related with the principal debtor. 
The case of Lloyds TSB Bank Plc v Holdgate79 that dealt with the application of Etridge 
(No. 2) is illustrative. The appellant wife signed a joint mortgage with her husband, 
charging the matrimonial home, in favour of the respondent bank in an unlimited amount 
in respect of any sums owing then or thereafter by her husband. When the bank 
commenced possession proceedings, the wife pleaded in her defence that she was under 
the undue influence of her husband and had been led to sign by a misrepresentation made 
to her by him and the bank that the charge was limited to £5,000. In this case, the bank 
was put "on inquiry" as it knew that the wife was standing as surety for her husband's 
business. The presumption existed and the next question to be decided by the Court of 
Appeal was whether it was rebutted. The court ordered the case to go to trial. 
The case of Greene King Plc v David John Stanley, Alan Edward Stanley, Doris 
Rosabel80 is also an example as to how the tests were applied. There, the parents 
mortgaged the home, which was their only asset purchased after many years of modest 
savings, to secure a loan for their son's business adventure. The son never informed his 
76 [2003] E. W. C. A Civ. 1935. 
77 Also in Macklin v Dowsett [2004] E. W. C. A. Civ. 904, manifest disadvantage and absence of choice were 
enough to raise the presumption; the Court of Appeal, in Daily v Daily [2003] U. K. P. C. 65, held that a 
relationship between spouses did not raise the presumption regarding a transaction between them, it was 
necessary for the wife to show that she reposed trust and confidence in her husband 
78 Royal Bank ofScotland Pk v Etrldge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
" [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1543. 
80 [2001] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1966. 
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parents of the seriousness of his financial problems but reassured them that no risk was 
involved. The judge found that the lawyer involved did not explain to them in detail the 
transaction (i. e. the amount involved, the complicated calculations with regard to interest 
rate or the period the loan was to run). A relationship of trust and confidence did exist 
(the parents were naive in financial matters in relation to their son and had helped him 
financially before) and the transaction was one that called for explanation. So, the 
presumption of undue influence was raised. In relation to this point, the bank argued that 
the transaction did not call for an explanation founding their argument on Lord Nicholls' 
speech81 where he approves Lindley L. J. 's dictum in Allcard v Skinner that "... if a gift 
is so large as not to be reasonably accounted for on the ground of friendship, relationship, 
charity, or other ordinary motives on which ordinary men act, the burden is upon the 
donee to support the gift. " Based on this, the bank argued that the transaction that 
involved parents and son can be explained on those motives and that there was nothing 
"immoderate and irrational" about it. The Court of Appeal disagreed and found that the 
parents were putting at risk their only asset and the transaction involved a gratuitous 
benefit to the son far beyond that contemplated by Lindley U. Accordingly, there was an 
evidential presumption of some impropriety and, the transaction not being of a 
commercial nature, the bank was hence put "on inquiry". Further, as the bank did not take 
reasonable steps to ensure that the sureties received independent legal advice the charge 
was set aside. 
Further, the "on inquiry" element was considered in Chater v Mortgage Agency Services 
Number Two Ltd. 83 The appellant's defence in this case was that she had been induced by 
the undue influence and the misrepresentations of her son to mortgage her house for a 
substantial sum, so that he could finance the purchase of a laser printing franchise. A 
financial adviser assured her that the business was bound to work very well and that there 
was no chance she could lose her house. The husband and the son appointed a firm of 
solicitors that corresponded with the bank. The purpose of the loan was described as 
`other home improvements'. There was no evidence of coercion and she had no hesitation 
$' Royul Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 22. 
82 [1887] L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145. 
83 [2003] E. W. C. A. Civ. 490. 
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in signing as to her the transaction looked reasonable. Despite this, the Court of Appeal 
recognised that in many undue influence cases the victim does not appreciate what she is 
doing. From having a modest loan she ended up with a big commercial loan secured by 
her sole asset. The question was whether the bank was put "on inquiry". This depended 
on what the bank knew. The starting point was that the loan was a joint one between 
mother and son who lived together for domestic purposes (at least on the face of it). 
Nothing in the documents indicated that the loan was for the son's purposes. The mere 
fact that security for the loan was offered only by the mother was not enough. The Court 
stated, "the respondent owed no duty to discover what the loan was for. It had its own 
interests to protect. [... ] There is no duty to ask questions albeit the bank is not entitled to 
shut its eyes to the obvious. "84 Mr. Anderson for the appellant pointed out that a mother 
and son are less likely to need a joint loan than a husband and wife and that the loan was 
unsuitable for a retired lady and that the interest rate was very high. So, the risk of undue 
influence was greater in this case and any prudent bank should have realised this. 
However, the Court of Appeal disagreed and held that where a mother and son live 
together and borrow money for domestic purposes nothing is called for explanation. The 
assumption was that the loan was for the improvement of their joint living 
circumstances. 85 So, sureties might be protected but not apparent joint borrowers. 
Moving now to the banks' duties, failure of the bank to advise the surety to seek 
independent legal advice, where the presumption is raised, leads to the setting aside of the 
transaction. 86 Nevertheless, the banks' duties are still partial. Illustration of the point is 
found in the case of Bank of Scotland V Hill. 87 There, Mrs. Tutor, the wife, argued that 
Mr. Hill put improper pressure on her to re-mortgage the matrimonial home for a much 
larger sum than the existing mortgage, so as to buy the freehold in a service station and 
that the bank was put "on inquiry" but failed to discharge the duty of inquiry as laid down 
in Etridge88 (No. 2). The existence of undue influence was assumed and the Court of 
Appeal had to consider whether the bank took adequate steps to rebut the presumption. 
'Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773,63. ss Ibid, 65. 
' Newell v Tarrant [2004] E. W. H. C. 772. 
87 [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1081. 
88 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
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The service station was acquired in the parties' joint names, but the truth of the matter 
was that Mrs. Tutor was not involved in the business. On the mortgage application the 
parties were described as `Married' and had the same residence address. The impression, 
though, of a happily married couple living and working together was wrong. The solicitor 
acting for the husband knew this but sent a letter to the Bank that he had explained the 
transaction to the wife and witnessed the signing of the documents following the 
guidelines of the bank. The Court of Appeal, following the guidelines of Lord Nicholls 89 
and Lord Scott, 90 found that the bank was entitled to rely on the letter even though the 
bank did not tell the solicitor what steps to take when advising the wife, and even though 
it did not communicate with her directly. This decision is wrong; their Lordships were 
very clear that the bank must communicate directly with the surety. 
Perhaps, the only limitation on banks is that the bank cannot rely on the mere presence of 
a solicitor, 91 or assume that he did his job properly unless it has received the relevant 
confirmation. Also, Lord Scott made it clear that even an honest belief to that effect is not 
enough. This was firstly applied in UCB Home Loans Corporation Ltd v Moore. 92 There 
the decision was that the bank had no reason to assume that the solicitor acting for the 
wife in the completion of the transaction extended his advice to explaining the nature and 
effect of the transaction. Lord Scott and Lord Hobhouse93 emphasised that the mere 
involvement of a solicitor does not rebut the presumption. This is because solicitors do 
not always take an advisory role; their role might be limited to executing the transaction. 
Since the solicitors never confirmed with the bank that they gave advice as to the effect 
and nature of the deed, the bank was not allowed to assume by the mere existence of a 
solicitor that they did so. 
89Ibid, paras 54,56,80. 
90 Ibid, para. 191. 
91 Contrary to Bank ofBaroda v Rayarel [1995] 2 F. L. 376, where the mere fact that a lawyer represented 
the wife was enough to give protection to the bank. 
92 [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
931bid, para. 306-7. 
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This was applied in UCB Corporate Services Ltd v Williams, 94 which involved the appeal 
from Mrs. Williams the wife. She signed a mortgage over the matrimonial home in order 
to secure a loan for her husband's business. The loan also paid off the outstanding 
indebtedness of the first loan that was used to buy the house. Mrs. Williams played no 
part in running the business and the solicitor had never spoken to her prior to the signing 
of the agreement. In the course of that meeting he only gave general advice as to the risk 
of losing the house, but did not get into detailed explanation upon the transaction (i. e. that 
the charge was for all moneys owed to UCB by any of the partners of the loan) and did 
not advise the sureties who were not borrowers themselves to seek independent legal 
advice. UCB called in the loan as the partnership had serious financial problems. In her 
defence, Mrs. Williams argued that she entered into the agreement as a result of her 
husband's undue influence and misrepresentations, she was never explained the risk and 
the terms involved and that the bank was fixed with constructive notice of the existence 
of her equity; this was because she was not a partner in the firm, she stood as surety for a 
loan for her husband's business, which was not to her financial advantage. She further 
argued that the bank did not take reasonable steps to satisfy itself that she was entering 
into the transaction with her own free will. The Court of Appeal found that actual undue 
influence was exerted upon Mrs. Williams. The bank was not allowed to rely on the mere 
knowledge that a solicitor was acting for the wife. The bank was not allowed to assume 
that his advice was extended (it was not in fact extended) to the nature of the transaction. 
Jonathan Parker L. J., citing Lord Scott and Lord Hobhouse said "after Etridge the bank 
cannot be said to have rebutted the presumption by assuming that the lawyer would have 
given "full and proper advice to Mrs. Williams. "95 
The case of First National Bank Plc v Achampong' also dealt with the point 
exhaustively. There Mrs. Achampong stood as surety in charging the matrimonial home 
held jointly between her and her husband, in order to finance the business of Mr. Owusu- 
Ansah. The purpose of the loan was clear from the whole documentation. The bank was 
hence put "on inquiry" and the Court of Appeal dealt with the question of the steps the 
94 [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ 555. 
9s Royial Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 67 and 95. 96 [2003] E. W. C. A. Civ. 487. 
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bank had to take to avoid being fixed with notice. The issue of independent legal advice 
was further explored in the light of Etridgeg' (No. 2). In their appeal, the bank argued that 
they were entitled to assume that the lawyer who advised the borrower and the sureties 
had discharged his duty to the surety, by bringing home to her the consequences of 
executing a legal charge over the property; the bank also argued that the fact that the 
lawyer had not properly advised her did not affect its position. The question, as Mrs. 
Hayes argued for the bank, was not what was actually happening between the lawyer and 
the surety but whether the bank could have reasonably thought that she was properly 
being advised. The Court of Appeal first stressed that if the bank is to be protected, it 
must ensure that the solicitor properly advises the wife. The steps outlined by Lord 
Nicholls are for future transactions 98 In regard to past transactions, according to Lord 
Nicholls, confirmation from the solicitor to the effect that he had brought home to the 
surety the risk she is running is required. `' This is because as Lord Hobhouse identified 
solicitors do what they are instructed to do by their clients, so their role might just be 
purely procedural and involve no advisory role as to the effects of a transaction. Their 
involvement is very often a formality. In relation to old transactions, the Court of Appeal 
in Achampong said that the central theme in Lord Hobhouse's judgment was that a 
relationship between the solicitor and the wife, whereby the solicitor accepts his full 
duties towards the wife, must be present and the bank must be aware of such a 
relationship in order to avoid being fixed with constructive notice. 
The bank, on the other hand, argued that confirmation is a sufficient but not a necessary 
step. In support of this, the bank pointed to Lord Browne-Wilkinson's dicta in O'Brien 
that: "the furthest a bank can be expected to go is to take reasonable steps to satisfy itself 
that the wife has had brought home to her, in a meaningful way, the practical implications 
of the proposed transaction. "loo The bank also referred to the Scottish case of Forsyth v 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc'°' where the bank was entitled to infer that the fact that 
solicitors appeared to be acting for the wife was enough. Finally, the bank tried to rely on 
"Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. "a Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 79. 
" Ibid, para. 80. 
100 [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL), 196G. 
101 [2000] S. L. T. 1295. 
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Lord Clyde in Etridge102 (No. 2) who emphasised that the steps to be taken by a bank are 
essentially matters of banking practice for the banks themselves, that it was undesirable 
to be prescriptive and that the necessary steps to be adopted depend on the 
circumstances. 103 The Court of Appeal disagreed with the bank and reaffirmed that 
confirmation is essential, since this had been made clear by Lord Nicholls, Lord 
Hobhouse and Lord Scott. 104 As confirmation did not come from the lawyer in 
Achampong, the bank was fixed with constructive notice. 
The same conclusion was reached in Yorkshire Bank Plc v Tinsley'°5 where the Court of 
Appeal rejected the judge's view that it is implicit in a case where a solicitor is retained 
to act for a wife in a conveyancing transaction that the retainer extends to advising the 
wife about practical implications of the proposed transaction. A confirmation that his 
advice extended to the nature of the transaction is necessary. 
A very good decision for sureties is National Westminster Bank Plc v Amin. 106 The case 
involved the provision of a security by the parents, who did not speak or understand any 
English, for their son's debts. The House of Lords held that: 
1. The bank's letter to the solicitor should have stated that `special care' might be 
needed in advising Mr. and Mrs. Amin. It was totally inappropriate simply to ask 
the solicitor to attend to the necessary formalities) as the bank had done on the 
facts of the case. 
2. The bank should have sought `confirmation of Mr. and Mrs. Amin's apparent 
understanding of the transaction', rather than being content with a statement from 
the solicitor that he had `explained' the terms and conditions of the transaction. 
Hence, it appears that where the bank knows that the guarantor is "specially vulnerable to 
exploitation in respect of the proposed transaction", the bank must draw the attention of 
the solicitor acting for the wife to the need for `special care' in giving advice. It should 
also ask reassurance that the surety has understood the nature of the transaction. 
102 Royal Bank ofScotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
103 Aid, para. 95. 
104 Aid, para. 168. 
105 [2004] E. W. C. A. Civ. 816. 
106 [2002] U. K. H. L. 9. 
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Arguably, it is difficult for banks to identify which potential sureties come within this 
category. It is not clear if the category is limited to people with ethnic minority 
background, or whether it covers others who may be especially vulnerable for other 
reasons, for example, because of their educational background. 107 
3.4 Discussion of Etridge (No. 2) 
The abolition of manifest disadvantage as a necessary requirement to raise the 
presumption of undue influence (under the first step of the O'Brien principle) is 
welcomed. However, the surety still needs to prove that the allegation of undue influence 
is well founded. Apart of undue influence the surety may be pushed into the agreement as 
a result of misconceptions and misunderstandings. These however are not sufficient to 
establish misrepresentation as a matter of law. So, even after Etridge (No-2) the first step 
of the O'Brien principle remains under inclusive. 
The most eye-catching feature of the judgment in Etridge (No. 2) is the shift of emphasis 
away from the nature of the relationship. This in practical terms means that banks will no 
longer need to investigate into parties' private affairs, so as to determine the existence of 
a relationship of trust and confidence or dependence. Now the bank is put "on inquiry" in 
every non-commercial relationship. The importance of this new test is twofold. It sets a 
very low threshold to determine when banks are put "on inquiry", benefiting in this way 
potential undue influence victims, while lending institutions benefit from this clear cut 
test in that it is easier for them now to know when they are required to take precautions. 
This test, as their Lordships noted themselves, instigates a new wider principle, or more 
correctly revisits the principle that Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch 108 tried 
to lay down. At this point their Lordships deserve our congratulations as they realised the 
restrictions and narrowness of the previous tests. Thus, Etridge (No. 2) strengthens and 
107 Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modern Contract of Guarantee English Edition. London: Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd., 2003,240. 
10ß Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E. R. 144. 
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boosts the foundations of this thesis that is in favour of an all-embracing recognition and 
formal implementation of a wider doctrine. 109 
Moving now back to the specifics of the judgment, even though the threshold is now 
lower than before, still the position of joint borrowers remains out of the reach of the test. 
A joint loan may very well be fictitious when it is really for the purposes of one of the 
parties. This is because victims of undue influence do not logically have any control as to 
how they appear on the documentation. 
Moving further, sureties can largely benefit from the additional duties of banks especially 
the ones relating to disclosure of information and the solicitors confirmation. Before, 
sureties were brought in at a very late stage and their participation, in many occasions, 
lasted only as long as it was required for the signing of the contracts. In many occasions, 
victims of undue influence and misrepresentation were kept in complete darkness, not 
only of details and complicated financial matters, but also of the very basics and 
essentials of the transaction, such as the extent of their liability or the very nature of the 
document. So, lack of information, knowledge and understanding of what they were 
getting into was very real and very severe. This is by and large cured, as sureties are 
brought in at an earlier stage and will at least now have more information at their 
disposal. 
Banks should also be content because, even though the threshold is low, the steps 
required to avoid liability are clear, simple, and sufficiently formulaic to keep compliance 
costs within manageable bounds. With these steps banks seem to be more involved in the 
procedure of informing the surety. They have to contact her directly and pass information 
to the solicitor. However, making a standard phone call to the surety and searching their 
computer data for information is really a manual job and requires no substantive 
participation in the actual provision of advice. What is more, the bank can rely without 
109 David Capper argues that, despite the fact that many problems remain outstanding after the decision of 
the House of Lords, the case may have a profound effect on the future development of the law on 
unconscionable transactions. Capper, David, "Restitution; Banking and Finance; Equity; Real Property 
(Case Comment) Banks, Borrowers, Sureties and Undue Influence -a Half Baked Solution to a Thoroughly 
Cooked Problem" (2002) 10 RLR 100. 
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any fear on the confirmation of the solicitor and only in rare occasions it will not be able 
to do so. Hence, the reasonable steps may be applied very technically, while banks are 
allowed to unload the entire burden on solicitors and wash their hands of the matter. 
Even though disclosure of information is welcomed, it is dubious if it can be assed and 
utilised in an effective and productive way, as it is questionable whether solicitors can 
give any advice on business matters. So, it is not certain that sureties will receive good 
advice after all. Perhaps financial/business advice should also be given. 
Regarding solicitors, they need only satisfy themselves that the surety understands the 
implications; they do not have to ensure that she is not unduly pressurised; furthermore, 
they are under no duty to advise on the wisdom of the transaction not to veto the decision 
of the surety. However, explanations and clarifications are not an antidote to undue 
influence. Even if sureties are independently advised and fully comprehend the whole 
transaction, it does not necessarily mean that they are not acting under undue influence. 
Cognitive and informed consent is not the same with free consent. 
Finally, the judgment is defective in one very important respect. The four-stage process 
of succeeding in a claim to set the charge aside is preserved. This makes the onus of 
proof very difficult of sureties. In the search of primary liability against the bank, it is 
unfortunate that the House of Lord did not abolish this indirect and multipart test in order 
to avoid liability under the charge. In practical terms, this means that even if the bank 
does not follow the reasonable steps set by the House of Lords, it does not automatically 
follow that the charge will be set aside. Still the surety has to prove some wrong on the 
part of the debtor and that the bank had notice of this. A more direct method would be 
preferred so as to impose direct liability against the bank, based on the bank's own 
conduct. Such a test would create more legal certainty and clarity as well as help 
vulnerable sureties in setting aside charges. Also, once the bank's liability is more clearly 
defined it will be easier for them to know what their exact responsibilities are. 
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We should at least attribute to the House of Lords that clear rules were laid and indeed, 
many puzzling issues within the law were resolved. The ability of these rules, though, to 
fully protect vulnerable sureties is questioned. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the judgment of the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc 
v Etridge (No. 2), 110 which reformulated the tests of the O'Brien principle of notice. The 
analysis of the most important cases both in chapter 2 and 3 always led to the same 
finding; the courts consistently take a creditor sympathetic approach and "continue to 
approach security transactions from the perspective of creditors. ""' So, even though the 
law is much clearer after Etridge (No. 2), still it fails to strike a fair balance between the 
interests of sureties and creditors. One commentator went as far to argue that in the event 
that the guidelines of the House of Lords in Etridge (No. 2) are followed, wives may have 
a greater difficulty in establishing their arguments before the courts. The problem has 
always been finding the correct balance between two opposite interests. "This duality of 
sentiment, however, necessarily gives rise to an uneasy tension between the preservation 
of the interests of institutional lenders and the protection of the vulnerable from 
exploitation by third parties. "' 12 As a result "like every compromise, the outcome falls 
short of achieving in full the objectives of either of the two competing interests, ""' while 
one of them is bound to prevail over the other in the end. 
This pro-creditor attitude is the result of persisting wrong assumptions, which pertain the 
power, control and sharing of finances within the marriage. To explain, the assumption of 
liberal contract law offree and self-centred motivations behind financial decisions is out 
of touch with the vulnerable sureties' reality. According to empirical research, the 
reasons that sureties enter into such agreements vary from love and loyalty to their 
Ito [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
"' Fehlberg, Belinda, "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" (19%) 59 MLR 
675. 
"Z Haley, Michael, "Royal Bank of Scotland pk v Etridge (No. 2). The O'Brien Defence- a Compromise 
Reworked? " (2002) 14 CFLQ 93. 
113 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 37, per Lord Nicholls. 
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husbands, emotional pressure, economic dependence, a feeling of lack of choice, or even 
actual undue influence. These factors do not always come within the scope of the 
traditional vitiating grounds. Traditional doctrines (such as undue influence and 
misrepresentation) are under-inclusive and as a result many types of victimisation and 
vulnerability are not covered. This means that many of the practical problems of surety- 
wives remain unaddressed. It is suggested that a more flexible doctrine is needed, which 
is capable of duly addressing the specific and special weaknesses of surety-wives. 
In addition, these liberal notions of freedom of contract also assume that wives look after 
their interest, while empirical research shows that this is not true, since important 
financial decisions (such as loan agreements) are considered to be the province of to their 
husbands. As a result, it is unlikely that independent legal advice will be of any assistance 
to them. Explanations are not the appropriate cure to their problem, which is lack of 
choice. 
Moving further, the law assumes that equal sharing of income exists between couples, 
and hence the security is seen as being in the wife's interest. However, empirical research 
has revealed that the social perception of equal sharing in marriages does not reflect 
reality. Also, the adverse consequences on the wife and her family, which result from 
repossession of the home, make the point very strongly that the loan agreement is not in 
the wife's interest. 
Finally, it is proposed that the biggest flaw of the law has to do with the theory that the 
surety and the creditor are both innocent victims of the wrongful conduct of the husband. 
So, "establishing whether a surety wife should be liable to a creditor raises the risk 
that a creditor may be held responsible for spousal behaviour and relationship 
patterns which are generally regarded by society as `private'. The perceived social 
good of maintaining the use of the family home as business loan security, along 
with the related view that wives benefit from this process, is a disincentive for judges 
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to make creditors responsible for such `private' conduct. " 4 As a result of this stance, 
imposing liability on the bank has proved very complicated and confusing. The analysis 
of the O'Brien principle showed the surety has to succeed at four distinct stages, even 
after the long awaited judgment in Etridge (No. 2). First, a surety wife must establish a 
prima facie case for relief against the wrongdoer-husband (such as undue influence 
and/or misrepresentation). The second stage involves showing that the creditor should be 
fixed with liability for this wrong, either on the basis of agency or actual knowledge (both 
infrequent in reality), or constructive notice on the basis that the creditor was put "on 
inquiry" (the most frequent argument). Afterwards, as a third stage, a creditor may avoid 
being fixed with constructive notice if it has taken `reasonable steps'. The final stage 
involves determining the extent and type of relief. This four-stage process has proved 
difficult for sureties to complete. 
The underlying assumption of this four stage-test, according to which the creditor is 
treated as a victim, is not very convincing. Banks cannot possibly be compared and be 
equated with surety-wives. The one is a professional financial institution capable of 
protecting themselves and the other is usually an uninformed (but not necessarily 
uneducated) wife whose first priority is her family. It is difficult to consider the bank as a 
victim in this respect. Instead, the parties are more appropriately described as "The Good, 
the Bad and the Ugly", the good being the surety, the bad being the debtor, and the ugly 
being the creditor. This characterisation of the trilogy suggests that the only innocent 
party is the wife and connotes that the creditor is equally blameworthy with the husband. 
Both of them take advantage of vulnerability of the surety. Surely, the debtor is in a direct 
contact with his wife and in a position to exert many types of influence (varying from 
active to passive), what is important though is that he takes advantage of a special 
vulnerability of the wife (such as love, confidence, economic dependence, fear) in order 
to obtain benefit for himself (the security) on her detriment. The creditor, even though not 
usually guilty of duress, may be equally responsible and morally liable with the husband, 
for passively taking advantage of the vulnerability (lack of control or knowledge) of the 
114 Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997,75. 
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surety-wife in order to obtain a benefit for themselves (the security agreement) on the 
detriment of the surety-wife. Also, it is worth noting that the decision of many sureties 
"to sign was a decision based on trust in the debtor and the lender... (and) at the time of 
signing, most perceived banks as `honourable institutions' ... which would 
behave as 
such, rather than as the other side to a commercial agreement" Despite the 
blameworthiness of banks, as the law stands now, they may choose to wash their hands, 
avoid any substantive discussion with the wife and pass the blame to third parties, by 
ensuring that the wife sees some independent solicitor. However, it is submitted that it 
should not be so easy for them to avoid liability. Imposing liability against the husband 
and the bank should involve the same level of difficulty in both instances. Wives need 
protection not only against wrongdoing by borrowers, but also by banks' irresponsible 
behaviour. More duties should be imposed on banks and banks should become more 
answerable for their actions. Bank's before entering into suretyship agreements must 
make sure that the wife exercises full, free, informed consent. They must make sure that 
they are not taking advantage of sureties (even passively) due to their weaknesses. In this 
process legal advice is not enough. In some instances financial advice is also necessary. 
This advice cannot, of course, come from the bank, since there is a conflict of interest; 
perhaps though banks should pay for such advice. In order to achieve these ends, the 
better approach, it is submitted, is to find a way to impose liability against the bank 
straight, instead with the indirect and elusive doctrine of notice. 
Fundamentally, the defect of the law, as already explained, is that courts still insist on 
looking at the triangular relationship between surety, debtor and creditor instead of 
focusing on the relationship between surety and creditor. In the search for primary 
liability against creditors, it makes more sense to impose liability against them directly. 
None of the legal solutions tried so far looked at the problem directly. This conclusion 
brings us to the next chapter, where a different doctrine is examined as the suggested 




The Doctrine of Unconscionability 
Aim 1: Describe the doctrine ofunconscionability 
Method: Presentation of the doctrine of unconscionability as applied in the UK, Ireland, 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA 
Conclusion 1: Unconscionability as understood in the UK has the same elements with the 
rest of the jurisdictions, even though it is not as popularised 
Conclusion 2: Unconscionability is not a vague doctrine without definition 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters examined the techniques used by English law in their effort to 
strike a balance between the interests of sureties, debtors and creditors in the area of 
suretyship contracts. However, none of these techniques managed to set clear, practical 
and just rules. Even after the attempt of the House of Lords in Etridge (No. 2)1 to improve 
the O'Brien principles, still the law, as it currently stands, does not effectively address 
the special problems and needs of vulnerable sureties. For this reason, it is essential to 
look for an alternative technique or doctrine, which is more capable of dealing with this 
problematic area of law. This, it is submitted, is the doctrine of unconscionability, which, 
even though has not met wide application in this jurisdiction, has seen great development 
in both parts of Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA. The purpose of 
this chapter is to present the doctrine of unconscionability. 
As already mentioned contrary to these jurisdictions, English law has not moved a long 
way from the initial formulation of the doctrine and, as a result of this, the doctrine, as 
understood here, is much narrower than in the aforementioned jurisdictions. To explain, 
within English law the doctrine is applied in a very narrow context and refers to abuse of 
the poor and ignorant in a Fry v Lane3 fashion, while in other jurisdictions it arises every 
' Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
2 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
3 (1888) L. R. 40; Ch D. 312. 
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time there is abuse of inequality of bargaining power, which obviously is a wider and 
more inclusive phenomenon. The form of the doctrine in this country may be viewed as a 
sub-category of the wider doctrine of unconscionability as applied in these other 
jurisdictions. This wider unconscionability doctrine may be called the modern doctrine of 
unconscionability, as it has moved a long way from its initial formulation. This thesis 
proposes the application of this wide modem doctrine of unconscionability, as a vitiating 
factor in suretyship agreements, which is capable of capturing the special weaknesses of 
vulnerable surety-wives. 
For this reason, this chapter tries to present the full picture of the proposed doctrine. 
Naturally, an exhaustive analysis of all of these jurisdictions is not desired; instead a 
selection of the most important cases will be studied. The purpose is to draw parallels 
between the applications of the doctrine in these jurisdictions, so as to identify its basic 
components and give clear guidelines. This task is particularly important because one of 
the biggest criticisms of the doctrine is that it is a vague concept, which can cause 
uncertainty. The analysis will show that the circumstances under which it arises and its 
basic components are well known. These are: relational inequality (being more general 
than inequality of bargaining power, so as to include gifts as well)4, manifest 
disadvantage (or transactional imbalance or substantive injustice) and abusive or 
unconscionable conduct (which may be active or passive in the form of knowingly 
accepting an unfair bargaining to the detriment of a weak person). 
4.2 Description of the Doctrine of Unconscionability within various Jurisdictions 
4.2.1 The Doctrine of Unconscionability within English Law 
This section looks into the application of the doctrine of unconscionability within English 
law. In England the doctrine has not moved far from its initial formulation but still it has 
appeared in some more recent cases. Generally, there is unwillingness to apply wide 
vitiating -factors. 
The chapter starts with an exposition of the origins of the doctrine and 
then some other more recent examples are presented. 
ISO 
4.2.1.1 The Emergence of the Doctrine 
By way of background of the formulation of the doctrine in this country, it emerged from 
a series of old cases whereby the Court of Chancery interfered to protect heirs, expectants 
or reversioners, meaning those who were in a difficult financial position at the time of 
entering the challenged agreement, but were relying on the expectation that they would 
potentially come to inherit a large legacy. 5 In such circumstances the courts interfered on 
the grounds of public policy. Lord Hardwicke L. C. noted "There is always fraud 
presumed or inferred from the circumstances or conditions of the parties contracting - 
weakness on the one side, usury on the other, or extortion, or advantage taken of that 
weakness. There has been always an appearance of fraud from the nature of the 
bargain. "6 Then Lord Selborne L. C. explained, "Fraud does not here mean deceit or 
circumvention; it means unconscientious use of power arising out of these circumstances 
a Capper, David, "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation" (1998) 14 LQR 479, 
480. 
5 Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves. Sen. 125; 28 E. R. 82; Evans v Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox. 
333; Earl ofAylesford vMorris (1873) L. R. 8; Ch. App. 484. Also, in Nevill v Snelling (1880) L. R. 15; 
Ch. D. 679, it was stated that "the principle, on which a Court of Equity has granted relief from an 
unconscionable bargain entered into with an expectant heir or reversioner for the loan of money, 
applies also to the case of money being lent on unconscionable terms (not fully understood by the 
borrower, and known not to be fully understood by him by the lender), to a young man, being a minor 
at the time of the first transaction, the son of a father possessing large property, who has no property of 
his own and no expectation of any, except such general expectations as are founded on his father's 
position in life, the money being lent without any thought of repayment by the borrower, but on the 
credit of such general expectations, and in the hope of extorting payment from the father to avoid the 
exposure attendant on the son's being made a bankrupt" In Beynon v Cook (1875) L. R. 10; Ch. 389, it 
was asserted that the principle applies to all cases in which, on the one hand, there is a demand for very 
unreasonable terms, and on the other hand, a young man, even though of full age, without any means. 
if one of the parties is prima facie in a position to take advantage of the other, the onus is on the 
defendant to show that the transaction was a fair one. In O'Rorke v Bolingbroke (1877) L. R. 2 App. 
Cas. 814,823, Lord Hatherley said, "in the case of the `expectant heir, ' or of persons under pressure 
without adequate protection, and in the case of dealings with uneducated, ignorant persons, the burthen 
of showing the fairness of the transaction is thrown on the person who seeks to obtain the benefit of the 
contract"; however, in that case the majority of the Lords held that the appellant had fully satisfied the 
onus. 
6 Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves. Sen. 125,28 E. R. 82,101. For example, earlier in Evans 
v Blood (1746) 3 Brown Parl Cas 632; 1 E. R. 1543, imposition and unfairness were manifested by both 
undue method of obtaining the consent to the transaction and by the inadequacy of consideration. Also, 
in Bridgman v Green (1757) 2 Ves. Sen. 408; 28 E. R. 399, relief was afforded in circumstances where 
a footman and valet had great influence over his master and the transaction was unfair on the weak 
party. In Filmer v Gott (1774) 4 Brown Part. Cas. 230; 2 E. R. 156, relief was given in regards to a 
transaction with an ill and old lady. In Wamsley v Both (1739) 2 Atk. 25; 26 E. R. 412 and in Middleton 
v Welles (1785) 2 E. R. 166, applying the principle, un unfair transaction between a client and his 
attorney was struck down, since advantage was taken of the weakness of the client. However, in 
Newman v Payne (1793) 2 Ves. Jun. 199; 30 E. R. 592, it was stated that transactions between clients 
and attorneys maybe set aside irrespective of any misconduct. In Underhill v Norwood (1804) 10 Ves. 
209, Lord Eldon LC explained that the Court will intervene where the transaction is so unfair, so as to 
satisfy the conscience of the Court that imposition must have taken place (constructive fraud). This 
occurred in Taylor v Obee (1816) 3 Price 83; 146 E. R. 180. 
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and conditions; and when the relative position of the parties is such as prima facie to raise 
this presumption, the transaction cannot stand unless the person claiming the benefit of it 
is able to repel the presumption by contrary evidence, proving it to have been in point of 
fact, fair just and reasonable. "? So, even though there might be no evidence of fraud or 
misrepresentation, nevertheless the transaction will be set aside. 
These cases were the springboards for the expansion of the principle upon other cases of 
`catching bargains', meaning whenever the parties "meet under such circumstances 
as... to give the stronger party a dominion over the weaker. "9 Thus in Fry v Lane10 it was 
held that "where a purchase is made from a poor and ignorant man at a considerable 
undervalue, the vendor having had no independent legal advice, a court of equity will set 
aside the transaction. " 
Subsequent cases generalised the principle in Fry v Lane even more, so as to include 
cases where parties do not necessarily suffer from destitution and serious ignorance but 
from lack of awareness and sophistication in respect of the specific transaction. So, in 
Cresswell v Potter, " Megary J. held that a van driver and currently a telephonist came 
within the ambit of Fry v Lane. "I do not think that poverty is confined to destitution. 
Further, although no doubt it requires considerable alertness and skill to be a good 
telephonist, I think that a telephonist can properly be described as `ignorant' in the 
context of property transactions in general and the execution of conveyancing documents 
in particular. " 12 Added to the requirement of ignorance in respect of the specific 
transaction (or inequality of bargaining power), there is also the requirement of 
considerable undervalue, which is always a question of fact. In Cresswell v Potter, 13 the 
wife gave up her right in the home in return only for an indemnity against liabilities under 
the mortgage of the property. In Fry v Lane, £170 was paid for a reversionary interest 
under a will which ultimately proved to be worth £730. The purpose of this requirement 
7 Earl ofAylesford vMorris (1873) L. R. 8; Ch. App. 484,488-9. 
8 As Cartwright describes them in: Cartwright, John, "An Unconscionable Bargain" (1993) 109 LQR 
530. 
9 Earl ofAylesford vMorris (1873) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 484,491, per Lord Selbome L. C. 
to Fryv Lane (1888) L. R. 40 Ch. D. 312, per Kay J. 322. 
11 [1978] 1 W. L. R. 255. 
'2 Cresswell v Potter[ 1978] 1 W. L. R. 255,257-8. 
13 See also Backhouse v Backhouse [1978] 1 W. L. R. 243; Watkin v Watson-Smith, The Times, 3 July 
1986; Boustany v Pigott (1993) 69 P. & C. R. 298. 
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is that it raises the presumption that some kind of active advantage has been taken over 
the weak party. 
These cases were the first applications of the doctrine. The basic components which 
clearly arise are as follows: First, one party must be at a serious disadvantage to the other 
through, for example, poverty, ignorance or lack of advice. Secondly, this weakness must 
be abused by the stronger party in a morally culpable manner. And, thirdly, the 
transaction must be overreaching, and oppressive and not merely harsh or improvident. 
The third element means that in a case of sale there must be substantial undervalue which 
`shocks the conscience of the court'. 14 Significantly, as the analysis will show,, these are 
the basic counterparts of the doctrine as applied in other jurisdictions as well, the 
difference being that the latter have developed a more general doctrine of 
unconscionability. 
4.2.1.2 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch 
However, after these cases, the doctrine in England has not developed to the same 
extent as it has in other jurisdictions. It appeared again in Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland NV v Burch, '5 although the case was wrongly treated as an undue influence 
case. 
There, the defendant mortgaged her flat, valued at £100,000, with an equity of 
£70,000, as security for the employer's overdraft, which was in the region of 
£250,000-£270,000. The principal ground, based on O'Brien, 16 on which the court set 
the charge aside was that the Bank had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
employer's undue influence upon the defendant. It is very important to note here that 
the extremely onerous nature of the mortgage was a strong evidential factor in the 
court's eyes as to the existence of undue influence, and it was argued that it should 
have been as clear to the bank as well. However, the fact that Miss Burch (the surety), 
worked for ten years for her employer, baby-sat and visited his family, were not really 
enough to find a relationship of trust and confidence to come under 2B class. The 
14 Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. v Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd [1983] 1 W. L. R. 87,94-5, per Peter Millett 
Q. C. 
u [1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA). 
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court went to great pains to explain this case as class 2B undue influence but really 
this was an unconscionability case. "It is substantive unfairness which gave rise to the 
inferences that the procedural pre-conditions of relief existed in this case: (i) that the 
relationship of employer-employee must have ripened into a class 2B relationship of 
influence, necessary for the presumption of undue influence; (ii) that the bank must 
have suspected that this was so, giving rise to the further inference of constructive 
notice that undue influence induced Burch's consent; (iii) that the bank's awareness of 
Burch's refusal to obtain the independent advice urged, or at least its ignorance as to 
whether she obtained the advice, should have confirmed rather than allayed its 
suspicion of undue influence; (iv) that, even if Burch received advice, the bank must 
have suspected that the advice was either not competent or not followed and so did 
not free Burch from the effects of the suspected undue influence. " 17 
4.2.1.3 Gifts 
There is some confusion as to whether the doctrine of unconscionability applies to gifts in 
this jurisdiction. In Snell's Equity it is stated that the doctrine of unconscionable bargains 
"a fortiori ... must extend to the setting aside of gifts. 
" 18 
The deputy Court judge in Langton v Langton19 opined that the doctrine does not apply to 
gifts. The deed of gift in this case was set aside on the grounds of undue influence, so it 
was not really necessary for him to consider whether the bargain was unconscionable. 
Nevertheless, he went on and stated that if the doctrine applied to gifts, it would mean 
that, in the case of all gifts by poor and ignorant persons without independent legal 
advice, the onus of proving that the gift was fair, just and reasonable would be placed on 
the recipient. That, in his view, would be a surprising result. 
In addition, if we go back to Fry v Lane20 the doctrine was limited to purchases of 
property and not gifts. However, latter on in Cresswell v Potter, 21 the doctrine was 
16 Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
17 Chen-Wishart, M., "The O'Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness" (1997) 56 CLI60,70. 
18 McGhee, John (ed. ); Snell's Equity. 31'` ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005,559. 
19 [1995] 2 F. L. R. 890, the case involved the transfer of the claimant's bungalow to his son and 
daughter-in-law by deed of gift. 
20 (1889) L. R. 40 Ch D. 312,322. 
21 [1978] 1 W. L. R. 244. 
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applied to an unconscionable transaction, which, although described and treated as a 
bargain, was really a gift. Megarry J. stated "what was done by the release was, in 
substance, that a gift was made by a wife who was being divorced to the husband who 
was divorcing hei". 22 
The better view it is submitted is that the doctrine applies to gifts as well, as the situation 
stands in other juri sdictions z3 The same idea is supported by Capper. ' 
4.2.1.4 Contracts in Restraint of Trade 
Contracts in restraint of trade form one category of cases where it is suggested that courts 
were influenced by considerations of unconscionability. These cases involve a less 
sophisticated party on the one hand and a more experienced party on the other, together 
with terms which are unfair and oppressive to the weaker party. This combination proves 
that some unfair conduct must have taken place. 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd25 is illustrative 26 There, the 
plaintiffs, suppliers of motor fuels to dealers, entered into two solus agreements with the 
defendants in relation to two garages, M. and C., owned by the defendants. The 
agreements were on the plaintiffs' standard printed forms, under which unfair terms were 
imposed on the defendants. The defendants agreed to buy from the plaintiffs' fuel for 
four years and five months (in relation to garage M. ) and (in relation to garage C. ), to 
resell motor only in accordance with the plaintiffs' retail schedule prices for 21 years, not 
to operate any discount and if the garage was to be sold to get the buyer to enter into a 
similar solus agreement with the plaintiffs. Garage C. was also subject to a mortgage. 
Under the loan agreement the defendants covenanted, inter alia, to repay by instalments 
over 21 years the sums advanced with interest, to purchase their total requirements of 
22 Ibid, 259. 
p For example, in Wilton v Farnworth [1948] 76 C. L. R. 646 (HC Australia), the claimant was deaf, 
poorly educated and dull witted. His stepson persuaded him to release his interest in the estate to him. 
The court had set aside the transaction as unconscionable dealing. Also, in Louth v Diprose [1993] 67 
A. L. J. R. 95 (HC of Australia), 97, Brennan J. said: "gifts obtained by unconscionable conduct and gifts 
obtained by undue influence are set aside by equity on substantially the same basis. " 
24 Capper, D., "Unconsdonable Bargains and Unconscionable Gifts" (1996) Conv 308. He argues that 
there is no distinction between undue influence and unconscionability in regards to gifts. zs [1968] A. C. 269. 
26 The facts are taken from the head note of the case. 
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motor fuels at the mortgaged premises from the plaintiffs during the continuance of the 
mortgage, not to buy, receive or sell any motor fuels other than those purchased from the 
plaintiffs, not to offer any lubricants for sale unless of corresponding type or the nearest 
equivalent to those supplied by the plaintiffs, who should be given no less publicity than 
any other supplier, and not to redeem the mortgage otherwise than in accordance with the 
covenant for repayment. Then in 1961, low-price petrol came on the market and the 
defendants began to sell another brand of petrol at both garages. The plaintiffs sought 
injunctions, so as to restrain the defendants from buying or selling other than the 
plaintiffs' motor fuels. The defendants contended, inter alia, that the agreements and the 
mortgage were null and void as being in unlawful restraint of trade and counterclaimed 
for declarations that they were entitled to redeem the mortgage upon payment of the 
principal moneys secured with interest. 
Mocatta J. held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the injunctions sought. The defendants 
appealed successfully to the House of Lords 27 Lord Pearce said: "It is important that the 
court, in weighing the question of reasonableness, should give full weight to commercial 
practices and to the generality of contracts made freely by parties bargaining on equal 
terms. 2928 Since though, the parties here were not of equal bargaining power and the terms 
were unconscionable and oppressive29 the terms were void. 
Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay30 is also of interest. In this case, a 
songwriter who was inexperienced in relation to commercial matters entered into an 
agreement with a professional music publisher on their `standard form'. In addition to the 
presence of inequality of bargaining power, the terms of the contract were one-sided and 
oppressive to the songwriter. They provided that the songwriter was to assign to the 
publishers the full copyright for five years; remuneration was to be paid by way of 
royalties on works published; if the total royalties during the term exceeded £5,000, the 
agreement was automatically extended for a further five years; the publishers could 
terminate the agreement at any time by one months notice, while no such right was given 
to the song writer, the publishers had the right to assign by agreement; finally, the 
27Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] A. C. 269,564C E, 572A-B, 576 
B-C. 
28 1bid, 323. 
29Ibid, 567C D, 571D-E, per Lord Denning M. R.; and 580A-B, per Harman L. J. 30 [1974] 1 W. L. R. 1308. 
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songwriter agreed not to assign his right under the agreement without the publishers' 
written consent. The songwriter brought an action for a declaration that the agreement 
was contrary to public policy and void. 
Plowman J. made the declaration and his judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal 
and the House of Lords. Lord Diplock explained that abuse of inequality of bargaining 
power underlay the public policy cases of agreements restrictive of trade, after noting that 
such contracts fall within a limited category of contracts in which courts allow the 
promisor not to fulfil his promise. 1 In these cases, he explained, courts need to "assess 
the relative bargaining power of the publisher and the songwriter at the time the contract 
was made and to decide whether the publisher has used his superior bargaining power to 
exact from the songwriter promises that were unfairly onerous to him"32 In this case, the 
appellants tried to justify the agreement on the basis of a standard form contract that had 
stood the test of time. Rejecting this, Lords Reid and Diplock referred to the judgments of 
Lord Pearce and Lord Wilberforce in Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harpers Garage 
(Stourport) Ltd, 33 to distinguish between agreements "made freely by parties bargaining 
on equal terms" or "moulded under the pressure of negotiation" and those imposed on a 
weak party on a take it or leave it basis34 as the case was here. 
Clifford Davis Management Ltd v WEA Records33 involved similar facts 36 Here, the 
court had to decide on the enforceability of an agreement under which a composer was to 
write songs, which the publisher was at liberty to publish and the composer was allowed 
ten per cent of the retail price of the sheet music and 50 per cent of the royalties on the 
records. The agreement vested copyright in the publisher in all of the composer's work 
for ten years. The Court of Appeal found that the agreement was in restraint of trade 
(similarly to Schroeder3). The parties "had not met on equal terms, the one was so strong 
in bargaining power and the other so weak that, as a matter of common fairness it was not 
31 Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd vMacaulay [1974] 1 W. L. R. 1308,1315. 
32 ibid. 
33 [1968] AC 269. 
34 Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd vMacaulay [1974] 1 W. L. R. 1308,1316, per Lord Diplock. 35 [1975] 1 W. L. R. 61. 
36 Similarly, in Levinson v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co Ltd [1978] Q. B. 69 an unreasonable 
limitation clause was set aside as it involved a standard form contract and inequality of bargaining 
power, see 79E-F, 81D, per Lord Denning M. R. 
37 SchroederMusic Publishing Co Ltd vMacaulay [1974] 1 W. L. R. 1308. 
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right that the strong be allowed to push the weak to the wall. 08 Also, regarding the terms 
of the contact, these were found "manifestly unfair"39 to the composer and it was argued 
that, "if the publisher wished to exact such onerous terms or drive so unconscionable a 
bargain, he ought to have seen that the composer had independent advice. "40 
The cases examined involved abuse of superiority in bargaining strength coupled with an 
unfair transaction, which are the elements of unconscionability. 
4.2.1.5 Mortgages - Redemption and Interest 
In regards to the mortgagor's right to redeem, Cartwright4' explains that courts uphold a 
mortgage, so long as the provision is not unconscionable and is obtained fairly. In G&C 
Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd, 42 Lord Parker of 
Waddington said: "there is now no rile in equity which precludes a mortgagee, whether 
the mortgage be made upon the occasion of a loan or otherwise, from stipulating for any 
collateral advantage, provided such collateral advantage is not either (1) unfair and 
unconscionable, or (2) in the nature of a penalty clogging the equity of redemption, or (3) 
inconsistent with or repugnant to the contractual and equitable right to redeem. 9A3 
The case was applied in Cityland and Property (Holdings) Ltd v Dabrah, `4 where further 
advantage over and above repayment of principal loan, interest and costs was held to be 
unfair and unconscionable45 The court said, that whilst there was then no rule in equity 




41 Cartwright, John, "An Unconscionable Bargain" (1993) 109 LQR 530. - 
42 [1914] A. C. 25. 
43 [1914] A. C. 25,33. 
44 [1968] Ch. 166. 
45 The same rationale was applied in: Booth v Salvation Army Building Association Ltd (1897) 14 
T. L. R. 3; Horwood v Millar's Timber and Trading Co. Ltd [1917] 1 KB. 305; Estates Trust Ltd v 
Byrne [1939] Ch. 441; in Biggs vHoddinott [1898] 2 Ch 307, a mortgage to brewers was for five years 
certain with a "tie" during the continuance of the mortgage. Two questions arose in the case, one as to 
the right of the mortgagor to redeem before the expiration of the five years, the other as to the validity 
of the tie. Romer J. held that there was no objection to the five year period, either in itself or when 
taken in conjunction with the tie. He said: "I am of opinion that it is obviously to the advantage of both 
the mortgagor and mortgagee that such a provision should be enforced. Of course, that does not prevent 
the Court in a proper case from preventing the application of the clause if it is too large, or there are 
circumstances connected with the proviso which renders it, in the opinion of the Court, unreasonable or 
oppressive. " In Morgan v Jeffreys [1910] 1 Ch. 620, the mortgage contained a provision by which the 
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precluding a lender from stipulating for a collateral advantage if it was fair and 
reasonable, in the present case collateral advantage was in the circumstances 
unreasonable, and the court could and would interfere. In reaching this decision, the 
judge considered all the circumstances, noting that, unlike the facts in Kreglinger v New 
Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd, this was not a bargain between two large 
trading concerns. It was the case of a company selling houses and a purchaser who was 
obviously of limited means because he was unable to find more than £600 towards the 
purchase. The premium which was added to the loan was no less than 57 per cent of the 
amount of the loan. Moreover, it was expressly provided by the charge that, on default, 
the whole should immediately become due. It was clear that there was abuse of inequality 
of bargaining power and this led the judge to a finding of unconscionability. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Knightsbridge Estates Trust Ltd v Byrne dealt 
with the same issue. In that case, the borrower and lender were both large companies. The 
terms of the mortgage provided for repayment of principal by instalments over 40 years. 
The borrower wished to redeem by paying off the whole debt much sooner. At first 
instance, Luxmoore j., 47 held that they were so entitled to redeem since the terms of the 
mortgage were such that they were "onerous and unreasonable. " The Court of Appeal 
reversed his decision. Sir Wilfrid Greene M. R. said: 48 
"equity may give relief against contractual terms in a mortgage 
transaction if they are oppressive or unconscionable, and in 
deciding whether or not a particular transaction falls within this 
mortgagor was precluded from paying off the debt for a period of twenty-eight years unless the 
mortgagee was willing to receive it earlier. The mortgage also contained a "tie" - it was a public-house 
mortgage and the mortgagee was a brewer - and this tie was to last during the thirty-one years. The 
mortgagor (who was a working miner) claimed to be entitled to redeem before the thirty-one years had 
elapsed. Joyce J. held that he was entitled to do so. He relied on the length of the period, the absence of 
mutuality, the position of the mortgagor, the character of the stipulation in the agreement and the 
severity of the provisions for the benefit of the mortgagee, and held that in all the circumstances the 
period of twenty-eight years "exceeded all reasonable limit" Also, in Tyler v Yates (1870) L. R. 6 Ch. 
App. 665, it was held that the jurisdiction of the court over unconscionable bargains is not affected by 
the repeal of the usury laws, as to dealings with reversionary interests. So there, an exorbitant rate of 
interest agreed to be paid by a young and needy man on the security of property in reversion, held by 
an indefeasible title, was unfair dealing. In Fairclough v Swan Brewery Co Ltd [1912] A. C. 565, it was 
held that the equity of redemption must not be crippled in any way, but the question there raised was 
considered on the merits of the case. The Court only intervenes to vary the bargain between parties 
when the bargain is unconscionable. 46 [1939] Ch. 441. 
47 [1938] Ch. 741,768. 
48 [1939] Ch. 441,457. 
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category the length of time for which the contractual right to 
redeem is postponed may well be an important consideration. In 
the present case no question of this kind was or could have been 
raised. But equity does not reform mortgage transactions because 
they are unreasonable. It is concerned to see two things - one that 
the essential requirements of a mortgage transaction are 
observed, and the other that oppressive or unconscionable terms 
are not enforced. " 
The Court of Appeal also referred to the importance of the bargaining strength of the 
parties and noted that the principle only applies when the parties are not at arm's length 
and not bargaining on equal terms. The case went to the House of Lords, where the 
decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld on different grounds but no doubt was 
thrown on the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. 
Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd and Others v Marden49 involved a question of 
unconscionable mortgage terms. The mortgage provided for repayment by reference to 
the rate of exchange of the Swiss franc; interest was payable on the full sum advanced 
irrespective of repayments of capital; the mortgage was not to be redeemed during the 
first 10 years. The question before the court was whether the provision for "Swiss franc 
uplift" was void as against public policy and whether the terms of mortgage were 
unenforceable as "unfair or unconscionable". The court decided that, while the terms may 
have been unreasonable, they were not unfair, oppressive or morally reprehensible and 
the court would not intervene to relieve the plaintiffs from performance of the terms of 
the mortgage. 
The cases described above involved the taking advantage of the inequality of bargaining 
power between the parties, so as to impose abusive terms on the week party. These are 
also the elements of the doctrine of unconscionability. So, the effect of these cases is that 
they constitute examples of the doctrine. 
49 [1979] Ch. 84. 
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4.2.1.6 Review 
In England the doctrine has not seen great development. It has not moved a long way 
from its initial formulation in Fry v Lane . 
50 Despite the fact that is underdeveloped it still 
may be traced in some cases like Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch, sl where 
the extravagant facts led Nourse L. J. to remark that the transaction was "so harsh and 
unconscionable as to make it hardly necessary for a court of equity to rely on that 
[O'Brien] S2 decision as a basis for avoiding the transaction. 9953 Its elements may also be 
traced in other doctrines, under a different name like in cases concerning restrain of 
restraint of trade, mortgages and redemption and interest. Apart from the authorities 
presented above there is a number of cases where unconscionability exists more 
silently. 54 For example, cases of restraint of trade, mortgages, redemption and interest, 
receipt of full discharge of claims in negligence'51 trustees and fiduciaries, 56 substantial 
50 (1889) L. R. 40; Ch. D. 312. 
51 [1997] 1 All E. R, 144 (CA). 
52 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
53 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA), 146. 
54 In Waddams, S. M. "Unconscionability in Contracts" (1976) 39 MLR 369, Waddams looked into 
various groups of cases and concluded that the real reason for agreements struck down by courts is 
unreasonableness and unconscionability; such are various forms of forfeiture, mortgages, gifts, penalty 
clauses, deposits of money to be forfeited on breach of an obligation secured and exemption clauses. 
The principle of substantial performance was explained in the light of unconscionability. Cases of 
duress and of sales of reversions by expectant heirs are seen as areas of the law where problems of 
unfairness and inequality of bargaining power are central. He also explained cases of restraint of trade 
as based on criteria of what is reasonable and fair. In Cartwright, John, "An Unconscionable Bargain" 
(1993) 109 LQR 530, Cartwright also observes that the courts in determining whether a provision is a 
penalty or liquidated damages clause, have often used the language of unconscionability and the 
relevant criterion being inequality of bargaining power, see Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New 
Garage Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79,87,98; Johnson v Johnson [1989] 1 W. L. R. 1026,1032. 
55 A different category of cases where the same elements where applied in order to declare the contract 
void has to do with agreements of full discharge of claims in negligence. In Horry v Tate & Lyle 
Refineries Ltd [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 416, the judge applied the doctrine but concluded that there was 
no inequality between the two parties in that particular case. In this case, the plaintiff who was 
employed by the defendants, sustained a hernia after his fall at work and claimed damages for personal 
injury. In their defence, the defendants pleaded that there was a release by way of accord and 
satisfaction by means of a receipt which the plaintiff signed settling his claim for £1000. The receipt 
provided that the sum was to be accepted in full settlement, satisfaction and discharge of all and every 
present and future claim that the plaintiff might have against the defendant in respect of his any loss 
damage or injury whether now or hereafter to become manifest caused by or consequent upon the 
accident in question. In reply, the plaintiff contended that the defendants were not entitled to upon the 
receipt because: (i) it was induced by the undue influence of the insurers; and (ii) there was inequality 
of bargaining power between the plaintiff and the insurers. On the facts of the case, the court found that 
while a fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiff and the insurers, as he relied on their advice, 
and that this relationship was breached by the insurers' misrepresentation. Based on these, the 
defendants were not allowed to rely on the receipt. Arrale v Costain Civil Engineer [1976] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 98 involved similar facts. There as well, the plaintiff had suffered an injury as a result of an 
accident, which occurred while the plaintiff was employed by the defendants. The defendants 
compensated the plaintiff but "in full satisfaction and discharge of all claims in respect of injury 
whether arising now or hereafter to become manifest arising directly or indirectly from the accident. " 
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performance 57 and equitable estoppel58 involve abuse of position of superior bargaining 
power. Of course, in these last examples it is a matter of interpretation if courts had 
unconscionability in mind. The position remains that the doctrine is under-utilized in this 
jurisdiction. The reason for this under-development is the fear of English courts to apply 
The plaintiff then issued a writ of summons claiming damages. The judge found in favour of the 
defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal decided that there was 
no consideration for the agreement and upheld the appeal. However, Lord Denning M. R. approached 
the issue on the basis of inequality of bargaining power. The plaintiff was a poor labouring man who 
was presented with a contract to sign without any explanation and for no consideration, at a time when 
his bargaining power was grievously impaired by reason of his own ignorance. Even though Lord 
Denning did not find actual misconduct on the part of the defendants, he found unconscionability on 
the basis that they took away a man's right without adequate consideration. 
56 As Cartwright explains, equity developed rules to protect beneficiaries against the advantages which 
could be taken of them by trustees. In Tito v Waddell (No. 2) [1977] Ch. 106,241, Megarry V-C noted: 
"equity is astute to prevent a trustee from abusing his position or profiting from his trust: the shepherd 
must not be the wolf. " Similar duties applied between fiduciaries. The cases of Edwards v Meyrick 
(1842) 2 Hare 60 and Cowdry v Day 1 Giff. 316 which involved a contract between a solicitor and 
client, are illustrative. Considering these cases Cartwright argues, "there seems to be a consistent policy 
developed by equity to prevent abuse of a position of strength" Cartwright, John, "An Unconscionable 
Bargain" (1993) 109 LQR 530. 
57 Roger Brownsword argues, the rules in relation to substantial performance may be "seen as reflecting 
a concern about inequality of bargaining power. " Brownsword, Roger, Howells Geraint; Wilhelmson, 
Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in Contract Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,42. He suggests that even 
though the relative bargaining power might be pretty much the same, this could change in the course of 
the transaction. He explains that "a refusal to pay for work done (as in D&C Builders Ltd v Rees 
[1966] 2 Q. B. 617) or to perform the agreed work (as in North Ocean Shipping Co v Hyundai 
Construction Co: The Atlantic Baron [1979] Q. B. 705. ) may involve, as the courts are now fond of 
saying, one party "having the other over a barrel. " "By bringing the doctrine of economic duress to 
bear on such situations, the courts not only hold the parties to their original agreement, they protect 
contractors who find themselves vulnerable to asymmetrical changes in their relative bargaining 
power. " Brownsword, Roger, Howells Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); We farism in Contract 
Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,42-43; in Waddams, S. M. "Unconscionability in Contracts" (1976) 
39 MLR 369 and Cartwright, John, "An Unconscionable Bargain" (1993) 109 LQR 530, Wadddams 
argues that the principle of substantial performance can be explained as a measure formulated to cure 
the unconscionable results of the requirement of entire performance of contract. The injustice resulting 
from the strict application of the principle is illustrated in Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 T. R. 320, where the 
widow of a sailor, who died before completing a journey, was not allowed any payment for work 
carried out by her husband because he had not completed the entire journey. So, a number of cases 
established that, unless a party to the contact departs substantially from the agreement or leaves work 
unfinished, it is allowed payment subject to a deduction measured by the extent to which the work falls 
short (Sumpter v Hedges (1898) 1 Q. B. 673; Bolton vMahadeva [1972] 1 W. L. R. 1009; HDakin & Co 
Ltd v Lee [ 1916] 1 KB. 566; Hoening v Isaacs [1952] 2 All E. R. 176). 
58 The principle of "accord and satisfaction" of Pinnels Case (1602) Co. Rep. 7a, whereby 
consideration was needed so as to alter terms in a contract, could lead to injustice. Denning J., in 
Central London Property Trusts Ltd v High Trees House [1947] KB. 130, explained that equity will 
not allow a party to go back on his word when he had promised not to insist on a term of the contract 
when he knew that the other party would rely on such a representation. It would be inequitable for a 
contractual party to insist on performance in such circumstances, despite the lack of consideration 
when making the promise. Equitable estoppel was subsequently applied in a number of cases (Combe v 
Combe [1951] 2 KB. 215; Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 2 All 
E. R. 657; Inwards v Baker [1965] 1 All E. R. 446; D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 Q. B. 617; WJ 
Alan & Co Ltd v El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 All E. R. 127) and came to be a rule on its 
own instead of an exemption; from a mere evidence rule or a defence it evolved into a cause of action 
in itself (Crabb v Arun DC [1975] 3 All E. R. 865). Even though the principle was not explained in 
terms of inequality of bargaining power, to go back to one's word when knowingly the other party 
relied on the promise involves, again, "having the other over the barrel. " 
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wide vitiating factors, which could threaten the principle of freedom of contract and legal 
certainty. 59 From the analysis of the doctrine of unconscionability in English law what 
must remain in mind are its main elements being, inequality of bargaining power, abuse 
of dominance and manifest disadvantage. These elements are the same as in the rest of 
the jurisdictions examined. 
4.2.2 The Doctrine of Unconscionabilitv within Irish Law 
Despite the narrow application of the doctrine of unconscionability within English law, in 
Ireland it has seen great development. 60 There also, the roots of the doctrine are found in 
the Court of Equity's desire to protect expectant heirs 61 The elements, which clearly 
distinguish, are inequality of bargaining power, manifest disadvantage and 
unconscionable conduct. So, a successful unconscionability claim is achieved when the 
stronger party takes advantage of some inequality of bargaining power, while manifest 
disadvantage signals that the transaction is unconscionable. These elements are taken one 
at a time below. 
In regards to inequality of bargaining power, in Grealish v Murphy62 Gavan Duffy J. 
stated: 
"Equity comes to the rescue whenever the parties to a contract 
have not met on equal terms [... ] the corollary is that the Court 
must enquiry whether a Grantor shown to be unequal to 
protecting himself, has had the protection which was due by 
reason of this infirmity and the infirmity may take various 
forms. " 
59 This is the reason that the similar doctrine of inequality of bargaining power of Lord Denning M. R. 
was rejected. In Lloyds Bank v Bundy (1975) 1 Q. B. 326 (CA), Lord Denning tried to introduce the 
doctrine of inequality of bargaining power (which is similar to the doctrine of unconscionability). Lord 
Scarman, in National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] A. C. 686, resisted its development, Even 
though, inequality of bargaining power and unconscionability are not the same, still these statements 
are important; they are both dicta as to English law's attitude in relation to their willingness to 
introduce wide doctrines. The latter is more influential and authoritative being a unanimous dictum in 
the House of Lords, instead of a single voice in the Court of Appeal. Lord Scarman's view shows 
deference to Parliament and reflects judicial thinking. 
60 For a presentation of the doctrine in Ireland see: David Capper in Dawson Norma; Greer, Desmond; 
Ingram Peter (eds. ); One Hundred and RJ? y Years ofirish Law. Sweet and Maxwell, 1996, chapter 3. 61 Aid, 45-46. 
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Even though the list of inequality of bargaining power cannot be exhaustively set, some 
categories have been identified. For example, in Garvey vMcMinn, 63 the plaintiff was an 
illiterate woman in need of money and agreed to release her annuity at her disadvantage. 
In Rooney v Conway, an 85 year old sold his land, which he had left by will to his 
nephew after a family disagreement. Similarly, in Lydon v Coyne, 65 the transferor was old 
and confined to bed when he made the transfer. 66 Carroll v Carrolt7 involved a 
conveyance of land by a father to his son; the father depended on his son for his 
maintenance and support, he was physically frail and depressed due to is wife's death and 
transferred his premises without reserving to himself any right of maintenance and 
support; the transaction was set aside on the grounds of undue influence and 
unconscionability. In Grealish vMurphy, 68 the plaintiff was a marksman and incapable to 
manage his farm. Also, in Buckley v Irwin, 69 the defendant vendor was not capable of 
running business affairs, contrary to the purchasers. On the other hand, in O'Reilly v 
O'Connor, 70 the High Court held that a contract conducted by a business man was not an 
unconscionable bargain. Apart from age, illiteracy and mental weakness, other cases 
involved recklessness and improvidence. In Slator v Nolan, 71 the transaction was to the 
manifest disadvantage of the plaintiff who was a reckless and improvident person. He had 
been declared bankrupt many times and had spent time in prison without knowing he had 
property, which he could sell to repay his debts. On the other hand, the purchaser was 
well inclined in business affairs. In Howley v Cook, 72 the plaintiff mortgaged his 
property with 60% interest and did not understand what he was signing, while the 
defendant was a disbarred solicitor who lended money with exorbitant interest and had 
also spent time in prison. Also, in Buller v Miller, 73 the vendor, a reckless and 
improvident man, sold his property to a shopkeeper to whom he was indebted and 
depended for necessities. All these different cases involve different types of inequality of 
62 [1946] 1R 35. 
63 (1846) 9 Ir Eq Rep 526. 
64 [1982] NUB. 
65 [1946] Ir Jur Rep 64. 
66 Also, Grealish vMurphy [1946] IR 35; Walkin v Watson-Smith, The Times, 3 July 1986. 
67 [1998] IEHC 42. 
68 [1946] IR 35. 
69 [1960] NI 98. 
70 [2005] IEHC 255. 
71 (1876) IR 11 Eq 367 
72(1873)IR8Eg570. 
73 (1867) IR 1 Eq 195. 
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bargaining power. 74 Of course, that alone is not enough to set the contract aside. The 
stronger party has to take advantage of that special disadvantage. 
Moving along, the next requirement for a successful unconscionability case under Irish 
law is the existence of unconscionable conduct on the part of the stronger party. This 
conduct may be either of active or passive nature. So, in Buckley v Irwin, 75 the purchasers 
took advantage of the vendor to sell his farm at a serious undervalue because they knew 
he could be imposed upon. Also, in Butler v Miller, 76 the purchaser put pressure on the 
weak party that unless he sold his property to him, so as to get money and repay his 
debts, his creditors would proceed against him. 
Other cases, do not involve apparent wrongdoing; these cases are of passive form. This is 
what is called passive taking advantage of benefits, which in Ireland and in 
Commonwealth jurisdictions is equally good as active taking advantage of benefits, for 
the purposes for giving rise to the doctrine of unconscionability. For example, in Slator v 
Nolan, " the defendant took advantage of the fact that the plaintiff did not understand the 
terms of the contract. In Grealish v Murphy, 78 the defendant took passive advantage of 
the severe misfortune of the plaintiff. A useful case is Rooney v Conway, 79 where the 
defendant bought land from an old and vulnerable friend of his at the one quarter of the 
price. The vendor felt obliged for all the help and the services that the defendant provided 
to him and after a family fallout he sold the property to the defendant, while it was 
initially planned to be passed on to the family. On the other hand, in Smyth v Smyth, 80 the 
transaction between two brothers was not unconscionable, even though it was carried out 
casually, because there was neither manifest disadvantage nor mental weakness or any 
other type of inequality between the two parties. So, in the absence of inequality of 
bargaining power this passive acceptance of benefits could not be considered as 
74 Capper argues that in principle, any contract where there is inequality of bargaining power, terms 
which are manifestly one-sided, and evidence of exploitation of the weaker party by the stronger party, 
is open to challenge as an unconscionable bargain. So, he continues unconscionability could apply to 
cases of undue influence like O'Flanagan v Ray-Ger Ltd Unreported, Irish High Court, 28 April 1983. 
Dawson Norma; Greer, Desmond; Ingram Peter (eds. ); One Hundred and Fifty Years of Irish Law. 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1996,60. 
75 [1960] NI 98. 
76 (1867) IR 1 Eq 195. 
77 (1876) 1R11Eg367. 
78 [1946] IR 35. 
79 [1982] NIJB. 
80 Unreported, Irish High Court (Costello J. ), 23 November 1978. 
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unconscionable. In conclusion, it appears that some form of unconscionable conduct need 
always be present but passive acceptance of benefits from a weak party may constitute 
unconscionable conduct, whether the strong party was responsible for that weakness or 
not. 
Apart from inequality of bargaining power and unconscionable conduct, the third element 
of unconscionability is manifest disadvantage. In Haverty v Brooks, 81 the vendor sold his 
land below the market price. In Rooney v Conway, 82 the property was sold for 500 
pounds but the purchaser admitted that he would have paid four or even six times more. 
In Grealish v Murphy, 83 the plaintiff surrendered the fee simple in his land for a life 
interests and some personal covenants, which could not easily be enforced sa Apart from 
these cases, there are dicta, which suggest that the presence of extreme transactional 
imbalance is evidence of fraud in itself. So, in Butler v Miller. " it was stated that sale in 
half price of property satisfies the test. Relevant to transactional imbalance, David 
Cappe? ' explains that in essence, it has to be present otherwise there will be nothing to 
suggest that unconscionability took place, while in some extreme circumstances the 
presence of it is enough proof of unconscionable conduct. So, the more imbalance is 
present the less inequality of bargaining power and unconscionable conduct need to be 
present. This shows that manifest disadvantage is not a necessary requirement but helps 
to raise the presumption ofunconscionability as a very strong evidential tool. 
A last point about the doctrine is that a transaction which looks unfair may be upheld if 
the defendant shows that the plaintiff had or could have independent legal advice but 
refused. 87 The presence of independent legal advice shows that the transaction was not 
the result of pressure of the defendant or circumstances exploited by the defendant. 88 This 
81 [1970] 1R 214. 
82 [1982] NIJB. 
83 [1946] IR 35. 
84 An added interesting point about Grealish v Murphy [1946] IR 35,49-50, is that Gavan Duffy J. 
stated that unconscionability also applies to gifts. Capper argues that the doctrine should apply to gifts 
too as a matter of principle in Dawson Norma; Greer, Desmond; Ingram Peter (eds. ); One Hundred and 
Fifty Years oflrish Law. Sweet and Maxwell, 1996,61.63. 
85 (1867) IR 1 Eq 195. 
86 Dawson Norma; Greer, Desmond; Ingram Peter (eds. ); One Hundred and Fijly Years of Irish Law. 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1996,52-53. 
87 Harrison v Guest (1855) 6 De G, M and G 424. 
88 Of course, advice need not necessarily be legal advice; in Kelly v Morrisroe (1919) 53 ILTR 145, the 
plaintiff received advice from her employer. 
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advice must be independent. In Grealish v Murphy, the solicitor who acted for both 
parties did not inquire into the financial position of the parties and the purposes behind 
the agreement. His failure to explore these issues meant that independent legal advice 
was not given and the contract was set aside. On the other hand, in Smyth v Smyth, 90 
even though the same solicitor consulted the parties, the requirement of independent 
advice was satisfied because there was nothing objectionable about the agreement. 
Finally, even tough, independent legal advice is essential it is not always enough. In Rae 
v Joyce, 91 O'Brien C. J. warned that independent legal advice is only one of the elements 
to be taken into account when deciding if unconscionability exists. So, what is important 
about the doctrine of unconscionability is to look at the totality of the facts in each case. 
Some cases with extreme manifest disadvantage may only be saved with the presence of 
independent legal advice, while less extravagant cases may be saved notwithstanding 
insufficient or no legal advice. 
In conclusion, the presentation of the doctrine in Ireland revealed that Irish courts have 
widened the doctrine much more than in England. The doctrine in Ireland is quite open- 
ended and gives much flexibility to the courts to decide upon the facts of each case. 
However, this discussion is saved for the end of the chapter. 
4.2.3 The Doctrine of Unconscionability within Australian Law 
The four landmark cases in the Australian jurisdiction examined here are Blomley v 
Ryan, 93 Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio, 94 Louth v Diprose95 and National 
Australia Bank Ltd v Garcia. 96 Here, similarly to Irish and English law, three 
requirements are necessary to raise the presumption of unconscionability: a) an inequality 
of bargaining power; b) an improvident agreement; and c) an unconscientious taking of 
89 [1946] IR 35. 
90 Unreported, Irish High Court (Costello J. ), 23 November 1978. 
91 (1892) LR Ir 500,521-522. 
92 See Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James; Undue Influence and the Family Home. London: Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd., 2002,198-202; 
http J/pandora. nla. gov. au/pan/25078/20020531 Avww. uws. edu. au/law/eldcriaw/lawreformsubmissionp 
df 
43 (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362 (HC of Australia). 
94 (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447 (HC of Australia). 
95 (1992) 175 C. L. R. 621 (HC of Australia). 
96 (1998) 194 C. L. R. 395. 
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advantage of the party under a special disability; while the presence of independent legal 
advice may be the antidote to uphold the agreement. 
In Blomley v Ryan, an uneducated 78 years old farmer who was mentally and physically 
weak and suffered from the effects of intoxication, sold his farm at a considerable 
undervalue. The purchaser knew of his disabilities and the inadequacy of the price. So, all 
three elements were present and the transaction was held to be unconscionable and as a 
result the contract was set aside. McTiernan J. said that the `essence of the fraud' was that 
`advantage was taken of weakness, ignorance and other disabilities' and that the contract 
was an unfair bargain. 9S 
Relating to the scope of the doctrine, according to McTiernan J., the principle applies to 
"all cases in which the parties to a contract have not met upon equal terms.. "9 This means 
that indeed the doctrine is very wide. The scope of the doctrine of unconscionability as 
stated in this case is such that: 
"the circumstances adversely affecting a party, which may 
induce a court of equity either to refuse its aid or to set a 
transaction aside, are of great variety and can hardly be 
satisfactorily classified. Among them are poverty or need of any 
kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity, of body or mind, drunkenness, 
illiteracy or lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation 
where assistance or explanation is necessary. The common 
characteristic seems to be that they have the effect of placing one 
party at a serious disadvantage vis-ä-vis the other. s100 
These are identical to the circumstances under which the doctrine arises in the rest of the 
jurisdictions presented in this chapter. 
An added point about this case is that even though the stronger party did not act in a 
morally reprehensive manner, in that he did not actively take advantage of the weaker 
97 (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362 (HC of Australia). 
98B1omleyvRyan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362,385. 
99Ibid, 386. 
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party, still he was acting unconscionable in accepting a benefit in those circumstances. 
So, similarly to Irish law, also under Australian law, passive acceptance of benefits may 
constitute unconscionable conduct. 
The next important case is Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio. iol Here, two elderly 
migrants, who were unfamiliar with written English, provided security to the bank for the 
overdraft of a company owed by their son, by mortgaging their land. The son told his 
parents that the mortgage was for limited sum and duration and the parents signed under 
this impression. In fact, it was for all amounts owing (or which might be owing) to the 
bank on the company's account. The bank was aware that the parents had been 
misinformed about the contents of the mortgage. Under these circumstances, the majority 
of the High Court (Mason, Wilson and Deane J. J. ) held that the transaction should be set 
aside. The parents were under a special disability when executing the deed, this was 
apparent to the bank, so as to make it unconscionable for it to be allowed to rely on the 
mortgage. Mason J. concluded the doctrine is applicable "whenever one party by reason 
of some condition or circumstance is placed at a special disadvantage vis-a-vis another 
and unfair or unconscientious advantage is then taken of the opportunity thereby 
created. " 102 
In this case, the parents were in a disadvantageous position in relation to the bank being 
misled as to the extent of their liability and also as to the indebtedness of their son's 
company. Also, their age and background and their confidence in their son contributed to 
their inequality of bargaining power. The bank was aware of these facts. Both Mason and 
Deane J. J. suggested that actual knowledge of facts from which the possibility of special 
disadvantage may reasonably be inferred would amount to `wilful ignorance' capable of 
supporting the doctrine of unconscionability, or in other words passive acceptance of 
benefits. So, since the bank here had sufficient knowledge, it was prima facie 
unconscientious for it to accept the parents' as sureties. Having raised the presumption of 
unconscionability, the burden was then turned on the bank to show that the transaction 
was fair, just and reasonable. This, similarly to Irish law, can be achieved by showing 
that the parents received independent legal advice. As this was not done here, the bank 
100 Per Fullager J. Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362,405. 
101 (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447 (HC of Australia). 
102 (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447 (HC of Australia), 462. 
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was fixed with knowledge of the parents' equity and could not as a result rely on the 
guarantee. 103 
A related case is Louth v Diprose. 104 In this case, the High Court of Australia held that 
the respondent was entitled to recover a substantial gift of money, which he had made to 
a woman (the appellant) with whom he had had a romantic relationship for several 
years. '°5 It was obvious that the appellant took advantage of the infatuation he had for 
her. The special disadvantage in this case was the relationship of trust and confidence 
between the parties. The effect of this judgment is substantially to merge the concept of 
unconscionability with that of undue influence. 106 This proves that the doctrine of 
unconscionability is wide enough and flexible to include any kind of inequality of 
bargaining power. 107 
The final landmark case examined here is National Australia Bank Ltd v Garcia. 108 In 
this case, the High Court sought to apply the doctrine of unconscionability to a situation 
where the surety wife did not understand the purpose and effect of the transaction. The 
majority of the High Court, applying Yerkey v Jones, 109 held that the lender had acted 
unconscionably in accepting the wife as a surety because: 
1) she did not understand the purpose and effect of the transaction; 
2) she was a volunteer because she did not obtain any benefit from the transaction; 
103 In Familiar Pty Ltd v Samarkos (1994) 115 F. L. R. 443, P's special disadvantage lay with his 
desperate financial circumstances (he needed money to fulfil a contract with a third party), which in 
fact was known to the lender. The loan agreement was set aside on the basis of unconscionable dealing. 
Unfortunately, if assessed against the strict threshold test in Amadio, analysis was very-thin on the 
existence of special disadvantage. P had owned and operated his own business for many years. There 
was some evidence of his inability to manage his financial affairs properly, but there was no evidence 
that the lender was aware of this. The real objection to the transaction, operating sub silentio, seemed to 
lie in the substantive unfairness of the loan agreement itself: the lender had made a loan of $50,000 for 
two months, which P repaid, but then tried to enforce P's promise to pay the lender an administration 
fee of an amount equivalent to the loan-$50,0001 It was this promise that was set aside as 
unconscionably obtained. Also in Asia Pacific International Pty Ltd v Dalrymple [2000] 2 Qd. R. 229, 
urgent financial need for bridging finance, coupled with oppressive loan terms, were determined to 
amount to unconscionable dealing. Note that the parties were at arm's length and the borrower had 
received competent independent advice and understood well the nature of the obligation entered into, 
and its general consequences. 
104 (1992) 175 C. L. R. 621 (HC Aus. ). 
105 Similarly Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 C. L. R. 646 involved the application of unconscionability to 
pThe case involved the assignment of an estate by a deaf, ill-educated man to his stepson. 
06 Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James; Undue Influence and the Family Home. London: Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd., 2002,202. 
107 This is discussed in chapter 6. 
108 (1998) 194 C. L. R. 395. 
109 (1939) 63 C. L. R. 649. 
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3) the lender was taken to have understood that the wife may have reposed trust and 
confidence in her husband in business matters and, therefore, the husband may not 
have fully and accurately explained the effect of the transaction to her; and 
4) the lender took no steps to explain the purpose and effect of the transaction to her 
or to ascertain whether it had been explained by a competent, independent third 
Party 
The Australian High Court held, contrary to the O'Brien principle of notice, that even 
though the wife cannot prove that her husband exercised undue influence she was 
nevertheless in a position to have the guarantee declared void against the bank when the 
bank took no appropriate precautions once the presumption was raised. In effect, the 
decision imposes strict (primary) liability on lenders to disclose full and accurate 
information to wives who act as sureties for their husbands' debts. 110 
The effect of this case is that under Australian law, the presumption of unconscionability 
is raised when the wife approaches as volunteer surety. "" Also, after Garcia, 112 
Australian courts went further and expanded their principle even more. As a result, wives 
who, ostensibly, had a financial interest in the fortunes of the company have been 
successful in having the guarantees set aside. To illustrate, in Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia v Khouri, 113 the respondent surety wife was a director and shareholder of the 
company whose debts were guaranteed. Also, in Granfield Pty v Commonwealth Bank, 114 
the wife surety had executed guarantees to support financial accommodation for a 
company of which she was a director. In both cases, the court held that both wives were 
volunteers. In relation to the last case, the wife was an Italian immigrant, who was never 
given any explanation and had no control of the company. Thus, in Garcia, Khouri and 
Granfield Australian courts investigated behind the apparent role of the wife to determine 
10 See, further, Bryan, Michael, "Setting Aside Guarantees: Reviving an Old Equity" (1999) 3 LMCLQ 
327; Brown, Murray, "Suretyship and Marriage: Notice v Unconscionability" (2000) 2 RLR 152; 
Stone, Elizabeth, "Infants, Lunatics and Married Women: Equitable Protection in Garcia v National 
Australia Bank" (1999) 62 MLR 604; Finlay, Anne, "Australian Wives are Special: Yerkey v Jones 
Lives on" (1999) JBL 361. 
rrr In Westpac Banking Corporation v Paterson (2001) F. C. A. 556 (Fed. Ct. (Aus) (Full Ct. ), the 
rinciple was applied to an ex-wife. 
r2 (1998)194 C. L. R. 395. 
"3 Commonwealth Bank ofAustralia v Khouri (1998) V. S. C. 128. 
114 Granfield Ply v Commonwealth Bank (1998) V. S. C. 140. 
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whether a transaction that apparently benefited her in fact it did benefit her. "5 These 
cases are good illustrations of the flexibility of the doctrine of unconscionability but also 
its application in the context of suretyship agreements, which is examined in the next 
chapter. 
Concluding here, it appears that the elements of unconscionability are the same as in the 
rest of the jurisdictions examined. "What is required is that there be an unconscientious 
advantage taking of the disability or disadvantage of the person who is in the weaker 
bargaining position by procuring or retaining the benefit in question in away that is both 
unreasonable and oppressive. "' 16 Also, one may easily assert that the doctrine of 
unconscionability has widened in Australia due to its flexibility, so that it does not only 
cover expectant heirs. Finally, the application of the doctrine in the context of suretyship 
agreements is of particular interest for the thesis. 
4.2.4 The Doctrine of Unconscionability within New Zealand Law 
The doctrine of unconscionability as applied in New Zealand involves the same elements 
as the jurisdictions already examined above. "? 
One of the first unconscionability cases in New Zealand is Harris v Richardson. 118 The 
case involved the sale of a life interest at an undervalue and parties which met on unequal 
terms; the one party the seller was a bankrupt who had no experience in business matters 
and entered into the agreement without independent advice and the other party. was 
experienced moneylender who was also aware of the financial difficulties of the seller. 119 
115 An interesting case is Radin v Commonwealth Bank (1998) 1361 F. C. A. There, the court held that a 
surety wife, who was not formally recorded as being involved in any of her husband's business and 
was not a joint borrower, was not a volunteer because she gained directly from the company. This 
decision has been criticised by academic commendatory as a disturbing development in that it renders 
the voluntariness criterion of Garcia redundant. In Garcia, the majority said that the fact that the wife 
is a volunteer is crucial in the decision as to whether the bank acted unconscionably or not. 
16 Halliwell, Margaret; Equity and Good Conscience. 2nd ed. London: Old Bailey Press, 2004,52. 
117 See, Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James; Undue Influence and the Family Home. London: Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd., 2002,202-205; Meagher, R. P.; Gummow, W. M. C.; Lehane, J. R. F.; Equity Doctrines 
and Remedies. Third cd. London: Butterworths, 1992. 
118 [1930] N. Z. L. R. 890 (CA). 
19 On the issue of knowledge the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Keith Richard Mason and Glenys 
& Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd [2002] N. Z. C. A. 75, para. 27 stated that an underlying 
assumption of unconscionability "must be that the respondent was or should have been aware, not only 
that the appellants were unsophisticated seemingly in a way which is inconsistent with their 
occupations of... but also that they were victims of an unconscionable transaction. " 
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Another important case is Archer v Cutler. 120 Here, the claimant who suffered from 
dementia and was incapable of managing her own affairs sold her land of 10 acres at a 
substantial undervalue. The claimant had no knowledge of the defendant's impaired 
mental condition and that the agreed price was underrated. The Supreme Court of 
Auckland held that the defence of unconscionable bargain was established. Even though, 
the claimant was unaware of the defendant's disability and he had not set out to take 
advantage of her, still he was aware of her advanced years, the defendant's lack of advice 
and some manifestations of her eccentricity. These factors created an inequality of 
bargaining power between the contractors and together with manifest disadvantage the 
bargain was unconscionable. So again, passive taking advantage will suffice. 121 This was 
followed in subsequent New Zealand cases. 
The High Court in Nichols v Jessup (No. 2)'22 reached a similar conclusion. Here, the 
claimant was aware of the defendant's weaknesses in regard to financial and property 
matters, 123 including her lack of legal advice, and yet passively accepted the benefit of the 
transaction, which was manifestly one-sided. It should be noted that the claimant never 
intended to take advantage of the defendant's ignorance. The agreement was held 
unconscionable. McMullin J. said Australian and New Zealand cases on 
unconscionability: 124 
" ... 
do not require proof of an active extortion of a benefit, an 
abuse of confidence, a lack of good faith by the party seeking to 
hold the bargain. Accepting the benefit of improvident bargain 
by an ignorant person acting without independent advice which 
cannot be shown to be fair, may be unconscionable. " 
Further, Pritchard J. said: '25 
"... my reconsideration of this case in the light of [O'Connor] 
leads me to the conclusion that this agreement, although not 
120 [1980] 1 N. Z. L. R. 386 (SC of Auckland). 
121 On the point see, Bamforth, N., "Unconscionability as a Vitiating Factor" [1995] LMCLQ 538. 
122 [1986] 1 N. Z. L. R. 237 (HC of Auckland). 
123 Ignorance need not be general but may be as here in regards to the specific transaction. 124 Nichols v Jessup (No. 2 [1986] 1 N. Z. L. R. 226,234. 
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originally extorted by an unconscientious exercise of power, 
should be set aside in exercise of the court' equitable jurisdiction 
on the ground that in all the circumstances it is not consistent 
with equity and good conscience that the plaintiff should enforce 
or retain the benefit of the transaction. " 
The Wellington Court of Appeal in Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee126 also applied the 
Hart v O'Connor 127 ruling. It held that equity will intervene to set contracts aside where 
the parties have unconscionably obtained benefits or have accepted benefits in 
unconscionable circumstances. In this case, the complainant had a defective 
understanding of the transaction due to her mental incapacity. The company had no 
knowledge of, and could not be expected to have any awareness of, her incapacity and, 
moreover, had no reason to believe that she was under the influence of her son. In 
addition, the guarantee and mortgage over her house had no unusual features, which the 
company was required to disclose to the complainant and the transaction could not be 
characterised as improvident. As a result the mortgage was valid. 
Moving further, another important point in regards to this jurisdiction is that, similarly to 
the rest of the jurisdictions, the more manifest disadvantage the less evidence is needed of 
inequality of manifest disadvantage and unconscionable conduct and vice versa. This 
proves that manifest disadvantage is not an essential requirement but an evidential tool. 
This is evident from Nichols v Jessup (No. 2), 128 where the vendor did not suffer a heavy 
loss but the rest of the elements were more severe. As a result the charge was set aside. 
The case of Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd'29 is also important. There Tipping. J set out 
the necessary circumstances required for a finding of fining of unconscionability. These 
are: 
1. the weaker party is under a significant disability; 
2. the stronger party knows or ought to know of that disability; 
3. the stronger party has victimised the weaker in the sense of taking advantage of 
'25 Ibid, 240. 
'26 [1992]2 N. Z. L. R. 157. 
127 [1985] 1 A. C. 1000. 
'28 [1986] 1 N. Z. L. R. 237 (HC of Auckland). 
129 [1992] 1 N. Z. L. R. 449. 
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the weaker's disability, either by active extortion of the bargain, or passive 
acceptance of it in circumstances where it is contrary to conscience that the 
bargain should be accepted; 
4. there is a marked inadequacy of consideration and the stronger party either knows 
or ought to know that to be so; and 
5. there is some procedural impropriety either demonstrated or presumed from the 
circumstances. 
Tipping J. further explained that not all elements need necessarily be present, but the first 
three are vital, since there could not be an unconscionable bargain without a disability in 
the weaker party and knowledge and taking advantage thereof by the stronger party. 130 
He also explained that absence of independent advice was a frequent feature of 
unconscionable bargain cases. 
4.2.5 The Doctrine of Unconscionability within Canadian Law 
Moving to the Canadian jurisdiction, again the same elements are found as with the rest 
of the jurisdictions. 131 
Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd132 is a significant authority within Canadian law in that it 
sets out the material ingredients for a successful claim to set aside a contract on the 
ground of unconscionability. 133 In this case, an elderly widow, with slender finances, was 
convinced by two men to borrow money by mortgaging her home, so as to lend the 
proceeds to them. The British Columbia Court of Appeal found that the transaction was 
unconscionable. The decision was based on two vital elements: (1) the existence of 
relational inequality between the parties arising out of ignorance, need or distress of the 
weaker; and (2) the presence of substantial injustice with the contract. The combination 
of these two elements gave rise to a presumption of fraud, which could only be rebutted 
130 Bowkett vAction Finance Ltd, [1992] 1 N. Z. L. R. 449,460. 
131 For a full review, see Enman, S. R., "Doctrines of Unconscionability in Canadian, English and 
Commonwealth Contract law (1987) 16 AngloAm L. R. 191; Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James; Undue 
Influence and the Family Home. London: Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 2002,198-202; for an economic 
analysis of Canadian cases see, Reiter, Barry, J.; Swan John, (eds. ); Studies in Contract Law. Toronto: 
Butterworths, 1980, study 11. 
132 (1965) 55 D. L. R. (3d) 710. 
133 See also Knupp v Bell [1968] 67 D. L. R (2d) 256. 
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by showing that the bargain as a whole was fair, just and reasonable with no advantage 
taken. 
Davey J. A. in his judgment clearly distinguished between undue influence and 
unconscionability. He said, 
"... The equitable principles relating to undue influence and 
relief against unconscionable bargains are closely related, but the 
doctrines are separate and distinct. The finding here against 
undue influence does not conclude the question whether the 
appellant is entitled to relief against an unconscionable 
transaction. "134 
He explained that unconscionable bargains bring "relief against an unfair advantage 
gained by an unconscientious use of power by a stronger party against a weaker"135 while 
undue influence looks at the sufficiency of consent. In spite of this initial reluctance to 
formulate a wide unconscionability doctrine, later, as Pawlowski and Brown explain, 
Canadian courts have propounded a wider doctrine of unconscionability. 136 
For example, in McKenzie v Bank ofMontreal137 the High Court held that the bank, who 
knew that the claimant had been acting under the undue influence of her partner, owed a 
duty of care to her to ensure that she appreciated and intended the consequences of the 
transaction. In order to discharge this duty, the bank had to provide the claimant with the 
necessary information and advice, or to see that she had obtained it. The bank failed to do 
this and as a result the charge was set aside. 138 
Other cases went even further and propounded a broader test of unconscionability based 
on `community standards of commercial morality'. The most notable example is Harry v 
134 Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd (1965) 55 D. L. R. (3d) 710,713. 
1351bid. 
136 Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James; Undue Influence and the Family Home. London: Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd., 2002,197. 
137 (1975) 55 D. L. R. (3d) 641. 
138 See also, Buchanan v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1979) 100 D. L. R. (3d) 624 (British 
Columbia Supreme Court); and Bertolo v Bank of Montreal (1986) 33 D. L. R. (4d) 610 (Ontario Court 
of Appeal). 
176 
Kreutziger. 139 In this case, the parties had unequal bargaining power. The appellant was 
an elderly, inarticulate Indian with limited education, who was also partially deaf; the 
other party was a man of greater business experience. The appellant agreed to sell his 
fishing boat for $4,500. In fact, the boat was worth $16,000, largely because of a fishing 
license attached to it and the buyer had knowledge of this. Not surprisingly, the sale was 
set aside as an unconscionable bargain. Applying the test put forward by Lambert J. A., 
the circumstances of the transaction revealed a `marked departure' from community 
standards of commercial morality. 140 
Here, the same elements are present as in the rest of the jurisdictions. Also, the doctrine 
has moved and widened more than its initial formulation; it applies in suretyship 
agreements between sureties and creditors, in situations which involve inequality of 
bargaining power and in cases of marked departure from community standards of 
commercial morality. 
4.2.6 The Doctrine of Unconscionability within USA Law 
The term unconscionability in American law initially appeared in Earl of Chesterfield v 
Janssen. 141 There, an unconscionable contract was described "such as no man in his 
senses and not under delusion could make on the one hand, and no honest and fair man 
would accept on the other; which are inequitable and unconscientious bargains; and of 
such even the common law has taken notice. s142 In other cases an unconscionable 
contract was described as "one abhorrent to good morals and conscience. It is one where 
one of the parties takes a fraudulent advantage of. "143 This line of thought has been 
passed on until the present day in a number of cases. 144 Starting as an equitable 
139 (1978) 95 D. L. R. (3d) 231. 
140 This test has been applied in several subsequent Canadian authorities: see, for example, A&K Lick- 
a-Chick Franchises Ltd v Cordiv Enterprises Ltd (1981) 119 D. L. R. (3d) 440 (Nova Scotia Supreme 
Court). 
1412 Ves. Sen. 125; 28 E. R. 82 (1750). 
142 The characterisation is found in Hume v United States 132 U. S. 406,10 S. Ct. 134,136,33 L. Ed. 
393 (1889). 
143 F. N. Roberts Pest Control Co vMcDonald 132 Ga. App. 257,208 S. E. 2d 13 (1794), 260(3). 
'44 In Estate of HA True v Commissioner of International Revenue (2001) W. L. 761280 (U. S. Tax Ct. ), 
82 T. C. M. (CCH) 27, T. C. M. (RIA) 2001-167,2001 R. I. A. T. C. Memo 2001-167 the United States 
Tax Court held that under Wyoming law, unconscionability is "considered as a form of fraud 
recognized in equity, but such fraud should be `apparent from its intrinsic nature and subject of the 
bargain itself; such as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and no 
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doctrine, '45 over the years it has become an important part of common law and has finally 
been incorporated into important legislation; it achieved official recognition in the 
Uniform Commercial Code and was adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts146 
and other pieces of legislation. 147 The relevant unconscionability sections in these 
legislations have the same effect as the UCTA 1977 that an unfair term in a contract may 
be set aside. Nevertheless, the relevant cases are useful so as to understand the main 
elements of the doctrine of unconscionability. 148 It is also worth noting that 
unconscionability does not arise only under this legislation, courts also apply it under the 
general exposition'49 using the same principles and elements in both instances. So, due to 
the official recognition of the doctrine, the USA example offers a plethora of 
unconscionability cases, which will be of assistance so as to understand the concept of 
unconscionability, even though these cases may arise under different facts. 150 Of course, 
this section does not aspire to exhaustively present all these cases, but only the principles 
and characteristics of the doctrine as applied in the most important authorities. '5' 
honest and fair man would accept on the other' " (citing Re Estate of Frederic 599 P. 2d 550 (1979), 
555). 
145 In many instances, courts have held that equity does not enforce unconscionable bargains: 
Indianapolis Morris Plan Corporation v Sparks 132 Ind. App. 145,172 N. E. 2d 899 (1961); 
Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors, Inc 32 N. J. 358,161 A. 2d 69,75 A. L. R. 2d 1 (1960). 
146 Tent. Drafts 1-7, (1973). 
147 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 1968,1974 Section 4.2(a); The Uniform Consumer Sales 
Practices Act 1971, Section 4.2(b). 
'1 In Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co 350 F. 2d 445,18 A. L. R. 3d 1297 (D. C. Cir 1965), the 
US Court of Appeals dealt with the doctrine of unconscionability soon after Congress adopted it in the 
UCC. The court adopted the doctrine as a matter of Common Law, as the UCC had not been formally 
adopted in the specific jurisdiction yet. The Code was treated as a persuasive authority to give 
continuation to the cases that led to it; see also Deutch, Sinai; Unfair Contracts: The Doctrine of 
Unconscionability. Lexington; Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1977, where it is argued that the UCC 
continues the equity doctrine; for a debate on this see Leff, Arthur, Allen, "Unconscionability and the 
Code: The Emperors New Clause" (1967)115 UPa L Rev 485. 
Like inJefrey v Wentraub 32 Wash. App. 536,648 P. 2d 914 (1982). 
150 For a critique of the code see Leff, Arthur, Allen, "Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperors 
New Clause" (1967) 115 U Pa L Rev 485,537 he explains the shortfalls of the code; one of the 
problems is that the unconscionability section does not cover individualised bargaining but only 
merchant-to-merchant bargaining and merchant-to-consumer bargaining. 
151 For a discussion of UCC s. 2-302, see, Leff, Ibid; Anderson, R. A.; Uniform Commercial Code. 
Rochester, New York Lawyers Co-operative Publishing, 1970; Deutch, Sinai; Unfair Contracts: The 
Doctrine of Unconscionability. Lexington; Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1977; Carrington, "The 
Uniform Commercial Code - Sales, Bulk Sales and Documents of Title" (1961) 15 Wyn LJ 1; Kripke, 
"The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code" (1962) U Ill LF 321; 
Buerger, "The Sales Article of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code" (1951) 23 NYSB Bull 116; 
Douglass, "Discussion on Sales as Proposed in the Uniform Commercial Code" (1950) 21 Okla BAJ 
808; Goodwin, "How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect the Law of Sales 
in Oregon" (1951) 30 Ore L Rev 212; Levy, "A Study of the Uniform Commercial Code - Sales" 
(1953) 58 Com LJ 329; Mooney, "Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the 
Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law" (1966) 11 Vill L Rev 213; Llewellyn, Karl, "Why a 
Commercial Code? " (1953) 22 Tenn L Rev 779; Beutel, "The Proposed Uniform (? ) Commercial Code 
Should not be Adopted in Ohio" (1953) 14 Ohio StLJ3; Malcolm, "The Uniform Commercial Code" 
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As most of the cases evolved in the light of the UCC s. 2-302, it is important to give the 
exact wording which reads as follows: 
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of 
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made 
the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it 
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 
avoid any unconscionable result. 152 
The case of Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Company133 is referred to here as it 
identifies all the relevant issues that are taken into account in an unconscionability claim. 
The case involved suits by a furniture company to recover on contracts under which 
balance due on every item purchased continued until balance due on all items, whenever 
purchased, was liquidated. The Court of Appeals had to decide whether these terms were 
unconscionable. The court started with a definition of unconscionability and citing 
Campbell'54 and Henningsen, 155 said: "unconscionability has generally been identified to 
comprise an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with 
contractual terms which are unreasonably one-sided or overly harsh. "156 The first 
component, relating to impropriety during the process of forming a contract, is commonly 
referred to as procedural unconscionability and the second, relating to the impropriety 
inherent within the terms of the contract, is called substantive unconscionability. 1S7 These 
are presented below. 
(1960) 39 Ore L Rev 318; Mentschikoff, "The Uniform Commercial Code, An Experiment in 
Democracy in Drafting" (1950) 36 ABAJ 419; 
httpl/pandom. nla. gov. au/pan/10115120040106/www. murdochedu. au/elaw/issues/vl0n2/burke102 tex 
thtml#t24. 
152 Article 2 of the UCC applies only to transactions in goods, but some courts have applied an 
analogous doctrine to other contracts, and Restatement Second s. 208 adopts a similar provision for 
application to any contract. 
13 350 F. 2d 445,121 U. S. App. D. C. 315 (1965). 
154 Campbell Soup Co v Wentz 3 Cir., 172 F. 2d 80 (1948). 155 Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors Inc 32 N. J. 358,161 A. 2d 69,75 A. L. R. 2d 1 (1960). 
156 Schroeder v FageolMotors Inc 86 Wash 2d 256,544 P. 2d 20 (1975). 
157Maynard Nelson vMaryMMc Goldrick 127 Wash 2d 124,896 P. 2d 1258 (2000). 
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The court, in Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 158 explained that the 
presence or absence of meaningful choice is determined by consideration of all the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction when the contract was made. In Floyd E 
Coursey and Michael B Coursey v Caterpillar, 1S9 further ingredients of unconscionability 
were given. The court stated that under the `procedural' rubric are factors which involve 
the real and voluntary `meeting of minds' of the contracting parties, age, education, 
intelligence, 160 business acumen and experience, 161 relative bargaining power, 162 who 
drafted the contract, 163 whether the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether 
'-58 350 F. 2d 445,18 A. L. R. 3d 1297 (D. C. Cir 1965). 
159 64 F. 3d 662, W492923 (6t' Cir. Mich. ) (1995). In Schroeder v Fageol Motors Inc 86 Wash. 2d 256, 
544 P. 2d 20 (1975), the above factors were shortened under three parts, these are: 1) the circumstances 
surrounding formation of the contract; 2) the opportunity to read and understand the contract; and 3) 
the use of fine print for important terms. 
160 In Marshall v Mercury Finance Co 550 So. 2d 1026, (Ala. Civ. App. ) (1989); E&W Building 
Material Co v American Savings Loan Ass'n 648 F. Supp. 289,291 (M. D. Ala. ) (1986): 
unconscionability is said to be "an extraordinary remedy usually reserved for the protection of the 
unsophisticated and uneducated. "; in Cheshire Mortgage Services v Montes 223 Conn. 80,612 A. 2d 
1130 (1992) and Bondy's Ford Inc v Sterling Truck Corporation, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (2001) it was 
stated that Alabama courts recognise this too. 
161 In Helena Chemical Co v Wilkins 18 S. W. 3d 744 (2000) the seed seller took advantage of the lack 
of knowledge, ability, experience, and capacity of farmers to a grossly unfair degree so as to amount to 
unconscionable conduct. Also, the court, in James P Knapp and Pamela K Knapp v American General 
Finance Inc 111 F. Supp. 2d 758 (2000), explained that the principle arises when parties are a national 
corporate lender on the one side and unsophisticated, consumers on the other. 
162 The doctrine does not apply when: there is no gross disparity in the bargaining power (Wallace 
Hardware Company Inc v Bill Abrams 223 F. 3d 382 (2000); Lela Bishop v We Care Hair 
Development Corporation, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1182,738 N. E. 2d610,250 111. Dec. 394 (2000)); when 
the transaction is a typical arms-length business transaction among parties of equal bargaining power 
(Mobil Oil Corporation v Earhart Petroleum Inc 213 F. 3d 632, W. L. 530351 (4t` Cir. (Va. )) (2000)); 
Envirotech Corp v Halco Eng 'g Inc 364 S. E. 2d 215, (Va. ) (1988)); when the plaintiff is sofisticated 
business capable of protecting their own interests (JN Exploration & Production v Western Gad 
Resources Inc 153 F. 3d 906, (1998); Interstate Piping & Controls Inc v Robert-James Sales Inc 315 
Ill. App. 3d 248,733 N. E. 2d 718,248 Ill. Dec. 43 (2000); Royul Indemnity Co v Westinghouse 
Electric Corp, 385 F. Supp. 520 (S. D. N. Y. ) (1974); Cognitest Corporation v Riverside Publishing 
Company 107 F. 3d 493 (1997); Taylor Investment Corporation v Dennis L Weil 169 F. Supp. 2d 1046 
(200 1)); when the purchaser is a PhD business executive with the capacity to understand plain language 
of a contract (Harvey Block v Fort Motor Credit Company 286 A. 2d 228,63 A. L. R. 3d 1,10 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 139, D. C., Jan 17, (1972)). 
163 This involves adhesion contracts. " `Adhesion contract' is a handy shorthand descriptive of standard 
form printed contracts prepared by one party and submitted to the other on a `take it or leave it' basis. 
The law has recognized there is often no true equality of bargaining power in such contracts and has 
accommodated that reality in construing them. ": Standard Oil Company of California v Clyde Perkins, 
449 U. S. 232,101 S. ct. 488,66 L. Ed. 2d. 416 (1980); in Joseph Rosenfeld v Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey, 108 F. Supp. 2d 156 (2000), the court held that adhesion contracts are never 
unconscionable per se, other considerations are taken into account like the bargaining power of the 
parties and the harshness of the terms; the court in Blakely v Housing Auth, 8 Wash. App. 204,213, 
505 P. 2d 151 (1973), expressed the opinion that "assuming that we are dealing with an adhesion 
contract, it does not follow that the... clause is void. The characterisation of a lease as an adhesion 
contract because exacted by reason of a gross disparity in bargaining power is to enable the court to 
protect the injured party from unconscionable clause provision. "; in Marybeth Armendaris v 
Foundation Health Psychcare Services 6 P. 3d 669,99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (2000), it was held that the 
context of an arbitration agreement imposed by an employer on an employee, which was a one-sided 
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alterations in the printed terms were possible, whether there were alternate sources of 
supply for the goods in question, 164 whether the parties had a reasonable opportunity to 
understand the terms of the contract, 165 and whether the important terms were hidden in a 
maze of fine print. ' 
However, it should be noted that the "mere fact that one party to contract is larger than 
another cannot be basis of finding unconscionability. s167 In Andersons Inc v Horton 
Farms Inc, 168 which involved an arbitration clause, the court held that "merely because 
the parties have different options or bargaining power, unequal or wholly out of 
proportion to each other, does not mean that the agreement of the one of the parties to a 
term of a contract will not be enforced against him; if the term is substantively 
reasonable, it will be enforced"169 or as the court in Results Oriented Inc v Crawford170 
term requiring the employee to submit claims to arbitration without requiring that the employer do so 
was unconscionable. 
164 In Allen v Michigan Bell Telephone Co 18 Mich App. 632,171 N. W. 2d 689 (1969), the only 
telephone yellow pages company in the area included in a contract with its advertisers a clause limiting 
to the price of the contract the telephone company's liability for errors or omissions. The court found 
that the contract was one of a `take it or leave it' nature.; the opposite conclusion was reached in 
Yakinma County (West Valley) Fire Protection District et al v City of Yakima, 122 Wash. 2d 371 
(1993). In this case the landowners, the appellants, who lived outside city limits but received sewer 
services, brought a declaratory judgment action seeking determination that the city requirement to sign 
an agreement, promising to support any future annexation efforts in exchange for sewer service was, 
unconscionable, adhesion contracts or void as against public policy. Regarding the question of 
procedural unconscionability the court found that the City did not create a situation of economic duress 
by imposing the annexation provision; this was because the City had no duty to provide service outside 
its borders and this gave it the legal right to impose the annexation condition. Moreover the need for 
the services did not leave the appellants with no choice at all. Some choices did exist in this case. The 
court observed that the landowners could have their septic tank pumped out. 
11 In NorthwestAcceptance Corp vAhnond Gravel Inc, 162 Mich App. 294,412 N. W. 2d 719 (1987), 
leases presented to a plaintiff for signature during a 45-minute meeting that took place at a restaurant 
were unconscionable because the plaintiff had no opportunity to read, study or consult in regards to the 
deal; In Deminsky vArlington Plastics Machinery, 249 Wis. 2d 441,638 N. W. 2d 331 (2001), despite 
the fact that the parties did not orally discuss the provision challenged as unconscionable and that the 
representative of Image signed the sales order without reading its terms did not tip the balance in 
favour of unconscionability, because records indicated that the same industry provision was contained 
in other sale orders between the two parties. As the court put it "the form was not `pushed under his 
nose' to sign `on his way out the door. ' " 463. 
166 In Modern Drop Forge Company v Rapid Technologies Inc, 94 F. 3d 647, WL 453235 (7`s Cir. 
(I11) (1996)) and Krueger Associates Inc (National Fulfilment Services) v The American District 
Telegraph Company of Pennsylvania, 247 F. 3d 61 (2001), the challenged provisions were in capital 
letters, so the plaintiffs could not argue that they did not see those terms. 
167 Stedor Enter Ltd vAnmtexInc 947 F. 2d 727 (4's Cir. ) (1991); in JLMlndustries v Nielsen SA W. L. 
2382231 (2" Cir. ) (200); the same was held in Chatlos Atlos Systems Inc v National Cash Register 
Corp 635 F. 2d 1081, (3 Cir. ) (1980); Gladden v Cadillac Motor Car Division 83 N. J. 320, A. 2d 394, 
(1980), 403. 
168 166 F. 3d 308 (1998). 
'69 Id. 322. 
170 245 Ga. App. 432,538 S. E. 2d 73 (2000). 
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put it "lack of sophistication or economic disadvantage does not amount to 
unconscionability. " 171 
Moving now to the second rubric of unconscionability, under Floyd, 172 the substantive 
heading embraces the contractual terms themselves rather than the course leading to them 
(which fall under the procedural heading) and requires a determination whether they were 
commercially reasonable. So, substantive unconscionability, as stated in the overview 
"involves those cases where a clause or term in the contract is alleged to be one-sided or 
overly harsh. "173 Also, "shocking to the conscience", 174 "monstrously harsh" , 
'7S and 
"exceedingly calloused" are more terms sometimes used to define it. However, as the 
Appellate Court of Illinois held in Re Marriage of Susan Hamm-Smith and Lewis Daniel 
Smith, 176 even if an agreement merely favours one party over the other does not mean that 
it is unconscionable. 177 
The case of Campbell Soup Co v Wentz 178 is a good illustration of what constitutes 
oppressive terms. Under the contract Campbell was allowed to refuse carrots in excess of 
twelve tons to the acre, the grower was not allowed to sell carrots to anyone else and he 
would not allow anyone else to grow carrots on his land. In Freeman v Hubco Leasing 
Inc, 179 a consumer contract that barred all remedies and all damages was found to be 
unenforceable being another example of grossly harsh condition and contrary to public 
policy. 
In addition, it should be noted that, excessive financial hardship is the most obvious 
example of substantive unconscionability. In fact, in some consumer cases American 
courts have held that gross excessiveness of price, alone, rendered the contract 
171 Id. 81. 
172 Floyd E Coursey and Michael B Coursey v Caterpillar 64 F. 3d 662, W492923 (6th Cir. Mich. ) 
(1995). 
173 Schroeder v Fageol Motors Inc 86 Wash. 2d 256,544 P. 2d 20 (1975), 260; Araiza Olmedo v 
Ashcroft W. L. 2203824 (9th Cir. ) (2004); Azanor vAshcroft W. L. 2203824 (9th Cir. ) (2004). 
174Jeffreyv Weintraub 32 Wash. App. 536,545,648 P. 2d 914 (1982). 
Id. 
176 261111. App 
. 3d 209,633 N. E. 2d 225,198 111. Dec. 763 (1994). 177 The same view existed in Gorham Savings Bank v Susan MacDonald, 710 A. 2d 916 (1998); Grow 
v Grow W. L. 84438 (Va. App. ) (2000), the fact that the pre-marital agreement left the husband in a 
better position was not enough for a finding of unconscionability. 178 172 F. 2d 80 (1948). 
179 324 S. E. 2d 462 (1985). 
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unconscionable. 180 This is because gross excessiveness of price can create the 
presumption that procedural impropriety must have taken place as well. This relates to 
the quantum of procedural and substantive unconscionability that need to be present for a 
successful case of unconscionability. In relation to this point, courts have taken a 
"balancing approach" to the unconscionability question and seem to require a certain 
quantum of procedural plus a certain quantum of substantive unconscionability to tip the 
scales in favour of unconscionability. "181 However, although procedural and substantive 
unconscionability must both be present in order for a court to refuse enforcement of a 
contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability, they need not be present at the 
same degree; the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of 
procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is 
unenforceable, and vice versa-182 Essentially a sliding scale is invocated which disregards 
the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, 
in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms 
themselves. 183 
Finally, the court in Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Company184 also explained that 
the test must not be mechanically applied. Following the Comments of the UCC s. 2-302 
the question of unconscionability cannot be judged in the abstract, but rather it must be 
determined "in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs 
"American Home Imp Inc vMaclver 105 N. H. 435,201 A. 2d. 886,14 A. L. R. 3d 324 (1964); Central 
Budget Corp v Sanchez 53 Misc. 2d620,279 N. Y. S. 2d391 (Civ. Ct. ) (1967). 
181 Floyd E Coursey and Michael B Coursey v Caterpillar 64 F. 3d 662, (1995) W492923 (6's Cir. 
Mich); Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co 350 F. 2d 445,18 A. L. R. 3d 1297 (D. C. Cir. ) (1965). 
182 The same idea was advanced in Donovan v PRL Corporation 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807 (2001). 
183 "While determinations of unconscionability are ordinarily based on the court's conclusion that both 
the procedural and substantive components are present, there have been exceptional cases-where a 
provision of the contract is so outrageous as to warrant holding it unenforceable on the grounds of 
substantive unconscionability alone. " (Gillman 73 N. Y. 2d, 537 N. Y. S. 2d, 534 N. E. 2d 824; similarly, 
the court in Maxwell v Fidelity Fin Servs Inc 184 Ariz. 82,907 P. 2d 51 (1995) held that under 
Arizona's version of the Uniform Commercial Code, a claim of unconscionability can be established 
by a showing of substantive unconscionability alone). These are cases that involve "clauses... so one- 
sided so as to be against public policy and unconscionable to allow them. " (Jones Leasing Inc v Gene 
Phillips & Assoc 282 S. C. 327,318 SE. 2d 31,33 (App. ) (1984); the same idea was applied in: Coker 
Int'1 Inc v Burlington Industries Inc 935 F. 2d 267, W. L. 97487 (4 th Cir. ) (1991); and Lucille M 
Couture v Pawtucket Credit Union, 765 A. 2d 813; Atel Financial Corporation v Quaker Coal 
Company, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (2001)). Also, on this point the Restatement Second of Contracts 
states: "Inadequacy of consideration does not of itself invalidate a bargain, but gross disparity in the 
values exchanged may be an important factor in a determination that a contract is unconscionable and 
may be sufficient ground, without more, for denying specific performance. " (Veliz v Cintas Corp. N. D. 
Cal. (2004); Ingle v Circuit City Stores, Inc. 328 F. 3d 1168 (2003)). 
184 350 F. 2d 445,18 A. L. R. 3d 1297 (D. C. Cir. ) (1965). 
183 
of the particular trade or case. " As Corbin'85 explains the test is whether the terms are so 
extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices of the 
time and place. As a general exposition, the court in Royal Indemnity Co v Westinghouse 
Electric Corp' held that terms that are common in the industry are not generally 
unconscionable. 187 
The discussion above revealed that the doctrine in the US involves the presence of 
procedural and substantive justice under which come many different factors. The 
procedural part relates to any impropriety in the course of the formation of the contract. 
Under this heading special reference is made to a wide range of types of inequality of 
bargaining power that the stronger party may take advantage off. The substantive part 
relates to the harshness of the terms themselves. In determining this issue, the relevant 
commercial background is taken into account. Also, in relation to both elements of 
unconscionability courts have taken a `balancing approach' to the unconscionability 
question and require a certain quantum of procedural plus a certain quantum of 
substantive unconscionability on sliding scales, whereby the more there is of the one the 
less is required of the other. 
185 Corbin, Arthur, Linton; Corbin on Contracts. (Rev. cd. by Joseph M. Pcrillo). St. Paul; 
Minneapolis: West Publishing Co., 1993. 
186 385 F. Supp. 520 (SD. N. Y. ) (1974). 
187 Posttape Associates v Eastman Kodak Co 450 F. Supp. 407 (E. D. Pa. ) (1978); DOV Graphics Inc v 
Eastman Kodak Co 46 Ohio Misc. 37,347 N. E. 2d 561 (Common Pleas) (1976); in Sofia v 
Massachusetts Mut Life Ins W. D. N. Y. (2004), the Court held that in New York State a business 
transaction is unconscionable only if it is so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable in light of the 
mores and business practices of the time and place according to its literal terms. In Cheshire Mortgage 
Services v Monies 223 Conn. 80,89,612 A . 2d 1130 (1992) 
it was held that a determination that costs 
are unconscionable cannot be made simply by a subjective impression that the contract imposes costs 
that the obligee finds onerous; rather, that obligations imposed by the contract must be assessed against 
some objective standard such as prevailing market rate or customary terms. The same rationale was 
incorporated in Calentano v Oaks Condominium Association (2001) WL 83944. There, the superior 
court of Connecticut found no evidence to establish that the leases under consideration exceeded 
customary charges or costs so as to be unconscionable. In Honey Dew Associates Inc vM&K Food 
Corp 241 F. 3d 23 (2001), the court had to determine the validity of a liquidated damages clause. The 
court expressly stated that when there are claims of unconscionable contract provisions, Massachusetts 
law requires that the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the 
contracts or clause's commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making its 
determination. The provision in this case was not contrary to the relevant commercial setting and the 
court refused to find unconscionability. In Adcock v Ramtreat Metal Technology Inc WL 410658 
(Wash. App. Div. 1) (2001) courts held that a party defending a limitation of liability or any other 
clause might prove it is "conscionable regardless of the surrounding circumstances if the general 
commercial setting indicates a prior course of dealing or reasonable usage of trade as to the 
exclusionary clause. " Quoting MA Mortenson Company Inc v Timberline Software Corporation and 
Sofiworks Data Systems Inc 93 Wash. App. 819,970 P. 2d 803 (1999). 
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4.3 Summary 
At this point is becomes essential to summarise the basic characteristics and main 
elements of unconscionability as identified in the various jurisdictions presented in this 
chapter. 
Initially, it may be said that despite the fact that the doctrine of unconscionability 
originates from a protectionist jurisdiction concerned with a special class of case 
(catching bargains with expectant heirs and reversioners), in its contemporary form it 
stretches to a wide range of dealings. Its focus has shifted from the protection of 
individuals because of their own ineptness, misfortune, or incompetence, towards the 
prohibition against `victimization' or `exploitation' by a stronger party. So, what is 
important is not just the presence of inequality of bargaining power but the abuse of it. 
"The equitable jurisdiction to set aside unconscionable bargains 
is not a paternalistic jurisdiction protecting or assisting those who 
repent of foolish undertakings. It is a jurisdiction protecting those 
under a disadvantage from those who take advantage of that fact; 
equity looks to the conduct of the stronger party. " 88 
4.3.1 Summary - Inequality of Bargaining Power 
Starting with inequality of bargaining power, Mason J. in Commercial Bank of Australia 
v Amadio'89 said that the disadvantage must be a `special' one: 
"I qualify the word `disadvantage' by the adjective `special' in 
order to disavow any suggestion that the principle applies 
188 Nichols v Jessup (No. 2) [1986] 1 N. Z. L. R. 237,239, per Somers J.; see also Loulh v Diprose (1992) 
175 C. L. R. 621,638, per Deane J: "The intervention of equity is not merely to relieve the plaintiff from 
the consequences of his own foolishness. It is to prevent victimisation" Familiar Pty Ltd v Samarkos 
(1994) 115 FLR 443,456, per Thomas J.; Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd (1999) 75 
S. A. S. R. 1,109, para. 589, per Debelle and Wicks J. J.; it will be explained in chapter 7 that 
unconscionability is paternalistic but only in a strictly indirect way, as it does not wish to protect 
people form themselves but form external threats, which are not consistent with the liberal conception 
of contract. 
189 (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447 (HC of Australia). 
185 
whenever there is some difference in the bargaining power of the 
parties and in order to emphasize that the disabling condition or 
circumstance is one which seriously affects the ability of the 
innocent party to make a judgment as to his own best interests, 
when the other party knows or ought to known of the existence or 
condition or circumstance and of its effect on the innocent 
party. " 190 
Such situations under which the doctrine arises form an open-ended list. 191 Some 
examples include the peculiarly behaved; 192 the elderly and incapacitated; 193 the 
intoxicated; 194 the desperately disadvantaged; 195 the muddle-headed; 196 the emotionally 
infatuated or dependent; 197 the nervous; 198 the uneducated (or unwell-spoken) and 
inexperienced; 199 the ignorant; 200 the exceptionally naive; 201 and so on. 
190 Ibid, 462. 
191 ]bid, 462,474, per Deane J.; also Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362,405, per Fullager J.; but 
many cases have repeated some basic examples: "poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, 
infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of education, lack of assistance or 
explanation where assistance or explanation is necessary. "; the High Court of Australia approved of 
this list in Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,459 (per Gibbs. J. ), 462 
(per Mason J. ), 474-5 (per Deane J. ), 489 (per Dawson J. ). Sex in combination with other factors that 
tend to flow from traditional gender roles in our society (such as exclusion from business affairs and 
emotional vulnerability) may still at preset time create disadvantages for women; see, Garcia v 
National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 155 A. L. R. 614; see also Merkel J. 's discussion of the position of 
wives under the Amadio principles in Grego v Tasmanian Trustees Ltd (1997) 143 A. L. R. 328,346-9. 
192 Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 C. L. R. 646. 
193 Bloomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362; Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 
C. L. R. 447. 
194 Bloomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362; Adenan v Buise [1984] W. A. R. 61. 
195 Sturge v Sturge (1849) 12 Beav. 229; 50 ER 1049. 
196 Nichols v Jessup (No. 2) [1986] 1 N. Z. L. R. 226,231, per Cooke P, and 235, per Somers J., quoting 
the trial judge at (1985) A. N. Z. Conv. R. 246,250. 
197 McKenzie v Bank of Montreal (1975) 55 D. L. R. (3d) 641,648 per Stark J. (Ont. S. C. ); Louth v 
Diprose (1992) 175 C. L. R. 621. Emotional dependence or attachment was confirmed as a potential 
special disadvantage in Grego v Tasmanian Trustees Ltd (1997) 143 A. L. R. 328,351, per Merkel J., 
and by majority of the High Court of Australia in Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 C. L. R. 457,490, 
Para 115. 
98Moffat vMoffat [1984] 1 N. Z. L. R. 600; Grantv Grant [1979] 1 N. Z. L. R. 66. 
199 Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447; Ribchenkov vSuncorp-Metway 
Ltd (2000) 175 A. L. R. 650. 
200 Evans v Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox 333; 29 ER 1191; Cresswell v Potter (1968) [1978] 1 W. L. R. 255. 
Ignorance may of course stem simply from P not having been advised in respect of the nature and 
effect of the obligation she was undertaking; see Boustany v Pigott (1993) 69 P. & C. R. 298. 
201 Bal-Fel Inc v Boyd 503 SW 2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. ) (1973); Gaertner v Fiesta Dance Studios Ltd 
(1972) 32 D. L. R. (3d) 639; Griesshammer v Ungerer and Miami Studios of Dancing (1958) 14 D. L. R. 
(2d) 599. 
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The commodity of these cases is the inability of the weak party to judge and decide for 
himself either because of lack of normal cognitive ability or lack of opportunity to 
exercise his abilities. So, the doctrine is also relevant to the smart and competent. 202 What 
is important is that the weak party is specially disabled vis-a-vis the stronger party by 
virtue of some personal, social or circumstantial misfortune. This vulnerability needs be 
relative only to the other contracting party and not necessarily to others. 203 This proves 
the flexibility of the doctrine. 
4.3.2 Summary - Unconscionable Conduct 
Apart from inequality of bargaining power, there must be abuse of this inequality by the 
stronger party. A contract cannot be set-aside in equity as "an unconscionable bargain 
against a party innocent of actual or constructive fraud. Even if the terms of the contract 
are `unfair' in the sense that they are more favourable to one party than the other 
('contractual imbalance'), equity will not provide relief unless the beneficiary is guilty of 
unconscionable conduct s204 Of course, it was illustrated that both active and passive 
receipt of benefits will suffice as unconscionable conduct. 
"In its active form, exploitation consists in a wrongful creation, acquisition, or activation 
of contracting power, followed by its exercise. In its passive form, it consists in a 
wrongful exercise of such power only. s20S In cases of passive unconscionability, the 
defendant is aware of the plaintiff's impairment of bargaining ability or opportunity, he 
deliberately fails to take positive measures to correct that impairment and simply `lets the 
transaction happen', thereby receiving benefits from the victim. For example, in Slaton v 
Nolan, 206 the defendant took advantage of the fact that the plaintiff did not understand the 
terms of the contract. In Grealish v Murphy, the defendant took passive advantage of 207 
202 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,240. 
203 Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd (1999) 75 S. A. S. R. 1,108, per Debelle and Wicks J. J.: 
"The issue is not simply whether the plaintiffs were labouring under one or more disabilities but 
whether they were under a special disability vis-ä-vis [the defendant]. "; in Begbie v State Bank ofNew 
South Wales Ltd (1994) 16 A. T. P. R. 41-288, Drummond J. spoke of the issue of special disability as 
depending on 'an objective comparison of the relative positions of the respective parties and of their 
ability to protect their own interests'. 
204 Boustany v Pigott (1993) 69 P& CR 298,303, per Lord Templeman. 205 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,133 
206 (1876) 11 111 Eq 367. 
207 [1946] IR 35. 
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the severe misfortune of the plaintiff. A useful case is Rooney v Conway, 208 where the 
defendant bought land from an old and vulnerable friend of his at the one quarter of the 
price. The vendor felt obliged for all the help and the services that the defendant provided 
to him and after a family fallout he sold the property to the defendant, while it was 
initially planned to be passed on to the family. 
In such cases, in order to impose liability against the stronger party knowledge of the 
special impairments of the plaintiff is essential. However, not only actual knowledge is 
sufficient but also `Nelsonian' (or `shut-eye' or `wilfully blind') knowledge 209 For 
example, in Amadio itself it is suggested that, in order to satisfy the knowledge 
requirement of unconscionable dealing, it suffices that the defendant was actually "aware 
of the possibility that [the plaintiff was under a special disability] or [was] aware of facts 
that would raise that possibility in the mind of any reasonable person. 210 
4.3.3 Summary - Manifest Disadvantage 
The third element of unconscionability is manifest disadvantage or substantive 
unconscionability. Equity will not relieve a party from a contract on the ground only that 
208 [1982] NUB. 
209 Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,479, per Deane J. A number of 
phrases have been used to describe this like: "Should have known" in Micarone v Perpetual Trustees 
Australia Ltd (1999) 75 S. A. S. R. 1,107; "ought to have known" in Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd 
v Amadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,462, per Mason J.; Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd 
(1999) 75 S. A. S. R. 1,107,114, per Debelle and Wicks J. J.; Hart v O'Connor [1985] 1 A. C. 1000 
(PC), 1014, per Lord Brightman: P must show that D` knew of or ought to have appreciated such 
incapacity' (Bradley West Solicitors Nominee Co Ltd v Keeman [1994] 2 N. Z. L. R. 111,126, per 
Tipping J. ); "put on inquiry" and "constructive notice" in Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd 
(1999) 75 S. A. S. R 1,114, para. 600. 
210 Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,467, per Mason J. In Bigwood, 
Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,252, although used in a different 
context ('knowing assistance' to a breach of fiduciary duty) Bigwood argues that the five-scale 
classification of knowledge in Baden v Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpement du 
Commerce et de l' Industrie en France SA [1992] 4 All E. R. 161 may also apply here. On the Baden 
scale, the five possible levels of cognitive awareness are: 1) actual knowledge; 2) wilfully shutting 
one's eyes to the obvious (D `did not want to know'); 3) wilfully and recklessly failing to make such 
inquiries as an honest and reasonable person would make; 4) knowledge of circumstances that would 
indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable person; and 5) knowledge of circumstances that would 
put an honest and reasonable person on inquiry. It should be noted that one category may merge into 
another: Polly Peck International Plc v Nadir (No. 2) [1992] 4 All E. R. 769,777, Scott L. J. In general, 
though, the first three categories have been taken to constitute actual knowledge, Agip (Africa) Ltd v 
Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265,293, per Millen J.; Commission for the New Towns v Cooper Great Britain 
Ltd [1995] 2 All E. R. 929,947, per Stuart-Smith L. J., and 957, per Evans L. J. while the last two 
comprise constructive knowledge only. 
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there is contractual imbalance not amounting to unconscionable dealing. 11 However, it 
should be stressed that even though inadequacy of consideration is a very important 
element of unconscionability, it will never of itself be a ground for resisting enforcement. 
It is only important as a forensic tool; it helps to raise the presumption that a position of 
disadvantage existed or that an unfair use of bargaining power was made. 212 
Substantive unconscionability is important especially in cases of passive acceptance of 
benefits where abusive conduct as such cannot be proved. In such cases, manifest 
disadvantage helps to prove that the defendant had appreciation of the plaintiffs serious 
vulnerability relative to him, and that power was put by him. The more contractual 
imbalance is present the greater becomes the claim of unconscionability. 
That manifest disadvantage is only used as an evidential tool is illustrated by the `balance 
theory' of unconscionability. 213 Under this theory, a sliding scale is involved between 
substantive and procedural unconscionability. So, the mere passive acceptance of a 
contractual benefit may be `unconscionable' where the contractual imbalance is large214 
but not where it is small 215 Likewise, a more active process of exploitation like: a 
`process of manipulation'; 216 an exacerbation of existing predilections; 217 use of heavily 
21' Hart v O'Connor [1985] 1 A. C. 1000,1018, per Lord Brightman. 
212 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362,405, per Fullagar J.; also Tate v Williamson (1866) L. R. 2 
Ch. App. 55,66; Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,475, per Deane 
J; Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee [1992] 2 N. Z. L. R. 157,174, per Richardson J.; `While any apparent 
unfairness of the bargain is a factor for consideration it is not the touchstone. ' 
213 The theory is so named after Levin and McDowell's wider study (Levin, J.; McDowell, B., "The 
Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice in Voluntary Obligations" (1983) 29 McGill LJ 24). 
There it is argued that once minimal threshold levels of voluntariness and fairness are met, in 
determining whether or not to enforce a contract the elements of voluntariness and fairness may be 
balanced against each other, so that a greater degree of one element permits a lesser degree of the other. 
214 Nichols V Jessup (No 2) [1986] 1 NZ. L. R. 237; Boustany v Pigott (1993) 69 P& CR 298: slow- 
witted landlord, with a life interest only in the let property, for absurd reasons grants a new lease-to the 
tenant for twenty years on disadvantageous terms. 
215 Chen-Wishart, Mindy; Unconscionable Bargains. Wellington: Butterworths, 1989,110, n. 35, citing 
Aqua Leisure Lid v Bammant and Styles (1980), Civil Division, CA, 1977, A 62,15 May 1980, LEXIS. 
21 Diprose v Louth (No. 1) (1990) 54 S. A. S. R. 438,448, per King C. J.: defendant manipulated 
plaintiff s infatuation by manufacturing an atmosphere of crisis where none existed. Although the case 
involved a gift, which by its nature is improvident, gifts may be large or modest in nature. In Diprose, 
numerous modest gifts given by the plaintiff to the defendant over time were not upset, but the 
significant gift of a house in fee simple was. 
21 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362: purchasers supplying nun, which alcoholic vendor then 
drank before selling, Say v Harwich (1812) 1 Ves & Bea 195; 158 E. R. 76: purchasers getting infant 
vendor drunk; Mundinger v Mundinger (1968) 3 D. L. R (3d) 338: wife entered into an 'unconscionable 
transaction' with her husband while, inter alia, `affected by brandy which was liberally provided by the 
husband for reasons best known to himself. 
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persuasive, tricky sales practices or techniques; 218 dissuasion from obtaining independent 
advice; 219 and the like - might justify an unconscionability judgment where there is less 
substantive unfairness than might otherwise be required. 
The fact that manifest disadvantage is not the ground for relief has importance from a 
normative perspective. Within liberal systems of contract and market, people are free to 
negotiate for whatever terms they like and take any risks they want, albeit how foolish 
their decision might be. This discussion is carried out in chapter 7. 
4.3.4 Summary - Independent Leeal Advice 
It is important to note that the presence of the above factors raises the presumption of 
unconscionability, which the defendant may then rebut. So, if suspicious circumstances 
exist (like inequality of bargaining power and unfair terms), which may give rise to a 
claim of unconscionability, then the defendant is under a duty to make sure that the other 
party is exercising free consent. The easiest way in practice to discharge this 
responsibility is to obtain from a solicitor a declaration or certificate stating that the 
weaker party has received independent legal advice. This requirement existed in all 
jurisdictions. 
In Ireland a transaction which looks unfair may be upheld if the defendant shows that the 
plaintiff had or could have independent legal advice but refused 220 The presence of 
independent legal advice shows that the transaction was not the result of pressure of the 
defendant or circumstances exploited by the defendant. 21 
This advice must be independent. In Grealish v Murphy, 222 the solicitor who acted for 
both parties did not inquire into the financial position of the parties and the purposes 
behind the agreement. His failure to explore these issues meant that independent legal 
advice was not given and the contract was set aside. On the other hand, in Smyth v 
218 Gaertner v Fiesta Dance Studios Ltd (1972) 32 D. L. R. (3d) 639. 
219 Mundinger v Mundinger (1968) 3 D. L. R. (3d) 338 (among other `active' factors, such as pressure 
and inducing intoxication). 
220 Harrison v Guest (1855) 6 De G, M and G 424. 
221 Of course, advice need not necessarily be legal advice; in Kelly v Morrisroe (1919) 53 ILTR 145, 




223 even though the same solicitor consulted the parties, the requirement of 
independent advice was satisfied because there was nothing objectionable about the 
agreement. Finally, even tough, independent legal advice is essential it is not always 
enough. 
The explanation given must be tailored to each party's special needs in the specific 
transaction. This is because, as Bigwood explained, unconscionability treats the 
plaintiff's special disadvantage as unique to her and not generic to all. This means that in 
some cases advice does not necessarily need to be legal. 224 Of course, in the event of 
complicated legal documents or when the cognitive abilities of the parties are limited, 
then legal advice may be essential. Illustration of this is Commercial Bank of Australia v 
Amadio, 22s which involved the provision of security by two elderly immigrants. It was 
held that the information given to them should have included details of the nature and 
scope of the proposed surety arrangement between the bank and them, in addition to 
details of the financial position of their son's company (the debtor). The details as to the 
debtor's financial position, while not ordinarily required to be disclosed in surety 
agreements, were nevertheless relevant to the elimination of the Amadios' particular 
disadvantage relative to the bank. 
Also, having in mind that each case must be judged on its merits, in some extreme cases 
independent legal advice may not sufficient. But as a general rule, it may be said that the 
more unconscionable the agreement the more there is need for independent legal advice, 
while in less unconscionable transactions the transaction may be saved notwithstanding 
inadequate or no independent advice. 226 In Rae V Joyce, '' O'Brien C. J. warned that 
independent legal advice is only one of the elements to be taken into account when 
deciding if unconscionability exists. So, what is important about the doctrine of 
unconscionability is to look at the totality of the facts in each case. Some cases with 
extreme manifest disadvantage may only be saved with the presence of independent legal 
advice, while less extravagant cases may be saved notwithstanding insufficient or no 
legal advice. 
223 Unreported, Irish High Court (Costello J. ), 23 November 1978. 
224 Kelly vMorrisroe (1919) 53 I. L. T. R. 145. 
225 (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447 (HC of Australia). 
226 Capper in Dawson Norma; Greer, Desmond; Ingram Peter (eds. ); One Hundred and Ffly Years of 
Irish Law. Sweet and Maxwell, 1996,59. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that the development of the doctrine of unconscionability in 
England has not kept in paste with the rest of the jurisdictions presented. This is probably 
due to English courts' reluctance to apply a wide and flexible doctrine, fearing that this 
would jeopardize freedom of contract, doctrinal formalism and certainty within the 
law. 228 
The lack of a precise definition for the doctrine has probably added to this attitude. 229 In 
Moffat v Moffat Somers J. said "the label unconscionable bargaining does not lend itself 
to exhaustive definition. "230 Many academics also noted this weakness of 
unconscionability. 231 For example Phang Andrew said: "it is also worth noting that the 
doctrine of unconscionability itself is not simple of analysis. The distinction between 
substantive and procedural unfairness is not always an easy one to draw. Further, 
although the formulation of general criteria can be attempted (see, e. g. per Tipping J. in 
Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd)232, these are but broad guidelines at best, and there is 
much room for reasonable disagreement. " Bamforth argues that "dishonesty - the actual 
fraud requirement - tends towards imprecision, and reliance on constructive fraud would 
take the unconscionability vitiating factor dangerously close to being the sort of general 
power [... ] to set aside bargains just because they appear at first glance to be unfair or 
harsh. Given the vagueness of this element, it is unsurprising that there have been 
differences of judicial opinion about whether the stronger party's knowledge of the 
other's weakness should be subjectively held or objectively assessed . 
9)233 Also, referring 
to unconscionability Hans Tjio said, "the obvious disadvantage is that broad standards 
tend to increase uncertainty. v)234 Indeed, in the jurisdictions examined in this chapter, the 
227 (1892) LR Ir 500,521-522. 
228 David Capper in Dawson Norma; Greer, Desmond; Ingram Peter (eds. ); One hundred and Fifty 
Years oflrish Law. Sweet and Maxwell, 1996,65. 
229 The difficulties of giving a precise meaning of the term unconscionability even led Ellinghaus to say 
that it might well be indefinable, Ellinghaus (1969), "In Defence of Unconscionability" 78 Yale LJ757, 
759, n. 11. 
230 [1984] 1 N. Z. L. R. 600,606. 
23' Phang, Andrew, "The uses of Unconscionability" (1995) 111 LQR 559,560-61, he argues that a 
way to overcome this problem is to embody the doctrine within legislation. 
232 [1992] 1 N. Z. L. R. 449,460-461. 
233 Bamforth, Nicholas, "Unconscionability as a Vitiating Facto? ' (1995) 4 LMCLQ 538,555. 
1 Tjio, Hans, "O'Brien and Unconscionability" (1997) 113 LQR 10,16. 
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doctrine was applied in a wide scope of cases involving inequality of bargaining power. 
In ACCC v Samson Holdings, '" the Full Court found that: 
"Under the rubric of unconscionable conduct, equity will... [s]et 
aside a contract or disposition resulting from the knowing 
exploitation by one party of the special disadvantage of another. 
The special disadvantage may be constitutional, deriving from 
age, illness, poverty, inexperience or lack of education - 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio. Or it may be 
situational, deriving from particular features of a relationship 
between actors in the transaction such as the emotional 
dependence of one on the other. " 
With this formulation of unconscionability which covers `situational disadvantage', 
unconscionability receives greater commercial application. This has caused concerns. 
Recently, Hayne J. in his speech, in the Australian National University Centre for 
Commercial Law, expressed concern about the `intrusion' of equitable principles in 
commercial dealings, calling for clarity and precision in the way equitable principles are 
developed and applied. 236 This is understandable. Bamforth explains that: "the danger of 
using pejorative terms should be clear: precision and clarity are useful when a court is 
drawing up and deploying criteria for assessing whether a transaction is unconscionable, 
for a court must strike a delicate balance between conflicting policy considerations. On 
the one hand, it is important to safeguard the certainty of commercial transactions, 
especially those involving real property [or suretyship agreements]. It is also, however, 
important to protect weaker parties against improper exploitation in the bargaining 
process. The situation is further complicated by the need, in protecting weaker parties, to 
avoid compromising their autonomy through excessive judicial intervention in their 
transactions. The chances of striking a coherent balance between these considerations are 
greatly reduced when courts use imprecise or ambiguous language, or fail properly to 
explain why transactions are upheld or stuck down. %v237 
235 (2002) 189 A. L. R. 76,92 (emphasis added). 
236 http i/www. hcourLgov. au/speeches/haynej/haynej_CommercialLawANU. htm. 
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Despite this, the idea advanced in this thesis is that the doctrine of unconscionability can 
be more inclusive with no costs on certainty and with functionally defined doctrines, on 
which courts can easily embark upon. So, even though, unconscionability cannot be 
easily defined it can easily be identified, since the circumstances under which it arises are 
well known; it is like an elephant. The court, in Michael Haga v Martin Homes Inc , 
2311 
stated that unconscionability is not a concept at all, but instead a determination made in 
the light of a variety of factors and must be gauged by the circumstances of the case. 
Bamforth argues "courts are not, in reality, acting in a wholly discretionary fashion in 
cases where unconscionability is invoked as a vitiating factor. Behind the imprecise 
language, four elements have characteristically been treated as important in assessing 
whether a transaction should be set aside. First, whether the weaker party was afflicted by 
a special or serious disadvantage or disability, mere inequality of bargaining power being 
insufficient. Secondly, whether the stronger party's conduct amounted to actual or 
constructive fraud. Thirdly, whether the weaker party lacked independent advice. 
Fourthly, whether the terms of the transaction were clearly disadvantageous to the weaker 
party. " Also, in Louth v Diprose, 39 it was said that: "Although the concept of 
unconscionability has been expressed in fairly wide terms, the courts are exercising an 
equitable jurisdiction according to recognized principles. They are not armed with a 
general power to set aside bargains simply because, in the eyes of the judges, they appear 
to be unfair, harsh or unconscionable. " 
In fact, the examination of the doctrine in this chapter in various jurisdictions has shown 
that usually successful claims of unconscionability are based on inequality of bargaining 
power, abuse of dominance and substantive unfairness. It has to be stressed though that 
the catch-phrase `inequality of bargaining power' (within the doctrine) and the term 
unconscionability do not capture the true nature and contents of the doctrine. Taken alone 
each of these terms might lead one to believe that the doctrine is vague without clear 
focus. It has to be kept in mind that none of these elements alone is sufficient for a 
successful unconscionability claim; both need to be present. A different way of 
approaching the subject is by requiring a certain amount of procedural impropriety with a 
certain amount of substantive unfairness on sliding scales, whereby the more there is of 
2" Bamforth, Nicholas, "Unconscionability as a Vitiating Factor" (1995) 4 LMCLQ 538,544. 
zis W. L. 1133267 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. ) (2000). 
235'(1992) 175 C. L. R. 621,654. 
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the one the less is required of the other. In fact, one scholar240 has argued that this method 
allows 93% predictability of the decision of the court. 
It addition, it has been argued that "that unconscionability, as an expanding doctrine 
operating within clearly defined categories, is far more likely to satisfy the objectives of 
clarity and precision .,, 
241 Also, Waddams argued in favour of adopting a general 
unconscionability principle to cover within its ambit forfeitures, penalty clauses, deposits, 
exemption clauses and duress. He recognised that an argument frequently raised against 
recognition of a general power of relief is that it would contribute to uncertainty. 
However, he then went on and argued that certainty does not exist now and that "only 
with an open recognition of the true principle can the courts begin to develop rational 
criteria and guidelines that will satisfactorily explain their decisions and offer a useful 
guide for the future. "242 It has been argued that the rich history of the doctrine can help to 
set clear test and guidelines. 43 These criteria were summarised in the previous section. 
In addition, certainty would be better served if the doctrine of unconscionability was 
premised on some underpinning principle. "A suitable underpinning principle would 
provide a way of understanding, rationalizing and controlling the development of the 
vitiating factor's four elements, minimizing the danger of palm tree justice. The 
identification of a suitable underpinning principle therefore affects the assessment of 
unconscionability's desirability, in policy terms, as a vitiating factor. The relative 
importance attached to the three policy factors mentioned earlier - certainty in 
commercial transactions, protection of weaker parties from improper exploitation, and 
avoiding judicial intervention on a scale which deprives vulnerable persons of any 
bargaining autonomy - is also likely to influence the categorization of the particular 
underpinning principle as suitable.. "244 
240 Ostas, "Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic Model and an Empirical Test" 
(1992) 29 Am Bus LJ 535. 
241 McConvill, James; Bagaric, Mirko, "The Yoking Of Unconscionability and Unjust Enrichment in 
Australia" (2002) Deakin L Rev 13,15. 
242 Waddams, S. M., "Unconscionability in Contracts" (1976) 39 MLR 369,373. 
243 McConvill, James; Bagaric, Mirko, "The Yoking Of Unconscionability and Unjust Enrichment in 
Australia" (2002) Deakin L Rev 13,27. 
244 Bamforth, Nicholas, "Unconscionability as a Vitiating Factor" (1995) 4 LMCLQ 539,544,555. 
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" `Inequality of bargaining power' has been dismissed as an underpinning principle in the 
case law - rightly, as it cannot explain the need for special disadvantage and the 
relevance of the terms of the transaction. It is also, in and of itself, too vague a principle 
on which to base an entire vitiating factor. Another possibility has been canvassed by 
John Cartwright, who argues that the key is that one party has abused his or her position 
vis-a-vis the other. 245 Unfortunately, the term `abuse' does not assist as greatly, being as 
pejorative as much of the language used by the judiciary. This impression is confirmed 
by Cartwright's suggestion that misrepresentation, duress and undue influence might also 
be described as examples of `abuse of bargaining position' implying that `abuse' is a 
malleable concept which can simply be adjusted to fit the vitiating factor in play. 99246 
The most appropriate principle is found in the liberal contract theory and relates to 
absence of consent 247 This is examined in chapter 7. 
245 Cartwright, John, "An Unconscionable Bargain" (1993)109 LQR 530,532. 
246 Bamforth, Nicholas, "Unconscionability as a Vitiating Factor" (1995) 4 LMCLQ 538,544,555. 
Bamforth argues that the most appropriate possibility is the suggestion that unconscionability works to 
reverse or to prevent unjust enrichment, 556. 
247 This idea is also advanced in McConvill, James; Bagaric, Mirko, "The Yoking Of 
Unconscionability and Unjust Enrichment in Australia" (2002) Deakin L Rev 13,21. 
196 
Chapter 5 
Comparison of the 0' Brien Formula 
with the Doctrine of Unconscionability 
Aim: Prove that the doctrine of unconscionability is better than the O'Brien principle in 
regards to suretyship agreements 
Method: Compare unconscionability with the O'Brien principle 
Conclusion: Unconscionability has more advantages compared to the O'Brien principle 
and should therefore replace it 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters described and discussed two different doctrines, the O'Brien' 
principle and the doctrine of unconscionability. These doctrines are invoked, albeit in 
different jurisdictions, as vitiating factors in the setting aside of suretyship agreements 
against creditors. The thesis of this work is that, even though these two doctrines work in 
the same field, they are still very different in terms of their effectiveness in balancing the 
interest of all the parties involved. More precisely, chapter 2 examined the various legal 
techniques used by English courts over the years in their effort to lay down simple, clear 
and comprehensive tests in the field of suretyship agreements. The upshot of that chapter 
was that none of the legal techniques used over the years has managed to achieve these 
aims. Then, in chapter 3 it was argued that, despite the attempts of the House of Lords in 
Etridge2 (No. 2) to improve the O'Brien formula, still the result is not absolutely 
satisfactory. Due to this failure of the law, it was then proposed to look for an alternative 
legal formula or doctrine, which would achieve more efficient and equitable results in the 
field of suretyship agreements. For this reason, in chapter 4 the doctrine of 
unconscionability was analysed, which, despite its narrow application in this jurisdiction, 
is widely applied in other jurisdictions. 
1 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 2 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
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This chapter carries out a specific task. It compares the two doctrines in the special field 
of suretyship agreements and tries to illustrate the superiority of unconscionability in 
relation to the O'Brien formula. 3 The effort is to convince of the desirability to replace 
doctrine of O'Brien with that of unconscionability. The main arguments in favour of 
unconscionability, which are presented in this chapter, are four. Very briefly the first is 
that unconscionability does not treat lenders as third parties in the wrongful act of the 
principal debtor; as a result of this, it manages to impose direct liability against them. On 
the other hand, the O'Brien formula imposes liability against lenders but indirectly; it 
initially imposes liability against the husband and then tries to affect the conscience of the 
lender with notice. The result of this in practice is that the surety has to apply a confusing 
four-step test in order to avoid liability under the guarantee. This approach is rather 
rationalized and unconvincing. Secondly, the counterparts of unconscionability, i. e. a 
certain amount of procedural and substantive unfairness on sliding scales, make the 
burden of proof easier for sureties. More precisely, the doctrine is very flexible and may 
capture many types of victimisation. In contrast, the traditional doctrines of 
misrepresentation and undue influence, which are normally incorporated under the first 
step of the O'Brien formula, are very restrictive and under-inclusive. As a result of this, 
many vulnerable parties are left without protection. Thirdly, unconscionability deals 
much better with market failures in this area by imposing a requirement to disclose 
information. Finally, the doctrine of unconscionability carries with it remedial flexibility 
in that it allows partial rescission, while on the other hand, as it has already been 
explained in chapter 2, under the O'Brien formula rescission is only in toto. Partial 
rescission is to be preferred because, as it will be explained, it mitigates the loss of all the 
parties and as a result of this it makes the decision of the courts easier. These four 
arguments are presented immediately below taking one a time. 
5.2 Imposing Liability against the Lender 
This section argues that unconscionability works more naturally in imposing liability 
against the lender than the O'Brien doctrine, because it focuses directly on the 
unconscionable conduct of the lender. Conversely, the O'Brien formula takes a long and 
3 For a comparison of the two approaches see Thomas, Susan, Barkehall, "Garcia v National Australia 
Bank. Would the Real Volunteer Please Stand Up? " (1999) JIBL 319; Tjio, Hans, "O'Brien and 
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indirect method to impose liability against the lender because it treats the lender as a third 
party to the unfair act of the husband. Liability is imposed against the lender with an 
obscure technique by fixing the lender with notice of the illegal act of the husband. This 
indirect method does not make sense in the search for primary liability against the lender. 
5.2.1 Imposing Liability against the Lender - The O'Brien Formula 
Starting with the O'Brien principle, as it has been explained in chapter 2, the surety-wife 
must satisfy a four-step test in order to succeed against the banks. First, she must show 
that the debtor has committed a legal wrong (like misrepresentation or/and undue 
influence) in the formation of the contract, which gives to her the right to set the contract 
aside against him. Secondly, the wife must prove that the creditor is fixed with liability 
for this wrong either on the basis of agency (which is now likely to be rare) or actual or 
constructive notice on the basis that the creditor was put "on inquiry". Thirdly, the lender 
may avoid liability if it can show that it took reasonable steps to avoid the wife's equity. 
The fourth step involves the remedies. 
So, under the O'Brien formula the lender is not treated as a party to the wrongful act of 
the husband. Instead, liability is first imposed against the husband and then the O'Brien 
formula tries to bring the lender into the picture by incorporating the principle of notice. 
This approach is ambiguous; it is not clear how notice, which pertains to the setting aside 
of securities under the O'Brien formula, assists in setting aside the transaction against a 
third party whose behaviour has been held blameless. So, when the doctrine of 
constructive notice was firstly introduced, academic commentary questioned the shift of 
focus from a duty to make inquiries to a doctrine of notice. 4 It was argued that the test 
"creates difficulties even to equity lawyers". s It was also asked why constructive notice is 
even relevant in O'Brien situations. The argument was that "the right to set aside an 
agreement is a mere equity, capable of binding purchasers with notice. O'Brien cases are, 
however, invariably two-party situations; there is nothing to set aside against the 
debtor. "6 So, one is correct to say that in the search for primary liability, it is not 
Unconscionability" (1997) 113 LQR 10; O'Sullivan, Dominic, "O'Brien and Unconscionability" 
(1997) 113 LQR 10. 




immediately apparent why courts still treat the bank as a third party. As the law stands 
now, courts go to great lengths to explain and rationalise the setting aside of a charge 
against the bank with an indirect and elusive concept, when in fact banks stand to gain 
from mortgage and suretyship agreements directly. The method of imposing liability 
indirectly seems very remote and in many occasions the plaintiff fails to prove the test. 
This is because it is always difficult to impose obligations in non-priority third party or 
quasi-third party situations. 
5.2.2 Imposing Liability against the Lender - The Doctrine of Unconscionability 
On the other hand, as the practice is in Australia under Garcia7, the doctrine of 
unconscionability operates more naturally than the O'Brien doctrine of notice, because it 
focuses directly upon the unconscionable behaviour of the bank itself instead of the 
husband. To explain, any surety who comes forward does not gain anything from the 
transaction. This is sufficiently evident to the stronger party, the bank. Banks are also 
aware that generally wives repose trust in their husbands. They are also aware of the fact 
that most wives are not involved in important decision making of the family business, 
which is really the husband's business. So, it is more than likely that important terms do 
not reach the wife or are misunderstood by her. Proceeding with the loan under these 
circumstances would be unconscionable for the bank to accept the transaction. Even 
though the behaviour of the bank could not be described as actively wrongful but rather 
passively wrongful, in the sense that it did not exercise improper pressure or duress, still 
it is condemned and the transaction is set aside against it. The reason is that it turned a 
blind eye to an obvious reality and it knowingly benefited from the disadvantage and 
weak position of another. So, under the doctrine of unconscionability, notice still plays a 
part, but not as a function of priority dispute. Rather, it provides a platform for inferring 
knowledge of a surety's disadvantaged position. Once armed with such knowledge, the 
creditor will be expected to cure the imbalance between the parties' position and if it fails 
to do so it would be acting contrary to good faith. 
Concluding here, it appears that unconscionability works more naturally as a doctrine 
rather than the O'Brien formula. The doctrine of unconscionability concentrates on the 
Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 C. L. R. 395. 
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unconscionable conduct of the bank itself rather than the behaviour of the husband who 
after all is really a third party to the agreement between the surety and the creditor. This 
direct and primary liability against the bank renders the explanation for setting aside the 
charge more comprehensive and reasonable, 9 rather under the O'Brien indirect formula. 
5.3 Scope 
The second advantage of the doctrine of unconscionability relates to the flexibility it 
carries with it. Due to this flexibility the doctrine manages to capture many types of 
victimisation within its ambit. In fact, the list of the different scenarios coming under 
unconscionability is open and these cannot possibly be exhaustively enumerated. 10 On the 
other hand, the first step of the O'Brien formula (proving some equitable wrong i. e. 
misrepresentation and/or undue influence) is very restrictive and as a result many sureties 
may fail from the first step. " 
5.3.1 Scope - The O'Brien Formula 
Starting with the O'Brien principle, the first requirement that a surety-wife needs to 
satisfy, so as to avoid liability under surety contracts, is the establishment of a legal 
wrong like (i) misrepresentation and/or (ii) undue influence. The problem is that these 
concepts are under inclusive and many different scenarios of victimisation that arise very 
often in reality are not covered. As a result the surety-wife is deprived of the opportunity 
to have the charge set aside from the first stage of the test. 
To explain, starting with misrepresentation, 12 empirical research has revealed that wives 
do not usually play an important or executive decision-making role in their husband's 
business. 13 As a result of this, all of the information and understanding they have depends 
8 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien (1994) 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
9 At this point, it would be interesting to note that "Good Faith" instead of the "constructive notice" 
was preferred in Scotland, in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Wilson [2004] S. C. 153, as the underlying 
basis of O'Brien. The Scottish approach is useful as it illustrates that a change towards 
unconscionability is possible. 
10 See 2.3 and 6.3.1. ii. 
11 See 2.6.1. 
12 See 2.6.1.1. 
13 See 1.2. Also Felhberg, B.; Sexually Transmitted Debt Surety Experience and English Law. Oxford 
University Press Clarendon Press, 1997,164. 
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on what is said to them by their husbands. The problem with this is that the exact position 
cannot be objectively described, either because of high optimism about the new business 
or financial difficulties, which are not fully revealed to the wife. 14 However, for the 
purposes of the law, misrepresentation will not be established, if the husband's statement 
it merely the hopeful opinion or belief of an optimistic debtor, even if his wife believes 
him. 15 In addition, empirical research showed that even though most sureties who 
participated in that research, had some factual understanding why security was required 
and had some understanding of the legal effect of the security provided, usually this was 
very broad and even vague. 16 Also, the surety's understanding involved some 
misunderstanding and confusion of the legal terms of the transaction to the extent that 
they misunderstood the amount being secured. Illustratively, in most of these cases, the 
surety had provided an `all monies' security but had not realised at the time of signing 
that their liability was unlimited. '7 These types of misunderstanding though do not 
amount to misrepresentations of fact, so as to establish a prima facie legal wrong against 
the lender, or against the debtor for the purposes of the O'Brien principle. 18 So, many 
sureties are left unprotected. 
Moving further to undue influence, one of the most serious defaults and limitations of 
this concept is the requirement that some kind of a pre-existing relationship needs to be 
established (if the exercise of undue influence cannot be proved) for the doctrine to be 
invoked. 19 Buxton L. J. in Irvani v Irvani20 explained: 
14 Felhberg, B.; Sexually Transmitted Debt Surety Expirience and English Law. Oxford University 
Press Clarendon Press, 1997,166. 
Is e. g. Bank Melli Iran v Samadi-Rad (Ch. D., Judge Robert Walker QC, 9 February 1994), Transcript, 
13 (although the outcome of this case was reversed on appeal: Bank Melli Iran v Samadi-Rad [1995] 2 
F. L. R. 367 (CA). 
161bid, 164. 
17lbid, 166. 
18 Felhberg notes that in her research "Many sureties suggested that the debtor had misled them, but 
their descriptions rarely focused on any particular statement of fact, necessary to establish 
misrepresentation. Where misleading statements had been made by the debtor, the technical distinction 
between statements of fact (which give rise to a technical misrepresentation) [... ] Most other sureties 
were generally confused rather than misled about the specific legal implications of the documents they 
had signed, but trusted the optimistic view of the debtor that everything would be all right. In such 
cases, the chances of establishing an actionable misrepresentation were remote. " Ibid, 167. 
19 Slayton, "The Unequal Bargain Doctrine" (1976) 22 McGill LJ 94,106: "How does the unequal 
bargain doctrine differ from that of undue influence? The traditional view is that the latter applies 
either when undue influence resulting in a contract that would not otherwise have been made can be 
proved as a fact, or when a confidential relationship exists leading to a duty of fiduciary care and 
giving rise to a presumption of undue influence which is not rebutted. In my opinion, under the unequal 
bargaining power doctrine as set forth by Lord Denning (1) no confidential relationship or duty of 
fiduciary care is necessary, and (2) undue influence need not be proved as a fact, but will be presumed 
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"Undue Influence is concerned with the prior relationship 
between the contracting parties, and with whether that was the 
motivation or reason for which the bargain was entered into. 
Unconscionable bargain is, as its title suggests, concerned with 
the nature and circumstances of the bargain itself, and can arise 
without there being any relationship, outside that of the 
immediate contract, between the parties. " 
However, it will be illustrated in chapter 6 that not all cases conventionally treated under 
the doctrine of undue influence can be persuasively and realistically explained on the 
basis of abuse of an existing relationship. 2' Abuse of inequality of bargaining power in 
most of these cases describes the problem more accurately. Forcing all these different 
scenarios of relational inequality under some arbitrarily and loosely defined relationship 
can only lead to ambiguity. A relationship of "trust and confidence" is only one type of 
inequality of bargaining power and should be treated as such if English law is to have a 
coherent basis. 
The conclusion is that even though many surety wives are victimised because of their 
economic and emotional dependence upon their husbands, still they are likely to 
encounter particular difficulties in meeting the requirements of `established' legal 
grounds for avoiding liability under security contracts. This leads to the conclusion that 
the traditional law of contract is ill-suited to long-term relationships, where flexibility 
needs to be maintained. So, it may be argued that the law of contract, while appearing to 
be a logically coherent, neutral, and just set of rule, reflects particular (male, market) 
interest within society, concealing the reality that opportunities and choices are not 
equally available, and that exchanges are often far from voluntary. 
when bargaining power is impaired and the terms are very unfair or consideration grossly inadequate. 
If this is so, then clearly a new doctrine of momentous scope has been introduced into the law of 
contract. " 
20 [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 412,424. 
21 See6.3.1. iand6.3.3. 
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5.3.2 Scone - The Doctrine of Unconscionabilitv 
On the other hand, unconscionability, with its sliding scale between the procedural and 
the substantive parts, renders the burden of proof easier to claimants and can potentially 
capture more cases of victimisation than misrepresentation and undue influence. Under 
the doctrine of unconscionability, as explained previously in chapter 4, a person can point 
to the inequality of bargaining power of the parties and the substantive unfairness so as to 
set aside the transaction. 22 As David Capper23 explains, the principal grounds for relief 
are inequality of bargaining power and unconscionable conduct (as the procedural 
impropriety) while manifest disadvantage (as the substantive impropriety) plays a 
powerful evidential factor. Also, the more there is of these features (procedural and 
substantive impropriety) the less will be required of the others as the practice is in the 
USA. 24 
This means that lack of sophistication in relation to suretyship agreements, 
misunderstandings, miscomprehension of the terms of the agreement, which cannot be 
captured under the doctrine of misrepresentation, and lack of legal advice25 will be taken 
into account under the inequality of bargaining power requirement. Also, as already 
explained, one of the most serious shortfalls of undue influence is the requirement to 
prove some pre-existing relationship. However, there are situations where a pre-existing 
relationship might be completely inexistent, but still abuse of inequality of bargaining 
power can take place. In such a case, under the doctrine of undue influence, in the 
absence of proof of actual undue influence or duress, a victimised person is left wholly 
without protection. Such a person cannot invoke presumed undue influence because there 
is no pre-existing relationship. However, under the doctrine of unconscionability, a weak 
party may point at the inequality of bargaining power together with harsh terms in order 
to set the charge aside. 
22 See 4.3. 
23 Capper, David, "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation" (1998) 114 LQR 479. 
24 See 4.2.7. 
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5.3.2. i Scope - The Doctrine of Unconscionability: Illustrations in the Context of 
Suretyship Agreements 
It would be useful at this point to demonstrate more methodologically how the sliding 
scales will function in suretyship three-party contracts and see how English cases 
analyzed in chapter 2 would be treated under unconscionability. In doing that the writer 
will also be looking at the Australian jurisdiction where the doctrine is applied in the 
specific suretyship area. 
Starting with procedural impropriety, naturally, most sureties are in an inferior position in 
relation to the bank in terms of financial position and skill. However, in the absence of 
actual undue influence, inequality of bargaining power alone is not enough to invoke the 
doctrine. Substantive deficiency needs to be present as well. The fact that a surety comes 
as a volunteer and has nothing to gain from the transaction tips the scales towards 
substantive unconscionability; also, since substantive unconscionability here is obvious, 
less procedural impropriety is required on the sliding scales to raise the presumption. 
Substantive unconscionability is enough and the bank does not need to know that the 
husband exercised undue influence. The sliding scales of unconscionability have the 
effect that a sharp case of manifest disadvantage will strengthen the suit of the plaintiff, 
raising the presumption easily, even if the bank is not aware of the exercise of undue 
influence. So, scenarios like BCCI SA v Aboody26 and Burch27 can be treated under the 
proposed doctrine. In practical terms, this means that every time a surety approaches to 
offer security the presumption is raised. 28 To illustrate, in Garcia v National Australia 
Bank, 29 the Australian High Court held that, under the doctrine of unconscionability, even 
though the wife cannot prove that her husband exercised undue influence, she may point 
to her luck of understanding and legal advice and have a guarantee declared void against 
the bank when the bank took no appropriate precautions once the presumption was raised. 
Under Australian law, the presumption is raised when the wife approaches as volunteer 
25 Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983)151 C. L. R. 447. 
26 [1990] 1 Q. B. 923. 
27 [1997] 1 All ER 144 (CA). 
28 Fortunately, this test was formulated by their Lordships in Etridge (No. 2). 
29 (1998) 194 C. L. R. 395. In this decision the High Court modified principles from the 1939 decision of 
Yerkey vJonnes (1939) 63 C. L. R. 649. There, Dixon J. was regarded as having stated a "special wives' 
equity" which gave wives, as a class, a unique ability to challenge a guarantee. 
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surety. Interestingly, Australian courts expanded the reach of Garcia so as to embrace 
non-married couples as well. 30 
Moving further, the doctrine can be beneficial to cases like Bank of Scotland v Bennett. 31 
As a reminder, the wife's dependence on her husband, in other words the relational 
inequality, was paradoxically the reason the court refused to set the charge aside against 
the bank on the grounds of undue influence, because she could potentially or indirectly 
gain from the transaction. Under the doctrine of unconscionability, one's inequality of 
bargaining power cannot work at their disadvantage. Banks are generally deemed to be 
aware of the relationship of trust and confidence between couples and unconscionability 
is interfering exactly to make sure that this inequality of bargaining power is not abused. 
To illustrate, after Garcia, 32 Australian courts went further and expanded their principle 
even more. As a result, wives who, ostensibly, had a financial interest in the fortunes of 
the company have been successful in having the guarantees they signed set aside. For 
example, in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Khouri, 33 the respondent surety wife was 
a director and shareholder of the company whose debts were guaranteed. Also, in 
Granfield Pty v Commonwealth Bank, 34 the wife surety had executed guarantees to 
support financial accommodation to a company of which she was a director. In both 
cases, the court held that both wives were volunteers. In relation to the last case, the wife 
was an Italian immigrant, who was never given any explanation and had no control of the 
company. Thus, in Garcia, Khouri and Granfield Australian courts investigated behind 
the apparent role of the wife to determine whether a transaction was in fact beneficial to 
her or not. An interesting case is Radin v Commonwealth Bank. 35 There, the court held 
that a surety wife, who was not formally recorded as being involved in any of her 
husband's business and was not a joint borrower, was not a volunteer because she gained 
directly form the company. This decision may be criticised as a disturbing development 
in that it renders the voluntariness criterion of Garcia redundant. In Garcia, the majority 
said that the fact that the wife is a volunteer is crucial in the decision as to whether the 
31 In Westpac Banking Corporation v Paterson (2001) F. C. A. 556 (Fed Ct (Aus) (Full Ct. ), the 
principle was applied to an ex-wife. 
' [1991] 1 F. L. R. 1151. 
32 Garcia v NationalAustralia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 C. L. R. 395. 
33 Commonwealth Bank ofAustralia v Khouri (1998) V. S. C. 128. 
34 Granfield Pty v Commonwealth Bank (1998) V. S. C. 140. 
35 Radin v Commonwealth Bank [1998] 1361 F. C. A. 
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bank acted unconscionably or not. A better approach, it is suggested by commentators, 
would be to protect all wives coming as volunteers, which means all non joint borrowers. 
Some even went further and proposed that the bank should be careful in all the cases 
where a wife approaches the bank. So, it seems that thinking in Australia has moved 
away from thinking in this country adopting an increasingly wider doctrine, perhaps even 
wider than the propositions of this thesis. 36 
Moving along, there is a different scenario where couples appear as joint borrowers. On 
the face of the transaction, this kind of contacts do not raise any suspicion. Even under 
the flexible doctrine of unconscionability it is difficult to set aside such transactions. This 
means that the superficiality of the "on inquiry" requirement in O'Brien 37 is not 
diminished completely. To explain, in such cases substantive impropriety is not present, 
or at least is not obvious to the bank, as the wife stands to gain from the transaction. This 
was the problem with CIBC V Pitt. 38 Looking at procedural impropriety to see if the 
scales weight more towards that direction, again the mere inequality between bank and 
surety is not enough to tip the scales towards that direction either. Also, the bank is 
unlikely to be aware of the sophistication of the wife and her degree of independence. In 
fact, this is the core of the problem with such cases; the law has to apply on a diversity of 
people with different sophistication. So, it is not realistic to expect that the wife who 
comes forth as a joint borrower will be protected. However, things change if one of the 
joint borrowers is the sole provider of security; this adds some more weight on the 
substantive part of the scales. This element is strengthened even more if this person puts 
at risk his/her only valuable asset. These are facts, which the bank is aware of. Also, if 
the purpose of the loan does not appear to accord to the characteristics and needs of the 
provider of the security (e. g. an old lady buying a new home together with a 
neighbouring couple), this is a further reason to alert the bank. So, some cases of joint 
borrowers can be caught under the doctrine of unconscionability. 
Throughout this section it was described how the doctrine is applied to suretyship cases, 
by invoking the approach of sliding scales. In the same time, the practice in Australia was 
36 Interestingly, Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773 held that indirect 
benefit from the husband's business should not affect a wife's equity. So, in that aspect Etridge (No. 2) 
is leaning towards unconscionability and gives more support to the propositions in the thesis. 
37 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien (1994) 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
39 [1994] 1 A. C. 200. 
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presented, so as to see how the doctrine can be applied in the UK in this specialised area. 
The result of this discussion is that the doctrine of unconscionability captures many 
situations of victimization and thus it affords more protection to sureties. 
5.4 Unconscionabilitv as an Alternative to the O'Brien Principle to Correct Market 
Failure 
Chapter 7 will identify various types of market failure in relation to vulnerable sureties. 39 
These include lack of independence, lack of expertise in suretyship agreements and 
business matters, lack of explanation and advice and lack of information regarding the 
principal debtor's financial position. These market failures justify from an economic 
efficiency point of view the need for intervention in general. The same economic 
justifications can be used to justify the intervention of O'Brien and unconscionability. 
However, it is submitted that unconscionability deals with market failure much better 
than the O'Brien principle. 
To explain the traditional rules of undue influence (which form the first step of the 
O'Brien formula) as a form of corrective mechanism to the victimisation of sureties has 
failed; a point overstressed in chapters 2 and 3. The plethora of cases which reach courts 
illustrates the argument very well. In fact, the prolongation of the inefficient status quo is 
attributed to the under-inclusiveness of traditional doctrines. Undue influence rules do not 
deal with market failures directly. To explain, even though the rules arise in scenarios of 
inequality of bargaining power, they refuse to admit it and instead they prefer to explain 
them as a type of an arbitrary relationship; as a result fewer scenarios come under its 
ambit. 
Moving along, even though the problem with many cases is lack of information and 
information-processing capacity, the House of Lords only recently insisted on 
confirmation from the solicitor that the wife received independent legal advice regarding 
the transaction. However, even if the bank does not insist on such confirmation, it does 
not mean that the charge will be set aside. First, the surety will have to prove that she was 
acting under the undue influence or misrepresentation of her husband and that the bank 
39 See 7.3.2. 
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had notice of this. If the surety does not manage to prove these tests, then the charge is 
not set aside, even if the bank never asked for a solicitor's confirmation that the wife was 
advised. On the other hand, the doctrine of unconscionability accommodates the 
disclosure of facts pertaining to the credit status of the principal debtor to the prospective 
surety. 40 Failure to do this means that the transaction is unconscionable and the change is 
set aside against the bank without the surety having to prove anything else (like undue 
influence by the husband and notice on the bank). So, unconscionability attacks market 
failure (like informationally impaired market) directly, unlike the O'Brien formula. 
5.5 Remedies 
Moving further, a significant advantage of unconscionability is that it carries remedial 
flexibility. It allows partial rescission while on the other hand, as already explained in 
chapter 2, under the O'Brien formula rescission is only in toto. 41 Partial rescission is to be 
preferred because it mitigates the loss of the lender, when setting aside, and in this way 
courts will be more prepared to find in favour of the surety wife. 
5.5.1 Remedies - The O'Brien Formula 
As already mentioned in chapter 2, in the Court of Appeal cases of Allied Irish Bank v 
Byrne42 and TSB Bank plc v Camfield, 43 the transactions were set a aside in toto and the 
possibility of partial rescission was denied. 44 
In Allied Irish Bank v Byrne, the wife was induced to mortgage a house, of which she was 
the sole owner, as security for her husband's indebtedness by a false representation made 
by him that her liability was limited to £35,000. In reality, the charge was for an 
unlimited sum. Ferris L. J. held that setting aside a charge was an `all or nothing process' 
40 Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,463-4, per Mason J.; 481, per 
Dean J. 
41 See 2.6.4.1. 
42 [1995] 2 F. L. R. 325 (CA). 
43 [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430. 
44 However, in Bank Melli Iran v Samadi-rad February 9,1994, the court emphasised the inherent 
flexibility of equity and the mortgage was partially enforced to the extent that the co-habitee had 
consented. For a full discussion of the meaning of `rescission' see O'Sullivan, J., "Rescission as a Self- 
Help Remedy: a Critical Analysis" (2000) 59 CLJ 509,510. 
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and, accordingly, the wife had the right to have the whole charge set aside as against her 
husband and against the bank, since it had constructive notice of her equity. His Lordship 
said: 
"It seems to me that setting aside must refer to setting aside in 
its entirety. This is consistent with the fact that a party who 
complains of having entered into a transaction on the basis of a 
misrepresentation is saying that if he had been aware of the 
truth, he would not have entered into the transaction. If this 
claim is upheld, the court seeks to put that party into the 
position in which he would have been if the representation had 
not been made. This involves ascertaining what the position 
would have been if the transaction had not taken place. It does 
not involve reforming the transaction to accord with the 
representation. 945 
The same conclusion was reached in TSB Bank plc v Camfield. 46 Here, the husband and 
his business partner requested an overdraft facility of £30,000 for their motor company 
from the plaintiff bank. The overdraft was agreed to, provided that the bank was able to 
take a charge over each of their houses. The bank manager stipulated that the mortgagors' 
wives should receive independent legal advice. However, contrary to the solicitor's 
confirmation, such advice was never given. Mrs. Camfield executed the charge, thereby 
charging her beneficial interest with an unlimited liability to meet the debts of the 
partnership. Her impression, however, fostered by an innocent misrepresentation by her 
husband, was that the maximum liability under the charge would be only £15,000. The 
bank lent £30,000 to the partnership and subsequently made further advances. At first 
instance, it was held that the mortgage should be set aside only to the extent that the wife 
had not consented to it, since she was prepared to risk her interest in the house to the 
extent of £15,000 anyway. The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed with this approach 
and concluded that the charge should be set aside in its entirety. Nourse L. J. held that the 
court seeks to put the wife into the position in which she would have been if the 
representation had not been made. This involves ascertaining what the position would 
45 [1995] 2 F. L. R. 325 (CA), 354-55. 
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have been if the transaction had not been entered. His Lordship explained that the process 
does not involve reforming the transaction to reflect the representation. Thus, the 
mortgage has to be set aside in toto. Here, on the facts, the wife would not have entered 
into the charge if she had known its true nature. Her ignorance of the true nature of the 
transaction resulted from the bank's failure to take reasonable steps, to make sure that she 
was advised, and thus there was no room for the charge to be partially set aside or set 
aside on terms (even though Nourse L. J. fully recognised the `morality' of the latter 
solution). In addition, in this type of cases, he continued, "the wife's right to have the 
transaction set aside in toto as against the husband is no less enforceable against the 
mortgagee. " 
5.5.1. i Remedies - The O'Brien Formula: Discussion of the Camfield Decision 
The underlying rationale of the Court's reluctance to permit a partial setting aside of the 
transaction stemmed from the nature of the right to rescind itself. 47 To explain, according 
to Roch L. J., such right is that of the representee'48 not that of the court . 
49 Even though, 
the court does have discretion in some cases to refuse rescission and award damages in 
lieu thereof under s. 2(2) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, this does not convert 
rescission into an equitable remedy subject to the court's discretion. Accordingly, the 
court may only decide whether the misrepresented (wife) has lawfully rescinded the 
transaction or is entitled to rescind it. It follows that the court's involvement is limited to 
a declaratory function. It is not the function of the court to grant equitable relief to which 
terms may be attached. According to his Lordship, such an analysis is consistent with s. 1 
of the Misrepresentation Act 1967,50 which recognises that the right to rescind for 
misrepresentation is that of the person to whom the misrepresentation has been made. But 
46 [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430. 
47 See Pawlowski, Mary Brown, James; Undue Influence and the Family Home. London: Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd., 2002,157-60. 
48 TSB Bank Plc v Camfield [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430,438, per Roch L. J. But see O'Sullivan, J., 
"Rescission as a Self-Help Remedy: a Critical Analysis" (2000) 59 CLI 509 for a contrary argument; 
and see also Meikle, D. J., "Partial Rescission-Removing the Restitution from a Contractual Doctrine" 
(2003)19JCL 40,48. 
49 TO Bank Plc v Camfield [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430,438, per Roch L. J.: "The right to set aside to rescind 
the transaction is that of the representee, not that of the court The court's role in a disputed case will be 
to decide whether the representee has lawfully rescinded the transaction or is entitled to rescind it. " 50 For a discussion of s1 of the Misrepresentation Act see 1.5.1. 
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for s. 2(2), the court does not have the power to declare the contract to be subsisting when 
the representee has already exercised the right to set aside the transaction. 51 
This decision has been applied in subsequent cases. For example, in Castle Phillips 
Finance Co Ltd v Piddington, S2 the Court of Appeal decided that the mortgage had to be 
set aside in toto. This case involved the obtaining of the wife's consent as a result of her 
husband's undue influence. Peter Gibson L. 7., giving the leading judgment of the Court, 
felt unable to draw any distinction between misrepresentation (alleged in Camfield) and 
undue influence in the case before him. The same conclusion was reached in Midland 
Bank Plc v Greene. 53 Here, Mrs. Greene while succeeding on O'Brien principles on the 
basis of her husband's presumed undue influence, was obliged as a term of her relief to 
repay her share of the funds advanced to her and Mr. Greene by Midland for home 
renovations in reliance on the impugned transaction. Walker QC's decision was later 
reversed by the Court of Appeal on the basis that partial mortgage enforcement for 
misrepresentation was not available in the light of TSB v Camfield. 54 
It has to be argued though that the case appears to be in marked contrast to an analogous 
line of authority, in particular, Bristol & West Building Society v Henning, " Abbey 
National Building Society v Cann56 and Equity & Law Home Loans v Prestidge. 57 
Ferguson, commenting on these cases, argues: 
"In these cases, the claimant of a beneficial interest in a property 
purchased with the aid of a mortgage was held impliedly to have 
consented to the subordination of any beneficial interest to the 
rights of the mortgagee. The mortgagee's claim was in all cases 
upheld to the extent of the claimant's understanding of the 
amount of the proposed mortgage; and in one case in which the 
mortgage advance was far beyond what the claimant believed 
51 Ibid. 
52 (1995) 70 P. & C. R. 592 (CA). 
53 [1994] 2 F. L. R 827. 
54 [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430. 
55 [1985] 1 W. L. R. 778 (CA). 
56 [1991] 1 A. C. 65. 
57 [1992] 1 W. L. R. 137. For discussion see Hudson, Alastair; Johanna, Boyd, "Setting Mortgages 
Aside" (1996) 7 KCLI 120. 
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would be raised, the mortgagee was nonetheless permitted to 
recover in full. 58 The contrast with Camfield, in which the 
chargee received nothing at all, is striking. "s9 
The only substantial difference, noted by Ferguson, between Camfield and the Henning 
authorities is that in the latter the mortgage was required for the purchase of the home, 
hence the wife derived some interest. This, of course, is not true regarding the case to 
which the O'Brien principles apply, where the charge is usually a second charge for the 
finance of the husband's business. 60 So, the argument of Mrs. Camfield appears stronger 
in comparison rather than that in Henning. However, as Ferguson argues, this cannot be a 
serious distinction, having in mind that the Court of Appeal in Skipton Building Society v 
Clayton61 was prepared to hold that Henning could in principle apply even though the 
mortgage in no way benefited the claimants. 62 
At this point it is interesting to refer to some relevant developments in Australia, where 
the High Court in Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd63 allowed partial rescission of 
the contract in a case of fraudulent misrepresentation. 64 In that case, the appellant was a 
director of Vadipile Drilling Pty Ltd (`Vadipile'), a company in the business of 
foundation piling. The respondent manufactured ready-mixed concrete. The respondent 
supplied its ready-mixed concrete to the appellant on terms of extended credit. The terms 
of supply were renegotiated and, during the negotiations, the respondent indicated that it 
was not willing to supply more concrete to Vadipile in the future without a personal 
guarantee of its debts from the appellant. Accordingly, the appellant instituted a personal 
guarantee in favour of the respondent of `all moneys which are now or may at any time' 
be owing to the respondent by Vadipile. The appellant, not having read the personal 
guarantee before signing it, believed that he was only guaranteeing the future 
SB See Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1991] 1 A. C. 56. 
59 Ferguson, P., "Partial Rescission for Misrepresentation Rejected" (1995) 111 LQR 555,556. 
60 See chapter 1. 
61 (1993) 66 P. & C. R. 223. 
62 Ferguson, P., "Partial Rescission for Misrepresentation Rejected" (1995) 111 LQR 557-8. 
63 Vadaz v Pioneer Concrete (S4) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 C. L. R. 102 (HC of Australia). 
64 Also in Far Eastern Shipping Co Public Ltd v Scales Trading Ltd [1999] 3 N. Z. L. R. 26, the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal accepted the existence of a jurisdiction to award partial rescission, although 
on appeal the Privy Council, Far Eastern Shipping Plc Ltd v Scales Trading Ltd [2001] 1 All E. R. 
(Comm) 319, found it unnecessary to decide whether Vadasz or Camfield was correct on this matter. 
For a discussion see O'Sullivan, Dominic, "Partial Rescission for Misrepresentation in Australia" 
(1997) 111 LQR 16. 
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indebtedness of Vadipile. The trial judge found that the appellant had only intended to 
guarantee the future indebtedness of Vadipile and that the respondent was fully aware of 
this. Furthermore, the respondent had misrepresented the true effect of the guarantee to 
the appellant. The trial judge held that equity operated to allow the appellant to rescind 
the guarantee to the extent that it guaranteed the past indebtedness of Vadipile. The case 
reached the High Court, which agreed with the decision of the trial judge. 65 
The Full Court decided that the appellant could not rely on the common law as a basis for 
rescission. This was because the contract between the parties was no longer executory 
and because the appellant was not in a position to return to the respondent in specie that 
which he had received under the contract. Then the Court went on and recognised that 
when granting equitable relief by means of rescission, equity did not require that the 
parties be completely restored to their pre-contractual position. Rather, equitable 
remedies should be utilised to achieve practical restitution and justice. So, their Honours 
recognised that a court would less readily rescind part of a transaction where a defendant 
is innocent, as opposed to being fraudulent. As a result of this unconscionability justifies 
not setting aside a transaction in its entirety or setting aside a transaction subject to 
conditions, in order to prevent one party from gaining an unwarranted benefit at the 
expense of the other. This is because a person seeking the assistance of a court of equity 
and "he who seeks equity must do equity". The court held that it must look at what is 
practically just for both parties, not only the appellant. 
Some academics66 see this approach in Australia as a departure from established common 
law and equity principles. This is because, in both England and Australia, 67 in cases of 
fraudulent misrepresentation, the right to rescind is vested in the party misled, not in the 
court . 
68 Equity operates in a concurrent jurisdiction in aid of the law and follows the law 
65 The court distinguished this case from Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 
C. L. R. 447. In that case, the Amadios would not have entered into the transaction if they had known 
the true financial position of their son. These circumstances led the court to grant complete rescission 
of the guarantee the Amadios had executed in favour of the bank In this case, the court found that the 
appellants, independent of any misrepresentation, would have been prepared to guarantee the future 
indebtedness of Vadipile. 
66 O'Sullivan, D., "Partial Rescission for Misrepresentation in Australia" (1997) 111 LQR 113 16. 
67 Alati v Kruger (1955) 95 C. L. R. 216,224. 
68 See Meagher, RP.; Gummow, W. M. C.; Lehane, J. RF.; Equity Doctrines and Remedies. Third ed. 
London: Butterworths, 1992, para. 2413,2416. 
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in confirming or denying the right to rescind. 69 It has been argued, however, that much of 
this reasoning is open to question given that, in equity, the charge entered into with the 
bank would have to be cancelled, requiring the inevitable intervention of the court. 70 
On the other hand, it is important to distinguish between the two separate roles of equity. 
Apart from the concurrent role71 of equity, a different line of authority suggests that 
where common law is silent because it recognizes no cause of action, equity exercises an 
auxiliary or exclusive jurisdiction72 (as is the case of an innocent misrepresentation) and 
rescission is effected by the decree of the court rather than the act of the party. 73 In such 
situations, the maxim that equity follows the law does not apply. Poole and Keyser argue 
that these distinctions regarding the two roles of equity still apply. 74 They explain that 
historically, the first discretion enabled the court to impose terms to ensure restitutio in 
integrum and therefore preserved the availability of the remedy of rescission to protect 
the misrepresentee. However, since this discretion existed only where the 
misrepresentation was fraudulent, it follows that in instances involving fraud, rescission 
exists only at the election of the fraudulent misrepresentee. In contrast, there are sound 
policy reasons why the courts should have discretion to order rescission where the 
misrepresentation is non-fraudulent; the second broader equitable jurisdiction is limited 
to such instances. 75 The second equitable discretion, they argue, provides basis for the 
English courts to recognise the remedy of partial rescission. 76 They explain: 
"One possible justification for this use of the broad equitable 
jurisdiction is that, assuming that it can be established that all 
69 Alati v Kruger (1955) 95 C. L. R. 216,224: "It is not that equity asserts a power by its own decree to 
avoid a contract which the defrauded party himself has no right to disaffirm... rescission for 
misrepresentation is always the act of the party himself'; Meagher, RP.; Gummow, W. M. C.; Lehane, 
J. R. F.; Equity Doctrines and Remedies. Third cd. London: Butterworths, 1992, para. 2414. 
70 See O'Sullivan, J., "Undue Influence and Misrepresentation after O'Brien: Making Security Secure", 
in Rose, Francis D (ed), Restitution and Banking Law. Oxford: Mansfield Press, 1998 66-69; 
Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James; Undue Influence and the Family Home. London: Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd., 2002,157. 
71 `Concurrent jurisdiction' is the expression used in Meagher, R. P.; Gummow, W. M. C.; Lehane, 
J. R. F.; Equity Doctrines and Remedies. Fourth ed. London: Butterworths, 2002,24/035. 
72 Ibid 24/020 and 24/075. 73 See Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd (1965) 113 C. L. R. 265 (HC of Australia), 274, 
277, per Kitto J; Cooper v Phibbs (1867) L. R. 2 H. L. 149,173. 





other matters being equal the misrepresentee would nevertheless 
have been prepared to contract on the basis of the assumed facts, 
partial rescission restores the parties to the position they would 
have been in but for the misrepresentation. However, we prefer 
to analyse the grant of partial rescission as involving a 
fulfillment of the contractual expectations of the parties - in the 
example, agreement to give security covering a liability of not 
more than £20,000 - by preventing the misrepresentee from 
resiling from the agreement he had intended and purported to 
make. Thus we conclude that the current rejection of partial 
rescission in English law can be attributed to the fact that the 
English courts (i) have wrongly adopted a limited view of 
rescission as a remedy lying in the hands of the misrepresentee in 
all cases and (ii) have incorrectly assumed that any equitable 
jurisdiction which existed was always restitutionary in nature, " 
whereas in fact the separate and broader equitable jurisdiction 
permits the courts to balance other contractual interests and, for 
example, achieve the fulfillment of a contractual expectation by 
means of an award of partial rescission. s78 
A simpler and more liberal view is to disregard distinctions between concurrent and 
auxiliary roles of equity and to hold that equity may always take action to any form of 
actionable misrepresentation by ordering rescission, and may do so upon terms. 79 
In addition, it has been argued that whilst this `all or nothing' approach in Camfield is 
clearly correct where the guarantor would not have entered into the transaction but for the 
misrepresentation, it seems an inflexible rule when it is proved on the facts that the 
represented would in any event have entered into the transaction on certain terms 
77 In other words, limited to the adjustment of benefits or the giving of monetary compensation in order 
to achieve restitutio in integrum: see, for example, Dunbar Bank Plc v Nadeem [1998] 3 All E. R. 876, 
884, per Millett L. J. 
79 Poole, Jill; Keyser, Andrew, "Justifying Partial Rescission in English Law" (2005) 121 LQR 2005 
273,274-5. 
79 Lord Wright, in Spence v Crawford [1939] 3 All E. R. 271,288,289, takes this approach, and it may 
be implicit in the obiter comments of Mason J. in Commercial Bank ofA ustralia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 
151 C. L. R. 447,461. 
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knowing the true facts. 80 In other words, if it was shown that Mrs. Camfield would have 
been prepared to enter into a guarantee with an upper limit of £15.000 then it is only fair 
for the bank that she should be bound to that amount. Therefore, under the Henning and 
Vadasz analyses, there was actual consent by the wife to the bank's priority up to that 
limit and "a strong argument that she is estopped from claiming rescission except insofar 
as the liability exceeded the £15,000 she was - to the bank's knowledge - willing to 
risk. s81 Therefore, some academics argue that rescission is not `an all or nothing process' 
(effectively providing the claimant wife with an unwarranted windfall), but that the court 
has power to set aside the transaction partially. 82 
Belinda Fehlberg, in her book, argues that the decision in Camfreld should be seen as a 
victory of sureties. However, even though, this view appears to be correct at first glance, 
a microeconomic analysis suggests otherwise. The better approach would be, to allow 
partial rescission, as the practice is in Australia. Under English law, courts are faced with 
the dilemma of an absolute decision, either absolute setting aside or loss of the 
matrimonial home. Partial setting aside is the middle path. Half loss for the bank surely is 
not the same as loss of the whole amount. This will increase the incentives of the courts 
to allow more sureties to set aside charges. This brings us to the doctrine of 
unconscionability below. 
5.5.2 Remedies - The Doctrine of Unconscionability 
Apart from the practice in Australia above, which is to be welcomed, it is also worth 
noting of the USA UCC s. 2-302 (1) which allows partial setting aside of the contract. 
This reads as follows: 
S0 Ferguson, P., "Partial Rescission for Misrepresentation Rejected" (1995) 111 LQR 558. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that the Camfield approach has practical merit: "regardless of whether a surety 
wife would have agreed to a security for a lower amount than was actually provided, the actual risk of 
enforcement was higher than she anticipated as a result of the misrepresentation, justifying rescission 
of the security in its entirety. " Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and 
English Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997,70. 
81 Ferguson, P., "Partial Rescission for Misrepresentation Rejected" (1995) 111 LQR 558. 
82 See, Virgo, G., "Undue influence and misrepresentation after O'Brien: making security secure -a 
commentary" in Rose, Francis, D. (ed. ); Restitution and Banking Law. Oxford: Mansfield Press, 1998, 
76-77. 
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"A court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the 
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it 
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to 
avoid any unconscionable result. " 
This means that the part of the contract, which does not involve unconscionable results 
can be saved. In this way, courts, when certain of the existence of unconscionability, will 
not be faced with the dilemma of an absolute decision, either to set the contract aside 
completely or not. Applying this to suretyship contracts, a guarantee can, for example, be 
partially upheld to the extent of the liability that the wife thought she was consenting to 
(similarly to the Australian approach) or to the percentage that it binds the surety-wife 
only and not the husband. In fact, the latter is the practice in New Zealand, which 
developed after strenuous efforts of feminist groups. 
The relevant law is the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001.83 Even though, 
the doctrine of unconscionability is not involved in this process, it is useful to look at the 
practice, which can then be applied in the context of unconscionability. Under the Act, 
spouses and de facto partners84 each have a protected interest (s. 20 B) in the relationship 
property (like the family home). 85 This is an equal half share (s. 11(1)). In the case of 
bankruptcy of one of them, the house is sold and the proceeds of the sale pass to the 
Official Assignee. The Official Assignee must pay to the other spouse or de facto partner 
his/her share (s. 20 C) and the creditor acquires the share of the bankrupt party. This way, 
the rights of the creditor (both secured and unsecured) against the bankrupt party are 
preserved (s. 20 A), while the wife is left with something to carry on. Also, even if a loan 
has started as a joint loan, once undue influence is established then, similarly to the 
procedure followed in the event of bankruptcy of one of the spouses, the wife's interest is 
protected. The house is sold and the bank will obtain the husband's share while the wife 
will be able to keep her own. This practice can be applied in the UK86 with a combination 
together with the doctrine of unconscionability. So, once unconscionability is established, 
the court can either uphold the security to the extent that the surety consented (as in 
83 The relevant sections are set in the Appendix. 
84 People who are over 18 years old and live as a couple for three years or more. This includes both 
heterosexual and homosexual couples. 
85 Relationship property includes: the family home, family chattels, any other relationship property (s. 
11(1)). 
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Vadasz) or to the extent that binds the husband and set aside up to the extent that it binds 
the wife. This way, the husband does not benefit from his own wrongdoing by the setting 
aside of the entire charge. Also, the wife is left with some money to start again and the 
bank bears only half loss. This is a middle path and offers a compromise. It is important 
to pause and underline once more the concerns expressed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
that if the law is particularly protective over wife-sureties then banks will be put off from 
lending. This practice, it is proposed, will not have counter results in giving out loans, 
since in `lost cases' banks still receive a substantial part of the amount. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter tried to combine the previous three chapters, which described the O'Brien" 
formula (chapters 2& 3) and the doctrine of unconscionability (chapter 4). More 
precisely, as it has been illustrated (in chapters 2& 3), the O'Brien formula even after the 
House of Lords decision in Etridge8s (No. 2) still has many shortfalls. For this reason, an 
alternative doctrine was presented and discussed (chapters 4), which is proposed to 
replace the O'Brien formula. Having presented these different legal techniques, it was 
then necessary to exhibit how unconscionability will benefit this jurisdiction once it is 
applied in the field of suretyship agreements. To this effect, this chapter was entailed in a 
parallel assessment of the O'Brien formula and the doctrine of unconscionability in the 
specialised area of suretyship agreements. It has been argued that the doctrine of 
unconscionability should be preferred over the O'Brien formula because it manages to 
correct four very important shortfalls of the latter. More precisely, the O'Brien formula 
with the doctrine of notice causes much confusion, because it takes an indirect and long 
route to set the charge aside against the lender. It first sets the charge aside against the 
debtor and then tries to explain, by introducing the principle of notice, that the charge 
should also be set aside against the creditor, even though technically their behaviour is 
blameless. This approach is quite ambiguous and confusing. Instead, the doctrine of 
unconscionability should be preferred, because it looks at the unconscionable conduct of 
the creditor against the surety. The charge is -set aside because the creditor knowingly or 
negligently took advantage of the week bargaining position of the surety. This approach 
86 Of course this would require some alteration within the law of property. 
87 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
88 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
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is much more direct and clear and it should also be adopted in this jurisdiction. Moving 
further, as already explained the concepts of misrepresentation and undue influence, 
which form the first step of the O'Brien formula, are under inclusive and as a result of 
this many types of victimisation are not covered. On the other hand, unconscionability is 
a much wider and flexible doctrine capable to capture within its ambit many types of 
victimisation. The doctrine of unconscionability, it is submitted, is able to adjust to 
particular scenarios that might arise and which would not normally be captured by 
traditional inflexible common law doctrines. Also, it was explained that 
unconscionability tackles the various types of market failures that may exist in relation to 
suretyship agreements much better that the O'Brien formula. Finally, an added attraction 
to the doctrine of unconscionability is that it carries with it remedial flexibility. Under the 
O'Brien formula, rescission is an `all or nothing process'. This is not to the advantage of 
sureties because courts are faced with the dilemma of an absolute decision; normally, as 
the analysis in chapters 2 and 3 showed, the decision leans to the side of the market 
interest, which is that of the creditor. However, with partial rescission, the loss of the 
bank will be less and hence courts will be more ready to set it aside partially. Partial 
rescission is the middle path and should be preferred. So, unconscionability can cope 
better with the vulnerable surety phenomenon rather than the O'Brien principle of notice 
and thus it should thus replace it. 
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Chapter 6 
The Relationship of Undue Influence 
and Unconscionability 
Aim: Prove that undue influence may be subsumed under unconscionability being wider 
Method: Illustrate their common features 
Conclusion: Undue influence may and should be subsumed under unconscionability 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter tries to show the similarities between the doctrine of undue influence and 
unconscionability. The argument is that unconscionaility is the wider of the two, so that it 
allows undue influence to be subsumed under it. ' Even though, this discussion is not 
directly relevant to the thesis, which relates to the vulnerable surety-wife phenomenon 
and the solutions to the problem, still it is useful for two important reasons. First, this 
discussion will help to understand the nature of the doctrine better by showing that it is a 
wide doctrine capable of capturing many types of vulnerability, like lack of 
understanding (which is the case for many vulnerable sureties). Secondly, there is the 
possibility that preserving the doctrine of undue influence and at the same time by 
introducing the doctrine of unconscionability in suretyship contracts might cause some 
confusion as to which doctrine applies, since both doctrines might arise under the same 
' It should be noted that misrepresentation, duress and unjust enrichment have similar characteristics 
with the doctrine of unconscionability but it is beyond the scope of this work to discuss a possible 
merger with these doctrines and unconscionability. This is a separate, complicated and very big debate. 
Misrepresentation might be fraudulent, negligent or innocent, and according to the type the remedies 
vary. For example, at common law a fraudulent misrepresentation not only renders the contract 
voidable at the suit of the party misled, but also gives rise to an action for damages in respect of the 
deceit. On the other hand, unconscionability does not give action for damages in respect of deceit. 
Also, misrepresentation is a common law doctrine while unconscionability is an equitable concept. 
Similarly, duress is a common law doctrine. It would be outside the scope of this thesis, which is 
concerned with the vulnerable surety phenomenon, to deal with the similarities between 
unconscionability and other similar doctrines. For a discussion of the similarities between duress and 
unconscionability see Phang, Andrew, "Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages" (1995) 
JBL 552,555-574. Also, the debate as to the merger between unconscionability and unjust enrichment 
is also very big and outside the scope of this work. For more on this see McConvill, James and 
Bagaric, Mirko, "The Yoking of Unconscionability and Unjust Enrichment in Australia" (2002) 
Deakin L Rev 13. 
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facts. As undue influence is a similar doctrine to unconscionability it can cause confusion 
in areas outside of the vulnerable surety context because litigants' advisers may be unsure 
as to which doctrine applies. In fact, this is what happened in Credit Lyonnais Bank 
Nederland NV v Burch. 2 There a case of unconscionability was treated as a case of undue 
influence even though there was no relationship of trust and confidence between the 
borrower and the surety. So, for reasons of clarity it is useful to do some running repairs 
in the law, while we are in this area, even though this chapter does not deal with the 
advantages of unconscionability. 
6.2 Conflicting Opinions as to the Relationship of Undue Influence and 
Unconscionabilitv 
In cases of undue influence there is an imbalance between the parties and it is this 
imbalance that has motivated commentators to attempt the insertion of the doctrine of 
undue influence under the banner of unconscionability. However, this issue has attracted 
much academic debate, with some commentators arguing that the two doctrines are 
distinct3 and others arguing that they are not 4 The greatest opposition to such a merger 
comes from Professor Birks and Professor Chin. 5 They argue that the doctrines are 
fundamentally different and hence "developed law must respect analytical distinctions. " 
They explain that in cases of unconscionability, on top of the imbalance, there is an 
active abuse by one party vis-ä-vis the other party. In such cases, the contract may be 
vitiated when the necessary link can be shown between the inequality of position and the 
bargain. So, as they see it, it is an abuse of the bargaining Position which is required. It 
has been suggested that it is this further requirement of unconscionability that makes the 
doctrines essentially different. In other words, undue influence is `plaintiff-sided', being 
concerned with the quality of the plaintiff's consent, which can be invalidated due to 
extreme dependence upon the defendant, while unconscionability is `defendant-sided', 
2 [1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA). 
3 Birks and Chin, "On the Nature of Undue Influence", in Beatson, J.; Friedman, D. (eds. ); Good Faith 
and Contract Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. a Capper, David, "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation" (1998) 114 LQR 479; 
Phang, Andrew, "Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linicages" (1995) JBL 552; 
Hardingham, I. J., "The High Court of Australia and Unconscionable Dealing" (1984) 4 OJLS 275; 
Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James; Undue Influence and the Family Nome. London: Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd., 2002,27-30,205-211. 
5 Birks and Chin, "On the Nature of Undue Influence", in BeatsOn, J. 
Fried D. (eds. ); Good Faith 
and Contract Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
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being concerned with the defendant's abusive conduct and exploitation of the vulnerable 
plaintiff. The idea advanced here is more in agreement with the suggestion of Professor 
Phang6 and David Capper, 7 that "properly understood unconscionability, as the broader 
of the two doctrines, allows undue influence to be subsumed under it. "s In fact, the 
experience in Australia9 illustrates the point very well. 
Originally, the two doctrines were distinguished but later undue influence was subsumed 
under unconscionability. For example, in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio, 10 
Mason J. considered that, whilst the two doctrines have some resemblance and whilst 
they are not mutually exclusive, an important distinction was made: 
"In the latter the will of the innocent party is not independent and 
voluntary because it is overborne. In the former, the will of the 
innocent party, even if independent and voluntary, is the result of 
the disadvantageous position in which he is placed and of the 
other party unconscientiously taking advantage of that 
position. "" 
A similar conclusion was reached by Dean J., who considered that the two doctrines as 
being closely related but, nonetheless, distinct. 12 In his view, undue influence looks to the 
quality of the consent of the weaker party whereas unconscionability looks to the conduct 
of the stronger party. 13 Dean J. stated: 
"Undue influence, like common law duress, looks to the 
quality of the consent or assent of the weaker party [ ... 
] 
6 Phang, Andrew, "Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages" (1995) JBL 552. 
7 Capper, David, "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation" (1998) 114 LQR 479. 
8Ibid. 
9 Similarly in the Canadian case Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd (1965) 55 D. L. R. (3d) 710,713, Davey 
J. A. in his judgment clearly distinguished between undue influence and unconscionability. He said: 
"... The equitable principles relating to undue influence and relief against unconscionable bargains are 
closely related, but the doctrines are separate and distinct. The finding here against undue influence 
does not conclude the question whether the appellant is entitled to relief against an unconscionable 
transaction. " 
10 (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447. 
11 Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 C. L. R 447 (HC Australia), 461, per Mason 
J. 
12Ibid, 474, per Dean J. 
131bid. 
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Unconscionable dealing looks to the conduct of the stronger 
party in attempting to enforce, or retain the benefit of a dealing 
with a person under a special disability in circumstances where 
it is not consistent with equity or good conscience that he 
should do so. "la 
Later though in Louth v Disposers the doctrines were merged. The case involved an 
advantage of the infatuation and relationship of trust and confidence between the 
parties. 16 The High Court set the charge aside as unconscionable. The judgment of 
Brennan J. is interesting. His Honour sought to assimilate the doctrine of 
unconscionability with the `similar' doctrine of undue influence. In his view, both 
doctrines come into play when influence is improperly brought by one and whereby the 
other disposes of his property. This similarity "gives to cases arising in the exercise of 
one jurisdiction an analogous character in considering cases involving the same points in 
the other jurisdiction. " 17 Sir Anthony Mason, "' writing extra judicially, expressed the 
view that the development of the doctrine of unconscionability in Australia has reduced 
the importance of the doctrine of undue influence, since the scope of the doctrine of 
unconscionability has widened in recent years to the effect that it does not just cover 
expectant heirs. Also, it has been argued that "this relegation of undue influence and 
other categories to a subordinate position is an important step in recognizing the 
fundamental underlying principle of relieving against unconscionable conduct and 
understanding the basic tenets of such reliefi19 
So, the example from Australian authority may strengthen the argument that undue 
influence may be subsumed under the wider doctrine of unconscionability. Below, 
follows some further elaboration of the similarities between the two doctrines. 
14 Ibid. 
15 (1992) 175 C. L. R. 621. 
16 Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James; Undue Influence and the Family Home. London: Cavendish 
Publishing Ltd., 2002,202. 
17 Louth vDispose (1992) 175 C. L. R. 621. 18 Mason, Anthony, "The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary Common Law 
World" (1994) 110 LQR 238. 
19 Halliwell, Margaret; Equity and Good Conscience. 2nd cd. London: Old Bailey Press, 2004,52. 
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6.3 Unfolding the Similarities Between Undue Influence and Unconscionabilitv 
To begin with, their common features, as identified by David Capper'20 are inequality of 
bargaining power (or relational inequality so as to include gifts as well), transactional 
imbalance (this will be referred to here as manifest disadvantage) and abusive or 
unconscionable conduct. These features are examined one at a time in relation to each 
doctrine, to come to the conclusion that they are shared by both doctrines, contrary to 
Birks' and, Chin's opinion. 
6.3.1 Inequality of Bargaining Power 
6.3.1. i Inequality of Bargaining Power - Undue Influence 
Taking presumed undue influence first, the "trust and confidence" requirement, which 
plays a decisive role in a finding of Class 2B undue influence, 21 can be explained as a 
relationship of relational inequality between the parties. In the type of relationship 
described by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien, 22 factors like the 
emotional and sexual ties between spouses, the possible economic dependence upon the 
other and the desire not to cause problems in the family place the wife in a subordinate 
position in relation to her husband. This was the case in Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien23 
(amongst many others), where the unsuspecting wife placed her "trust and confidence" in 
her husband that he would take care of her financial welfare; so, her affairs were then out 
of her hands and hence the relationship between them became one of unequal bargaining 
power. The proposition finds support in Australia, where courts explain the relationship 
between the couple as a type of inequality and hence offer protection to wives as a 
"special class". It should be recalled here that the law of undue influence in England was 
formed out of the desire to protect against victimisation; 24 as a result, the presumption of 
undue influence was created (in spousal relationships and any other types of cohabitation 
or close affiliations) because of the vulnerability inherent in relationships of close ties 
20 Capper, David, "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation" (1998) 114 LQR 479. 
21 As to the categorisation of undue influence see 2.6.1.2. ii. 
22 [1994] 1 A. C. 180. 
23 Ibid. 
24 See 2.6.1.2. i. 
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and dependences. 25 Therefore, these relationships may be viewed as types of relational 
imbalance. 
Apart from scenarios between couples, there are many more undue influence cases which 
clearly resemble the inequality of bargaining power in the doctrine of unconscionability. 
A recent case, Patrick Albert Meredith (Administrator of the Estate of Mrs Elizabeth 
Lackschewitz-Martin Deceased) v Dominic Theodore Lackschewitz-Martin, Robabeh 
Lackschewitz-Martin, 26 portrays the argument very well. 27 The case involved a challenge, 
on grounds of undue influence, to the validity of three deeds that transferred land from 
Leila (aged 95) not long before she died to her son Dominic. Here, by 1996 Leila was 92 
and had had a series of medical setbacks, which as the High Court stated must have 
influenced her ability to impose her will. She was at the time in much contact with her 
children and was increasingly subjected to their influence and especially to the influence 
of her son, who lived very close to her and managed her day-to-day expenses. Evidence 
showed that she never intended one of them to be benefited more than the other. As a 
result, though, of the challenged three deeds Dominic was to get significantly more than 
his sister. In addition, the lawyer did not adequately explain the transactions to Leila 
before she signed the deeds, so that she did not realise that they would not benefit her 
daughter. Based on these facts the High-Court found that the transactions were procured 
by the undue influence of the son and should thus be set aside. The facts of the case 
remind of the usual unconscionability cases whereby advantage is taken from an ill and 
old person. 
A similar scenario occurred in Wright v Cherrytree Finance Ltd. 28 There, not long after 
her husband's death, Mrs. Wright was approached by her daughter in order to charge her 
home in support of a joint loan she would have with her son-in law to enable him to buy 
shares in a company. At first, she resisted the proposal but eventually after the third or 
fourth time of being asked she agreed. There was a misrepresentation that she ran no risk 
of losing her home and that the mortgage would be for five years, when in fact it was for 
fifteen years. The judge argued that such a representation to a financially sophisticated 
25 [1994] 1 A. C. 180,188, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
26 (2002) E. W. H. C. 1462. 
27 The case involved the application of the law following the decision of the House of Lords in Royal 
Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
28 [2001] E. W. C. A. Civ. 449. 
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person would be of no assistance in establishing misrepresentation. But to someone like 
Mrs. Wright who was wholly inexperienced in these matters, this sort of assurance would 
justify her confidence about her liability. The judge found that her vulnerability due to 
her husband's recent death, her relationship with her daughter, her commercial ignorance, 
misrepresentations made to her and the manifestly disadvantageous nature of the 
agreement raised the presumption of undue influence. 29 The presence of these factors 
again remind of the usual unconscionability scenarios, whereby advantage is taken from 
unsophisticated and weak individuals. 
Similarly, Bradshaw V BCTW Hardcastle, GC Lindsay30 involved a situation where there 
was pressure on a man, who suffered from a lung terminal disease and HIV and was 
under medication, to sign a will leaving his assets to his second wife some two weeks 
before his death. The only reason the testator signed was to have some "peace in his life" 
from arguing with his wife. Laddie J. of the High Court ruled that the wife's pressure 
overcame his resistance, "a resistance made harder to maintain because of his physical 
deterioration. 01 Clearly, in finding the existence of undue influence, the court relied on 
the husband's weakness or in other words on relational inequality, similarly to 
unconscionability cases. Also, in Goldsworthy v Bricke1132 the Court of Appeal found the 
presumption of undue influence was raised in a case where an illiterate and elderly man 
granted a tenancy to his manager on terms disadvantageous to himself. 33 
29 The judge then found that the bank was put "on inquiry" because they knew the disparity of ages 
between the parties; her husband had recently died; there was no sensible reason why she should want 
to mortgage her home at her age and the mortgage would appear to be of no benefit to her as the 
money would be paid to Mr. Scott. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether the bank did enough to 
dispel the effect of the notice. The bank repeatedly said in its correspondence with her that she should 
seek independent legal advice and that there was a risk of her losing her home. However, the Court of 
Appeal found that the bank did not follow the guidelines of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O'Brien of 
having a private meeting with the surety and hence the bank was still subject to notice. Along with the 
substantive impropriety of the contract, her inequality in relation to the other party was very important 
in raising the presumption. 
30 [2002] E. W. H. C. 2816. 
31 Ibid. para. 85. 
32 [1987] 2 W. L. R. 133. 
33 Contrary to these decisions, absence of inequality of bargaining power could not lead to a finding of 
undue influence in the formation of a will in Lutchman Ramcoomarsingh v The Administrator General 
[2002] U. K. P. C. 67. The deceased, Mr. Harper, left assets to his friend and lawyer without seeking 
independent legal advice. Despite this the Privy Council was very confident in not finding undue 
influence. As their Lordships found Mr. Harper was not a layman with no legal knowledge. He had the 
desire to leave the appellant his estate due to their long-term friendship and mutual assistance and so 
he did. In that process the appellant did not encourage him or advise him in any way as to the content 
of the will, he just performed and made sure that his wishes were carried out. 
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Furthermore, beyond family relationships where family members responsible for 
managing the property of another family member acquire a great influence over 
another, 34 claims of undue influence were raised against a servant entrusted with taking 
care of a Lord's heir, 35 of a person under the influence of his uncle, 36 a stepfather 
responsible for advising a young man, 37 a secretary and companion who advised an old 
lady as to management of her affairs, 38 a banker who acted as a customer's advisor 
regarding a suretyship contract, 39 a security advisor who was found to have acquired a 
great influence over a client'40 and a military man advising the plaintiff in respect of 
business matters and was found to have acquired great influence upon him, 41 while in 
another case, it was found that the seller of some property who acted in his advisory 
capacity as an engineer had from his position influenced the buyer. 42 It seems that these 
cases should more appropriately be placed under the wider banner of inequality of 
bargaining power rather than having to explain them as a type of special relationship. 
Inequality of bargaining power of the doctrine of unconscionability is a wider concept 
and includes situations whereby a stronger party takes advantage of a weaker party by 
reason of emotional dependence, financial dependence, old or young age, inexperience 
and ignorance in respect of a specific transaction, physical or mental infirmity, financial 
distress, illiteracy, humbleness of social station, poverty, eccentricity, loneliness and/or 
philanthropy. 
Turning to actual undue influence, again inequality of bargaining power exists. 
Illustratively, in AST Sportswear Inc v Majit & Another, 43 the High Court treated the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties involved as an element of domination or 
control in a case of actual undue influence. In Allcard v Skinner, 44 the most striking 
example of a dominant relationship, the plaintiff nun, the donor, was under an absolute 
duty of obedience to the defendant donee, who was the mother superior of her sisterhood, 
34 Harvey v Mount (1845) 8 Beav. 439; 50 E. R. 172; where it was found that a child had become a 
guardian of his aged and infirmed parents. In Brett v Brett (1938) 3 D. L. R. 539, a daughter acquired 
great influence over her mother. 
Osmond v Fitzroy (1731) 3 P. W. M. S. 129. 
36 Dettmar vMetropolitan and Provincial Bank (1863) 1 Hem. & M. 641; 71 E. R. 281. 
37 Berry v Glazebrook (1891) 7 T. L. R. 574. 
38 Re Craig [1971] Ch. 95. 
39 Lloyd's Bank Ltd v Bundy [ 1975] 1 Q. B. 326 (CA). 
40 Union Fidelity Trustee Co ofAustralia v Gibson (1971) V. R 573. 
41 Cavendish v Strult [1904] 1 Ch. 524. 
42 Tußon v Sperni [1952] 2 T. L. R 516. 
43 [2002] E. W. H. C 778. 
44 (1887) L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145. 
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was bound to treat her voice as the voice of God and was precluded by the rules of the 
sisterhood from seeking any external advice without the consent of the mother superior. 
The same domination existed in Huguenin v Baseley, 45 where a clergyman was entrusted 
with the entire management of the property and affairs of a widow. In Inche Noviah v 
ShaikAllie bin Omar46 the plaintiff donor was a wholly illiterate, old and infirm lady. She 
was never able to leave her house and seldom saw any of her relatives and friends. She 
was wholly dependent on the defendant donee, her nephew by marriage, to manage all of 
her affairs, including her domestic affairs, and to bring her food and clothing. Similarly, 
in Re Craig, 47 the deceased donor was a weak, dependent and vulnerable old man; the 
defendant donee, his secretary companion, had substantially the entire management of his 
affairs and was constantly in his company; the relational inequality of the parties is self- 
evident. The court concluded that she used her position to keep the donee isolated from 
other people. 
All the above cases involved the existence of relationships of dominance and control over 
weak individuals. Indeed, many commentators have noted parallels between actual undue 
influence and duress. 48 So, in situations of duress and actual undue influence there are 
two parties involved: a strong and a weaker. If that was not the case then the weak would 
be able to carry out his/her own will freely. 
The argument advanced in this section is that inequality of bargaining power is an 
important and invariably present element in finding both actual and presumed undue 
influence. 
6.3.1. ii Inequality of Bargaining Power - Unconscionabilitv 
The presence of inequality of bargaining power within the doctrine of unconscionability 
was illustrated in all the jurisdictions examined in chapter 4, where the various examples 
45 (1807) 14 Ves. Jun. 273; 33 E. R. 526. 
46 [1929] A. C. 127. 
47 [1971] Ch 95. 
48 Phang, Andrew, "Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages" (1995) JBL 552; 
Hardingham, I. J., "The High Court of Australia and Unconscionable Dealing" (1984) 4 OJLS 275; 
Birks and Chin, "On the Nature of Undue Influence", Beatson, J; Freedman (eds. ); Good Faith and 
Contract Law. 1995. 
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were collected and presented, so the reader is referred to the discussion there. 49 Very 
shortly though, the categories of inequality of bargaining power caught by the doctrine of 
unconscionability can include instances of poverty, or any type of need, sickness, age, 
sex, infirmity of body and mind and lack of sophistication, education, information and 
assistance to understand. S° Even with this open-ended listsl the examples of inequality 
caught by unconscionability cannot be enumerated. 52 So, there should be no difficulty in 
fitting the inequality arising in relationships of trust, confidence and actual undue 
influence within this extensive banner. 
6.3.2 Manifest Disadvantage 
6.3.2. i Manifest Disadvantage - Undue Influence 
Moving to the second feature, at first glance, the manifest disadvantage requirement 
seems to create an insuperable problem for the merger of the two doctrines. This is 
because on the one hand it is not an essential requirement in either category of undue 
influence; PittS3 abolished the requirement in cases of actual undue influence and 
Etridge54 (No. 2) reduced its role to an evidential tool helping to raise the presumption in 
class 2B; on the other hand, it is invariably present in all cases of unconscionability. If 
this element plays a different role in unconscionability cases it can create problems in the 
proposed merger. 
49 See 4.3.1. 
so Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,462, per Mason J. 
51 (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,462,474, per Deane J.; also Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362,405, per 
Fullager J.; But many cases have repeated some basic examples: "poverty or need of any kind, 
sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of education, lack of 
assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is necessary. "; the High Court of Australia 
approved of this list in Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd vAmadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,459 (per 
Gibbs . J. ), 462 (per Mason J. ), 474-5 (per Deane J. ), 489 (per Dawson J. ). Sex in combination with 
other factors that tend to flow from traditional gender roles in our society (such as exclusion from 
business affairs and emotional vulnerability) may still at preset time create disadvantages for women; 
see, Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 C. L. R. 395; see also Merkel J. 's discussion of 
the position of wives under the Amadio principles in Grego v Tasmanian Trustees Ltd (1997) 143 
A. L. R. 328,346-9. 
5' Browne-Wilkinson J. in Multiservice Bookbinding Ltd v Marden' [ 1979] Ch. 84,110, said "I do not 
think the categories of unconscionable bargains are limited. " 
53 CIBCMortgages Plc v Pitt [1994] 1 A. C. 200. 
54 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
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6.3.2. ii Manifest Disadvantage - Unconscionability 
It has been suggested above that if the doctrine involves manifest disadvantage as an 
essential component, then this can be fatal to the thesis. However, it should be 
remembered that unconscionability involves a sliding scale between procedural and 
substantive injustice, whereby the more there is of one element the less is required of the 
other. 55 So, only some small substantive deficit in the agreement supported by serious 
procedural impropriety in the formation of the contract can suffice. Similarly, harsh terms 
coupled with less procedural impropriety may suffice. So, disadvantage, either trivial or 
significant, is only an evidential tool within unconscionability. S6 The role of manifest 
disadvantage was explained in chapter 4, so the reader is referred to the discussion 
there. 57 
So, manifest disadvantage plays an evidential role both in undue influence and 
unconscionability cases. With this illustration, a second common feature of the doctrines 
is proven. 
6.3.3 Unconscionable Conduct 
Moving further, in an emphatic pronouncement Professor Birks and Professor Chin 
enunciated that the doctrinesýare -fundamentally different, undue influence being 
`plaintiff-sided', being a factor vitiating the plaintiff's consent owing to the excessive 
dependence upon the defendant, and unconscionability as being `defendant-sided' and 
concerned with the defendant's exploitation of the plaintiff's vulnerability. 58 The 
argument advanced here is that, contrary to the above proclamation, there is room in 
undue influence for the notion that the consent was procured by some wrongful conduct 
and secondly that the conduct of the defendant required in unconscionability is not 
necessarily reprehensible as commonly, but wrongly, thought. 59 In other words, as David 
ss See 4.3.3. 
s6 Capper, David, "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation" (1998) 114 LQR 479, 
493. 
S' See 4.4. 
58 Birks and Chin, "On the Nature of Undue Influence", in Beatson, J.; Friedman, D. (eds. ); Good 
Faith and Contract Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
59 In Singla v Bashir [2002] E. W. H. C. 883, para. 28, the judge looking at the issue of unconscionability 
said that a very strong case is required. "The bargain must be more than hard, unreasonable or foolish: 
it must be proved to be unconscionable in the sense that one of the parties has imposed the bargain in a 
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Capper observed, there is no absolute `plaintiff-sided' or `defendant-sided' approach: a 
middle path is taken in both doctrines with unconscionable conduct and consent having 
the same weight for each doctrine. 
6.3.3. i Unconscionable Conduct - Undue Influence 
In support of their argument, Birks and Chin point at two features of presumed undue 
influence that are thought to be diametrically different to the position regarding 
unconscionability. The first is that in many undue influence cases the defendant is guilty 
of nothing more than passive receipt of benefits flowing under the transaction. 60 So, even 
though many cases involve abusive conduct, it is not necessary as a prerequisite to raise 
the presumption. 
The point is correct and it is important to illustrate it so as to understand the role of abuse 
in undue influence. In Hammond v Osborne, 61 the court firmly rejected the argument that 
the presumption is rebutted if it is shown that the conduct of the donee has been 
unimpeachable, or at any rate that there has been nothing sinister in it. Sir Martin 
Nourse62 noted that the insistence that the defendant did something wrong is a 
`continuous misconception' as to the circumstances in which a transaction is set aside on 
the grounds of undue influence. Similarly, in a more recent case, Niersmans v Pesticcio, 63 
Mummery L. J. noted that, "although undue influence is sometimes described as an 
`equitable wrong' or as a species of equitable fraud, the basis of the court's intervention 
morally reprehensible manner. His behaviour must be characterised by some moral culpability or 
impropriety. There needs to be unconscientious or extortionate abuse of power. " The facts of the case 
were as follows: Mr. Bashir purchased the council house he was living in with some discount. Most of 
the money was advanced by Dr. Singla. Dr. Singla held the equitable title of the house after a 
declaration of trust by Mr. Bashir that he held the house in trust for Dr. Singla for three years when the 
legal title to the house would be transferred to him. Mr. Bashir remained in occupation but then refused 
to transfer the legal title to Dr. Singla, arguing that the trust was procured by undue influence and was 
unconscionable. The judge did not accept the argument. On the question of unconscionability he said 
that there was no evidence that Mr. Bashir, being an uneducated man, could not resist whatever Dr. 
Singla told him. Based on this and the lack of substantive unconscionability to raise the presumption of 
procedural unconscionability the charge was rightly upheld but not for the reason advanced by the 
judge that sinister conduct was required. In relation to undue influence there was no pre-existing 
relationship between the parties before the transaction in order to allow setting it aside (para. 25). 
60 They cite to their aid the following cases: Allcard v Skinner (1887) L. R 36; Ch. D. 145; Tufon v 
Sperni, [1952] 2 T. L. R 516; Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy [ 1975] 1 Q. B. 326 (CA); Goldsworthy v Brickell 
[1987] Ch. 378; Simpson v Simpson [1992] 1 F. L. R. 610. 
61 [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 885. 
62 Ibid, para. 32. 
63 [2004] E. W. C. A. Civ. 372. 
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is not the commission of a dishonest or wrongful act by the defendant, but as a matter of 
policy, the presumed undue influence arising from a relationship of trust and confidence 
should not operate to the disadvantage of the victim. "64 So, absence of an active exercise 
of power or influence does not amount to absence of undue influence. 
Secondly, another apparent distinction between the doctrines that Birks and Chin referred 
to is that undue influence is directed to the quality of the consent instead of the abuse. 
Indeed, Allcard v Skinner65 was very clear on the point that courts do not interfere 
because a wrongful act was committed but on the public policy that one's right to 
exercise free will should not be abused. That is why where the presumption of undue 
influence is raised, the defendant can rebut it by proof that the transaction "was the result 
of the free exercise of independent will. "66 This can be satisfied by the obtaining of 
independent legal advice. This requirement is clearly directed to the plaintiff's consent 
and not so much to the unconscionable conduct on the defendant's part. 
Summing up, taking into account actual undue influence which is tantamount to duress 
and the cases of presumed undue influence just described, abuse in undue influence cases 
takes the form of both passive And active taking advantage of a situation, but in all cases 
what matters, as the underlying notional basis and true vitiating factor, is that the victim's 
consent has been deprived. These observations are correct but do not necessarily lead to a 
schism between the two doctrines, as unconscionability involves the same degree of 
abusive conduct. The point is illustrated below. 
6.3.3. ii Unconscionable Conduct - Unconscionability 
Coming now to unconscionability, the name alone suggests that some kind of 
unconscionable conduct is required to set the transaction aside. This however does not 
mean that there must be a sharp exercise of abusive conduct; passive taking advantage of 
benefits will suffice. 67 
64 [2004] E. W. C. A. Civ. 372, para. 20. 
65 (1887) L. R. 36; Ch D. 145. 
66 (1887) L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145,171, per Cotton L. J. 
67 See 4.3.2. 
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On the point, David Capper argues that many unconscionability cases exhibit little more 
than the passive acceptance of benefits that is present in cases of undue influence. For 
example, in Ireland, in Slator v Nolan68 the defendant took advantage of the fact that the 
plaintiff did not understand the terms of the contract. In Grealish V Murphy, 69 the 
defendant took passive advantage of the severe misfortune of the plaintiff. A useful case 
is Rooney v Conway, 70 where the defendant bought land from an old and vulnerable 
friend of his at the one quarter of the value. The vendor felt obliged for all the help and 
the services that the defendant provided to him and after a family fallout he sold the 
property to the defendant, while it was initially planned to be passed on to the family. In 
the Australian case of Blomley v Ryan '71 advantage was taken 
from an uneducated 78 
years old farmer who was mentally and physically weak. The same occurred in the New 
Zealand cases of Archer v Cutler72 and Nichols v Jessup (No. 2). 3 That overt 
unconscionable conduct is not required was also certified in the US case of Alvah Van 
Orden Howard and Lucy Marino Howard v Joseph Diolosa and Nanuet National Bank. 74 
There, the Howard property worth $150,000 to $200,000 was sold for $25,000. 
According to the court, the mere fact of inadequacy of consideration would not justify 
relief, instead, fraud, mutual mistake, undue influence, duress, unequal bargaining power 
or some other equitable ground should be demonstrated. The court found that Diolosa did 
not exercise any duress. However, the transaction was unconscionable, as it was the result 
of disproportionate bargaining power, which led to taking advantage of the weak with 
grossly unfair contractual terms. 75 So, for the purposes of establishing unconscionability, 
it does not matter if one's free will is abused either by slender or hefty conduct. 
In relation to the second point now, Birks and Chin failed to trace the importance of 
independent legal advice within unconscionability. 76 In fact, the High Court of Australia 
in Garcia77 underlined the importance of such advice. Even back in Fry v Lane, 78 Kay J. 
68 (1876) IR 11 Eq 367. 
69 [1946] IR 35. 
70 [1982] NIJB. 
71 (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362 (HC Australia). 
72 [1980] 1 N. Z. L. R. 386 (Supreme Court of Auckland). 
73 [1986] 1 N. Z. L. R. 237 (HC Auckland). 
74 241 N. J. Super. 222,574 A. 2d 995 (1990). 
75 The same was held in Jefferson Loan Co Inc v Livesay, 175 N. J. Super. 470,419 A. 2d 1164 (Dist. 
Ct. 1980). 
76 4.3.4. 
77 Garcia v NationalA ustralia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 C. L. R. 395. 
78 (1889) L. R. 40; Ch. D. 312. 
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said: "The result of the decisions is that where a purchase is made from a poor and 
ignorant man at a considerable undervalue, the vendor having no independent advice, a 
Court of Equity will set aside the transaction aside. s79 Also, in Ireland a transaction 
which looks unfair may be upheld if the defendant shows that the plaintiff had or could 
have independent legal advice but refused. 80 
Thus, unconscionable conduct is the same in both doctrines, varying from extreme to 
trivial; so, the concept plays the same role in both doctrines. Also, both doctrines are 
concerned with consent considerations and this is evident by the requirement of 
independent legal advice, which is present in both doctrines. This is an added indication 
that they are not distinct. 
6.3.4 The Benefit from the Merger of Undue Influence and Unconscionability 
Throughout the course of this chapter the similarities between undue influence and 
unconscionability were identified. Both doctrines involve inequality of bargaining power, 
unconscionable conduct and manifest disadvantage. These similarities show that they are 
not distinct, so that undue influence may be subsumed under unconscionability as the 
wider of the two. After that comparative analysis of the two doctrines, it is now possible 
to isolate the benefits of subsuming undue influence within unconscionability. 
One of the most serious defaults and limitations of undue influence, as already noted, is 
the requirement that some kind of a pre-existing relationship needs to be established (if 
the exercise of undue influence cannot be proved) for the doctrine to be invoked. Buxton 
L. J. in Irvani v Irvani8' explained: "Undue influence is concerned with the prior 
relationship between the contracting parties, and with whether that was the motivation or 
reason for which the bargain was entered into. Unconscionable bargain is, as its title 
suggests, concerned with the nature and circumstances of the bargain itself, and can arise 
without there being any relationship, outside that of the immediate contract, between the 
parties. " So, the main advantage of subsuming undue influence under unconscionability 
is that while the conventional rules of undue influence are under-inclusive and define 
79 (1889) L. R. 40; Ch D. 312. 
80 Harrison v Guest (1855) 6 De G, M and G 424. 
81 (2000) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 412,424, emphasis added. 
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away many possible circumstances where victimisation takes place, unconscionability, on 
the other hand, being a more flexible and general doctrine, can capture these cases that in 
the real world one would want to be ruled. For example, in Re the Estate of Brocklehurst, 
Decd Hall and Another v Roberts82 of the Court of appeal, Lord Denning M. R. 
(dissenting) tried to apply the doctrine to a gift made from an old eccentric man to his 
friend, the defendant, a small garage proprietor. The donor in that case granted a 99-year 
lease of the unrestricted shooting rights over his landed estate of some 3,500 acres to the 
defendant, who had for some years enjoyed limited shooting over the estate as a much 
appreciated friend and practical helper during the latter years of the deceased's life, 
despite their widely differing social backgrounds. The contract was prepared by the 
defendant's solicitor. The effect of the leases was drastically to reduce the value of the 
estate in the hands of any owner. After the death of the donor, his executors brought an 
action to set aside the lease. Even though Lord Denning M. R. did not find that the donee 
had acted in a morally reprehensible manner still, he said, he took advantage of the 
eccentricity and generosity of the donor and placed his interest above the interest of the 
donor resulting to an utterly unjust disadvantage to the donor. The majority, though, of 
the Court of Appeal disagreed and applying the rather narrow doctrine of undue influence 
found that a relationship sufficient to be abused did not exist between the parties and as a 
result the contract was upheld. 
In addition, it has been illustrated earlier that not all cases conventionally treated under 
the doctrine of undue influence can be persuasively and realistically explained on the 
basis of abuse of an existing relationship. For example, in Bradshaw v BCTW Hardcastle, 
GC Lindsay, 83 the only reason that the husband agreed to sign the contract was not 
because there was a relationship of trust and confidence between him and his wife, but 
because he was very weak physically and agreed, so as to have some peace from 
argument with his wife before his death. So, abuse of relational inequality describes this 
case more accurately. Forcing all these different scenarios of relational inequality under 
some arbitrarily and loosely defined relationship can only lead to ambiguity. A 
relationship of "trust and confidence" is only one type of inequality of bargaining power 
and should be treated as such if English law is to have a coherent basis. In some cases, 
the requirement of a pre-existing relationship has led them to unconvincing justifications 
82 [1978] Ch 14. 
83 [2002] E. W. H. C. 2816. 
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in order to explain a situation of inequality of bargaining power as an example of some 
hybrid category of special relationship, as the case above. Such cases create confusion 
and uncertainty within the law. So, by subsuming undue influence under the wider 
doctrine of unconscionability, the law will become clearer. 
In addition, in some cases, "the ostensibly procedural pre-conditions for relief were 
satisfied, very largely, by inferences drawn from clear substantive unfairness. "84 It is 
submitted that the tests of unconscionability can do this better, since manifest 
disadvantage as an evidential tool helps to raise the presumption of unconscionability. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch85 provided a striking example of manifest 
disadvantage playing this role. 86 The case involved the provision of security by an 18- 
year-old secretary for her employer, by way of mortgage of her flat, which was her only 
valuable asset. The Court of Appeal found that the unfair and manifestly disadvantageous 
terms of the mortgage suggested no other explanation than the existence of undue 
influence between the surety and the debtor. However, the fact that the surety worked for 
ten years for her employer, baby-sat and visited his family, was not really enough to find 
a relationship of trust and confidence to come under 2B class. The court went to great 
pains to explain this case as class 2B, while it could simply base its finding on 
substantive unfairness which raises the presumption of unconscionability. 87 
84 Chen-Wishart, M., "The O'Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness" (1997) 56 CLJ 60,64. 
85 [1997] 1 All E. R. 144. 
86 See 4.1.2.2. 
87 Some commentators have argued that the basis for setting aside contract like the one in Credit 
Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch is substantive justice and that the law would be more clear if 
this was openly accepted. Chen-Wishart for example argues that "a jurisdiction explained in terms of 
vitiated consent is hard pushed to explain why and when a complainant, not under a legally recognised 
incapacity, who chooses, not to obtain advice or to act against advice, should be relieved from a "bad 
bargain" while, "recognition of undue influence as a category of unconscionability would explain cases 
like Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch better on a sound theoretical basis rather than the 
hybrid relationship of O'Brien. Without such recognition Burch remains an abnormality "while, 
paradoxically, viewed by the judges as the clearest possible case for relief of O'Brien. " Chen-Wishart, 
M., "The O'Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness" (1997) 56 CLJ 60,70. Also, Waddams, in 
Waddams, S. M.; The Law of Contracts. Second ed. Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc. 1984, argues that 
"several generations of common lawyers been have educated in the belief that the common law of 
contract admits no relief from contractual obligations on grounds of unfairness, or inequality of 
exchange. The rule might seem hard, it is said, in an individual case, but it is satisfied by the need for 
certainty and commercial stability, for 'the Chancery mends no man's bargain' (per Lord Nottingham 
in Maynard v Mosely (1676) 3 Swanst. 651,655). My view is that the law of contract, when examined 
for what the judges do, as well as for what they say, shows that relief from contractual obligations is in 
fact widely and frequently given on the ground of unfairness, and that general recognition of this 
ground of relief is an essential step in the development of the law. " (369) He also argues that, "even at 
a time when judges, by their words, refused to countenance any breach in the notion of sanctity of 
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"It is substantive unfairness which gave rise to the inferences that 
the procedural pre-conditions of relief existed in this case: (i) that 
the relationship of employer-employee must have ripened into a 
class 2B relationship of influence, necessary for the presumption 
of undue influence; (ii) that the bank must have suspected that 
this was so, giving rise to the further inference of constructive 
notice that undue influence induced Burch's consent; (iii) that the 
bank's awareness of Burch's refusal to obtain the independent 
advice urged, or at least its ignorance as to whether she obtained 
the advice, should have confirmed rather than allayed its 
suspicion of undue influence; (iv) that, even if Burch received 
advice, the bank must have suspected that the advice was either 
not competent or not followed and so did not free Burch from the 
effects of the suspected undue influence. "88 
So, really Burch was an unconscionability case, but the Court of Appeal approached it as 
a case of undue influence. This creates confusion within the law. It is submitted that by 
replacing undue influence with the doctrine of unconscionability these confusions will be 
avoided. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter tried to show that undue influence and unconscionability have common 
features: These are inequality of bargaining power, manifest disadvantage and 
unconscionable conduct. The difference is that unconscionability is wider of the two, so 
that undue influence may be subsumed under it. Even though, this discussion was not 
directly relevant to the thesis, which deals with the vulnerable surety phenomenon, still it 
contracts, relief was, in practice, frequently afforded. For no civilised system of law can accept the 
implications of absolute sanctity of contractual obligations. "(370) So, Waddams argues that "we have 
just passed through a period in which the values of certainty and predictability in contract law have 
been emphasised over others, and we now seem to be entering a period in which opposing values are 
beginning to reassert themselves. "(370) Even though these opinions are respected, the writer is not in 
agreement with them. Instead the idea advanced in this thesis is that manifest disadvantage helps to 
raise the presumption of unconscionability, but it is not the basis of setting aside the transaction. This 
was explained in the previous chapter. The next chapter will explain that unconscionability is 
consistent with the classical contract law model and not with notions of substantive justice. 
88 Chen-Wishart, Ni, "The O'Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness" (1997) 56 CLJ 60,70. 
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was useful so as to comprehend better the nature of unconscionability. The discussion 
helps to show that unconscionability, being a wide doctrine, can capture many types of 
vulnerability. This conclusion will be useful in chapter 5 which explained the benefits of 
unconscionability in the context of suretyship agreements. There, it was argued that this 
wide unconscionability doctrine is capable of setting the charge aside against the bank 
that took advantage of the situation of a person who may have very little to gain and may 
be subject to all sorts of vulnerabilities. Finally, since both doctrines work in the same 
field, confusion may be created as to which doctrine applies. It would thus be better is 
undue influence was subsumed under the wider doctrine of unconscionability, so as to 
avoid confusion, as it occurred in Burch. 
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Chapter 7 
Analysis of the Doctrine of 
Unconscionability within a Liberal 
Contract and Market System 
Aim: Prove that unconscionability is justified within the liberal contact and market 
system 
Method: Analyse the elements of unconscionability with reference to liberal contract and 
market theories 
Conclusion: Unconscionability strengthens the principle of freedom of contract and may 
also promote economic efficiency 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter carries out a normative discussion of the doctrine with reference to the 
concepts of freedom of contract, individualism, consent, welfarism and economic 
efficiency. It is believed that with this discussion the thesis will be more complete. Also, 
since the purpose of this thesis is to convince of the desirability of introducing the 
doctrine of unconscionability into suretyship agreements, it is necessary to assess how 
this doctrine will fit within the free contract and market theoretical backdrop of this 
jurisdiction. 
The first part discusses unconscionability within the classical liberal (or laissez-faire) 
contract law theories; it is argued that the doctrine does not upset freely negotiated 
contracts but, on the contrary, it guards and boosts the principle of freedom of contract 
The second part explains through empirical examples that, even though unconscionability 
may be viewed as a welfarist doctrine, this is not contrary to liberal contract and market 
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theories. The third part discusses unconscionability within the free market system; it is 
argued that it is not an interventionist doctrine but one which promotes competition and 
economic efficiency. This is because it comes into play in situations of market failure 
where economists accept intervention. Also, along the normative analysis of the doctrine 
in general, particular reference is also made to the vulnerable surety phenomenon. 
7.2 Classical Liberal Contract Law and Unconscionabilitv 
The purpose of this section is to show that unconscionability fits very well within 
classical contract law. First, the main classical contract law principles are presented and 
then the doctrine of unconscionability is explained with reference to these principles. 
7.2.1 Classical Liberal Contract Law 
This subsection explains the basic principles and theories of Classical liberal contract 
law. Under these theories, pre-contractual bargaining is seen as a purposeful or strategic 
activity whereby free and autonomous individuals enter into agreements with the 
intention to advance their own interests. ' The traditional legal rules governing contracts 
echo this conception and as a result the role of the law is narrowly constructed; it only 
aims to establish the specific ground rules within which such self-interested, free, 
competitive dealing can take place without interfering into the choices that free moral 
agents make. 2 
7.2.1.1 Classical Liberal Contract Law - Individualism 
The right to contract freely is connected to the notion of individualism, under which each 
individual has an untrammeled entitlement to pursue his/her own self-interests. The 
1A contract is "a transaction, which results from the free agreement of actors who are motivated by self 
interest. ": Brownsword, Roger; Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in Contract 
Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,30. 
4 The role of contract is "to protect citizens from unwilled interferences with their person and property, and 
to set the arena for freedom of transactions": Brownsword, Roger, Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas 
(eds. ); Welfarism in Contract Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,30. 
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central tenet of individualism is the right to self-determination vested in all moral agents 
and the respect for their personal autonomy. As Bigwood explains, 3 respecting personal 
autonomy means respecting the choices that people make; this is central to expressing the 
value of persons and their personhood; it is necessary to recognizing their special status 
as `freely choosing, rationally valuing, specially efficacious moral personalities. '4 
Respecting their choices in effect means that people deserve to enjoy the fruits of their 
bargains. "[F]reely choosing, rationally valuing, especially efficacious moral 
personalit[ies] deserve to enjoy benefits and suffer detriments according to their 
autonomous choices: the fact that a person has made an autonomous choice makes it a 
good thing for her to deserve the consequences of her choice. " 5 This is the desert-based 
notion of justice (advantages accruing from contracting being seen as fairly earned by 
virtue of prudent dealing). 6 
An added point, which appears in the previous paragraph, is that people are free to make 
good as well as had bargains. To interfere with bad bargains is to deny to those 
individuals their right to self-determination and to deny to them their status as 
autonomous individuals. For this reason, "modem courts continue to affirm this idea as 
one of the central tenets of the common law, and indeed this conception of justice is 
exemplified in the very idea of pacta sunt servanda - that justice consists in the keeping 
of one's voluntary agreements, and that justice `requires' such agreements to be kept. "7 
Of course, since market or exchange economies depend upon interactions and 
interdependence between members of society, the right of one as an individual should be 
' Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,64 
4 Fried, C.; An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice. Cambridge, [Mass. ]: Harvard 
University Press, 1970,29. 
' Mautner, M., "A Justice Perspective of Contract Law: How Contract Law Allocates Entitlements" (1991) 
10 TelAviv University Studies in Law, 239,246. 
6 Brownsword, Roger, Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in Contract Law. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,32. 
7 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,64-65; also, in Pao On v 
Lau Yiu Long (1980) A. C. 614,634, per Lord Scarman: "justice requires that men, who have negotiated at 
arm's length, be held to their bargains unless it can be shown that their consent was vitiated by fraud, 
mistake or duress". 
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exercised subject to the freedom of others to pursue their own self-interests. ' So, the law 
should interfere only when one's right to contract freely has been breached by some 
wrong during the pre-contractual process. This is a negative conception of freedom 
(placing restrictions on coercion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation, and mistake). 9 
Summarizing here, "liberal individualism is concerned with maintaining as much 
individual freedom as is compatible with the liberty of all. Self-interest, in turn, is shaped 
by each individual as a rational and independent moral agent, according to her 
(irreducible) desires and conception of the good, such that each individual is the ultimate 
arbiter of what is best for him. The focus of individualism, then, is on an instrumental 
rationality of means and not on a rationality of ends. s10 
7.2.1.2 Classical Liberal Contract Law - Procedural Justice 
A very important characteristic of liberal contract law is the rejection of end-state 
theories. 
If we remind ourselves of the fundamental bases of classical contract law, under the 
doctrine of consideration, a person can choose to pay an exaggerated price for a promise 
or accept a negligible price for his/her promise and the courts will not intervene. The real 
value or adequacy of consideration is immaterial; in fact, laying down even a peppercorn 
a See, for example, Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] H. C. A. 36, para. 114. per McHugh J.: "One of the 
central tenets of the common law is that a person is legally responsible for his or her choices. It is a 
corollary of that responsibility that a person is entitled to make those choices for him or her self without 
unjustifiable interference from others. In other words, the common law regards individuals as autonomous 
beings entitled to make, but responsible for, their own choices. The legal doctrines of duress, undue 
influence and criminal liability are premised on that view of the common law. " See, also Kronman, 
Antony, T., "Paternalism and the Law of Contract" (1983) 92 Yale LJ 763,794-5: "Our society is 
committed to the principle that, as long as they do not violate the rights of others, individuals may pursue 
their own conceptions of the good. We are also committed to the idea that the legal order should remain 
neutral among these conceptions, not favouring some or disfavouring others on the grounds of their 
intrinsic merit. "; also, see Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 
62-69. 
$ Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,61. 
Brownsword, Roger, Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Wellfarism in Contract Law. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,32. 
10 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford University Press, 2004,61. 
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can satisfy the law. 11 So, courts in general are not concerned with the wisdom of the 
contract; this is because people as free moral agents are allowed to contact well or 
poorly. 12 Furthermore, judging the validity of a contract with reference to some external 
factors of fair price is to deny that the contract is a free bargain device. A contract is 
supposed to be a bargain and not a swap or a sale for a fixed price. 13 This is consistent 
with the institution of free market system. 
In addition, there are practical reasons, apart from normative, for rejecting end-state 
theories. Value is not an objective criterion. It is very difficult to acquire a uniform 
consensus as to the value of an exchange. The only authoritative standard, therefore, can 
be the will of the parties as expressed in their bargain. 
For these reason, the law is only concerned with setting the ground rules for such free 
competitive bargain and not with issues of substantive justice. 
7.2.1.3 Classical Liberal Contract Law - Equality 
Apart from individualism and procedural justice, contract law adheres closely to the 
principle of equality. However, this is a formal conception of equality (the rules being the 
same for everyone). 14 This is one of the biggest criticisms against contract law. 15 It is 
usually alleged that the market and the laws which serve it are inherently unjust. This is 
Atiyah, P. S.; An introduction to the Law of Contract. Fifth ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995,127. 
12 Indicatively, in Glanville v Glanville [2002] E. W. H. C. 1587, para. 48, the High Court very recently 
emphasized in relation to undue influence that "the principle... is not one for the setting aside of something 
which appears to the court to have been foolish or unnecessary or unreasonable or excessive. "; in Allcard v 
Skinner (1887) L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145,183, Lindley L. J. said: "In this particular case I cannot find any proof 
that any gift made by the plaintiff was the result of any actual exercise of power or influence on the part of 
the lady superior or of Mr. Nihill, apart from the influence necessarily incidental to their position in the 
sisterhood. Everything that the plaintiff did is in my opinion referable to her own willing submission to the 
vows she took and to the rules which she approved, and to her own enthusiastic devotion to the life and 
work of the sisterhood.... under these circumstances it is going a long way to hold that she can invoke the 
doctrine of undue influence to save her from the consequences of her own acts, and to entitle her to avoid 
the gifts she made when in a state of mind different from that in which she now is. I am by no means 
insensible of the difficulty of going so far. " 
13 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,179. 
14 Brownsword, Roger, Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in Contract Law. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,32. 
15 See Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,67. 
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because people's initial endowments are unequal (due to genetic reasons, bad fortune, 
luck etc. ) and as a result their bargaining outcomes are unequal. 
However, despite the fact that people are different in many ways (in status, wealth, 
education, health, desires, intelligence etc. ), still the law is indifferent to this. It adopts a 
platform of neutrality towards individuals and their choices; it is assumed that a shilling's 
worth is the same for everyone. So, "what [binds] the wise man... also bind[s] the fool. 
What [is] good for the individual person [is] good for the railway company or the 
s16 international banking corporation. 
The liberal law of contract is not concerned with who makes the choice but with the way 
the choice is made, i. e. whether it was freely and voluntarily entered. 
7.2.1.4 Classical Liberal Contract Law - The Conditions of Consent and the 
Responsibility Principle 
As already stated, the essence of the bargaining process is the exercise of consent, which 
has to be free and voluntary. The exercise of the right to contract freely does not only 
generate rights (i. e. insisting that the agreement be performed by the other party) but also 
responsibilities. People are bound by their responsible autonomous promises" and they 
are not allowed to go back on their word - pacta sunt servanda- otherwise the essence of 
the institution of contract would be underestimated. People must feel sure that their deals 
will be kept; otherwise they will be discouraged from trading. 
So, since consent is causally linked to responsibility, it is important to examine the 
conditions of consent. On this point, Bigwood adopts Hart's conditions of excuse in 
relation to criminal law, which are enumerated under the Responsibility Principle. is 
These may also apply into the context of pre-contractual bargaining. Under this Principle, 
"what is crucial is that those whom we [hold legally responsible] should have had, when 
Aid, 67. 
There was a time when a promise had intrinsic value. 
is Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,114. 
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they acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental... and a fair opportunity to exercise 
these capacities. i19 So, the two essential conditions of consent are: (a) the Capacity 
Condition, and (b) the Opportunity Condition. 
"Translated into the context of pre-contractual bargaining, the Capacity Condition 
implies that we do not hold legally responsible persons who are, say, intoxicated, insane, 
or under-age; whereas the Opportunity Condition implies that an otherwise competent 
person has not, for example, had her opportunities for autonomous action reduced by 
threats of improper action (coercion), or reduced by fraud (deception). s20 Those who fail 
the capacity condition do not have the necessary physical and mental weapons, such as 
understanding, reasoning, and control of conduct, which are deemed to be necessary in 
order to participate into the bargaining game. They are unable to examine their options, to 
weight the risk involved and act in a self-maximising way. Those who fail the 
Opportunity Condition, even though they possess the normal capacities, they are denied 
the opportunity to use them. In these situations their consent is not the result of their own 
autonomous and voluntary decision but the result of misrepresentation, fraud, duress, or 
undue influence. 
Hence, a party is morally and legally bound by his/her promise when he/she is able to 
exercise and does exercise informed and deliberate consent 21 Since respecting people 
involves respecting their choices, it is very difficult to justify any sort of paternalistic 
intervention with these choices, unless consent is not present. 
19 Hart, H. L. A.; Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy ofLaw. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1968,152. 
20 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,115. 
21 Recently, the Court of Appeal, in UCB Corporate Services Ltd v Williams [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 555, in 
relation to undue influence stated: "Undue influence is exerted when improper means of persuasion are 
used to procure the complainant's consent to participate in a transaction, such that the consent thus 
procured ought not fairly to be treated as the expression of [the complainant's] free will... In such a case, 
equity proceeds on the basis that the complainant did not consent to the transaction. " A similar exposition 
was given in CIBCMortgages v Pitt [1994] 1 A. C. 200,209, where Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: "Actual 
undue influence is a species of fraud. Like any other victim of fraud, a person who has been induced by 
undue influence to carry out a transaction which he did not freely and knowingly enter into is entitled to 
have that transaction set aside as of right. " 
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7.2.1.5 Classical Liberal Contract Law - Eanloitation 
The previous section explained why a person is or is not held bound by his/her promise. 
However, autonomy concepts and consent considerations alone do not explain why the 
contract should be set side against another party. If consent was just the result of rational 
and free will, then hardly any agreement would stand. As Bigwood explains, if we 
accept that we do not all have all the information that we would ideally want before 
striking an agreement, then all decision is irrational. Also, not all of us have the same 
financial abilities to satisfy our desires, so such contracts are the result of constraint. 
Kronman answered this question by looking at exploitation and linking it to the question 
of consent. So, a person is morally and legally condemned and the contract may be set 
aside against him/her, when his/her exploitative conduct is related to the involuntariness 
of the other party. This happens either when the defendant has either caused the consent 
disabilities of the plaintiff or, even if he did not cause them, when he was aware of them 
but nevertheless went on with the transaction without discharging his neighbourhood 
responsibilities towards the plaintiff. 
This shift to advantage taking is justified on both descriptive and normative grounds. 25 
For example, as Bigwood argues, established legal doctrines reveal that the availability of 
relief turns on the conduct that caused (actively or passively) the assent, rather than on 
the mere state of mind of the victim who manifested it. 26 For instance, relief for fraud and 
22 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,116. 
zs Kronman, Antony, T., "Contract Law and Distributive Justice" (1980) 89 Yale Law LJ472. 
24 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,118; also, see Hart v 0' 
Connor [1985] 1 A. C. 1000,1024, per Lord Brightman: " 'Fraud' in its equitable context does not mean, or 
is not confined to, deceit; it means an unconscientious use of power arising out of the circumstance and 
conditions of the contracting parties... It is victimisation, which can consist either of the active extortion of 
a benefit or the passive acceptance of a benefit in unconscionable circumstances. " 
25 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,120. 
26 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] A. C. 686,705, per Lord Scarman: "the principle 
justifying the court in setting aside a transaction for undue influence is... not a vague "public policy" but 
specifically the victimization of one party by the other. "; see also in relation to undue influence in Allcard v 
Skinner (1887) L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145, per Lindley L. J.: "What then is the principle? Is it that it is right and 
expedient to save persons from the consequences of their own folly? Or is it that it is right and expedient to 
save them from being victimized by other people? In my opinion the doctrine of undue influence is founded 
upon the second of these two principles. Courts of equity have never set aside gifts on the ground of the 
247 
duress is given not simply because the victim contracted in ignorance or under pressure, 
but rather because the ignorance or pressure was wrongfully induced. So, in setting aside 
agreements the notion of exploitation or victimization is essential. 
Apart from this, there are also normative reasons, which justify the adherence to 
advantage taking rather than the mere existence of imbalance or involuntariness on the 
part of the consent-rendering party. As Bigwood explains, 27 it is impossible for the law to 
correct these inequalities; it is easier to look at the situations where these are taken 
advantage of 2' 
A final justification to shifting the focus to advantage taking is practical. If contracts 
between the weak and the strong were prohibited, then this would work to the detriment 
of the weak. Weak parties need to contract, so as to possibly improve their position or at 
least not become worse off. 
Summarising here, it appears that setting aside of contracts is permitted not only when 
there is absence of consent but also when this is linked to the conduct of the defendant. 
7.2.2 Unconscionability under the Microscope of Classical Contract Law 
The effort in this section is to prove that unconscionability can be justified and fit very 
well within liberal contract law theories. The method to be incorporated here is to 
deconstruct the doctrine down to its basic elements and then to place them under the 
microscope of the liberal law theories. 
folly, imprudence, or want of foresight on the part of donors. The courts have always repudiated any such 
jurisdiction. Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves. Jun 273, is itself a clear authority of this effect. It would 
obviously be to encourage folly, recklessness, extravagance and vice if persons could get back property 
which they foolishly made away with, whether by giving it to charitable institutions or by bestowing it on 
less worthy objects. On the other hand, to protect people from being forced, tricked or misled in any way 
by others into parting with their property is one of the most legitimate objects of all laws; and the equitable 
doctrine of undue influence has grown out of and been developed by the necessity of grappling with 
insidious forms of spiritual tyranny and with the infinite varieties of fraud. " 
27 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,120. 
za Similarly, competition law does not penalise dominance of a firm within the market but abuse of 
dominance; see Furse, Mark; Competition Law of the EC & UK. Fourth ed. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004, chapter 11. 
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7.2.2.1 Inequality of Bargaining Power 
It will be recalled from the discussion in chapter 4 that unconscionability arises in 
situations of inequality of bargaining power; in fact, inequality of bargaining power is of 
cardinal importance to the doctrine; it is a doctrine designed for the protection of the 
weak, the uneducated and the incapable. It applies to situations of vulnerability such as 
age, intoxication, lack of education, lack of sophistication in relation to a specific 
transaction, mental illness, physical infirmity, poverty and so on. 2 It is this inferiority in 
bargaining power vis-ä-vis the other contracting party, which gives space to abuse of 
their special vulnerabilities. People who suffer from some sort of vulnerability, even 
though they may posses the normal physical or mental abilities (they are not incapable in 
the sense that they are under-age or lunatics), still under some circumstances, they are 
unable to exercise their normal capacities and to bring a legally responsible (voluntary) 
consent to the specific transaction. 30 For example, even though one cannot say that a 
poor person does not have the cognitive ability to enter into a contract, still his destitution 
makes him susceptible to abuse. Similarly, even though one cannot say that a married 
woman cannot contract for herself, still under some circumstances her husband's undue 
influence deprives her of that chance. These people fail the opportunity condition of the 
responsibility principle, rather than the capacity condition. 
So, the circumstances of inequality of bargaining power of the doctrine of 
unconscionability are coterminous with the Opportunity Condition of the Responsibility 
Principle. 31 Absence of the opportunity condition means that the contracting party does 
not exercise voluntary consent, so one of the basic pre-conditions of the bargaining 
process under the liberal notion of classical contract law is absent. If he/she does not 
consent, then he/she cannot be bound by his/her involuntary promise; he/she cannot be 
29 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362,405, the list was given by Fullagar J; also, the High Court of 
Australia approved of this list in Commercial Bank ofAustralia Ltd v Amadio (1983)151 C. L. R. 447,459 
((per Gibbs CJ), 462 (per Mason J. ), 474-5 (per Deane J. ), 489 (per Dawson J. ); see 4.3.1. 
3° Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362, per Fullagar J.: "lack of assistance or explanation where 
assistance or explanation is necessary as a potentially qualifying disabling condition gives rise to the 
possibility, on analytical grounds alone, of courts extending equity's protective jurisdiction beyond the so- 
called `socially' inept or unable to those who might be termed transactionally disadvantaged. " 
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held `responsible'. It will be recalled from the discussion in section 7.2.1.4 above that 
responsibility is created only when the conditions of consent are satisfied. 
So, the first element of unconscionability, namely inequality of bargaining power, is 
reconciled with notions of consent and voluntariness of the classical contract law. 
However, care must be taken when referring to impaired consent and contractual 
responsibility. It is not the mere presence of impaired consent or inequality of bargaining 
power which work as a responsibility-relieving concept or a vitiating factor of the 
contact. Something like that as already explained in section 7.2.1.5 would produce many 
undesirable results. For example, sanctity of contract would be endangered, since nearly 
all contracts would be challenged on the ground that they involved inequality of 
bargaining power. This would eventually work on the detriment of weak parties. Also, it 
is virtually impossible for the law to correct all these inequalities; it is easier to look at 
the situations where these are taken advantage of. 32 It is exactly for this reason that 
unconscionability looks at unconscionable conduct. The compatibility of this element of 
unconscionability with classical law is examined below. 
In the vulnerable surety scenario, the inequality of bargaining power between the surety. 
wife and the bank is not attributed to the absence of the capacity condition but to the 
absence of the opportunity condition. In the usual scenarios involving vulnerable surety- 
wives, the wife might be acting under the undue influence and misrepresentations of the 
husband. So, even though she has the necessary capacities to bargain, her special 
vulnerabilities (economic and emotional dependence, undue influence, 
misrepresentations)" deny her the opportunity to exercise her capacities. So, her consent 
cannot be said to be voluntary. In such a case, the law is allowed to intervene, so as to 
help her exercise free and informed consent. 
31 The idea is advanced by Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 
239-246. 
32 Ibid, 120. 
33 See 1.2. 
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7.2.2.2 Unconscionable Conduct 
Although this area of law comes from the protectionist jurisdiction of equity over 
expectant heirs and reversioners, the modern doctrine of unconscionability, as applied in 
Ireland and Commonwealth jurisdictions, has shifted the focus to all cases of 
victimisation, or exploitative conduct by the stronger party. 34 "A contract cannot be set 
aside in equity as `an unconscionable bargain' against a party innocent of actual or 
constructive fraud. Even if the terms of the contract are `unfair' in the sense that they are 
more favourable to one party than the other ('contractual imbalance'), equity will not 
provide relief unless the beneficiary is guilty of unconscionable conduct .,, 
35 The reasons 
for shifting the focus on unconscionable conduct by the stronger party instead just on 
inequality of bargaining power have been explained above. However, the importance of 
unconscionable conduct as such needs further normative justification. 
Unconscionable conduct or victimisation within the doctrine should not be understood as 
material exploitation, which is linked to end-state theories, but as procedural exploitation. 
Exploitation is objectionable in a Kantian fashion, because it involves treating people as 
means to satisfying one's own selfish desires, instead of treating people as ends in 
themselves. 36 This alone is degrading to them as human beings despite and irregardless of 
the final distribution of wealth. The mere instrumental use of people without regard to the 
harmful consequences on them is condemned. The reference though to harmful 
consequences does not refer to material harm but to moral harm. The fact that people who 
might be victimised may also suffer economic or psychological harm has only empirical 
connection to the notion of victimisation. 37 Of course, it may be argued that material 
3a Unconscionability applies "whenever the parties meet under such circumstances as... to give the stronger 
party a dominion over the weaker", in Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873) L. R. 8; Ch. App. 484, per Lord 
Selbom L. C., 491; see also Birks, P. and Chin, N. Y, "On the Nature of Undue Influence" in Beatson, J; 
Friedman, D. (eds. ); Good Faith and Contract Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
35Boustany v Pigott (1993) 69 P. & C. R. 298,303, per Lord Templeman. 
36Kant, I.; Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is Enlightenment? (1785). Trans. Lewis 
White Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969,52-53,64. A point that merits attention is that Kant's 
theory prohibits use of people as means only. Use of people under conditions of social interdependence is 
acceptable and desirable. So, there is a distinction between permissible and impermissible uses of people. If 
a person voluntarily agrees to be used as means by another for his own reasons then that is acceptable. 
After all, respect of individuals requires respect of their voluntary choices. 
37 See Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,158-162. 
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harm to one's property is also proof of disrespect to them. Respecting human beings 
means respecting their rights, liberties and also their property. So, by inflicting damage to 
their property is condemned because it involves moral harm to the person. 38 
In addition, unconscionable conduct is rejected under the liberal conception of contract, 
since the strong party is abusing his relative power over the weaker party in such a way 
that he does not allow her to exercise her own rights. This is not only degrading to other's 
autonomy or moral interests. " "Such exploitation [ ... 
] involves an improper or irregular 
use of contracting-power. It consists in D consciously using either the institution of 
contract, or a particular contracting encounter, in ways or for purposes contrary to the 
underlying ethos, assumptions, intentions, or true purposes of contracting itself "40 
In the context of suretyship agreements, if the bank proceeds without taking into 
consideration the special vulnerability of vulnerable sureties, then the bank is failing treat 
these sureties as ends in themselves and in the same time it is abusing the institution of 
contract. 
7.2.2.3 Manifest Disadvantage 
Manifest disadvantage is a frequent element of unconscionability. However, care is 
needed when reference is made to it. A contract cannot be set aside merely on the 
grounds of injustice or harshness within the terms of the contract. It will be recalled from 
the discussion above in section 7.2.1.2 that the liberal contract law theory places attention 
on `procedural' unfairness (unfairness in the bargaining processes) over `substantive' 
unfairness (unfairness in the bargaining outcomes). 41 This is because autonomous moral 
agents are free, in a liberal democracy, to bargain both well and badly. 42 So, from a 
38Ibid, 205-206. 
39 Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,171. 
401bid, 172. 
41 See Chen-Wishart, M.; Unconscionable Bargains. Wellington: Butterworths, 1989: chapter 6, arguing 
for the primacy of substantive concerns over procedural ones. 
42 Brusewitz v Brown [1923] 42 N. Z. L. R. 1106,1109, per Sir John Salmond: "The law in general leaves 
every man at liberty to ... dispose of 
his own property as he chooses [however] improvident, unreasonable 
or unjust... such dispositions may be. " . 
I 
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normative perspective, they should not generally have the right to complain for their own 
foolish but still free decisions, neither should the courts be required to protect people 
from their own stupidity. 43 
This conception is inherent within the doctrine of unconscionability. 44 As stated in 
Rogers v Yourshaw, 4S "courts cannot relieve... the consequences of a contract merely 
because it was unwise or rewrite a contract simply because the contract may appear to 
reach an unfair result" or as noted in Hamm-Smith '46 
"a court should not set aside a 
settlement agreement merely because one party has second thoughts. " 
In order to illustrate the point more, it is important to clarify that manifest disadvantage, 
although it is invariably present in unconscionability cases, is not a necessary 
requirement 47 Instead, it is a useful evidential tool helping to raise the presumption of 
unconscionability. 48 Courts adopt the language of substantive justice only in cases where 
"Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 2 All E. R. 205,210; Alec 
Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 1 W. L. R. 87,94; Familiar Pty Ltd v Samarkos 
(1994) 115 F. L. R. 443,456. 
44 Comment 1 to the principal unconscionability provision in the Uniform Commercial Code (§2-302): 
"The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of 
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. "; also, some cases illustrate that the courts refuse 
to apply the doctrine of unconscionability so as to save people from their foolishness; in Cooper v Lynn 
Financial Services Inc 65 S. W. 3d 197 (2002) the creditor, which provided financing for lease of laser 
equipment to a surgeon, brought action for breach of contract resulting from non-payment of leasing 
charge. The surgeon counterclaimed and brought actions against supplier for deceptive trade practices. The 
Court of Appeals of Texas had to decide whether the leasing agreement was unconscionable. Cooper 
contended that he never received the reverse side of the contract and therefore had no reason to believe a 
reverse side existed. He admitted, however, that he saw the original on the day he signed the contract. In 
the absence of fraud, the Court stated that it is presumed a person knows the contents of a document he has 
signed and has an obligation to protect himself by reading a document before signing it. 
45 18 VaApp. 816,823,448 S. E. 2d 884,888 (1994); also followed in Peley v Peery 25 Va. App. 239, 
245,487 S. E. 2d 281,284 (1997) 
46 261 111. App. 3d, 214,198 I11. Dec. 763,633 NE. 2d225. see 4.3 & 6.3.2. ii. 
47 See 4.3.3; Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362,405, per Fullagar J.; also Tate v Williamson (1866) L. R. 
2 Ch. App. 55,66; Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447,475, per Deane J.; 
Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee [1992] 2 N. Z. L. R. 157,174, per Richardson J.: "While any apparent 
unfairness of the bargain is a factor for consideration it is not the touchstone; ACCC v CG Berbatis 
Holdings Plc Ltd (2003) 197 A. L. R. 197, para. 96, per Kirby J.: "To seek to answer the question whether 
the bargain was unconscionable first, and only then reflect upon the conduct of the stronger party in 
procuring the assent of the weaker one, is to invert the proper approach to analysis in such cases. The 
quality of the bargain (or the adequacy of the consideration) has never been either a necessary or a 
sufficient element for establishing unconscionable dealing. " 
48 Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362 is as a good example of a court using the one-sidedness of the 
bargaining outcome to draw inferences about the quality of the plaintiffs consent to the transaction. 
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there is no other direct evidence of the plaintiff being in apposition of special 
disadvantage, or of the defendant taking unfair advantage of that fact. 49 So, the 
significance of manifest disadvantage is not normative or justificatory, but only 
evidentiary and empirical. The evidentiary role of unconscionability is illustrated by the 
incorporation of the `balance theory'S0 or the `sliding scales', whereby no fixed quantum 
of manifest disadvantage needs to be present. Under this approach, "courts require a 
certain quantum of procedural plus a certain quantum of substantive unconscionability to 
tip the scales in favour of unconscionability, " s' whereby, the more substantively 
oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is 
required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa. 
In suretyship agreements, the fact that the surety is risking her home for a transaction 
which is not in her interests, like the surety in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v 
Burch, 52 is not in itself the reason to intervene. But the presence of manifest disadvantage 
raises the presumption that the agreement is unconscionable. 
7.2.2.4 Independent Legal Advice 
The final element of unconscionability is the requirement imposed on the stronger party 
to take some positive measures towards the weaker party, in order to save an otherwise 
unconscionable transaction. This is normally satisfied when the defendant advises the 
weaker party to receive independent legal advice. This requirement though is not to be 
equated with imposing Good Samaritanism, altruisms or beneficience. Something like 
49 In Nichols vJessup [1986] 1 N. Z. L. R. 237, the New Zealand Court of Appeal suggested that the stronger 
party ought to have realized the imbalance of the arrangement-the unequal outcome was a sufficient basis 
for imputing to him knowledge of the transactional incapacity. 
so The theory is so named after Levin and McDowell's study: Levin, J.; McDowell, B., "The Balance 
Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice in Voluntary Obligations" (1983) 29 McGill LJ 24. There it is argued 
that once minimal threshold levels of voluntariness and fairness are met, in determining whether or not to 
enforce a contract the elements of voluntariness and fairness may be balanced against each other, so that a 
reater degree of one element permits a lesser degree of the other. 
F 
eater 
E Coursey and Michael B Coursey v Caterpillar 64 F. 3d 662, (1995) W492923 (6th Cir. Mich); 
Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co 350 F. 2d 445,18 A. L. R. 3d 1297 (D. C. Cir) (1965); Matter of 
State of New York vAvco Fin Serv 50 N. Y. 2d 383,429 N. Y. S 181,406 N. E. 2d, 1075 (1980); Jones v Star 
Credit Corp 59 Misc. 2d 189,298 N. Y. S. 2d 264 (1969); Gillman v Chase Manhatta Bank 73 N. Y. 1,537 
N. Y. S. 2d 787,534 N. E. 2d 824; Donovan vPRL Corporation 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807 (2001). 
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that would be contrary to liberal notions of contract. Instead, the requirement should be 
explained in terms of neighbourhood responsibilities, which are easily justified within the 
liberal contractual tradition. 
As Goodin explains, vulnerability creates moral and legal responsibilities, provided that 
these vulnerabilities are known to the stronger parties. 53 These responsibilities create a 
duty to protect the vulnerable. This involves both positive (action) and negative duties 
(forbearance from action). So, failure to give explanations to the weak party constitutes 
breach of neighbourhood responsibility. But this responsibility is distinguished from 
moral duties of altruism or beneficience. This is illustrated through Goodin's example 
with the blind man. 54 He argues that letting a blind man walk into traffic involves 'a mere 
failure to discharge'" the duty to protect the vulnerable but no judgment of exploitation 
can follow from this. However, if one says to the blind man `Give me $5 or I will not tell 
you where the traffic is' (and the blind man accedes), this constitutes exploitation. So, 
even though the defendant may not have an altruistic duty to help the plaintiff, since he is 
not responsible for his unfortunate situation, when however he takes advantage of that 
vulnerability that constitutes exploitation. 
So, according to Bigwood, neighbourhood responsibilities do not impose Good 
Samaritanism on the parties but they do not tolerate unbridled selfishness either. 
`Neighbourhood' mediates between the two extremes. It allows people to contract freely, 
pursue their own self-interest, but with due respect of the like freedoms of others. 56 So, 
even though neighbourhood responsibilities do impose positive duties in some cases, this 
does not intend to enforce general altruism in contract. The real reason for imposing 
52 [1997] 1 All E. R. 144. 
33 Goodin, R. E.; Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities. Chicago, London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985,118,139,206. 
sa In Reeve, A. (ed. ); Modern Theories ofExploitation. London: Sage Publications, 1987,196-7. 
ss Ibid, 187. 
56 Bigwood argues: "The recognition of this idea of neighbourhood, moreover, underscores the 
exaggeration in the Critical Legal Studies that liberal contract law is plagued by a contradiction between 
our commitment to individualism and self-reliance, on the one hand, and our commitment to altruism and 
sharing on the other. Liberal contract's enforcement of standards of fair dealing reveals that there is a 
compromise or reconciliation between these values rather than a contradiction. " Bigwood, Rick; 
Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003,213. 
255 
positive duties in such cases is to enable the strong party to pursue fairly his own self- 
interest, by not abusing the process of contract law and by not interfering with the right of 
the weak party to pursue his/her own self-interest. So, such responsibilities to take 
positive duties in unconscionability cases are justified within the liberal contractual 
theories. 
In suretyship agreements, positive duties such as disclosure of information and making 
sure that the surety receives independent legal advice are needed, in order to help the 
surety understand complicated legal documents and the risk involved. The bank must 
carry out these neighbourhood duties, so as to pursue its own interests, but with due 
respect of the like freedoms of weak sureties. 
7.2.3 Classical Liberal Contract Law and Unconscionabilitv - Conclusion 
This section tried to show that the doctrine of unconscionability is justified in the 
classical liberal contract law, so that English courts may safely apply it to suretyship 
agreements, without fear that it will distort the principle of freedom of contract. Even 
though the doctrine is wide, capable of capturing within its ambit many situations of 
victimisation, still it does not allow blunt intervention every time there is inequality of 
bargaining power. There must be absence of consent, which is of vital importance to 
liberal theories. Also, the involuntariness of the weak contracting party must be linked to 
the unconscionable conduct of the stronger party. So, unconscionability arises only when 
there is abuse of inequality of bargaining power in such a way that the plaintiff cannot 
exercise his/her rights as a free moral agent. The requirement of unconscionable conduct 
justifies imposition of liability on the stronger party not on a vague "public policy but 
specifically [on] the victimization of one party by the other. 07 It has been argued that 
unconscionable conduct of any kind (either active or passive) is condemned because it 
involves treating people as means rather that as ends in themselves. Affording people 
with the respect they need as human beings and free autonomous individuals requires that 
57 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] A. C. 686,705, per Lord Scarman this was said in 
relation to the doctrine of undue influence but it may be used here as well. 
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we do not act unconscionably towards them. The duties may be both positive and 
negative. Such a duty is the requirement to disclosure information and provide advice to 
weak contractors, so as give them the opportunity to use their contracting abilities and 
exercise their right of freedom of contract. Explained in this way, the positive duties 
imposed by the doctrine of unconscionability advance the principle of freedom of 
contract. Finally, it has been explained that manifest disadvantage of the doctrine of 
unconscionability is not a necessary element but a forensic tool, which helps to raise the 
presumption of unconscionability. Unconscionability, being a liberal contract law 
doctrine, is only concerned with procedural justice and not with substantive justice. These 
points help to show that unconscionability fits very well with liberal contract law 
theories. 
73 Welfarism and Unconscionability 
This section looks at the concept of welfarism, which shares many common 
characteristics with unconscionability, their basic commodity being the desire to help the 
weak. However, since welfarism is treated as contrary to liberal contract theories, it 
would be an omission not to discuss it. 
7.3.1 Welfarism and Unconscionability - PromotinLy Competition 
The discussion above revealed that unconscionability has the following characteristics: 
"(a) a negative concept of freedom... supplemented by a 
positive conception (in which the State - or, failing that, the law 
of contract - engages in a support operation in order to protect 
below-the-line contractors); (b) a conception of equality in 
which formal equality is maintained wherever possible but 
subject to a safety-net proviso for those who are below the line; 
and (c) a conception of justice involving strands of both deserts 
and needs, needs being employed to establish minimally fair 
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competitive conditions and to protect serious casualties, but 
desert ruling otherwise, "" 
These are essentially the basic characteristics of welfarism, the main purpose of which is 
the protection of the weak. 59 However, welfarism is commonly treated as being contrary 
to liberal (or laissez-faire) contract and market theories. This is a misconception. It is 
submitted that, even though a welfarist state is committed to equity and allows 
intervention in order to protect the weak, it can also be relevant to self-sufficiency and 
competition, despite the opposing extreme laissez-faire belief. This stance is supported 
below. 
The adherence of welfarism and unconscionability to protect the weak captures the 
essence of Churchill's vision when he said: "We want to draw a line below which we will 
not allow persons to live and labour, yet above which they may compete with all the 
strength of their manhood. We want to have free competition upwards; we decline to 
allow free competition to run downwards. s60 Translating these words, contract law 
requires "that contractors should be at least minimally equipped for the competition; and 
[... ] that during the course of the competition contractors should be protected against 
outcomes which threaten to push them below the plimsoll line of civilised living. "61 This 
is the same rationale explained under the neighbourhood principle above. Protection of 
the weak, should not necessarily be translated in a materialistic way but protection of 
their right to contract freely. 
Even Adam Smith, if examined more carefully, was not against welfarism. He starts from 
the principle that one's freedom of any kind should not be interfered with by others. 
Building on this, as regards economic life, he was very keen on a liberal plan of buying 
58 From Brownsword, Roger, Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in Contract Law. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,30. 
59 As Wilhelmsson put it, the idea of welfarism is the protection of the weak. Brownsword, Roger, Howells, 
Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in Contract Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,5; in a 
welfarist state: "the primary objective of a governmental policy is or is claimed to be the improvement of 
the economic welfare of the whole population or for some segment of that population. " 
60 Brownsword, Roger, Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in Contract Law. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,30. 
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and selling free from any kind of limitation and oppressions such as governmental 
intervention. 2 This standpoint is reflected in what one would call free market economy. 
Due to these principles, after his death he was viewed as a purely conservative economist 
who was against intervention. This characterization though is a misnomer. His principles 
of laissez-faire were always circumscribed by considerations of justice and equity. When 
Adam Smith spoke of freedom, he included in it the freedom from poverty. He talked of 
inequality as a form of oppression, and of low wages as a form of inequity. He accepted 
governmental intervention when this would benefit the poor. So, his true economic 
sentiments were really of a welfarist nature. He proposed government intervention to 
oblige employers to pay their employees in money and not in kind (when prices were 
falling), he supported progressive taxation on rents to the effect that "the rich should 
contribute to the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something 
more than in that proportion. "63 More than that, he approved of limitations on the 
freedom of corn trade in cases of necessity. These kinds of intervention were viewed as 
necessary in order to elevate the standard of living of the poor and to slowly help them 
participate on equal terms in the free market system. 64 This means that welfarist 
intervention (like unconscionability) is not necessarily contrary to freedom of contract 
and trade. In fact this conclusion is supported with empirical examples below. 
61 Ibid. 
62 In his book Wealth of Nations he described free commerce in corn as the 'best palliative' of dearth, the 
'best preventative' of dearth and the 'best thing that can be done'. Governmental intervention in the supply 
of corn would prevent the establishment of commerce and would result in scarcity. These "arguments have 
been interpreted ever since as a simple prescription that commerce is good and government bad. " 
Rothschild, Emma.; Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment. Cambridge; 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001,72. In reality though, this is not at all what Smith asserted. 
In fact he suggested intricate policies of government intervention. 
63 Smith, Adam, 1723-1790; The Wealth of Nations: Books I-III (with an introduction by Andrew 
Skinner) Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979,157-158, 
64 Smith was not the only laissez-faire thinker to acknowledge the need of welfarism. Bentham saw state 
intervention as a necessary evil but one, which could be accepted if it was the only way to achieve greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of people. John Stuart Mill said: "Letting alone should be the general 
practice, every departure from it unless required by some great good is a certain evil. " Finally, Spencer and 
Marshall were ready to stress the limits of laissez-faire and to underline the benefits of state regulation on 
public health, housing and education. Peden, G. C.; British Economy and Social Policy: Lloyd George to 
Margaret Thatcher. Second ed. New York: Philip Alan, 1991,3. 
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7.3.2 Welfarism and Unconscionability - Historic Illustration of Welfarist State 
This section shows very shortly the existence of welfarist-interventionist society. The 
effort is to prove that welfarism is not inimical to the free market economy but even 
necessary to it. Hundreds of years of co-existence can demonstrate their interrelationship. 
History shows that welfarist "state activity has grown over the years from small scale to 
large; from permissive to mandatory; and from piecemeal to complex and interrelated. %s61 
The Poor Law Act 1601 was the first most important movement; the 1904-16 period 
represented a substantial departure from laissez-faire capitalism towards welfarist 
capitalism; and the post-war legislation of the 1944-8 period set the foundations of the 
welfare state as we know it today. In times when the evolution of the welfare state was 
progressing slowly, that can be attributed to external and unfortunate factors such as the 
1931 economic crisis and the oil shock of 1973. All things counted, one is right to say 
that successive governments over a course of over 400 years have been trying through 
welfarist laws to defeat social inequality and market instability by securing an educated 
and healthy workforce. This proves that libertarians' and laissez-faire thinkers' rejection 
of welfarism does not accord with the needs of society. Also, it is important to note that 
welfarist legislation was widely introduced even during the Victorian and Thatcher eras 
when the pendulum swung towards the orthodox politico-economic ideology of laissez- 
faire. So, welfarism has always been present even at times when laissez-faire ideologies 
were flourishing. This means that despite the welfarist nature of unconscionability, this is 
not necessarily contrary to a capitalist system, since the two have always coexisted. 
A possible counter-argument is that most of the welfarist interventionist-measures 
presented above arose in extreme circumstances, during the Black Death, the two World 
Wars and times of illness, hunger and national exhaustion. Since these situations are now 
in the past, arguably welfarism and intervention in general should be left in peace having 
no place today. On the contrary, welfarist legislation and intervention in general instead 
of becoming weaker over time have become stronger. Today, it is part of our 
65 Barr, Nicholas, A.; The Economics of the Welfare State. Fourth ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004,15. 
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community's idea of a welfarist state, that the state offers socialised education and health 
care, gives benefits to children, single parents, and protects the weak with proactive 
measures, for instance, the Consumer Ombudsman. There is also a wider twentieth 
century trend (1945 and onwards to the 21" century), namely consumerism, which is 
associated with the development of the consumer society. The term is self-explanatory; it 
aims at the protection of consumers. Part of the rationale for such protection is that 
consumer contractors characteristically deal from a weaker bargaining position than their 
commercial counterparts 66 In fact, the analysis of the doctrine of unconscionability as 
applied in the USA showed that courts distinguish between commercial and consumer 
contracts. The consumerist tendency strengthens the argument from the existence of an 
interventionist-protectionist society. So, a turn towards unconscionability can be justified 
within this consumerist context67 
' Certainly, this assumption is commonly borne out in practice. Some consumer contractors might be quite 
exceptionally well informed or otherwise able to negotiate a favourable deal. As Brownsword observes, 
"many landmark cases involve plaintiffs who are conspicuously not below-the-line contractors - to be 
blunt, below-the-line contractors cannot afford to take cruises (Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 Q. B. 158), nor do 
they run expensive cars or wear mink stoles (Morns v CWMartin and Sons Ltd [1966] 1 Q. B. 716), and 
nor do they send Persian carpets to the cleaners (Levison v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co Ltd [1978] 
Q. B. 69). " Brownsword, Roger, Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in Contract 
Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994,39-40. So, consumer welfarsm is in favour of regulation in contracts, 
even in relation to commercial contracts, which are viewed as competitive transactions. Nevertheless, the 
purpose here is not to assess every type of welfarist legislation. 
7 Apart from the wider welfarist society, the proposition is further supported by specific examples from 
common law and statute. According to Brownsword, Howells and Wilhelmsson in Brownsword, Roger, 
Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in Contract Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994, 
welfarsm is one of the salient features of the modem law of contract. The argument here is that even 
though welfare considerations are not systematically present within the law, yet it is not alien to the modem 
law of contract. Judges and legislatures have in many cases reached welfarist outcomes. Brownsword 
argues, "It is not as though there is some independently identified philosophy with which modem doctrinal 
developments in contract law are seen as being consistent. ", 25. Various doctrines exist, "which have been 
assembled under the rubric of 'welfarism' and in this weak sense `reflect' welfarist values. ", 25-6. 
However, Collins went as far as to argue that lawmakers, aware of a particular welfarist philosophy, have 
self-consciously tried to bring it to bear on contract law. Also, Brownsword argues that contracts are now 
tightly controlled through the growth of a collection of doctrinal phenomena like the doctrine of economic 
duress, improved remedies for misrepresentation, the use of the collateral contract device, together with 
statutory control over standard form contracts, requirements for disclosure, and the like. The welfarist 
function of contract law may also be observed in situations where it imposes a duty of disclosure. For 
example, professional providers of financial services and standard form dealers in general may be required 
to ensure that the terms of the contract have been fully understood; and suppliers of goods may need to 
disclose known defects in their goods. Such a duty is imposed by the law of contract to ensure that 
competition-promoting information be disclosed. Parliamentary legislation, the Unfair Contact Terms Act 
1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, being the strongest examples, place 
control over exemption and limitation clauses and the Consumer Credit Act 1974 regulates extortionate 
credit bargains. 
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In addition, protection of the weak is also related to what economists call `social peace' 
or economic and social coherence. 68 Under this idea, it is better, for society and the 
market, not to have great inequalities among people and the sexes. A practical example is 
related to minimum wages that increase in some cases, so as to reduce social inequality 
and achieve social peace. So, unconscionability may be justified in this context since it 
tries to extinguish background inequalities in bargaining power, enabling in this way 
people to contract freely, so as to maximize their own efficiency and in effect general 
efficiency. 
73.3 Welfarism and Unconscionability - Conclusion 
It has been argued that even though unconscionability may be viewed as a welfarist 
doctrine, since it tries to protect the weak, this is not necessarily contrary to free market 
system. Helping the weak may be explained in terms of the free market system. When 
weak people are given the chance to contract, then they will participate into the market, 
so as to increase their own welfare, but in the same time they will advance competition 
and efficiency. In fact, various empirical examples were presented, whereby both 
welfarist and liberal legislation existed in the same time. So, unconscionability, despite 
its welfarist nature, is not an interventionist doctrine but actually it can contribute to 
economic efficiency. This is illustrated immediately below with reference to specific 
microeconomic tests. 
7.4 Paretian Economics and Unconscionability 
This section tries to show that unconscionability, despite its welfarist or equitable nature, 
is attuned to principles of free market system and it also boosts economic efficiency. 69 
This is because, as it will be explained below, unconscionability comes into play only in 
6s Fox, Roland, "Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Community: Some Preliminary Results" 
University of Salford, 1993; Osberg, Lars (ed. ); The Economic Implications of Social Cohesion. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003. 
69 See Duggan, Anthony, J., "Economics: Is Equity Efficient? " 113 (1997) LQR 601, it is argued there that 
modem equity doctrines are more easily explained in efficiency terms rather than by reference to altruism. 
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situations of market failure, where intervention is allowed even by economists. By 
treating market failures, economic efficiency is also increased. 
7.4.1 Paretian Economics 
To begin with, Paretian economics, 70 incorporated here, starts from the stance that free 
market economies left to their own devices will produce the most efficient results. This 
idea was first advanced by Adam Smith with his theory of the 'invisible hand'71 back in 
1776 and has been supported by economists over the last 200 years, and since the 
collapse of East European planned economies, forms the basis for most of the world's 
economic systems. The wide acceptance of the related theories is taken as enough of a 
justification of its own for their adoption in this thesis. 72 
Coming back to the underlying principle, economists argue that the market alone will 
evolve into the ideal economic system where perfect competition exists and thus 
everybody including consumers will be benefited. So, the market itself is seen as an 
organization that can lead to economic efficiency. This contention of perfect competition 
is based on five fundamental assumptions as follows: 
1) Individualism. The model assumes that social welfare is equated with the 
aggregate of all individual welfare. So, welfarism, in economic terms, is 
explained on an individualistic level covering all members of society. In other 
words, increase of general welfare can exist if the welfare of one person only is 
advanced'3 
70 Pareto efficiency is named after the 19th century economist Vilfredo Pareto. 
71 Grampp, William, D., "What did Smith Mean by the Invisible Hand? " (2000) 108 Journal of Political 
Economy 441. 
72 For an attack on law and economics and neoclassical economic theory see Fineman, Martha, Albertson; 
Dougherty, Terence (eds. ); Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus. London: Cornell University Press, 
2005. 
73 This can be represented as W=w l +w2+w3... ws. W stands for social welfare and w 1, w2, w3... ws stand 
for the individual welfare of the members of the society. Alternatively, since social welfare is explained in 
the terms of utility, it can be represented as W=W (U1, U2, U3... Us). W represents social welfare and U1, 
U2, U3 ... Us represent the utility of 
individuals; Kaplaw, Louis; Shavell, Steven, "The Conflict between 
Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle" (1996) 1 Am Econ Rev 63,66. 
263 
2) Utility-maximizing behaviour. This is the fundamental tenet of the theory of 
`revealed preferences'. By this theory, economists treat the actual behaviour of 
consumers as faithfully reflecting preferences, and they consider preferences 
shown to be an extension of consumer behaviour. 74 Under the theory, individuals 
are assumed to be perfectly rational, selfish creatures that cynically manipulate 
their environment and choose courses of action in such ways as to maximise their 
personal gains and utility, given their tastes, market opportunities and 
circumstances. This person is the homo economicus, a man who acts in ways that 
have a degree of mutual consistency. 75 
3) Information. This is considered very important and the absence of it can lead to 
mistakes; individuals are assumed to have the information needed and the 
information assessment capacity to make utility-maximizing choices. 
4) Absence of externalities. The theory is based on the assumption that externalities 
(such as bargaining costs, legal costs, research costs) are minimal. 76 If, however, 
these external costs are present, the best allocation of resources can by achieved 
through the bargaining of the parties who are assumed to be acting rationally. 
5) Competitive markets. The efficiency of the market system depends on the 
existence of competition. 
77 
However, these five elements are mere assumptions. To take one example, the Pareto 
theory assumes that perfect competition exists; but if one looks around, it becomes 
obvious that monopolies and dominant firms surround us. So, state intervention is 
justified here, which comes in the form of competition law and other forms of regulation, 
so as to regulate these monopolies and assure the existence of healthy competition, or at 
least minimise abuse of dominance. So, in real life the assumptions are not present. 
74 On choices see Bruni, Luigino; Viledo Pareto and the Birth of Modern Microeconomics. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002,124, 
" On the theory of homo economicus see Danner, Peter L; The Economic Person: Acting and Analysing. 
Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002; Machan, Tibor, R; Capitalism and Individualism. 
London: Cybereditions Corp., 2002. 
76 On costs see Gravelle, Hugh; Rees, Ray; Microeconomics. Third edition, Harlow: FT/Prentice Hall, 
2004,111; Casson, Mark; The Economics of Business Culture: Game Theory, Transaction Costs, and 
Economic Performance. Second ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
77 On competitive markets see Gravelle, Hugh; Rees, Ray, Microeconomics. Third edition, Harlow: 
FT/Prentice Hall, 2004,170. 
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Economists recognise this and this is what they call market failure. 78 When market failure 
occurs intervention is allowed and the state comes in with regulation to correct it or with 
taxation to eliminate inequalities of distribution of income. So, even though Paretian 
economics' central ideology is that the market should be left free without intervention, 
there are situations where such intervention is deemed necessary. 
Therefore, since Pareto supporters can accept intervention as well, if unconscionability is 
to pass the test of economists, it needs to be justified on the basis of market failure. 
7.4.2 Unconscionability under the Microscope of the Five Paretian Assumptions 
The task in this section is to examine whether market failure exists in the situations where 
unconscionability arises. Similarly, Trebilock79 tried to fashion some economically 
defensive criteria of unconscionability based on what he called structurally and 
informationally impaired markets. He argued that intervention with the doctrine of 
unconscionability is allowed, so as to prevent the enforcement of transactions in such 
markets. He explained that structurally impaired markets can arise in two modes; first, 
there might be, what he called, on the spot or situational imbalance, where one party has 
abnormal market power in respect to the other party but not necessarily in respect of 
other parties in the same market; secondly, there is the case of market-wide monopolies 
where one contracting party is the victim of the abnormal market power of the other on 
an all-encompassing and persistent basis throughout the market. 80 His propositions are 
examined along with the other Pareto assumptions below with reference to case law and 
the vulnerable surety phenomenon. It will be shown that unconscionability comes to play 
only in situations of market failure. Also, the vulnerable surety-wife phenomenon 
involves various types of market failures and hence intervention is desirable. 
78 On market failures see ibid, 314; Pindyck, Robert, S.; Rubinfield, Daniel, L.; Microeconomics. Pearson 
Higher Education Prentice Hall, 2004, chapter 3. 
79 Reiter, Barry, J.; Swan John, (eds. ); Studies in Contract Law. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980, study 11. 
80Ibid, 392. 
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7.4.2.1 Utility-Maaimizin2 Behaviour and Situational Monopolies 
The assumption of utility-maximizing behaviour, which is the fundamental tenet of the 
theory of `revealed preferences', is examined first. By this theory, economists treat the 
actual behaviour of consumers as faithfully reflecting preferences, and they consider 
preferences shown to be an extension of consumer behaviour. Yet, the theory is basically 
circular; it argues that, since people are rationally self-interested, what they do shows 
what they value and their willingness to pay for what they value as the ultimate proof of 
their rational self-interest. However, a market economy that starts with an unjust 
distribution of economic resources will yield an unjust distribution of goods and services. 
Applying this realisation to cases of victimised sureties, the conclusion is that, because of 
the unequal distribution of economic resources, of information and knowledge and 
independence among the bank and victimised sureties, any trade between them will be 
unjust and inefficient. So, the revealed preferences of sureties do not necessarily 
represent their true preferences. To explain, the Paretian theory assumes the consumer as 
being a homo economicus. However, if we take the examples of Mrs. Pitt, Mrs. Aboody 
and Miss Burch (the list can go on), it is unquestionable that they were very far from 
selfishly manipulating their environment to their best interest and allocating their 
resources in the most efficient way. Chapter 1 explained that the reasons under which 
vulnerable sureties enter into suretyship agreements relates to their absence of decision 
making in the family business, undue influence, duress, misrepresentations by their 
husband and the desire to help their husband fulfil his dreams. 81 Vulnerable sureties like 
them prove that the story of homo economicus, at least in the cases under examination, is 
a myth. An economist would agree that if a person is pushed in doing something under 
the compulsion of another then that is not efficient. Pure efficiency would say, and equity 
would agree, that compulsion then is so bad that it must be eliminated. This argument is 
given some more analytical and methodological explanation below. 
81 See 1.2. 
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For example, abuse of inequality of bargaining power is condemned because it deprives a 
person of the opportunity to use their abilities. 82 In such cases, even though people posses 
the normal mental capacities required in the bargaining process, still they are deprived of 
the opportunity to use them, since their will is overborne by the compulsion of another. 
The opportunity condition is missing. The courts in Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Company, 83 Campbell, " and Henningsen8S (the list could go on) stated: 
"unconscionability has generally been identified to comprise an absence of meaningful 
choice on the part of one of "the parties together with contractual terms which are 
unreasonably one-sided" or overly harsh. " 86 
Trebilock paralleled the person who imposes pressure or who takes advantage of the 
weakness or needs of another with a monopolist. Such scenarios create "on the spot 
situational imbalance or monopoly". In economic terms, persons under duress do not 
have the opportunity to choose what is in their best interest, so as to distribute their 
resources in the most efficient way. Trebilock explains "the relevant test in the so-called 
duress cases [and abuse of superiority in bargaining power cases] is whether the conduct 
of the party against whom the doctrine is pleaded was such as to remove from, or to take 
advantage of the absence of, effective access by the other party to a workably competitive 
range of alternative choices. "" He explains this with two scenarios, which are worth 
mentioning. "In the salvage cases, what may be objectionable about the terms exacted by 
a tug owner from the owner or the captain of a sinking ship is that the latter faces no 
realistic alternative suppliers of the demanded service. Similarly, in cases where one 
contracting party threatens to suspend performance unless the other party agrees to a 
variation in the contract. Here, again, the latter may face a form of situational monopoly 
if the nature of the contract and the stage of performance is such that he cannot readily 
obtain an alternative supplier to complete the contract. 08 In fact, the `take it or leave it' 
82Ibid, 395. 
83 350 F. 2d 445,121 U. S. App. D. C. 315 (1965). 
84 Campbell Soup Co v Wentz 3 172 F. 2d 80 Cir. (1948). 
85 Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors Inc 32 N. J. 358,161 A. 2d 69, A. L. R. 2d 1(1960), 75,84-96. 
sß Schroeder v Fageol Motors Inc 86 Wash. 2d 256,544 P. 2d 20 (1975), 260. 




USA cases, examined in chapter 4, applied the doctrine of unconscionability exactly in 
this way. In Allen v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 89 the court found that the contracts of 
the only telephone yellow pages company were unconscionable, as the weaker party 
could not bargain for different terms or go anywhere else for the same services. 90 
Unconscionability applies to `catching bargains', meaning whenever the parties `meet 
under such circumstances as... to give the stronger party a dominion over the weaker' 91 
Trebilock explains that in all these scenarios, where no real choice exists, the monopolist 
takes away the entire consumer surplus and this behaviour results in misallocation of 
resources and inefficiency. It follows from this that there are clear economic sentiments 
in not enforcing a transaction where abuse of inequality of bargaining power exists. As 
Trebilock says, "apart from `fairness' considerations, one potential advantage of a 
properly fashioned intervention here is that the social waste (inefficiency) that is often 
generated by [... ] behaviour in [... ] monopoly situations might be reduced. "92 So, 
interference in cases of abuse of inequality of bargaining power is justified, so as to make 
sure that weak individuals are offered a meaningful choice so as to use their resources in 
the most efficient way. 
In the context of suretyship agreements, the on spot monopolist is the creditor who takes 
advantage of vulnerabilities of sureties (i. e. lack of independence, lack of information, 
lack of advice). In such circumstances, the law may interfere and find the contract 
unconscionable. 
7.4.2.2 Information 
Moving along, information is also very important in the utility and efficiency maximising 
process. Information helps in achieving allocatively efficient outcomes, in a Pareto 
'39 171 N. W. 2d 689,692 (Mich. Ct. App. ) (1969). 
9° See also the cases in 4.2.6. 
'Earl ofAylesford vMorris (1873) L. R. 8; Ch. App. 484,491, per Lord Selbom L. C. 
9Z Reiter Barry, J.; Swan John, (eds. ); Studies in Contract Law. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980, study 11,396. 
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optimal sense. 93 Lack of information can lead to mistakes in decision-making and 
inefficiency. In the context of informationally impaired markets, Trebilock examined 
three classes of situations where a party to a contract may have entered into it with 
imperfect information; first, the case where that party lacks a normal capacity for 
processing information; second, the case were one party to a contract possesses material 
information which has not been disclosed to the other party to the contract prior to 
formation; third, the case of standard form contracts containing clauses which have not 
been read, or understood by the parties to such contracts. These are examined below. 
7.4.2.2. i Information - Lack of Normal Information Processin! Capacity 
Trebilock argues that similarly to infants who do not normally possess information 
processing capacity, equally, some adults are likely to be afflicted by the same lack of 
capacity exhibited by infants. He then breaks down the concept of infancy and the 
rationale behind rules formulated to guard infants, so as to arrange it in a line of thought 
that justifies court intervention in cases of unconscionability involving adults 94 
He explains that rules which deny contractual capacity to infants probably reflect a 
concern over vulnerabilities flowing from factors such as: illiteracy, lack of education, 
and experiential factors such as the absence of reasonable acquaintance with market 
bench-marks against which to evaluate proposed contractual offerings. Thus, an inability 
to reason about a proposed contractual offering in a reasonably mature adult fashion, as a 
result of some fairly precisely identifiable physiological disability, or an inability 
resulting from lack of experience to evaluate proposed contractual offerings against 
prevailing market bench-marks, seem to lie at the heart of the current rules on contractual 
incapacity. Thus, it seems reasonable to accept that similar physiological characteristics 
A market outcome is Pareto Optimal when all mutual gains from trade have been exhausted so that all 
resources have moved to their highest value uses and further transactions could not make some parties 
better off without leaving others worse of; Kaplaw, Louis; Shavell, Steven, "The Conflict between Notions 
of Fairness and the Pareto Principle" (1996) 1 Am Econ Rev 63,65. 
"` Reiter, Barry, J.; Swan John, (eds. ); Studies in Contract Law. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980, study 11, 
405. 
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might also impair the ability of some adults to reason about proposed contractual 
offerings. 95 
The doctrine of unconscionability follows precisely this line of thought. There are many 
unconscionability cases in our books where courts invoked the doctrine exactly in this 
context. Indeed, in Marshall v Mercury Finance Co, 96 quoting E&W Building Material 
Co v American Savings & Loan Assn P97 unconscionability was said to be "an 
extraordinary remedy usually reserved for the protection of the unsophisticated and 
uneducated" Also, the doctrine has been applied to cases of "poverty or need of any 
kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of 
education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is 
necessary. "98 
Coming now to the vulnerable surety cases, some sureties (even though they do posses 
normal information capacities) might need professional advice, so as to have a full and 
complete understanding of the transaction. It is not suggested that they do not understand 
what a mortgage is, but the relevant legal complicated documents might need to be 
explained to them. Also, in some cases where the loan is required for a business in 
trouble, accountant advice might also be necessary, so as to understand the risk involved. 
So, market failure might exist in vulnerable surety cases because of the complexity of 
legal documents and difficult financial issues and not because of absence of normal 
information capacity. 
"Ibid. 
96 550 So. 2d 1026,1028 (Ala Civ. App. ) (1989). 
97 648 F. Supp. 289,291 (MD. Ala. ) (1986). 
98In Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362,405 (High Court of Australia), per Fullagar J.; the High Court 
of Australia approved of this list in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447, 
459 (per Gibbs C. J. ), 462 (per Mason J. ), 474-5 (per Deane J. ), 489 (per Dawson J. ); in Floyd E Coursey 
and Michael B Coursey v Caterpillar 64 F. 3d 662, (1995) W492923 (6th Cir. Mich. ), the court stated that 
"under the "procedural" rubric are factors which involve... age, education, intelligence, business acumen 
and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether the terms were explained to 
the weaker party. " In Helena Chemical Co v Wilkins, 18 S. W. 3d 744 (2000), the court found that the seed 
seller took advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, and capacity (in other words the 
inferiority in business expertise) of farmers to a grossly unfair degree so as to amount to unconscionable 
conduct. 
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7.4.2.2. ii Information - Material Non-Disclosure 
The importance of information is stressed above. It is essential, so as to make a wise 
choice and produce the best possible allocation of resources. So, if the parties are acting 
rationally, they will minimize the joint costs of a potential mistake by assigning the risk 
of its occurrence to the party who is the better (cheaper) information gatherer. In the 
event of a unilateral mistake, it is assumed that the mistaken party is in a better position 
than the other to prevent his own error. This is a sensible representation but still if the 
other party knows or reasonably should have known of the mistake, it may be able to 
rectify it more cheaply in the interim between its occurrence and the formation of the 
contract. So, liability rules requiring such disclosure can be justified. However, things are 
not simple in practice. There is often a problem with such a requirement of disclosure of 
information, especially in complex markets. To explain, firms invest resources into 
research to produce information, knowledge and skill, so as to decide whether to invest in 
one market or not. Once they produce this information, then it will be difficult to prevent 
those who do not buy their goods or services, but who nevertheless can gain from such 
information, from using it. This practice increases the costs on consumers who actually 
buy their products. Also, the incentive, to produce and exploit such new information and 
participation in the market, is limited 99 So, before rules that require disclosure are 
imposed, it is necessary to determine where the social optimal position of the supply of 
information lies. 
A further problem relating to disclosure of information was raised in the USA case MA 
Mortenson Company Inc v Timberline Software Corporation and Softworks Data Systems 
Inc. 100 There, Mortenson, the buyer of computer software used in preparing construction 
bids brought action against the sellers, alleging that the software caused it to submit an 
inaccurate bid and was damaged as a result. The buyer argued that the fact that 
" Trebilock explains, "the most important caveat with respect to duty to disclose information is to 
distinguish information which was casually acquired from that which has been deliberately acquired. To 
require disclosure of such information would over time lead to a reduction in the general level and quality 
of information obtaining in such a market and therefore a general reduction in the efficient functioning of 
the market" in Reiter, Barry, J.; Swan John, (eds. ); Studies in Contract Law. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980, 
study 11,411. 
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Timberline knew of the bug but failed to inform him prior to purchase contributed to the 
unconscionability of the license term. The Court of Appeals accepted that disclosure of 
information is important but in the specific case it found no evidence that Timberline was 
aware the bug would lead to an inaccurate bid, being an `obscure' bug and not a `major 
problem'. In addition, the Court of Appeals argued that requiring the provider of software 
to disclose information even for such obscure bugs would increase costs for consumers. 
So, information which is not a public good and disclosure of which does not impose 
additional costs may be disclosed. 
In the context of suretyship agreements, many sureties may be unaware of important 
information regarding the debtor's financial position, which is essential in order to assess 
the risk involved. This might also be the case even if the surety is the debtor's wife. As it 
has already been explained in the introduction of this work, many wives do not get 
involved in the husband's business and in many cases the true facts are not revealed to 
them. 10' This absence of information is a type of market failure. For this reason, it is 
sensible that the creditor be required by law to disclose such information, so as to cure 
the market failure. This is because, clearly, the bank is in a better position to know of the 
mortgagor's financial position rather than the surety. Passing on to the guarantor the 
information it possesses on the debtor does not in any way affect the incentive of the 
bank to produce that information. That kind of information is not a public good that can 
be used by competitors. Indeed, there are Canadian cases where the doctrine was applied 
in this context. In Bank ofBritish Columbia v Wren Development Ltd102 the bank failed to 
reveal to a guarantor in negotiating a renewal of the guarantee that it had released some 
securities of the principal debtor, and was held to have engaged in actionable 
misrepresentation. This was also the case in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v 
Amadio, 103 where the bank did not disclose to the surety parents the debtor's (son's) 
100 93 Wash. App. 819,970 P. 2d 803 (1999). 
101 See 1.2. 
102 (1974) 38 D. L. R. (3d) 759 (B. C. S. C. ). 
103 (1983)151 C. L. R. 447 (HC of Australia). 
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financial position. In the event that this does not occur, the law is justified on an 
economic basis in finding the contract unconscionable. '°4 
7.4.2.3 Adhesion Contracts 
Trebilock observes that courts and commentators alike have incorrectly taken the view 
that standard form contracts are an indication of dominance and that the party who draws 
them has the ability to impose them involuntarily on the other party without the latter 
having the opportunity to read and comprehend them. '°5 However, this is not always the 
case. Some standard from contracts have been settled over the years by negotiation by 
representatives the commercial interest or by consumer bodies. So, is not the case that 
every standard form contract is unconscionable. This was acknowledged by Lord Diplock 
in Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd vMacaula lo6 y. 
104 In England, the House of Lords in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, has 
rightly placed a requirement on the bank to provide the solicitor advising the surety with the financial 
information that he needs for these purposes. However, failure of the bank to provide this information does 
not set the charge aside. The surety must first prove that the debtor exercised undue influence or 
misrepresentation and that the creditor ad notice of this. 
105 Meyerson, Michael, I., "The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real 
World" (1990) 24 Georgia L Rev 583,590 at note 39 argued that standardized terms may be inefficient 
because consumers cannot evaluate the cost of risk; however, Llewellyn, Karl, "Book Review" (1939) 52 
Harv L Rev 700,701 argues that the use of standard contracts is a social good; it is the contracting - process 
component of the mass - transaction, and the mass sales transaction as exceeding economic utility. 
106 In Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 1 W. L. R. 1308,1316 Lord Diplock 
distinguished between two types of standard form contracts: "the first, of very ancient origin, are those 
which set out the terms upon which mercantile transactions of common occurrence are to be carried out 
Examples are bills of lading, charter parties, policies of insurance, contracts of sale in the commodity 
markets. The standard clauses in these contracts have settled over the years by negotiation by 
representatives of the commercial interests involved and have been widely adopted because experience has 
shown that they facilitated the conduct of trade. Contracts of this kind affect not only the actual parties to 
them but also others who may have a commercial interest in the transactions to which they relate, as buyers 
or sellers, chatterers or ship-owners, insurers or bankers. If fairness or reasonableness were relevant to their 
enforceability the fact that they are widely used by parties whose bargaining power is fairly matched would 
raise a strong presumption that the terms are fair and reasonable. The same presumption, however, does not 
apply to the other kind of standard form contract. This is a comparatively modern origin. It is the result of 
the concentration of particular kinds of business in relatively few hands. The ticket cases of the nineteenth 
century provide what are probably the first examples. The terms of this kind of standard form of contract 
have not been the subject of negotiation between the parties to it, or approved by any organisation 
representing the interests of the weaker party. They have been dictated by that party whose bargaining 
power, either exercised alone or in conjunction with others providing similar goods or services, enables him 
to say, "if you want these goods or services at all, these are the terms on which they are obtainable. Take it 
or leave it. " 
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This is also the attitude in the USA regarding adhesion contracts. In Carnival Cruise 
Lines Inc v Shute, '" it was stated that courts will normally look into the reasonableness 
of the terms and factors such as the relative bargaining powers of the parties and all the 
surrounding circumstances at the time the standard form contract was entered. So, in 
Joseph Rosenfeld v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, "' the court held that 
adhesion contracts are never unconscionable per se. Rather, the opinion was that an 
adhesion contract has relevance only with procedural unconscionability, but their 
existence does not lead to a conclusive result of unconscionability. 
Coming now to suretyship, it cannot be said that the presence of standard form contracts 
leads to a conclusion of unconscionability. On the contrary, these standard form contracts 
are useful in that they save time and minimise costs. Also, they have been bargained, on 
behalf of consumers by the Council of Mortgage Lenders much better than most of them 
could have managed. So, really, the mere existence of standard form contracts does not 
necessarily mean the existence of monopoly or even if it did it does not follow that the 
terms themselves are unconscionable. So, it is better if unconscionability is based on 
situational monopolies relating to inequality of bargaining power and on the existence of 
an informationally impaired market. 
7.4.2.4 Costs 
The next assumption under examination is costs. As already noted above, in cases of loss 
due to negligence, private bargaining of the parties is taken to ensure that the best result 
will be achieved. This depends on two requirements. First, there has to be a preliminary 
set of rights and obligations to sketch the approved area of behaviour, and secondly, these 
rights and obligations must be shifted between the parties costlessly. This is the Coase 
theorem, which states that the initial assignment of the rights of individuals does not 
107 499 U. S. 585,111 S. Ct. 1522,113 L. Ed. 2 622 (1991). 
108 108 F. Supp. 2d 156 (2000). 
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matter, provided that such costs are negligible. 109 So, if the gains from eliminating the 
inefficiency are smaller than the bargaining cost required for such a move then the 
inefficiency will be preferred, because it is, paradoxically, more efficient. "° In real life 
though, transaction costs are not zero. Costs are present in most transactions, which can 
have a deterrent role for the formation of meaningful choice. This observation led to the 
realisation that the initial assignment of rights and obligations matters. In other words, it 
may be too expensive for the parties to remove themselves from their initial position 
where there is inefficient assignment of liability. In such cases, law has to reassign 
responsibility in the most equitable and efficient way. This is extended to all examples of 
loss in civil law. 
Therefore, coming to our group of cases, the fees of lawyers or financial advisers might 
discourage some sureties from obtaining independent professional advice in relation to 
the transaction. As result of this, sureties might be in an inferior position in terms of 
information possessed and know how compared to the bank. In other words, the costs 
might not allow some sureties to bargain out of their inferior bargaining power. This is a 
type of market failure. So, it might not be realistic to leave it to the private bargaining of 
the bank and the surety to achieve the most efficient allocation of cost. For this reason, 
the law needs to reconsider their initial responsibilities and assign greater liabilities to 
banks the doctrine of unconscionability, by making sure that they receive independent 
legal advice. Who the cost bearer will be for such advice is examined in the next 
chapter. " 
109 Medema, Steven, G. (ed. ); The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis. Aldershot: Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, 1995, part 4; Frank, Robert H.; Microeconomics and Behavior. Fourth Ed. Boston; London: 
McGraw-Hill Education, 2005, chapter 10. 
"0 The favourite example of the Coase theorem is illustrative. So, a railroad runs across a farmer's land and 
a spark emitted by the trains destroys crops. If negotiation costs are negligible, the parties can then agree 
how often trains are to run, whether spark guards are to be placed and how close the farmer is allowed to 
plant crops. In other words, they can shift responsibility to reach a cost-reducing set of activities or more 
efficient allocation of loss. This is irrespective of the initial liabilities of the parties. If, however, the costs 
become significant then such a shift of responsibility is not preferred. In other words, if the gains from 
eliminating the damage on crops are smaller than the bargain costs required for the change, then the 
damage would be preferred. 
111 See 8.2.3. 
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7.4.2.5 Market Mononolies 
Finally, the fifth assumption of perfect competition, absence of monopoly, is examined in 
the context of the money lending market. 112 The existence of monopolies in any market, 
as a form of market breakdown, requires an appropriate remedial response, so as to 
minimise abuse of dominance. However, the task of determining the existence of 
monopoly is very difficult. Indicatively, the EU Commission takes months to determine 
dominance even with the aid of experts. This shows that it would be mission impossible 
if courts were required to determine such issues themselves. Such an attempt involves 
great risks of mistake and courts should decline from interfering so much. So, a finding 
of unconscionability on such grounds is not advisable. In any event, it is up to the 
regulators to determine such issues. Trebilock notes, 
"in areas where considerations of market forces and conditions 
need to be made where market-wide monopolies and standard 
form contracts are concerned there is always the risk of mistake 
so cautiousness is necessary when applying the doctrine. So, the 
doctrine should not be applied in those cases because it can lead 
to counter-productive results. However, in areas where such 
considerations are not necessary the doctrine can be safely 
applied in redressing transactional inequalities following from 
situational monopolies, impaired ability to process information 
and from some form of material non-disclosure. s113 
In relation to suretyship cases, the problem is not the abuse of market-wide monopolies, 
but on the spot monopoly between the surety and the debtor due to undue influence and 
the inequality of the initial endowments in information and skill between the surety and 
the bank. It is on this basis that unconscionability can be justified. 
l12 On monopoly see Gravelle, Hugh; Rees, Ray; Microeconomics. Third edition, Harlow: FT/Prentice Hall, 
2004,190. 
113 Reiter Barry, J.; Swan John, (eds. ); Studies in Contract Law. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980, study 11. 
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7.4.3 Paretian Economics and Unconscionability - Conclusion 
Taking the analysis of the assumptions in relation to the factual scenarios where 
unconscionability arises, it appears that there are sound economic justifications when the 
doctrine is applied. Even though unconscionability is a wide doctrine capable of 
capturing many situations of victimization, still all these scenarios involve market 
failures, in which case even free market economists accept intervention. Also, it should 
be emphasized that unconscionability is not concerned with the final distribution of 
wealth which results from free bargaining. It is for this reason that manifest disadvantage 
is not a necessary element of the doctrine. Unconscionability only tries to correct market 
failures or to put it differently to change the background inequalities in the initial 
endowments of the parties in terms of bargaining strength. This way it boosts competition 
and enables people to contract as free and self-maximising moral agents - homo 
economicus. 
It was also explained that market failure exists in the specific context of suretyship 
agreements. Vulnerable sureties who act under misunderstandings as to the exact terms of 
the contract, undue influence and all sorts of pressures and the desire to please their 
husband can hardly be described as acting as free self-maximising moral agents. So, 
individualism is not present. Market failure also exists in relation to lack of information 
regarding the terms and seriousness of the transaction and the debtor's financial position. 
Finally, costs required for professional advice, so as to cure the imbalance between the 
surety and the creditor from another type of market failure. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the doctrine of unconscionability from a normative and economic 
point of view. This was necessary in order to make the thesis more complete. Since, the 
doctrine is proposed to be expanded more in this jurisdiction in the context of suretyship 
agreements, it was important to examine its compatibility with liberal contract law and 
market notions. 
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The first part tried to show that the doctrine of unconscionability is justified in classical 
liberal contract law. More specifically it as been argued that, even though the doctrine is 
wide, capable of capturing within its ambit many situations of victimisation, still it does 
not allow blunt intervention every time there is inequality of bargaining power. There 
must be absence of consent, which is very important to liberal theories. Also, the 
involuntariness of the weak contracting party must be linked to the unconscionable 
conduct of the stronger party. So, unconscionability arises only when there is abuse of 
inequality of bargaining power in such a way that the plaintiff cannot exercise his/her 
rights as a free moral agent. The requirement of unconscionable conduct justifies 
imposition of liability on the stronger party not on a vague "public policy but specifically 
[on] the victimization of one party by the other. " 4 In addition, it has been argued that 
unconscionable conduct of any kind (either active or passive) is condemned because it 
involves treating people as means rather that as ends in themselves. Affording people the 
respect they need as human beings and free autonomous individuals requires that we do 
not act unconscionably towards them. The duties may be both positive and negative. 
Such a duty is the requirement to disclosure information and provide advice to weak 
contractors, so as give them the opportunity to use their contracting abilities and exercise 
their right of freedom of contract. Explained in this way, the positive duties imposed by 
the doctrine of unconscionability advance the principle of freedom of contract. Finally, it 
has been explained that manifest disadvantage of the doctrine of unconscionability is not 
a necessary element but a forensic tool, which helps to raise the presumption of 
unconscionability. Unconscionability, being a liberal contract law doctrine, is only 
concerned with procedural justice and not with substantive justice. 
These points help to show that unconscionability fits very well with the liberal contract 
law theories; it does not upset freely negotiated contracts but, on the contrary, it guards 
and boosts the principle of freedom of contract, so that English courts may safely apply it 
to suretyship agreements. After all, the jurisdictions, examined in chapter 4 which have 
expanded the doctrine have the same liberal contract law notions. 
114 National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] A. C. 686,705, per Lord Scarman, this was said in 
relation to the doctrine of undue influence but it may be used here as well. 
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The second part argued that, even though unconscionability may be viewed as a welfarist 
doctrine (since it tries to protect the weak), this is not contrary to the free market system 
and efficiency. This is because both welfarism and liberalism have always existed during 
the same periods supplementing each other. This was illustrated through various 
empirical examples. The basic argument is that by making sure that people do not follow 
below the line of civilised living means that these people will be able to participate and 
offer into the market. This is related to what economists call `social peace' or economic 
and social coherence. With this, it is believed that for society in general and the market it 
is better not to have great inequalities among people and the sexes. So, unconscionability 
may be justified in this context. 
The third part discussed uncdnscionability within the free market system. It was argued 
that unconscionability is justified from an economic efficiency point of view, since it 
comes into play only in order to cure situations of market failure. Such market failures 
include absence of independence, information, understanding of the particular transaction 
and so on. Unconscionability in such cases imposes duties on the strong parties to cure 
the imbalance. This involves disclosure of information and making sure that the 
transaction is fully understood by the stronger party. It is emphasized that 
unconscionability is not concerned with the allocation of the wealth of the parties which 
results from their free bargain, but with the allocation of their initial endowments (in 
terms of information, advice, bargaining power). As a result of this reallocation of the 
initial endowments of the parties, the result of the bargain will by more efficient, because 
each party will be enabled to act as homo economicus. So, unconscionability is not an 
interventionist doctrine but one which promotes competition and economic efficiency. 
Along this analysis, it was explained why unconscionability is justified in relation to 
vulnerable surety scenarios. It was argued that unconscionability corrects many forms of 
market failures that may arise in these situations, like absence of information about the 
debtor's financial position, absence of independence, absence of advice regarding the 
transaction and costs for such advice. By imposing positive duties on banks to disclose 
information and to advise the surety to receive independent professional advice, 
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unconscionability tries to correct these market failures or abuse of inequality of 
bargaining power. It helps vulnerable sureties to pursue their own self-interests as free 
and autonomous moral agents. 
It is believed that with these arguments English courts will be convinced to apply the 
doctrine of unconscionability in the context of suretyship agreements, since it is in line 
with liberal contract and market theories that they espouse. 
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Chapter 8 
Economic Assessment of the Doctrine of 
Unconscionability in the Context of 
Suretyship Agreements 
Aim: Assess whether it is desirable from an economic efficiency point of view to apply 
the doctrine of unconscionability in the context of suretyship agreements 
Method: Apply microeconomics 
Conclusion: The application of unconscionability in the context of suretyship agreements 
leads to a better allocation of resources rather than the status quo 
8.1 Introduction 
This thesis argues that unconscionability should replace the O Brien formula, in the 
context of suretyship agreements, since it has more practical advantages. This chapter 
carries out an economic assessment of the proposal, so as to determine whether the 
proposal is economically efficient. Despite the attractions of applying the doctrine for the 
protection of vulnerable sureties, if its incorporation produces more costs than benefits, 
then it will not be efficient to introduce it; any change should be brought only if its gain 
exceeds the harm to which it gives rise to. The relevant test here, before going on in 
bringing any new law, is whether the pattern of activity under this new law lies closer to 
the pattern of activity which would be associated with an efficient allocation of resources. 
On this point, Posner' is convinced that it may be possible to deduce the basic formal 
characteristics of law itself from economic theory. Consequently, he argues, the ultimate 
question for decision in many lawsuits is, what allocation of resources would maximise 
1 Posner, Richard, A.; EconomicAnalysis ofLaw. Fourth ed. Boston; London: Little, Brown & Co., 1992. 
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efficiency. Based on this standpoint, I introduce microeconomic theories as analytical 
tools in assessing my legal proposals, so as to determine if there are any hidden costs, 
which may need to be removed in some way and whether it is efficient to introduce 
unconscionability in the context of suretyship agreements. 
8.2 Banks' and Sureties' Reaction to the Doctrine of Unconscionability 
8.2.1 Banks' Reaction to the Doctrine of Unconscionability 
Chapter 5 explained that the doctrine of unconscionability should be preferred over the 
O'Brien formula, since it affords more protection to vulnerable sureties. This is because it 
is a wide doctrine and as a result it can capture many situations of victimization within its 
ambit (chapter 6). Also, it as been explained that the burden of proof on sureties becomes 
easier, compared to the O'Brien formula, since the tests sureties need to satisfy in order 
to raise the presumption of unconscionability against the bank are simpler. However, a 
protectionist doctrine might be interpreted as tipping the scales in favour of sureties on 
the expense of banks. If banks fear that they might easily loose their security and as a 
result be imposed with costs, then naturally they will react with protective measures, 
which in the end of the day might be detrimental to people seeking loans. 
To explain, banks price their loan products based on the level of the risk assumed; higher 
risk therefore means higher pricing of loans. Given this, if securities (mortgages and 
charges over the family home) become ineffective, the risk on loans secured by 
mortgages and charges over the family home becomes higher and so the price of such 
loans increases. This means that banks will either be pushed to increase interest rates, so 
as to cover their costs and compensate their potential losses from securities they cannot 
liquidate; or/and ask for additional security and more guarantors, which in many cases 
people may not be able to provide. It is a generally acceptable stance by economists that 
imposing more costs on any firm, not just banks, "implies a higher rate of return will be 
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demanded by firms, which in turn will be reflected in higher prices for buyers in such 
markets. 9,2 
In addition to this risk, if security is not secured and banks no longer see an interest in 
giving out loans to couples, then they will have fewer or no incentives to give out loans 
and as a result more people will be cut-off from these bank facilities. This fear was 
expressed by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in O'Brien' as the reason behind the courts' 
reluctance to confer special protection to wives in suretyship transactions. He stressed 
that it is "essential that a law designed to protect the vulnerable does not render the 
matrimonial home unacceptable as security to financial institutions" so that "wealth tied 
up in the matrimonial home does not become economically sterile. s4 If great costs are 
imposed on banks then there will be reduced profits and as a result they will find it no 
longer rational to continue giving out loans. The implications of this are explained further 
below. 
The fears described above are not mere assumptions but pragmatic conclusions borne out 
of experience. To illustrate, in the 1990s overly paternalistic bankruptcy laws were 
introduced in the USA, whereby more exemptions were provided to consumers. This 
resulted in more costs upon banks and consequently it led to a rise in mortgage rates and 
greater risk of being denied a mortgage. So, this protective legislation eventually worked 
to the detriment of consumers. ' Empirical investigation into this subject in the USA 
found that various legal protections (including down payments and mortgage insurance), 
provided to the lender in bankruptcy, made it unlikely that the homestead exemptions 
s Reiter, Barry, J.; Swan John, (eds. ); Studies in Contract Law. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980, study 11,391. 
On this point, economists argue that the cost pressures should be neither exaggerated nor understated, since 
either kind of deviation will militate against resources being used in the most valuable possible way. The 
argument applies well in the case of employers deciding how elaborate should the precautions be to 
safeguard workers. 'Excess' provision of safety precautions would mean higher product price, less 
production and fewer workers taken on. Equally, inadequate precautions will mean that very high costs are 
being imposed on workers who suffer more accidents; costs, which are not justified in terms of the savings 
to consumers or the higher level of unemployment. So, a balancing approach needs to be followed 
everywhere. 
3 Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180. 
4Ibid, 189. 
' Berkowitz, Jeremy; Hynes, Richard, "Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Market for Mortgage Loans" 
(1999) XLII JLaw & Econ 809. 
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could adversely affect the mortgage credit market, 6 contrary to unsecured transactions. 
So, in the absence of security, the availability of credit facilities is reduced. Bearing this 
in mind it is important to avoid similar results when adopting unconscionability in the 
UK and ensure that the institution of security does not lose its importance. The lesson of 
economics and the experience in the USA here is that excessive blunt intervention, which 
imposes great costs, may eliminate incentives to supply a product or service. There will 
be reduced profits and more risks for banks, so they will find it no longer rational to 
continue the facilitation of the specific service to a group of less well off people. 
On top of this microeconomic arguments, things become even more complicated since, as 
from 1°t of January 2008, banks will have to comply with the Capital Requirements 
Directive, 7 which aims to bring into force the new Capital Accord of the Basel 
Committee8 (Basel 2). 9 Basel 2 sets stricter rules than the previous accord (Basel 1) in 
regards to the capital requirements of banks. To explain, under the Internal Methodology 
Approach (IMA) of Basel 2, banks estimate the risk of different categories of loans and 
based on this they assess the capital requirements for each category of loans. If security 
loses its importance, then the risk for such loans will be higher and as a result the capital 
requirements of such loans will be higher (or to put it differently, the capital reserve that 
banks need to maintain constantly in relation to such loans will be higher). As a result of 
this, banks' income generating capacity and their prosperity will be reduced. Also, they 
will be pushed to give less loans, which is to the detriment of small family companies 
seeking loans. According to Lord Nicholls in Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridgelo: 
"[b]ank finance is in fact by far the most important source of external capital for small 
businesses with fewer than ten employees. These businesses comprise about 95% of all 
6lbid. 
7 Proposal (14.07.04) for European Parliament and Council Directives Re-casting European Parliament and 
Council Directive 2000/12/EC and Council Directive 93/6/EEC (Capital Requirements Directive). 
$ About the Basel Committee see http: //www. bis. org/bcbs/mdex. htm. 
On Basel 2 see Basel Committee Publication `Basel II: International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework" (2005) http: //www. bis. org/publ/bcbs118. htm; 
Basel Committee Publication, "Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks" (2005) 
http: /Avww. bis. org/publ/bcbsl19. htm; Alford, Duncan, "International Financial System Risks: A Current 
Assessment" (2005) 20 JIBLR 40; Donohue, Jennifer; Hoye, Peter, "Life Business Monetisation - Raising 
Capital for Life Assurers" (2005) 20 JIBLR 20 301; Valianti, Demetra, "New Capital Accord (Basel 2)" 
(2005) Economicos Fileleftheros, http: /Avww. phileleftheros. com/mainhnain. asp? gid=393&id=351073. 
10 (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, para. 34. 
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businesses in the country, responsible for nearly one-third of all employment. Finance 
raised by second mortgages on the principal's home is a significant source of capital for 
the start-up of small businesses. " So, giving less loans also means that there will be less 
loanable funds coming into the market and this will slow down growth in the economy. 
8.2.2 Sureties' Reaction to the Doctrine of Unconscionability - Moral Hazard 
In addition, an overly paternalistic doctrine of unconscionability is also likely to reduce 
sureties' standard of care when they enter into suretyship transactions. If a surety or a 
donor or any contracting party for that matter feels that they can easily get out of their 
contractual responsibilities, then they will demonstrate no care when entering into 
transactions. This is what economists call moral hazard, which is basically a post- 
contractual deviation from rational behaviour. " This is based on the common assumption 
that when people insure their property they tend to be more negligent Their economic 
incentives to be careful are minimised. A very recent empirical example has to do with 
no-fault automobile insurance in the USA. Empirical research showed that no-fault 
insurance resulted in people being less cautious and consequently in more fatal accidents 
occurring. 12 
Likewise, an overly protectionist doctrine of unconscionability, that allows the setting 
aside of contracts easily, will make people more reckless on the one hand and banks even 
stricter on the other. 
8.2.3 Banks' and Sureties' Reaction to the Doctrine of Unconscionability - Solution 
In order to avoid the undesirable results described above, it is important that banks feel 
confident that they will be able to enforce their security when they need to. This can be 
11 See Mosley, Paul; Aid, Conditionality and Moral Hazard. University of Reading, Department of 
Economics, 1996. 
12 Cummins, David, J.; Phillips, Richard D.; Weiss, Mary A., "The Incentive Effects of No-Fault 
Automobile Insurance" (2001) XLIV J Law & Econ. 
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the additional costs. In the end of the day the debtor will pay. So, it does not make a 
difference if the advice is paid by the debtor or the creditor. 
We now move to the second problem of imposing costs for advising sureties who may 
not need such advice. Unfortunately, this may be an unavoidable cost which will have to 
be imposed for the sake of those who need protection. However, it is submitted that the 
gain of requiring all surety-wives to receive independent legal advice exceeds the loss 
since the harm from losing a home is much bigger than paying for legal advice. Also, 
having in mind the avoidance of many other types of social, psychological, health, 
administrative, financial, political, organisational costs, which were presented in chapter 
2, it appears that having to pay for a solicitor sometimes even if it is not needed is indeed 
a small cost having in mind the benefit. 
Having resolved the issue of who the cost bearer should be, it is now possible to set some 
simple steps for banks to follow before accepting a wife as a surety. 16 
1. Every time a wife approaches the bank as a prospective surety, the bank should be 
alert. 
2. The bank should insist that the wife receives independent legal advice and ask for 
confirmation from the solicitor that she was independently advised. 
3. The bank should disclose to the solicitor, who will advise the wife, all the relevant 
information, which will enable him to furnish proper advice. 
4. A standard tick list could be set, which could be used by solicitors and then 
returned to the bank, so that the bank will know that advice was complete. 
5. Unless the bank receives such a confirmation it should not accept the specific 
surety. 
6. In cases where the loan is required for a new business enterprise the wife should 
also consult a financial/business advisor. 
When the bank complies with the above requirements it has nothing to fear. With these 
steps it discharges the neighbouring responsibilities it owes to the vulnerable surety and 
16 The steps given by the House of Lords, in Royal Bank ofScotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 
773, are useful and should still be used, see 3.2.3. 
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may safely rely on its security. Then with the provision of advice the wife will be given 
the opportunity to exercise her self-maximizing choice as a free moral agent. Whether she 
chooses to do so, is a question that does not concern the doctrine of unconscionability. 
Being a liberal doctrine it does not save people from their own poor choices. So, the 
moral hazard does not pose any problem either. 
8.3 Measuring the Overall Efficiency of the Doctrine 
The doctrine of unconscionability, when applied correctly in cases of spot monopolies, 
can increase efficiency. Unconscionability, as already explained in chapter 7 interferes in 
vulnerable surety scenarios because they involve market failures. The doctrine in such 
cases imposes a duty on the spot monopolist (the bank) to provide information and make 
sure that the surety-wife understands the transaction. This aims to cure the market failure; 
the initial endowments of the parties in terms of information and understanding are more 
equally distributed and hence the results of their bargain will be both more equitable and 
efficient. The surety-wife will be given the opportunity to use her abilities, so as to asses 
her options, calculate the risk involved and reach the decision which is more beneficial to 
her. Of course, this is a general stance and assumes that wives are acting rationally and 
independently, without being affected by external emotional factors. It has been 
emphasised, in the Introduction of this thesis that the problem with suretyship cases is 
lack of independence. A person giving his wallet to a robber under the threat of a gun 
knows very well what he is doing. So, informed consent cannot be equalised with free 
consent. Similarly, when a wife is given all the relevant legal and financial information 
she is not necessarily protected. What follows behind closed doors with her husband 
cannot be controlled. This is a barrier that cannot be crossed by any doctrine. The most 
that the law can do is to provide the wife with all the relevant information and give her 
the chance to act as homo economicus; whether she chooses to do so is a different matter 
and one that cannot be ensured. One should expect though, that some improvement 
should emanate from requiring the wife or any other surety to be informed. 
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Better protection of sureties is not only beneficial to them but also to all the parties 
involved. To explain, the Introduction of this work identified many types of costs 
experienced by borrowers, lenders, insurers, central government, local government, 
housing market institutions, labour market institutions and health services associated with 
mortgage arrears and possessions. By making sure that sureties do not lose their home 
these costs are also avoided. This way of describing efficiency is what economists call 
`measure efficiency'. With this, efficiency is measured on the totality of its effects on all 
the parties involved. So, measure efficiency exists when all the parties are benefited and 
this is considered as the best and most equitable allocation of resources. It involves a 
maximisation of the total surplus when compared to alternative situations. So, comparing 
the status quo with the outcomes that can result from introducing unconscionability, it 
can be argued that unconscionability achieves measure efficiency. To explain, vulnerable 
sureties and their family do not become homeless and they avoid financial, social, 
psychological and health problems. Also, banks have nothing to fear once they take 
reasonable precautions; also they avoid arrears; court charges; expenses for establishing 
and restructuring debt collection facilities; administrative costs for shifting to direct 
payments of ISMI from the government; charges for essential maintenance in post- 
possession; estate agency fees; costs for force sale of mortgaged property; increased level 
of human and capital investment to deal with arrears and possession. In addition, insurers 
providing Mortgage Indemnity Guarantees (MIG) do not have to `pay-out'. Local 
authorities are not imposed with administrative and financial costs, since they will not 
have to provide shelter to people whose home has been possessed by the bank. Central 
governments do not pay ISMI. Finally, future debtors like husbands and wives are not 
denied the possibility of a loan, because banks continue to give loans to couples and thus 
the matrimonial home is not rendered economically sterile. So, unconscionability 
achieves measure efficiency or as a politician would say guarantees a `win-win' case for 
all. 
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Moving further, unconscionability contributes to `social peace' or economic and social 
coherence, a widely accepted objective among politicians and economists. '7 With this, it 
is believed that for society in general and the market it is better not to have great 
inequalities among people and the sexes. So, unconscionability, contributes to `social 
peace' as it improves the position of weak contractors. 
A final point is that the efficiency test is applied here in a Rawlsian way. Rawls has 
attacked Pareto efficiency, which accepts the improvement of the welfare of any member 
of the society, accepting only an improvement of the position of the weak. So, suppose 
that a given policy change makes at least one better off without making anyone worse 
off; this is an increase of Pareto efficiency. Such a change allows the utilitarians to agree, 
as it increases total utility. Rawls on the other hand rejects this Pareto efficiency 
improvement, when it is the welfare of the rich that is increased. He accepts Pareto 
improvement only when it increases the wealth of the poor. 18 Thus an efficient answer in 
the Paretian sense is not always efficient in a Rawlsian sense. Applying this to vulnerable 
sureties cases, even though sureties are not always poor, especially if we consider that 
they have property to secure, they are certainly not as rich as the bank and in terms of 
bargaining power they are very weak indeed. So, unconscionability aiming to protect 
weak sureties is also in compliance with Rawlsian efficiency, at least to the effect that it 
protects people from becoming poor with the loss of their house. This way, persistent 
poverty, which was explained in the Introduction of the thesis, is also limited. 
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter carried out an economic impact assessment of the proposal to apply the 
doctrine of unconscionability in the context of suretyship agreements. The task here was 
twofold. First, is was assessed whether there are any hidden costs in the thesis that need 
17 See generally Formby, J. P.; Bishop, J. A.; Kim, H. Minimum Wages and Poverty: An Evaluation of Policy 
Alternatives. Elsevier Science JAI Press, 2005; Fox, Roland, "Economic and Social Cohesion in the 
European Community: Some Preliminary Results" University of Salford, 1993; Osberg, Lars (ed. ); The 
Economic Implications of Social Cohesion. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003. 
18 See generally, Rawls, John; A Theory of Justice. Cambridge [Mass. ]: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999. 
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to be removed; in relation to this, it was explained that if the institution of security loses 
its importance, then this will reduce banks' incentives to give out loans and will also lead 
to an increase of interests rates for loans. These undesirable results are avoided when 
banks feel that their security is not threatened. In order to reassure the effectiveness of 
their security, banks will have to follow some clear and simple steps. Once they do so, 
they have nothing to fear. The final task was to measure the overall efficiency of 
unconscionability; in relation to this, it was argued that the doctrine is not desirable only 
because it manages to protect vulnerable sureties but also because in doing so it also 
reduces administrative and financial costs on banks, building societies, insurance 
companies, local and central government, while in the same time it does not render the 
matrimonial home economically sterile. All things counted, the conclusion is that the 
doctrine of unconscionability should be adopted in the context of suretyship agreements, 




"Justice which, in one hand, holds the scales, in which she 
weighs the right, carries in the other the sword with which 
she executes it. The sword without the scales is brute force, 
the scales without the sword is the impotence of law. The 
scales and the sword belong together, and the state of the 
law is perfect only where the power with which Justice 
carries the sword is equated by the skill with which she 
holds the scales. s' 
The effort in this work was to find the best possible legal formula to deal with the 
vulnerable surety wife phenomenon. However, the reader was warned at the Introduction 
that this process is not easy since it involves balancing and compromising many interests, 
which are usually believed as being polarizing. For example, it involves balancing the 
interests of sureties with those of creditors, the family interests with market interests, 
practical justice with legal certainty and equity with economic efficiency. Allowing the 
weak to be victimized and families to be left in the streets, in the name of legal and 
market certainty, cannot possibly be tolerated in any civilized system. This would be 
"brute force". On the other hand, saving people from the misfortunes of their own poor 
decisions is not desirable either. This would be the "impotence of the law" and can lead 
to inefficient and counter productive results. A balancing approach needs to be followed 
with due care and by keeping these interests in mind. "The state of the law is perfect only 
where the power with which Justice carries the sword is equated by the skill with which 
she holds the scales. " 
I Jhering, Rudolph von; The Struggle for Law. (translated by Lalor, J. J. ), Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1879. 
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Of course, as already noted, this is not an easy task. The difficulty of reaching the most 
equitable and economically efficient result becomes obvious by the fact that this area of 
law has been going back and forth to the House of Lords but still "like every 
compromise, the outcome always fell short of achieving in full the objectives. " 2 It is 
submitted that the failure of the law to deal with this problem has to do with the wrong 
assumption that the problem is a private one and confined within the specific family. This 
is not correct. The problem is one of general concern with wide social and economic 
implications. Empirical research in the field, which was presented at the Introduction of 
this work, identified different types of costs associated with mortgage arrears and 
possessions and which are suffered by borrowers, lenders, insurers, central government, 
local government, housing market institutions, labour market institutions and health 
services. Also, the fact that this area has attracted much academic, judicial and 
governmental attention proves that the problem is not pathological but epidemic and 
unless it is approached as an issue of general concern the outcome will always fall sort of 
the desired outcome. This thesis tried to convince that unconscionability is the best 
method to deal with the problem. In order to reach this conclusion the various judicial 
techniques used by courts over the years were discussed and then the doctrine of 
unconscionability was presented. 
The historic evolution of the law in chapter 2 verifies the argument that finding the right 
formula is very difficult. Responsibility has been shifted back and forth and the law has 
been time after time returning to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords for running 
repairs. This discussion also revealed that courts have always taken a creditor- 
sympathetic approach in the end out of their desire to protect market interests. 
The "Romily Heresy"3 was first looked at. Under this method the charge could be set 
aside against the creditor if the surety entered into the agreement without full 
understanding of the terms and the implications of the deed. Unfortunately, this method 
2 Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773, per Lord Nicholls, para. 37. 
3 Named after Lord Romily who set the idea in Hoghton vHoghton (1852)15 Beav. 278. 
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was rejected by the House of Lords in O'Brien. 4 A surety's lack of understanding was not 
seen as a sufficient ground for avoiding liability. 
Then the Australian case of Yerkey v Jones5 was looked at. This case treated women as a 
special protected class. The effect of this principle was that security might be 
unenforceable, notwithstanding that the bank had no knowledge of, and was not 
responsible for, the debtor's wrongdoing. Again, this principle was rejected by the House 
of Lords in 0 'Brien. 6 Lord Browne-Wilkinson argued that instead of giving special 
treatment to wives the public interest of making sure that the matrimonial home does not 
become economically sterile carried more weight. However, empirical research revealed 
that even today women are in need of protection, despite the apparent equality of the 
sexes and hence special protection should be afforded to them. 
Then the route of agency by treating the husband as the creditor's agent was examined. 
This was also rejected. This may be justified since it does not seem appropriate to hold an 
individual as an agent of the bank. But of course one cannot deny that if the bank leaves 
everything to the husband, then it is really turning a blind eye to an obvious reality and it 
would be wrong not to hold the bank morally and legally liable for this. But once more 
the courts applied a creditor sympathetic approach and as a result it is very difficult to 
prove agency between the debtor and the creditor. This is because, as Lord Browne- 
Wilkinson said, to apply the law of agency to a situation like this is unrealistic and a 
distortion of the normal rules of agency. 8 
The agency principle in relation to the solicitor acting for the wife was also examined. 
Under this method, if the solicitor realized when advising the wife that she was acting 
under undue influence, this knowledge was imputed to the bank, so that the bank could 
`Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL). 
' (1939) 63 C. L. R. 649,683 "[I]f a married woman's consent to become a surety for her husband's debt is 
procured by the husband and without understanding its effect in essential respects she executes an 
instrument of suretyship which the creditor accepts without dealing directly with her personally, she has a 
prima facie right to have it set aside. " 
[1994] 1 AC 180,195. 
' Ibid, 188. 
81bid, 193-4. 
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not rely on its security. Also, negligent advice given by the solicitor rendered the security 
unenforceable, since the solicitor was acting as the bank's agent. Price9 arguing in favour 
of the agency principle expressed the opinion that, "in reality, the solicitor acts in a dual 
capacity, as agent of the bank to advise the wife and ad hoc as the wife's agent in giving 
the advice. " However, their Lordships in Etridge (No. 2)10 abolished the agency principle. 
Once more, the judiciary preferred the option that secures the interests of banks better. 
Then the inequality of bargaining power doctrine, which Lord Denning M. R. tried to 
formulate in Lloyds Bank v Bundy, " was examined. There Lord Denning M. R. tried to 
formulate a wide doctrine of inequality of bargaining power; this would be capable of 
capturing or grouping many different cases, which were treated under separate doctrines. 
Such a doctrine of inequality of bargaining power would be to the benefit of sureties. 
Banks, when dealing with prospective sureties, would have a duty to ensure that they are 
not taking advantage of the inequality of bargaining power between themselves and the 
sureties. However, this idea did not prosper either. So, it appears that English courts, in 
their desire to protect market interest always preferred creditor sympathetic outcomes. 
Finally, the O'Brien 12 principle was analysed in chapters 2 and 3. The findings of this 
discussion is that the law is still problematic even after Etridge (No. 2), which has 
somewhat improved the position since O'Brien. The position has been improved because 
clear tests and guidelines are set for banks and solicitors to follow. Also, there is a duty 
on banks to disclose information regarding the principal debtor's financial position to the 
professional who will offer advice to the surety. In addition, the bank must not proceed 
unless it has received confirmation from the solicitor that the surety received independent 
legal advice. These are positive steps still though one very significant problem persists. 
A surety needs to succeed in a four-stage test before the charge is set aside against the 
bank. First, a surety wife must establish a prima facie case for relief against the 
9 Price, N. S., "Undue Influence: Finis Litium? " (1998)114 LQR 186,188. 
10 Royal Bank of Scotland Pk v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
11(1975)1 Q. B. 326 (CA). 
12 Barclays BankPk v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (1-IL). 
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wrongdoer-husband (such as undue influence and/or misrepresentation). The second 
stage involves showing that the creditor should be fixed with liability for this wrong, 
either on the basis of agency or actual knowledge (both infrequent in reality), or 
constructive notice on the basis that the creditor was put on inquiry (the most frequent 
argument). Afterwards, as a third stage, a creditor may avoid being fixed with 
constructive notice if it has taken `reasonable steps'. The final stage involves determining 
the extent and type of relief. This four-stage process has proved difficult for sureties to 
complete. This in effect means that even if the bank does not disclose information to the 
solicitor or proceeds without having first obtained a certificate from the solicitor that the 
transaction was explained to the surety, it does not automatically follow that the charge 
will be set aside. The surety needs to prove first that she was acting under the undue 
influence and/or misrepresentation of the debtor and that the creditor had notice of this. 
This indirect four-stage process of setting the charge aside against the creditor reflects the 
judicial perceptions that the vulnerable surety wife problem is a private issue between the 
couple and that the creditor is treated as a victim that has to pay for the `private' conduct 
of the debtor. 
These perceptions inherent within the law are not correct. The creditor cannot be equated 
with the surety. Creditors are professional financial institutions capable of protecting their 
interests, while many surety wives are uninformed (but not necessarily uneducated) and 
susceptible to all types of vulnerabilities. It is difficult to consider the bank as a victim in 
this respect. Instead, the parties were described in this thesis as "The Good, the Bad and 
the Ugly", the good being the surety, the bad being the debtor, and the ugly being the 
creditor. This characterisation of the trilogy suggests that the only innocent party is the 
wife, while the creditor is equally blameworthy with the husband. Both of them take 
advantage of the vulnerability of the surety. Surely, the debtor is in direct contact with his 
wife and in a position to exert many types of influence (varying from active to passive), 
in order to obtain benefit for himself (the security) on her detriment. The creditor, even 
though not usually guilty of undue influence or misrepresentation, may be equally 
responsible and morally liable with the husband, for passively taking advantage of the 
vulnerability (lack of control or knowledge) of the surety-wife in order to obtain a benefit 
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(the security agreement) on the detriment of the surety-wife. Banks gain from these 
transactions and it is not fair if they are left to take advantage of vulnerable sureties in 
these situations. Banks should become accountable for their actions. This will be 
achieved only if liability against them is imposed directly, instead of indirectly with the 
elusive doctrine of notice. However, as the law stands now, the problem is not looked at 
directly. So, a different legal formula or doctrine should be applied which is more capable 
of addressing the problem regarding the vulnerable surety phenomenon. This is the 
doctrine of unconscionability. 
So, the discussion in chapter 4 described the doctrine of unconscionability as applied in 
various jurisdictions like England, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA. 
It was explained that contrary to the rest of the jurisdictions, English law has not moved a 
long way from the initial formulation of the doctrine. Within English law the doctrine is 
applied in a very narrow context and refers to abuse of the poor and ignorant in a Fry v 
Lane13 fashion and it has been applied in some other cases like Cresswell v Potter14 and 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch. 13 On the other hand, in other jurisdictions 
it arises every time there is abuse of inequality of bargaining power, which obviously is a 
wider and more inclusive phenomenon. This flexibility of the doctrine and its equitable 
nature were seen as causing problems to the need for legal certainty. So, the reason for 
the underdevelopment of the doctrine in England is attributed to English court's desire to 
maintain certainty within the law. However, the examination of the doctrine in the rest of 
the jurisdictions showed that clear and operative tests are in place and hence certainty 
within the law is not threatened. The analysis revealed that the circumstances under 
which the doctrine arises and its basic components are well known. These are: relational 
inequality (being more general than inequality of bargaining power, so as to include gifts 
as well)16, manifest disadvantage (or transactional imbalance or substantive injustice), 
abusive or unconscionable conduct (which may be active or passive in the form of 
13 (1888) L. R. 40; Ch. D. 312. 
1 [1978] 1 W. L. R. 255. 
[1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA). 
16 Capper, David, "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation" (1998) 114 LQR 479,480. 
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knowingly accepting an unfair bargaining to the detriment of a weak person) and absence 
of independent legal advice. 
Once the doctrine was explained, the discussion in chapter 5 focused on the advantages 
of unconscionability in comparison to the O'Brien principle in regards to the vulnerable 
surety phenomenon. More precisely, the O'Brien formula with the doctrine of notice 
causes much confusion, because it takes an indirect and long route to set the charge aside 
against the lender. It first sets the charge aside against the debtor and then tries to explain, 
by introducing the principle of notice, that the charge should also be set aside against the 
creditor, even though technically their behaviour is blameless. This approach is quite 
ambiguous and confusing. Instead, the doctrine of unconscionability should be preferred, 
because it looks at the unconscionable conduct of the creditor against the surety. The 
charge is set aside because the creditor knowingly or negligently took advantage of the 
week bargaining position of the surety. Secondly, the concepts of misrepresentation and 
undue influence, which form the first step of the O Brien formula, are under inclusive 
and as a result of this many types of victimisation that arise in practice are not covered. 
On the other hand, unconscionability is a much wider and flexible doctrine capable of 
capturing within its ambit many types of victimisation. The doctrine of unconscionability 
is able to adjust to particular scenarios that might arise and which would not normally be 
covered by traditional inflexible common law doctrines. Thirdly, an added attraction to 
the doctrine of unconscionability is that it carries with it remedial flexibility. Under the 
O'Brien formula, rescission is an `all or nothing process'. This is not to the advantage of 
sureties because courts are faced with the dilemma of an absolute decision; normally, as 
the analysis in chapter 2 showed, the decision leans to the side of the market interest, 
which is that of the creditor. However, with partial rescission, the loss of the bank will be 
less and hence courts will be more ready to set it aside partially. Partial rescission is the 
middle path and should be preferred. Based on this comparison between the two 
approaches, it was suggested that the O Brien formula should be replaced by the doctrine 
of unconscionability. 
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Chapter 6 followed with a discussion on the similarities between undue influence and 
unconscionability. Their common features were identified. These are inequality of 
bargaining power, manifest disadvantage and unconscionable conduct. The difference is 
that unconscionability is wider of the two so that undue influence may and should be 
subsumed under it. Even though, this discussion was not directly relevant to the thesis, 
which deals with the vulnerable surety phenomenon, still it was useful for two reasons. It 
helped to comprehend better the nature of unconscionability, that unconscionability being 
a wide doctrine can capture many types of vulnerability. This conclusion supports the 
argument in chapter 5 that this wide unconscionability doctrine can deal better with the 
problem of sureties who may be subject to all sorts of vulnerabilities. Secondly, as undue 
influence is a similar doctrine to unconscionability it can cause confusion in areas outside 
of the vulnerable surety context because litigants' advisers may be unsure as to which 
doctrine applies. In fact this is what happened in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v 
Burch, 17 where an unconscionability case was treated as an undue influence case, event 
though there was no relationship of trust and confidence between the debtor and the 
surety. So, by proving that undue influence may be subsumed under the wider 
unconscionability doctrine, the law becomes clearer and confusion is avoided. 
Chapter 7 discussed the doctrine of unconscionability from a normative and economic 
point of view. This was necessary in order to make the thesis more complete. The 
reluctance of English courts to apply the doctrine to the extent it has been developed in 
other jurisdictions made it necessary to try and justify the doctrine within the classical 
liberal contract law and market system, which English law espouses. This would help 
convince English courts to apply the doctrine in the context of suretyship agreements. 
The first part tried to show that the doctrine of unconscionability is justified within the 
classical liberal contract law. More specifically it as been argued that, even though the 
doctrine is wide, capable of capturing many situations of victimization (as it was showed 
in chapters 4,5,6), still it does not allow blunt intervention every time there is inequality 
of bargaining power. There must be absence of consent, which is very important to liberal 
"[1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA). 
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theories. Secondly, the involuntariness of the weak contracting party must be linked to 
the unconscionable conduct of the stronger party. The requirement of unconscionable 
conduct justifies imposition of liability on the stronger party not on a vague "public 
policy but specifically [on] the victimization of one party by the other. "" Thirdly, it has 
been argued that unconscionable conduct of any kind (either active or passive) is 
condemned in a Kantian fashion because it involves treating people as means rather that 
as ends in themselves. Respecting people requires that we do not act unconscionably 
towards them. The ensuing duties may be both positive and negative. Such a duty is the 
requirement to disclose information and provide advice to weak contractors, so as give 
them the opportunity to use their contracting abilities and exercise their right of freedom 
of contract. Explained in this way, it means that the positive duties imposed by the 
doctrine of unconscionability advance the principle of freedom of contract. Finally, it was 
explained that manifest disadvantage of the doctrine of unconscionability is not a 
necessary element but a forensic tool, which helps to raise the presumption of 
unconscionability. So, unconscionability, being a liberal contract law doctrine, is only 
concerned with procedural justice and not with substantive justice. This discussion helped 
to prove that unconscionability fits very well within the classical liberal contract law, so 
that English courts should be encouraged to apply it in the context of suretyship 
agreements. 
The second part of chapter 7 explained that despite the equitable or welfarist nature of 
unconscionability, the doctrine is not necessarily contrary to the liberal market system. 
Many examples were presented where welfarism and liberalism existed in the same time. 
The argument is that by helping the weak and vulnerable the chance is given to them to 
contract freely into the market as homo economicus. This is to the interest of the market 
since competition is promoted with more self-maximising individuals. 
This argument was boosted even more in the third part of chapter 7, which explained that 
unconscionability is justified from an economic point of view since it comes into play 
18 National WestminsterBankPlc vMorgan [1985] A. C. 686,705, per Lord Scarman, this was said in 
relation to the doctrine of undue influence. 
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only in situations of market failure, where economists accept intervention. Such market 
failures include absence of independence, information, understanding of the particular 
transaction and alternative choice. Unconscionability prohibits the strong party from 
taking advantage of the weak party in such situations and imposes a positive duty on 
them to disclose information and make sure that the weak party understood the 
transaction. This way the weak party will be given the opportunity to exercise their right 
or freedom of contract so as to promote their interests. Along this analysis reference was 
also made to the vulnerable surety phenomenon. In relation to this many types of market 
failure were identified which justified from an economic efficiency point of view the 
intervention of unconscionability is those circumstances. 
Chapter 8 is linked to chapter 7 in that it carries out a more specific economic assessment 
of the proposal to apply the doctrine of unconscionability within suretyship contracts. 
The task here was twofold. First, is was assessed whether there are any hidden costs in 
the thesis that need to be removed. In relation to this it was explained that if the 
institution of mortgage loses its importance, then this will reduce banks' incentives to 
give out loans and will also lead to an increase of interest rates for loans which are 
secured with a charge over the family home. This means that lending will be difficult for 
small and medium size family companies who do not have any other asset apart from the 
family home to offer as security. In other words, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson feared the 
family home will become economically sterile, which is clearly not to the interest of the 
vulnerable that this thesis is trying to protect. These undesirable results can be avoided 
only when banks feel that their security is not threatened by taking some positive steps. 
Once they do so, they have nothing to fear. The steps given by the House of Lords in 
Etridge (No. 2) are satisfactory. 
The final task in this chapter was to measure the overall efficiency of unconscionability. 
In relation to this it was argued that the doctrine is not desirable only because it manages 
to protect vulnerable sureties but also because in doing so it reduces administrative and 
financial costs on banks, building societies, insurance companies, local and central 
government, while in the same time it does not render the matrimonial home 
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economically sterile. All things counted, the conclusion is that the doctrine of 
unconscionability should be adopted in the context of suretyship agreements, since it can 
achieve more equitable and economically efficient results than the status quo. 
Having analysed (in chapter 2 and 3) the various legal structures used by courts, 
unsuccessfully, over the years in their attempts to deal with the vulnerable surety 
phenomenon and having explained the alternative doctrine of unconscionability from all 
possible perspectives, it is now possible to answer the question posed in the title. The 
doctrine is clear with functional and practical tests (chapter 4), so certainty within the law 
is not threatened. It is also much better than the O'Brien principle in terms of its ability to 
protect against many types of victimization (chapter 5 and 6), its ability to impose direct 
liability against lenders and its remedial flexibility (chapter 5). Also, it is justified within 
the liberal contract law and free market theories, which English law and society espouse 
(chapter 7). Finally, in the more specific context of suretyship agreements it can promote 
economic efficiency (chapter 8). So, all the interests at stake explained at the Introduction 
of this thesis are well balanced. The doctrine manages to balance better than the current 
rules the interests of sureties with those of creditors, the family interests with market 
interests, practical justice with legal certainty and equity with economic efficiency. The 
writer is optimistic that she has managed to break down the barriers and misconceptions 
that obstruct the growth of the doctrine in this jurisdiction in the particular field of 
suretyship agreements, so that one can safely reach the conclusion that All Roads Do 
Lead to Unconscionability after all. 
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Appendix 
Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001 
Commenced: 1 February 2002 
2: Preliminary provisions 
17 New Part 4 inserted 
17 New Part 4 substituted 
The principal Act is amended by repealing sections 11 to 18, and the 
headings before sections 11 and 15, and substituting the following Part: 
"Part 4 
"Division of relationship property 
""Division of relationship property: general 
"11 Division of relationship property 
"(1) On the division of relationship property under this Act, each of the 
spouses or de facto partners is entitled to share equally in--- 
"(a) the family home; and 
"(b) the family chattels; and 
"(c) any other relationship property. 
"(2) This section is subject to the other provisions of this Part. 
"11A Where family home sold 
"(1) If the family home has been sold, each spouse or de facto partner is 
entitled to share equally in the proceeds of the sale as if they were the 
family home, if the following conditions are satisfied: 
"(a) either spouse or de facto partner or both of them have sold the 
family home with the intention of applying all or part of the proceeds of the 
sale towards the acquisition of another home as a family home: 
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"(b) that home has not been acquired: 
"(c) at the date of the application to the Court, not more than 2 years 
have elapsed since the date when those proceeds were received or became 
payable, whichever is the later. 
"(2) This section is subject to sections 12 to 17A. 
"11B Compensation for absence of interest in family home 
"(1) This section applies where- 
"(a) section 11 A does not apply; and 
"(b) either--- 
"(i) there is no family home; or 
"(ii) the family home is not owned by 1 of the spouses or de facto 
partners or both of them. 
"(2) Where this section applies, the Court must award each spouse or 
de facto partner an equal share in such part of the relationship property 
as it thinks just in order to compensate for the absence of an interest in the 
family home. 
"(3) This section is subject to sections 12 to 17A. 
"Homesteads 
12 Homesteads 
"(1) If the family home is a homestead that is owned by either spouse or 
de facto partner or both of them, section 11(1 Xa) does not apply. 
"(2) Instead, each spouse or de facto partner is entitled to share equally 
in a sum of money equal to the equity of either spouse or de facto partner 
or both of them in the homestead. 
"(3) If a spouse or de facto partner does not have a beneficial interest 
in the land on which the homestead is situated, that spouse or de facto 
partner is deemed to be beneficially interested in that land until his or her 
share of that sum is paid or otherwise satisfied. 
"(4) This section is subject to sections 13 to 17A. 
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"12A Valuation of homestead 
For the purposes of section 12, a homestead's value is to be determined by 
ascertaining the capital value of the land on which the homestead is situated, 
and apportioning that value between the homestead and the remainder of that 
land. 
"Exception to equal sharing 
"13 Exception to equal sharing 
"(1) If the Court considers that there are extraordinary circumstances 
that make equal sharing of property or money under section I1 or section 11 A or 
section 11B or section 12 repugnant to justice, the share of each spouse or 
de facto partner in that property or money is to be determined in 
accordance with the contribution of each spouse to the marriage or of each 
de facto partner to the de facto relationship. 
"(2) This section is subject to sections 14 to 17A. 
"Relationships of short duration 
14 Marriages of short duration 
"(1) This section applies if a marriage is a relationship of short 
duration (as defined in section 2E). 
"(2) If this section applies, sections 11(1)(a), 11(1)(b), 11A, 11B, and 
12 do not apply--- 
"(a) to any asset owned wholly or substantially by 1 spouse at the date on 
which the marriage began; or 
"(b) to any asset that has come to 1 spouse, after the date on which the 
marriage began, --- 
11(i) by succession; or 
"(ii) by survivorship; or 
"(iii) as the beneficiary under a trust; or 
"(iv) by gift from a third person; or 
"(c) where the contribution of 1 spouse to the marriage has clearly been 
disproportionately greater than the contribution of the other spouse. 
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"(3) In every case to which subsection (2) applies, --- 
"(a) the share of each spouse in the relationship property is to be 
determined in accordance with the contribution of each spouse to the marriage; 
and 
"(b) the share of each spouse in any other relationship property that 
falls for division under sections 11(1)(a), 11(1)(b), 11A, 11B, and 12, and 
is not determined in accordance with paragraph (a), is to be determined in 
accordance with sections 11(1)(a), 11(1)(b), 11A, 11B, and 12. 
"(4) If this section applies, each spouse is entitled to share equally in 
any relationship property that falls for division under section 11(1)(c), 
unless his or her contribution to the marriage has been clearly greater than 
that of the other spouse. 
"(5) If, under subsection (4), the spouses do not share equally in any 
relationship property, the share of each spouse in that relationship property 
is to be determined in accordance with the contribution of each spouse to the 
marriage. 
"(6) This section is subject to sections 15 to 17A. 
"(7) In proceedings commenced after the death of 1 of the spouses, this 
section is modified by section 85. 
"14A De facto relationships of short duration 
"(1) This section applies if a de facto relationship is a relationship 
of short duration (as defined in section 2E). 
"(2) If this section applies, an order cannot be made under this Act for 
the division of relationship property unless--- 
"(a) the Court is satisfied--- 
"(i) that there is a child of the de facto relationship; or 
"(ii) that the applicant has made a substantial contribution to the 
de facto relationship; and 
"(b) the Court is satisfied that failure to make the order would result in 
serious injustice. 
"(3) If this section applies, and the Court is satisfied that the grounds 
specified in subsection (2) for making an order on an application 
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under this Act are made out, the share of each de facto partner in the 
relationship property is to be determined in accordance with the contribution 
of each de facto partner to the de facto relationship. 
"(4) Nothing in this section prevents a Court from making a declaration or 
an order under section 25(3), even though the de facto partners have lived in 
a de facto relationship for less than 3 years. 
"(5) This section is subject to sections 15 to 17A. 
"Court may make orders to redress economic disparities 
"15 Court may award lump sum payments or order transfer of property 
"(1) This section applies if, on the division of relationship property, 
the Court is satisfied that, after the marriage or de facto relationship ends, 
the income and living standards of I spouse or de facto partner 
(party B) are likely to be significantly higher than the other 
spouse or de facto partner (party A) because of the effects 
of the division of functions within the marriage or de facto relationship 
while the parties were living together. 
"(2) In determining whether or not to make an order under this section, 
the Court may have regard to--- 
"(a) the likely earning capacity of each spouse or de facto partner: 
"(b) the responsibilities of each spouse or de facto partner for the 
ongoing daily care of any minor or dependent children of the marriage or, as 
the case requires, any minor or dependent children of the de facto relationship: 
"(c) any other relevant circumstances. 
"(3) If this section applies, the Court, if it considers it just, may, for 
the purpose of compensating party A, -- 
"(a) order party B to pay party Aa sum of money out of party B's 
relationship property: 
"(b) order party B to transfer to party A any other property out of party 
B's relationship property. 
"(4) This section overrides sections 11 to 14k 
"15A Orders where spouse or de facto partner has contributed to increase in 
value of separate property 
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"(1) This section applies if, on the division of relationship property, 
the Court is satisfied--- 
"(a) that, after the marriage or de facto relationship ends, the income 
and living standards of 1 spouse or de facto partner (party 
B) are likely to be significantly higher than the other spouse or 
de facto partner (party A) because of the effects of the 
division of functions within the marriage or de facto relationship while 
the spouses or de facto partners were living together, and 
"(b) that any increase in the value of party B's separate property was 
attributable, wholly or in part, and whether directly or indirectly, to the 
actions of party B while the spouses or de facto partners were living together. 
"(2) In determining whether or not to make an order under this section, 
the Court may have regard to--- 
"(a) the likely earning capacity of each spouse or de facto partner: 
"(b) the responsibilities of each spouse or de facto partner for the 
ongoing daily care of any minor or dependent children of the marriage or, as 
the case requires, any minor or dependent children of the de facto relationship: 
"(c) any other relevant circumstances. 
"(3) If this section applies, the Court, if it considers it just, may, for 
the purpose of compensating party A for the increase in value of party B's 
separate property, -- 
"(a) order party B to pay party Aa sum of money, whether out of 
relationship property or separate property: 
"(b) order party B to transfer to party A any other property, whether the 
property is relationship property or separate property. 
"(4) This section does not limit section 15, but overrides sections 11 to 
14A. 
"Other provisions relating to division of relationship property 
"16 Adjustment when each spouse or de facto partner owned home at date 
relationship began 
"(1) This section applies it--- 
"(a) at the date the marriage or de facto relationship began, each spouse 
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"(i) the relationship property or any part of that property; or 
"(ii) the separate property of the other spouse or de facto partner or any 
part of that property: 
"(g) the forgoing of a higher standard of living than would otherwise have 
been available: 
"(h) the giving of assistance or support to the other spouse or de facto 
partner (whether or not of a material kind), including the giving of assistance 
or support that-- 
"(i) enables the other spouse or de facto partner to acquire 
qualifications; or 
"(ii) aids the other spouse or de facto partner in the carrying on of his 
or her occupation or business. 
"(2) There is no presumption that a contribution of a monetary nature 
(whether under subsection (1)(c) or otherwise) is of greater value than a 
contribution of a non-monetary nature. 
"18A Effect of misconduct of spouses or de facto partners 
"(1) Except as permitted by subsections (2) and (3), a Court 
may not take any misconduct of a spouse or de facto partner into account 
in proceedings under this Act, whether to diminish or detract from the positive 
contribution of that spouse or de facto partner or otherwise. 
"(2) Subject to subsection (3), the Court may take into account any 
misconduct of a spouse or de facto partner--- 
"(a) in determining the contribution of a spouse to the marriage, or of a 
de facto partner to the de facto relationship; or 
"(b) in determining what order it should make under any of sections 26, 
26A, 27,28,28B, 28C, and 33. 
"(3) For conduct to be taken into account under subsection (2), the 
conduct must have been gross and palpable and must have significantly affected 
the extent or value of the relationship property. 
"18B Compensation for contributions made after separation 
"(1) In this section, relevant period, in relation 
to a marriage or de facto relationship, means the period 
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"(a) increase the share to which party B would otherwise be entitled in 
the relationship property; or 
"(b) order party A to pay party Ba sum of money as compensation. 
"(3) This section overrides sections 11 to 14A- 
"I 7A Diminution of separate property 
"(1) If the separate property of 1 spouse or de facto partner has been 
materially diminished in value by the deliberate action or inaction of the 
other spouse or de facto partner, the Court may, to such extent as it 
thinks just, diminish the share to which the other spouse or de facto 
partner would otherwise be entitled in the relationship property. 
"(2) This section overrides sections 11 to 14A- 
"18 Contributions of spouses or de facto partners 
"(1) For the purposes of this Act, a contribution to the marriage or 
de facto relationship means all or any of the following: 
"(a) the care of--- 
"(i) any child of the marriage or child of the de facto relationship: 
"(ii) any aged or infirm relative or dependant of either spouse or 
de facto partner: 
"(b) the management of the household and the performance of household 
duties: 
"(c) the provision of money, including the earning of income, for the 
purposes of the marriage or de facto relationship: 
"(d) the acquisition or creation of relationship property, including the 
payment of money for those purposes: 
"(e) the payment of money to maintain or increase the value of--- 
"(i) the relationship property or any part of that property; or 
"(ii) the separate property of the other spouse or de facto partner or any 
part of that property: 
"(f) the performance of work or services in respect of--- 
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"(i) the relationship property or any part of that property; or 
"(ii) the separate property of the other spouse or de facto partner or any 
part of that property: 
"(g) the forgoing of a higher standard of living than would otherwise have 
been available: 
"(h) the giving of assistance or support to the other spouse or de facto 
partner (whether or not of a material kind), including the giving of assistance 
or support that--- 
"(i) enables the other spouse or de facto partner to acquire 
qualifications; or 
"(ii) aids the other spouse or de facto partner in the carrying on of his 
or her occupation or business. 
"(2) There is no presumption that a contribution of a monetary nature 
(whether under subsection (1)(c) or otherwise) is of greater value than a 
contribution of a non-monetary nature. 
"18A Effect of misconduct of spouses or de facto partners 
"(1) Except as permitted by subsections (2) and (3), a Court 
may not take any misconduct of a spouse or de facto partner into account 
in proceedings under this Act, whether to diminish or detract from the positive 
contribution of that spouse or de facto partner or otherwise. 
"(2) Subject to subsection (3), the Court may take into account any 
misconduct of a spouse or de facto partner--- 
"(a) in determining the contribution of a spouse to the marriage, or of a 
de facto partner to the de facto relationship; or 
"(b) in determining what order it should make under any of sections 26, 
26A, 27,28,28B, 28C, and 33. 
"(3) For conduct to be taken into account under subsection (2), the 
conduct must have been gross and palpable and must have significantly affected 
the extent or value of the relationship property. 
"18B Compensation for contributions made after separation 
"(1) In this section, relevant period, in relation 
to a marriage or de facto relationship, means the period 
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after the marriage or de facto relationship has ended (other than 
by the death of 1 of the spouses or de facto partners) but 
before the date of the hearing of an application under this Act by the Court of 
first instance. 
"(2) If, during the relevant period, a spouse or de facto partner 
(party A) has done anything that would have been a contribution 
to the marriage or de facto relationship if the marriage or de facto 
relationship had not ended, the Court, if it considers it just, may for the 
purposes of compensating party A--- 
"(a) order the other spouse or de facto partner (party B) 
to pay party Aa sum of money: 
"(b) order party B to transfer to party A any property, whether the 
property is relationship property or separate property. 
"(3) In proceedings commenced after the death of 1 of the spouses or 
de facto partners, this section is modified by section 86. 
"18C Compensation for dissipation of relationship property after separation 
"(1) In this section, relevant period has the same meaning as in 
section 18B. 
"(2) If, during the relevant period, the relationship property has been 
materially diminished in value by the deliberate action or inaction of one 
spouse or de facto partner (party B), the Court may, for the 
purposes of compensating the other spouse or de facto partner (party A), --- 
"(a) order party B to pay party Aa sum of money: 
"(b) order party B to transfer to party A any property, whether the 
property is relationship property or separate property. 
"(3) In proceedings commenced after the death of 1 of the spouses or 
de facto partners, this section is modified by section 86. " 
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Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001 
Commenced: 1 February 2002 
2: Preliminary provisions 
20 New sections 20 to 20F substituted 
20 New sections 20 to 20F substituted 
The principal Act is amended by repealing section 20, and substituting the 
following sections: 
"20 Interpretation 
"(1) In sections 20A to 20E, unless the context otherwise 
requires, --- 
"personal debt means-- 
"(a) a debt that is not a relationship debt: 
"(b) a debt to the extent that it is not a relationship debt 
"relationship debt means a debt that has been incurred, or to the extent that 
it has been incurred, -- 
"(a) by the spouses or de facto partners jointly; or 
"(b) in the course of a common enterprise carried on by the spouses or 
de facto partners, whether alone or together with another person; or 
"(c) for the purpose of acquiring, improving, or maintaining relationship 
property; or 
"(d) for the benefit of both spouses or de facto partners in the course of 
managing the affairs of the household; or 
"(e) for the purpose of bringing up any child of the marriage or, as the 
case requires, any child of the de facto relationship. 
"(2) To avoid any doubt, for a debt to fall within paragraph (c) 
of the definition of relationship debt in subsection (1), it is not necessary 
that, at the time at which the debt was incurred, the property for which it 
was incurred was relationship property, as long as the property later becomes 
relationship property. 
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"20A Rights of creditors preserved 
"(1) Secured and unsecured creditors of a 
spouse or de facto partner have the same rights 
against that spouse or de facto partner, and against property owned by 
the spouse or de facto partner, as if this Act had not been passed. 
"(2) If, had this Act not been passed, any property would have passed to 
the Official Assignee on or following the bankruptcy of a spouse or de facto 
partner, then that property (and no other property) passes to the Official 
Assignee as if this Act had not been passed. 
"(3) This section--- 
"(a) is subject to section 20B; and 
"(b) applies except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act. 
"20B Protected interest in family home 
"(1) Each spouse or de facto partner has a protected 
interest in the family home, which includes, -- 
"(a) where section 11 A applies, the proceeds of sale of the family home: 
"(b) where section 11B applies, the property shared under that section: 
"(c) where section 12 applies, the money shared under that section. 
"(2) The protected interest 
of a spouse or de facto partner is not liable for the unsecured debts of the 
other spouse or de facto partner, other than an unsecured debt incurred--- 
"(a) by the spouses or de facto partners jointly; or 
"(b) by the spouse or de facto partner subsequently declared bankrupt, for 
the purpose of acquiring, improving, or repairing the family home. 
"(3) The value of the protected interest of a spouse or de facto partner 
is as follows: 
"(a) where section 11 applies, the protected interest is to the extent of 
the lesser of--- 
"(i) the specified sum; or 
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"(ii) one half of the equity of the spouses or de facto 
partners in the family home: 
"(b) where section 11 A applies, the protected interest is to the extent of 
the lesser of--- 
"(i) the specified sum; or 
"(ii) one half of the proceeds of the sale of the family home: 
"(c) where section 11B or section 12 applies, the protected interest is to 
the extent of the lesser of-- 
"(i) the specified sum; or 
"(ii) one half of the property or money shared under the applicable 
section. 
"(4) In this section, specified sum means the amount for the time 
being prescribed under section 53A for the purposes of this section. 
"20C Payment of protected interest on bankruptcy of other spouse or de 
facto partner 
"(1) If, on the bankruptcy of a spouse or de facto partner, the family 
home (including a homestead) or, if section lIA applies, the proceeds of the 
sale of the family home pass to the Official Assignee, the Official Assignee 
must pay to the other spouse or de facto partner the lesser of--- 
"(a) the amount of the protected interest of the other spouse or de facto 
partner; or 
"(b) so much of that amount as remains after the Official Assignee has 
paid the debts specified in subsection (2). 
"(2) The debts referred to in subsection (1)(b) are as follows: 
"(a) any debts secured on the family home or homestead or, as the case may 
be, the proceeds of sale of the family home: 
"(b) any unsecured debt incurred- 
"(i) by the spouses or de facto partners jointly; or 
"(ii) by the spouse or de facto partner subsequently declared bankrupt, 
for the purpose of acquiring, improving, or repairing the family home. 
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"(3) If, on the bankruptcy of a spouse or de facto partner, 
section 11B applies, the Official Assignee 
must pay to the other spouse or de facto partner such 
amount in satisfaction of the protected interest of that 
spouse or de facto partner as the Court may direct, on 
application by the Official Assignee or by that 
spouse or de facto partner. 
"20D Calculation of net value of relationship property 
The value of the relationship property that 
may be divided between the spouses or de facto partners under this Act 
must be calculated by--- 
"(a) ascertaining the total value of the relationship property; and then 
"(b) deducting from that total any secured or unsecured relationship debts 
owed by either or both spouses or de facto partners. 
"20E Compensation for satisfaction of personal debts 
"(1) If a secured or unsecured personal debt of 1 spouse or de facto 
partner (party A) has been paid or satisfied (directly or indirectly) 
out of the relationship property, the Court may make 1 of the following 
orders in favour of the other spouse or de facto partner (party B): 
"(a) an order increasing proportionately the share to which party B would 
otherwise be entitled in the relationship property: 
"(b) an order that property that is part of party A's separate property be 
treated as relationship property for the purposes of any division of 
relationship property under this Act: 
"(c) an order that party A pay party Ba sum of money as compensation. 
"(2) The Court may make an order under this section on its own initiative, 
but must make an order under this section if party B applies for such an order. 
"(3) This section applies whether the debt was paid or satisfied 
voluntarily or pursuant to legal process. 
"20F Application of Joint Family Homes Act 1964 
Nothing in sections 20 to 20E derogates from the provisions of the Joint 




Adams, John, N.; Brownsword, Roger, Key Issues in Contract. London: Butterworths, 
1995. 
Adams, John, N.; Brownsword, Roger; Understanding Contact Law. Fourth ed. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004. 
Alchian, Armen, A.; Allen, William, R.; Exchange and Production. Theory in Use. 
California: Wadsworth Publication, 1969. 
Alonzo, I. R.; Current Issues in Banking Law in Missouri. EAU Claire, WI National 
Business Institute, 1992. 
Anderson, M.; Bechhofer, F.; Gershuny, J. (eds. ); The Social and Political Economy 
of the Household. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Anderson, R. A.; Uniform Commercial Code. Rochester, New York Lawyers Co- 
operative Publishing, 1970. 
Andrews, Geraldine Mary; Millett, Richard; Law and Guarantees. Fourth ed. London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2005. 
Atiyah, P. S.; Consideration in Contracts: A Fundamental Restatement. Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1971. 
Atiyah, P. S.; The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1979. 
Atiyah, P. S; Essays on Contract. (Rev. ed. ) Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. 
Atiyah, P. S.; An Introduction to the Law of Contract. Fifth ed. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995. 
Atkin, Bill; Parker, Wendy; Relationship Property in New Zealand. Wellington: 
Butterworths, 2001. 
Atkinson, Anthony, B.; The Economic Consequences of Rolling Back the Welfare 
State. Cambridge; Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1999. 
Aubert, Vilhelm (ed. ); Sociology of Law: Selected Readings. Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1969. 
Bacharach, G. J.; Salvage by the Surety. Chicago: American Bar Association, 1998. 
Barr, Nicholas, A.; The Economics of the Welfare State. Fourth ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
317 
Beale, H. G.; Bishop, W. D.; Funnston M. P. Contract: Cases and Materials. Fourth ed. 
London: Butterworths, 2001. 
Beale, Hugh; Arrowsmith, Sue (ed. ); Chitty on Contracts. 29th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2004. 
Beatson, J.; Friedman, D. (eds. ); Good Faith and Contract Law. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995. 
Beatson, J.; Ansons Law of Contract. 28'x' ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Bellamy, Richard, (ed. ); Liberalism and Recent Legal and Social Philosophy. 
Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1989. 
Bernard, J. The Future of Marriage. First ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, reprint 
1976. 
Bernard, J. The Future ofMarriage. Second ed. New Haven: Yale, 1982. 
Bigwood, Rick; Exploitative Contracts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Binmore, Ken; Game Theory and the Social Contract I: Playing Fair. Cambridge, 
Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1994. 
Binmore, Ken; Game Theory and the Social Contract II. Just Playing. Cambridge, 
Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1998. 
Birks, Peter, (ed. ); Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty First Century. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996. 
Birks, Peter, Rose, Francis; Restitution and Equity. London: Mansfield Press, 2000. 
Blair, William (ed. ); Banks and Remedies. Second ed. London: Lloyd's of London 
Press, 1999. 
Bowles, Roger, A.; Law and the Economy. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982. 
Brownsword, Roger; Howells, Geraint; Wilhelmson, Thomas (eds. ); Welfarism in 
Contract Law. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994. 
Bruni, Luigino; Vilfredo Pareto and the Birth of Modern Microeconomics. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002. 
Burrows, Paul; Veljanovski, Cento, G. (eds. ); The Economic Approach to Law. 
London: Butterworths, 1981. 
Burrows, R.; Pleace, N. Quilgars (eds. ) Homelessness and Social Policy. London: 
Routledge, 1997. 
318 
Campbell, David; Vincent-Jones, Peter (eds. ); Contract and Economic Organisation. 
Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996. 
Carty, Anthony, (ed. ); Post Modern Law: Enlightenment, Revolution and the Death of 
Man. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990. 
Casson, Mark; The Economics of Business Culture: Game Theory, Transaction Costs, 
and Economic Performance. Second ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
Chen-Wishart, Mindy; Unconscionable Bargains. Wellington: Butterworths, 1989. 
Chen-Wishart, Mindy; Contract Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Clark, Robert, W.; Inequality of Bargaining Power: Judicial Intervention in 
Improvident and Unconscionable Bargains. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987. 
Collins, Hugh; The Law of Contract. Third ed. London: Butterworths, 1997. 
Conboy, J. L; Law and Banking Principles. Washington American Bankers 
Association, 1990. 
Cope, M.; Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability. Sydney: The Law Book 
Company Limited, 1985. 
Corbin, Arthur, Linton; Corbin on Contracts. (Rev. ed. by Joseph Perillo, M. ). St. 
Paul, Minneapolis: West Publishing Co., 1993. 
Cranston, Ross.; Principles of Banking Law. Second ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2002. 
Daintith, Terence; Teubner, Gunther (eds); Contract and Organisation: Legal 
Analysis in the Light of Economic and Social Theory. Berlin, New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1986. 
Daintith, Terence, (ed. ); Law as an Instrument of Economic Policy: Comparative and 
Critical Approaches. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988. 
Danner, Peter L; The Economic Person: Acting and Analysing. Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2002. 
Dawson, Norma; Greer, Desmond; Ingram Peter (eds. ); One Hundred and Fifty Years 
of Irish Law. Sweet and Maxwell, 1996. 
Deakin, Simon; Johnston, Angus; Markesinis, Basil (eds. ); Markesinis and Deakin's 
Tort Law. Fifth ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. 
Deutch, Sinai; Unfair Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability. Lexington; 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1977. 
319 
Dieter Bos; Seidl, Christia, (eds. ); Welfare Economics of the Second Best. New York, 
Wien: Springer-Verlag, 1986. 
Edgell, Stephen; Middle Class Couples: A Study of Segregation, Domination and 
Inequality in Marriage. London: Allen & Unwin, 1980. 
Ellinger, E. P.; Lomnicka, Eva; Hooley, Richard (eds. ); Ellinger's Modern Banking 
Law. Fourth ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Farrell, M. J. (ed. ); Readings in Welfare Economics. London: MacMillan, 1973. 
Fehlberg, Belinda; Sexually Transmitted Debt: Surety Experience and English Law. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
Filer, Randall, K; Hamermesh, Daniel, S.; Rees, Albert, E.; The Economics of Work 
and Pay. Sixth ed. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1996. 
Fineman, Martha, Albertson; Dougherty, Terence (eds. ); Feminism Confronts Homo 
Economicus. London: Cornell University Press, 2005. 
Ford, Janet; Burrows, Roger; Nettleton, Sarah; Home Ownership in a Risk Society: A 
Social Analysis ofMortgage Arrears and Possessions. Bri stol: Policy Press, 2001. 
Formby, J. P.; Bishop, J. A.; Kim, H. Minimum Wages and Poverty: An Evaluation of 
Policy Alternatives. Elsevier Science JAI Press, 2005. 
Frank, Robert, H.; Microeconomics and Behavior. Fourth Ed. Boston; London: 
McGraw-Hill Education, 2005. 
Freedman, Michael, D. A.; Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence. Seventh ed. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2001. 
Fried, Charles; An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice. 
Cambridge [Mass. ]: Harvard University Press, 1970. 
Fried, Charles; Contract as a Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation. 
Cambridge [Massachusetts], London: Harvard University Press, 1981. 
Furse, Mark; Competition Law of the EC & UK. Fourth ed. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004. 
Gallagher, Edward, G., (ed. ); The Law of Suretyship. Chicago: American Bar 
Association, 2000. 
Garrow, James; Ellis, Mitchell; Garrow and Gray's Law of Personal Property in New 
Zealand. 5th ed. (by Hamish Ross Gray) Wellington: Butterworths, 1968. 
Goff, Robert, L. A.; Jones, Gareth; Law of Restitution. Sixth ed, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2002. 
I'M 
Goodin, Robert, E.; Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social 
Responsibilities. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
Gordley, James; The Philosophical origins of modern Contract Doctrine. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991. 
Gravelle, Hugh; Rees, Ray; Microeconomics. Third edition, Harlow: FT/Prentice 
Hall, 2004. 
Gray, K. J.; Symes, P. D.; Real Property and Real People Principles of Land Law. 
London: Butterworth, 1990. 
Halliwell, Margaret; Equity and Good Conscience. Second ed. London: Old Bailey 
Press, 2004. 
Halsbury'sLaws of England. London: Butterworths, 2004. 
Halson, Roger; Contract Law. Harlow: Longman, 2001. 
Hapgood, Mark (ed. ); Paget's Law of Banking. 12th ed. London: Butterworths, 2002. 
Harris, Donald; Campbell, David; Halson, Roger; Remedies in Contract and Tort. 
Second ed. London: Butterworths, 2001. 
Hart, H. L. A.; Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. 
Hirsch, Werner, Z.; Law and Economics: An Introductory Analysis. New York, 
London: Academic Press, 1979. 
Hirst, Martin; Mortgages: Contracts Review act and Unconscionability Defences. St. 
Leonards, N. S. W.: College of Law, 2004. 
Jhering, Rudolph von; The Struggle for Law. (translated by Lalor, J. J. ), Chicago: 
Callaghan & Co., 1879. 
Jones, Alison; Sufrin, Brenda; EC Competition Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
Kant, Immanuel; Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and What is 
Enlightenment? (1785). Trans. Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969. 
Kingcome, Turner, Alexander, Sir, Sutton, Richard (eds. ); The Law Relating to: 
Actionable Non Disclosure and other Breaches of Duty on Relations of Confidence, 
Influence and Advantage. London: Butterworths, 1990. 
Korah, Valentine; An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice. 8th 
ed. Oxford: Hart, 2004. 
321 
Kronman, Anthony, T.; Posner Richard, A. (eds. ); The Economics of Contract Law. 
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979. 
Lawson, Frederick H.; Rudden, Bernard; The Law of Property. Third rev ed. (by 
Bernard Rudden) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Little, Ian, M. D.; Ethics, Economics and Politics: Principles of Public Policy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
Machan, Tibor, R.; Capitalism and Individualism. London: Cybereditions Corp., 
2002. 
Maddaugh, Peter, D.; McCamus, John, D. The Law of Restitution. Ontario: Canada 
Law Books Inc, 1990. 
Marshall, Alfred; Principles of Economics. Ninth ed. Bristol: Overstone, 1997. 
Meagher, R. P.; Gummow, W. M. C.; Lehane, J. R. F.; Equity Doctrines and Remedies. 
Third ed. London: Butterworths, 1992. 
Meagher, R. P.; Gummow, W. M. C.; Lehane, J. R. F.; Equity Doctrines and Remedies. 
Fourth ed. London: Butterworths, 2002. 
Medema, Steven, G. (ed. ); The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis. 
Aldershot: Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1995. 
McGhee, John (ed. ); Snell's Equity. 31 " ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2005. 
McKendrick, Ewan; Contract Law: Text, Cases and Materials. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
Mercuro, Nicolas; Medema, Steven, G.; Economics and the Law: from Posner to 
Post Modernism. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
Middleton, Kirsty; Rodger, Barry; MacCulloch, Angus; Cases and Materials on UK 
and EC Competition Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
Miller, C. J.; Harvey, B. W.; Parry, Deborah, L.; Consumer and Trading Law Cases 
and Materials. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Moms, Cohen, R.; Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy. Hamden: 
Archon Books, 1967. 
Mosley, Paul; Aid, Conditionality and Moral Hazard. University of Reading, 
Department of Economics, 1996. 
Murphy, W. T. Roberts, Simon; Flessas, Tatiana; Understanding Property 
Law. Fourth ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003. 
322 
Ogus, Anthony, I.; Regulation and Legal Form and Economic Theory. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994. 
Ogus, Anthony, I.; Amass, Rachel; Research Review on Law and Economics: State of 
the Art and Questions for the Future. London: Lord Chancellor's Department, 1997. 
Osberg, Lars (ed. ); The Economic Implications of Social Cohesion. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2003. 
Pahl, Jan; Money and Marriage. Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1989. 
Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James; Undue Influence and the Family Home. London: 
Cavendish Publishing Ltd., 2002. 
Peart, N. S.; Briggs, Margaret; Henaghan, Mark; Relationship Property: Consolidated 
Legislation and Analysis. Wellington: Brookers, 2001. 
Peden, G. C.; British Economy and Social Policy: Lloyd George to Margaret 
Thatcher. Second ed. New York: Philip Alan, 1991. 
Phillips, John; O'Donovan, James; The Modern Contract of Guarantee English 
Edition. London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 2003. 
Pigou, Arthur, Cecil; The Economics of Welfare. Fourth ed. London: MacMillan & 
Co., 1932. 
Pigou, Arthur, Cecil; Essays in Economics. London: Macmillan, 1952. 
Pindyck, Robert, S.; Rubinfield, Daniel, L.; Microeconomics. Pearson Higher 
Education Prentice Hall, 2004. 
Pollard, Alfred; The Banking Law in the United States. Stoneham: Butterworths, 
1988. 
Poole, Jill; Casebook on Contracts. Seventh ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005. 
Posner, Richard, A.; Economic Analysis of Law. Fourth ed. Boston, London: Little, 
Brown & Co., 1992. 
Posner, Richard, A.; Law and Legal Theory in England and America. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997. 
Rawls, John; A Theory of Justice. Cambridge [Mass. ]: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999. 
Reeve, Andrew (ed. ); Modern Theories of Exploitation. London: Sage Publications, 
1987. 
323 
Reid, Kenneth, G. C.; Gretton, George L.; Conveyancing. Avizandum Publishing Ltd, 
2005. 
Reiter, Barry, J.; Swan John, (eds. ); Studies in Contract Law. Toronto: Butterworth, 
1980. 
Reynolds, F. M. B.; Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency. 17th ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2001. 
Rose, Francis, D. (ed. ); Restitution and Banking Law. Oxford: Mansfield Press, 1998. 
Rothschild, Emma.; Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the 
Enlightenment. Cambridge [Mass. ]: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
Rowley, Charles, K.; Peacock, Alan, T. (eds. ); Welfare Economics: A Liberal 
Restatement. London: Martin Robertson, 1975. 
Scheiber, Harry, N. (ed. ); The State and Freedom of Contract. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1999. 
Scherer, F. M.; Ross, David; Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 
Third ed. Boston [Mass. ]: Houghton Mifflin, 1990. 
Scitovsky, Tibor, Papers on Welfare and Growth. London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1964. 
Scitovsky, Tibor; Human Desire and Economic Satisfaction: Essays on the Frontiers 
of Economics. Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986. 
Scitovsky, Tibor, Economic Theory and Reality: Selected Essays on their Disparities 
and Reconciliation. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995. 
Sichel, Werner; Eckstein, Peter; Basic Economic Concepts: Microeconomics. Second 
ed. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977. 
Smith, Adam, 1723-1790; The Wealth of Nations: Books I-III (with an introduction 
by Andrew Skinner) Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979. 
Spry, I. C. F.; The Principles of Equitable Remedies. Fifth ed. London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1997. 
Stanton, Keith, M.; The Modern Law of Tort. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1994. 
Stone, Richard; The Modern Law of Contract. Fifth ed. London: Cavendish, 2002. 
Symons, Edward, L.; Banking Law: Teachers Manual. St Paul: MN West Pub., 1990. 
Thompson, Mark, P.; Repossession of Property on Mortgage Default. 
Croydon: Tolley, 1993. 
324 
Trebilock, Michael, J.; The Limits of Freedom of Contract. Cambridge 
[Massachusetts]: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
Treitel, G. H; The Law of Contract. 11a' ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003. 
Twining, W.; Miers, D.; How to Do Things with Rules: A Primer of Interpretation. 
Fourth ed. London: Butterworths, 1999. 
Waddams, S. M.; The Law of Contracts. Second ed. Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc. 
1984. 
Wadsley, Joan; Penn, Graham; The Law Relating to Domestic Banking. Second ed. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000. 
White, James, J.; Summers Robert, S.; Uniform Commercial Code. Third ed. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co., 1988. 
Wilson, Gail; Money in the Family. Aldershot: Avebury, 1987. 
Zimmermann, Reinhard; Whittaker, Simon; Good Faith in European Contract Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
325 
Trebilock, Michael, J.; The Limits of Freedom of Contract. Cambridge 
[Massachusetts]: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
Treitel, G. H; The Law of Contract. 11th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003. 
Twining, W.; Miers, D.; How to Do Things with Rules: A Primer of Interpretation. 
Fourth ed. London: Butterworths, 1999. 
Waddams, S. M.; The Law of Contracts. Second ed. Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc. 
1984. 
Wadsley, Joan; Penn, Graham; The Law Relating to Domestic Banking. Second ed. 
London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000. 
White, James, J.; Summers Robert, S.; Uniform Commercial Code. Third ed. St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co., 1988. 
Wilson, Gail; Money in the Family. Aldershot: Avebury, 1987. 
Zimmermann, Reinhard; Whittaker, Simon; Good Faith in European Contract Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
325 
Articles 
Abrey, Julia, "Private law" (2003) 8 ECA 8. 
Abrey, Julia, "Private law (Case Comment)" (2004) 9 ECA 7. 
Adams, John, N.; Brownsword, Roger, "The Unfair Contract Terms Act: A Decade of 
Discretion" (1988) LQR 104. 
Adams, John, N.; Brownsword, Roger, "More in Expectation than Hope: The 
Blackpool Airport Case" (1991) 54 LQR 281. 
Aitken, L., "Wife as Surety: the end of Yerkey v Jones? " (1995) 33 Law Society 
Journal (NSW) 38. 
Alford, Duncan, "International Financial System Risks: A Current Assessment" 
(2005) 20 JIBLR 40. 
Arkins, Jonathan, R. C., " "Ok-So You've Promised, Right? " The negative Pledge 
Clause and the "Security" it Provides" (2000) 15 JIBL 198. 
Arora, Anu, "Round up: Banking Law" (1999) 20 Comp Law 263. 
Arora, Anu, "Round up: Banking Law" (2000) 21 Comp Law 234. 
Atiyah, P. S., "Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations" (1978) 94 LQR 193. 
Auchmuty, Rosemary, "When Equality is not Equity: Homosexual Inclusion in Undue 
Influence Law" (2003) 11 Fem LS 163. 
Ayres, Robert, U., "Production, Consumption, and Externalities" (1969) 59 Am Econ 
Rev 282. 
Bailey-Harris, Rebecca, "Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd v Markou" (1999) Fam Law 
385. 
Bailey-Harris, Rebecca, "Bank of Scotland v Bennetf' (1999) Fam Law 307. 
Bailey-Harris, Rebecca, "Society of Lloyd's v Khan" (1999) Fam Law 92. 
Bailey-Harris, Rebecca, "Property (Case Comment)" (2004) Fam Law 719 
Baker, Chris, "Respect your elders" (2004) 101(39) LSG 28. 
Bamforth, Nicholas, "Unconscionability as a Vitiating Factor" (1995) 4 LMCLQ 538. 
Bamforth, Nicholas, "The Limits of European Union Consumer Contract Lave' (1999) 
24EurLR410. 
326 
Baron, B., "The Free Exercise of Her Will: Women and Emotionally Transmitted 
Debt" (1995) 13 Law in Context 23. 
Beale, H.; Dugdale, A., `Contracts Between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of 
Contractual Remedies' (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45. 
Beatson, J.; Virgo, G. J., "Contract, Unjust Enrichment and Unconscionability" (2002) 
118LQR352. 
Behrens, James, "A Case of Too Many Hats" (2001) 30 Tru & ELJ9. 
Berg, A., "Wives Guarantees - Constrictive Knowledge and Undue influence" 
(1994]) LMCLQ 34 
Berkowitz, Jeremy; Hynes, Richard, `Bankruptcy Exemptions and the Market for 
Mortgage Loans" (1999) XLII JLaw & Econ 809. 
Beutel, "The Proposed Uniform (? ) Commercial Code Should not be Adopted in 
Ohio" (1953) 14 Ohio St LJ 3. 
Bhasin, Sonia, "The Decision in Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No. 2)" (2002) 
IFL Rev 61. 
Bielanska, Caroline, "Public Law: Money Put Into Trust for Grandchildren to be 
Repaid due to Undue Influence" (2003) 8(5) ECA 6. 
Bielanska, Caroline, "The Wisdom Test" (2004) 9(4) ECA 10. 
Bielanska, Caroline, "Void Gift: Undue Influence (Case Comment)" (2004) 9 ECA 8. 
Bigwood, Rick, "Economic Duress by (Threatened) Breach of Contract" (2001) 177 
LQR 376. 
Bigwood, Rick, "Undue Influence in the House of Lords: Principles and Proof' 
(2002) 65 MLR 435. 
Birks, Peter, "Equity in the Modem Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy" (1996) 26 UWA 
Law Rev 1. 
Birks, Peter, "Undue Influence as Wrongful Exploitation" (2004) 120 LQR 34. 
Borne, Gordon, "Law and Morality in the Market Place" (1987) JBL 433. 
Boto, Karen; Pullen, Simon, "FSA New Mortgage Regulations" (2005) F& CL 1. 
Bottomley, A., "Self and Subjectives: Languages of Claim in Property Law" (1993) 
20JL&Soc56. 
Boulding, Kenneth E., "Economics of Moral Science" (1969) 59 Am Econ Rev 1. 
327 
Boyle, Melanie, "Security for Lending: Undue Influence" (1998) 13 JIBL N118. 
Breslin, John, "Undue Influence: Guarantor's Equitable Right or Creditor's 
Contractual Obligation? -Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge" (2002) CL Pract 35. 
Bridge, Caroline, "Midland Bank plc v Cox McQueen (A Firm)" (1999) Fam Law 
310. 
Briggs, John, "The Wife's "Equity of Exoneration": The Doctrine Revisited: Part 1" 
14 (2001) Insoly Int 33 . 
Briggs, Michael, "The Battlefield- What was Etridge About? " 13 (2002) Fam LJ9. 
Brown, Evelyn, L., "The Uncertainty of U. C. C. Section 2-302: Why 
Unconscionability has Become A Relic" (2000) 105 Com L J287. 
Brown, Murray, "Suretyship and Marriage: Notice v Unconscionability" (2000) 2 
RLR 152. 
Brownsword, Roger, "Two Concepts of Good Faith" (1994) 7 JCL 197. 
Brownsword, Roger, "The Implementation of the EC Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts-Some Unresolved Questions" (1995) JBL 243. 
Brownsword, Roger, "The Limits of Freedom of Contract and the Limits of Contract 
Theory" (1995) 22 JLaw & Soc 259. 
Brownsword, Roger, "Good faith in Contracts Revisited" (1996) 49 CLP 111. 
Brownsword, Roger, "Individualism, Cooperativism and an Ethic for European 
Contract law" (2005) 64 MLR 628. 
Bryan, Michael, "Setting Aside Guarantees: Reviving an Old Equity" (1999) 3 
LMCLQ 327. 
Buerger, "The Sales Article of the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code" (1951) 23 
NYSB Bull 116. 
Bullimore, Tim, "Undue Influence: The Price of Setting Aside" (1997) SJ 105. 
Bums, Fiona, R., "The Elderly and Undue Influence Inter Vivos" (2003) 23 LS 251. 
Burrows, Andrew, "Proprietary Restitution: Unmasking Unjust Enrichment" (2001) 
117 LQR 413. 
Burton, Gregory, "Recent Australian Developments in Commercial Law: a Special 
Equity for the Wife (and other Mortgagors or Debtors)? " (1997) 4 CL Pract 120. 
Burton, Gregory, "A special Equity for the Wife Confirmed" (1999) 6 CL Pract 176. 
328 
Callaghan, C., "Manifest Disadvantage in Undue Influence: An Analysis of its Role 
and Necessity" (1995) 25 VUWLR 289. 
Campbell, David; Picciotto, Sol, "Exploring the Interaction Between Law and 
Economics: The Limits of Formalism" (1998) 18 LS 249. 
Capper, David, "Unconscionable Bargains and Unconscionable Gifts" (1996) Cony 
1996. 
Capper, David, "Undue Influence and Unconscionability: A Rationalisation" (1998) 
114 LQR 479. 
Capper, David, "Restitution; Banking and Finance; Equity; Real Property (Case 
Comment) Banks, Borrowers, Sureties and Undue Influence- a Half Baked Solution 
to a Thoroughly Cooked Problem" (2002) 10 RLR 100. 
Carrington, "The Uniform Commercial Code - Sales, Bulk Sales and Documents of 
Title" (1961) 15 Wyo IJ 1. 
Cartwright, John, "An Unconscionable Bargain" (1993)109 LQR 530. 
Cartwright,. John, "Taking Stock of O'Brien" (1999) 7 RLR 20. 
Chandler, Adrian, "Undue Influence and the Function of Independent Advice" (1995) 
111 LQR 51. 
Chandler, S., "Wives Guarantees of their Husband's Debts" (1999) 115 LQR 1. 
Chapman, Vivian, "The Executor's Axe" (2003) 45 Tru & ELI 22. 
Chen-Wishart, M., "Loss Sharing, Undue Influence and Manifest Disadvantage" 
(1994) 110 LQR 173. 
Chen-Wishart, M., "The O'Brien Principle and Substantive Unfairness" (1997) 56 
CLI60. 
Chianu, Emeka, "Tackling Terrorist Bank Accounts in Nigeria" (2002)17 JIBL 110. 
Clayton, Nigel, A., "Banks as Fiduciaries: The UK Position" (1922) 7 JJBL 315. 
Coase, R. H., "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 JLaw & Econ 1. 
Coffee, John, C. Jr., "Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System" (1984) Va L Rev 717. 
Cohen, Morris, R., "The Basis of Contract" (1933) 46 HarvL Rev 553. 
Collins, Hugh, "Implied Duty to Give Information During Performance of Contracts" 
(1992) 55 MLR 556. 
329 
Cook, Edwin, S., "Canada: Security for Lending - Guarantor" (2003) 18 JIBL N9-11. 
Craig, Alistair, "Evidential Presumptions" (2002) NLI217. 
Cretney, S. M., "The Little Woman and the Big Bad Bank" (1992)109 LQR 534. 
Cretney, S. M., "TSB Bank Plc v Camfield' (1995) Fam Law 299. 
Cummins, David, J.; Phillips, Richard D.; Weiss, Mary A., "The Incentive Effects of 
No-Fault Automobile Insurance" (2001) XLIV JLaw & Econ 427. 
Dabbs, David, "Banking on a Proper Job" (2003) 153(7082) NLI831. 
Dale, Brenda, "Undue Influence: Recent Developments" (1989) Conv 63. 
Daly, George; Giertz Fred, "Welfare Economics and Welfare Reform" (1972) 62 Am 
Econ Rev 131. 
Dannemann, Gerald, "Unjust Enrichment by Transfer: Some Comparative Remarks" 
(2001) 79 Tx LR 1837. 
Davey, Martin, "Insolvency and the Family Home" (2000) 1 Insoly L 2. 
Davis, Michael, H.; Neascu, Dana, "Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of Free 
Trade Practice, Global Economics and the Governing Principles of Political 
Economy" (2001) 69 UMKC L Rev 733. 
Davis, Otto, A.; Whinston, Andrew, "Externalities, Welfare and the Theory of 
Games" (1962) 70 Journal of Political Economy 241. 
Day, Judy F. S.; Taylor, P. J., "Loan Documentation in the Market for the UK 
Corporate Debt: Current Practice and Future Prospects" (1997) 12 JIBL 7. 
Dean, Meryll, "Unfair Contract Terms: The European Approach" (1993) 56 MLR 581. 
Devenney, James P., "(Case Comment) A Pack of Unruly Dogs: Unconscionable 
Bargains, Lawful Act (Economic) Duress and the Clogs on the Equity of 
Redemption" (2002) JBL 539. 
Devenney, James, P., "Issues in the Law of Undue Influence" (2003) 1 Finance & 
Credit Law 1. 
Devenney, James, P., "Undue influence - "Presumed" Undue Influence - Rebuttal of 
"Presumption" of Undue Influence - Full, Free and Informed Consent? " (2003) 25 J 
Soc Wei & Fam L 169. 
Devine, William, B., "Equity Release Schemes for the Elderly: a Quandary for 
Solicitors" (2003) 8 Conv 64. 
330 
Dharmananda, Kanaga, "Central Bank Liability to Depositors: Three Rivers May not 
Open Floodgates" (2002) 17 JIBL 41. 
Dietrich, Joachim, "Giving Content to General Concepts" (2005) 29 MULR 242. 
Digman, Alan, "Exploring Corporate Governance: U. K. Regulatory Systems in a 
Global Economy" (2000) 21 Comp Law 70. 
Dixon, Martin, "(Case Comment) More Undue Influence: Life After O'Brien" (1993) 
10SLRev51. 
Dixon, M., "Looking up a Remedy for Inequitable Conduct" (1994) CLI 232. 
Dixon, Martin, "(Case Comment) Undue influence: the Sensitive and the Sensible" 
(1994) 11 SL Rev 47. 
Dixon, Martin, "(Case Comment) Fraud, undue influence and mortgages of registered 
land" (1994) Conv 421. 
Dixon, Martin, "Undue influence after Barclays Bank v O'Brien: the Fog Thickens" 
(1995) 16 SL Rev 63. 
Dixon, Martin, "(Case Comment) The Swinging Pendulum of Undue Influence" 
(1996) 19 SL Rev 68. 
Dixon, Martin, "(Case Comment) Mortgagees and their Remedies" (1997) 20 SL Rev 
51. 
Dixon, Martin, "(Case Comment) Undue Influence and the Taking of Advice" (1997) 
21 SLRev50. 
Dixon, Martin, "The Limits of Undue Influence Explained (again)" (2002) 35 SL Rev 
59. 
Donohue, Jennifer, Hoye, Peter, "Life Business Monetisation - Raising Capital for 
Life Assurers" (2005) 20 JIBLR 20 301. 
Doudko, Alexei, G., "Hardship in Contract: The Approach of the Unidroit Principles 
and Legal Developments in Russia" (2000) 5 UnifL Rev 483. 
Douglass, "Discussion on Sales as Proposed in the Uniform Commercial Code" 
(1950) 21 Okla BAJ 808. 
Draper, Michael, J., "Undue Influence: A Review" (1999) Conv 176. 
Duggan, Anthony, J., "Economics: Is Equity Efficient? " 113 (1997) LQR 601. 
Du Plessis, Jacques; Zimmermann, Reinhard, "The relevance of Reverence; Undue 
Influence Civilian Style" (2003) 10 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 345. 
331 
Eden, Sandra, "Cautionary Tales - the Continued Development of Smith v Bank of 
Scotland' (2003) 7 Edin LR 107. 
Eden, Sandra, "More Cautionary Tales" (2004) 8 Edin LR 276. 
Ellinger, E. P.; Tjio, Hans, "British Business Law" (1996)JBL 266. 
Ellinger, E. P.; Tjio, Hans, "British Business Law" (1997) JBL 350. 
Ellinghaus, "In Defence of Unconscionability" (1969) 78 Yale LJ757. 
Elwes, Sylvia, "Vulnerable Sureties" (2002) 10 CLWF1-F2. 
Enman, S. R., "Doctrines of Unconscionability in Canadian, English and 
Commonwealth Contract law" (1987) 16 Anglo-Am LR 191. 
Enonchong, Nelson, "The Undue Influence of a Co-Surety" (2003) 3 LMCLQ 307. 
Evans, Michael, "International Trust Law Update -a Practical View" (2003) 10 JTCP 
95. 
Farnsworth, Allan, E., "Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness 
under the Uniform Commercial Code" (1963) 30 U Chi L Rev 666. 
Fehlberg, Belinda, "The Husband, the Bank, the Wife and Her Signature-the Sequel" 
(1996) 59 MLR 675. 
Ferguson, P., "Partial Rescission for Misrepresentation Rejected" (1995) 111 LQR 
555. 
Finlay, Anne, "Australian Wives are Special: Yerkey v Jones Lives on" (1999) JBL 
361. 
Fisher, Jonathan, "Recent International Developments in the Fight Against Money 
Laundering" (2002) 17(3) JIBL 67. 
Fox, Alexander, "Is a Lender's Security on a Home Enforceable Against a Spouse? " 
(2002) 4 BJIBFL 3. 
Fraser, Tim, "The New Structural Funds, State Aids and Interventions on the Single 
Market" (1995) 20 Eur LR 3. 
Freedman, Sandra, "The New Rights: Labour Law and Ideology in the Thatcher 
Years" (1992) 12 OJLS 24. 
Friedman, Daniel, "The Objective Principle and Mistake and Involuntariness in 
Contract and Restitution" (2003) 119 LQR 68. 
Frieze, Steve, A., "Requirements for Enforcing Lender's Security" (2002) 15 Insolv 
Int 13. 
332 
Frydenson, Henry, "A Step Beyond - Pressing Issues" (2003) 49 Tru & ELJ 6. 
Furmston, Michael, P., "Performance in Good Faith" (1998) 9 Cons Law 109. 
Gale, M., "Fraud and the Sale of Shares" (2001) 22 Comp Law 98. 
Gardner, Simon, "A Confused Wife's Equity" (1982) 2 OJLM 130. 
Gardner, Simon, "Wives' Guarantees of their Husband's Debts" (1999) 115 LQR 1. 
Garon, Anthony, "Doing the Knowledge" (2004) 18 Lawyer 20. 
Gee, Steve, "Tender Law Obligations in Canada" (2001) 117 LQR 351. 
Gergen, Mark, P., "What Renders Enrichment Unjust" (2001) 79 Texas L Rev 1927. 
Giliker, Paula, "Barclays Bank v O'Brien Revisited: What a Difference Five Years 
Can Make" (1999) 62 MLR 609. 
Giliker, Paula, "The Surety, the Bank and the Solicitor: the Saga Continues" (1999) 
BLRev31. 
Goodwin, "How the Adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code Would Affect the 
Law of Sales in Oregon" (1951) 30 Ore L Rev 212. 
Gorham, Charles, "An Analysis of Surety Discharge under the Uniform Commercial 
Code Section 3-605" 104 Com LI464. 
Gorton, Lars, "Best efforts" (2002) JBL 143. 
Goss, Jefferey, "Australia: guarantees and indemnities" (1996) 11 JIBL N187-189 
Grampp, William, D., "What did Smith Mean by the Invisible Hand? " (2000) 108 
Journal of Political Economy 441. 
Gravells, Nigel, P., "Creditors and the Family Home: the Exercise of Discretion" 
(1985) 5 OJLS 132. 
Griffiths, Mike, "Safe as Houses" (2003) 147 SJ678. 
Gross, Felicia, "Enforcing Security Against a Surety: Matters Left Unresolved by the 
House of Lords in Barclays Bank Plc vO Tried' (1994) BJIBFL 265. 
Groves, Kelda, "The Doctrine of Good Faith in Four Legal Systems" (1999) 15 Const 
LJ 265. 
Haley, Michael, "Real Property (Case Comment) Undue influence: Does Anyone 
Know Where we are Going? " (1997) 22 SL Rev 66. 
333 
Haley, Michael, "Agency; Equity; Real property (Case Comment) Undue Influence: 
Agency and Manifest Disadvantage" (1998) 23 SL Rev 58. 
Haley, Michael, "Administration of justice; Equity; Finance; Real Property (Case 
Comment) Undue influence: the Search for Consistency after Etridge" (1999) 26 SL 
Rev 56. 
Haley, Michael, "Real Property (Case Comment) Undue Influence; Manifest 
Disadvantage" (2000) 30 SL Rev 64. 
Haley, Michael, "Real Property; Human rights (Case Comment) Co-Ownership and 
the Unrelenting Pursuit of Mortgage Remedies" (2001) 32 SL Rev 60. 
Haley, Michael, "The O'Brien Defence: The Saga Continues" (2001) Conv 430. 
Haley, Michael, "Banking and Finance (Case Comment) The Limits of Undue 
Influence Explained (Again)" (2002) 35 SL Rev 59. 
Haley, Michael, "Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge (No. 2). The O'Brien Defence- 
a Compromise Reworked? " (2002) 14 CFLQ 93. 
Hantke-Domas, Michael, "The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence 
or Misinterpretation? " (2003) 15 European Journal of Law and Economics 165. 
Hardingham, I. J., "The High Court of Australia and Unconscionable Dealing" (1984) 
4 OJLS 275. 
Hardwick, Matthew, "More Than You Bargained For? " (2000) Tru & ELI 12. 
Harrap, Giles, "Presumed Undue Influence: More Than Just an Evidential 
Presumption" (2003) 8 ECA 9. 
Hasson, R., "Darkness at Noon -A Comment on the Consumer Guarantee Law in 
Ontario" (1994) 11 BFLR 141. 
Heal, Adrew, J., "Construction Partnering: Good Faith in Theory and Practice" 15 
(1999) Const LJ 167. 
Hemraj, Mohammed, B., "Banking on Solicitors to Advise Sureties (Case Comment)" 
(2004) 25 Comp Law 341. 
Hewitt, Paul; Addison, Jane, "Wills and Probate Update" (2003) 153(7083) NLJ 853. 
Hochman, Harold, M., "Pareto Optimal Redistribution" (1969) 59 Am Econ Rev 542. 
Hooley, Richard, "Taking Security After O'Brien" (1995) 3 LMCLQ 346. 
Hooley, Richard; O'Sullivan, Janet, "Undue Influence and Unconscionable Bargains" 
(1997) LMCLQ 17. 
334 
Hooley, Richard, "Bankers' References and the Bank's Duty of Confidentiality: 
When Practice Does Not Make Perfect" (2000) 59 CLJ21. 
Horan, John, "Wives v Banks: Is there still an O'Brien Defence? " (1999) SI 1198. 
Howell, N., "Sexually Transmitted Debt": A Feminist Analysis of Laws Regulating 
Guarantors and Co-Borrowers" (1995) 4 Australian Feminist Law Journal 93. 
Howells, C. I., (2003), "Will Drafting" 153(7086)NL1977. 
Huber, Georg, "Australia: Banking Regulation- Bank Auditors" (2002) 17 JIBL N2-3. 
Jeremie, J., "Creditors Beware: a Wife is not a Surety" (1994) 15 Co Lawyer 137. 
Hudson, Alastair; Johanna, Boyd, "Setting Mortgages Aside" (1996) 7 KCLJ 120. 
Jeremie, J., "Creditors Beware: a Wife is not a Surety" (1994) 15 Co Lawyer 137. 
Johnson, William; Rutherdale, Alistair, "Banking and Security Law Update" (2002) 
CL Pract 44. 
Johnson, William, "Banking and Security Law Update: Joint Obligations" (2003) 10 
CL Pract 295. 
Kaplaw, Louis; Shavell, Steven, "The Conflict between Notions of Fairness and the 
Pareto Principle" (1996) 1 Am Econ Rev 63. 
Keenan, Denis, "Loan Guarantees and the Family Business" (2002) 129 Accountancy 
87. 
Kempson, Elaine; Moore, Nick, "High Volume, High Quality" (2005) Tribunals 16. 
Kennedy, Duncan, "Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 
Harv L Rev 1685. 
Kenny, Phillip, H., "Etridge- A practical Guide to Taking a (Spouses? ) Surety for 
Mortgage" (2002) Conv 91. 
Kilcoyne, Desmond, "Undue Influence" (2003) 1(7) EPS 5. 
Kilcoyne, Desmond, "Order for Sale of Property Granted to Mortgagee Where There 
Had Been Undue Influence" (2003) 1 EPS 3. 
King, Donald, B., "Reshaping Contract Theory and Law: Death of Contracts II Part 
One: Generalised Consent with Lawmade Obligations" (1994) 7 JCL 244. 
King, Lesley, "Probate law (January)" (2004) 103 LSG 30. 
Kosky, Jeremy, "Litigator's View" (1999) The Lawyer 24. 
335 
Kramer, Adam, "Duress, Undue Influence and the Bravo Two Zero patrol" (2003) 40 
SL Rev 15. 
Kramer, Adam, "More on Undue Influence" (2003) 40 SL Rev 16. 
Kremer, Ben, "Restitution and Unconscientiousness: Another View" (2003) 119 LQR 
188. 
Kripke, "The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Unoform Commercial Code" 
(1962) UI11 LF 321. 
Kronman, Anthony, T., "Contract Law and Distributive Justice" (1980) 89 Yale L Rev 
472. 
Kronman, Anthony, T., "Paternalism and the Law of Contract" (1983) 92 Yale LI 
763. 
Laming, Gregory; Ross, Nicola, "The Donee's Burden" (2004) 56 Tru & ELTJ 17. 
Landes, William, M.; Posner, Richard, A., "The Influence of Economics on Law: A 
Quantitative Study" (1993) XXXVIJLaw & Econ 385. 
Lang, Russell, "The Informed Client" (2004) 49 JLSS 38. 
Lawson, Anna, "O'Brien and its Legacy: Principle, Equity and Certainty? " (1995) 54 
CLI280. 
Lawson, Richard, "Duress and Unconscionable Bargains - Mortgage Transactions" 
(2001) 145 SJ 673. 
Leff, Arthur, Allen, "Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperors New Clause" 
(1967) 115 UPa L Rev 485. 
Lehane, J. R. F., "Undue Influence, Misrepresentation and Third Parties" (1994) 110 
LQR 167. 
Levin, J.; McDowell, B., "The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice in 
Voluntary Obligations" (1983) 29 McGill U 24. 
Levy, "A Study of the Uniform Commercial Code - Sales" (1953) 58 Corn LJ329. 
Levy, Robert, S., "Once Bitten, Twice Shy" (2003) 24 FLJ 19. 
Linzer, Peter, "On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the 
Second Restatement" (1981) 81 Colum LR 111. 
Llewellyn, Karl, "Book Review" (1939) 52 Harv L Rev 700. 
Llewellyn, Karl, "Why a Commercial Code? " (1953) 22 Tenn L Rev 779. 
336 
Loke, Alexander, F. H., "Fiduciary Duties and Implied Duties of Good Faith in 
Contractual Joint Ventures" (1999) JBL 538. 
Lomnicka, Eva, "The Reform of Consumer Credit in the UK" (2004) JBL 129. 
Lumpkin, Stephen, "Trends and Developments in Securitisation" (1999) 74 Financial 
Market Trends 25. 
Macaulay, S., "Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study" (1969) 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 195. 
Malcolm, "The Uniform Commercial Code" (1960) 39 Ore L Rev 318. 
Margolis, Julius, "Welfare Criteria, Pricing and Decentralisation of a Public Service" 
(1957) 71 LQR 448. 
Martyn, John, Ross, "Validity of Wills: Part 1: Covering all the Bases" (2004) 55 Tru 
& ELTJ 4. 
Mason, Anthony, "The Place of Equity and Equitable Remedies in the Contemporary 
Common Law World" (1994) 110 LQR 238. 
Mason, Anthony, "The Impact of Equitable Doctrine on the Law of Contract" (1998) 
27 Anglo Am LR 1. 
Mautner, M., "A Justice Perspective of Contract Law: How Contract Law Allocates 
Entitlements" (1991) 10 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 239. 
McAleavy, Catherine, "Wills and Probate Update" (2003) 147 51807. 
McAleavey, Catherine, "Wills and Probate Update" (2004) 148(3) SJ77. 
McConnell, David, "Owner Occupiers - Recent Developments" (2004) April Legal 
Action 15. 
McConnell, Derek, "Owner-Occupiers: Recent Developments" (2003) April Legal 
Action 21. 
McConvill, James; Bagaric, Mirko, "The Yoking Of Unconscionability and Unjust 
Enrichment in Australia" (2002) Deakin L Rev 13. 
McDowell, B., "The Balance Theory of Contracts: Seeking Justice in Voluntary 
Obligations" (1983) 29 McGill LI 24. 
McKnight, Andrew, "A Review of Developments in English Law During 2003: Part 
2" (2004) 19 JIBLR 151. 
McMeel, Gerard, "England and Wales" (2002) 10 RLR 162. 
117 
McMurtry, Lara, "Unconscionability and Undue Influence: An Interaction" (2000) 
Conv 573. 
McVeagh, Russell, "New Zealand: Security for Lending - Mortgages" (2003) 18 
JIBLR N113. 
Meikle, D. J. "Partial Rescission-Removing the Restitution from a Contractual 
Doctrine" (2003) 19 JCL 40. 
Mentschikoff, "The Uniform Commercial Code, An Experiment in Democracy in 
Drafting" (1950) 36 ABAJ419. 
Merricks, Walter, "Just a Phone Call Away" (2005) Tribunals 13. 
Meyer, Paul A.; Shipley, J. J., "Pareto Optimal Redistribution: Comment" (1970) 60 
Am Econ Rev 988. 
Meyerson, Michael, I., "The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics 
Meets the Real World" (1990) 24 Georgia L Rev 583. 
Millets, Lord, "The Husband, the Wife and the Bank" (2001) 4 PCB 283. 
Millett, P. J., "Equity's Place in the Law of Commerce" (1998) 114 LQR 214. 
Milne, Patrick, "Lenders, Co-Owners and Solicitors" (1999) NLJPractitioner 168. 
Mishan, E. J., "The Faculty of Pareto-Efficient Distributions" (1972) 62 Am Econ Rev 
971. 
Mishan, E. J., "Welfare Criteria: Resolution of a Paradox" (1973) 83 Economic 
Journal, 747. 
Mitchell, Gregory, "Undue Influence" (2001) 16 JIBL 283. 
Molloy, Timon, "Complaints from the Top" (2004) CM 9. 
Mooney, "Old Kontract Principles and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the 
Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law" (1966) 11 VW L Rev 213. 
Morgan, W. D., "The History and Economics of Suretyship" (1927) 12 Corn LQ 153 
Morris, Debra, "Wives are told: Don't Blame the Bank, sue your Solicitor" (1999) 7 
Fem LS 193. 
Morris, Debra, "Surety Wives in the House of Lords: Time for Solicitors to "Get 
Real"? " (2003) 11 Fem LS 57. 
Morris, Judith, "A Stitch in Time... " (2004) 147 Legal Bus 14. 
338 
Mwenda, Kenneth Kaoma; Fleming, Alex, "International Developments in the 
Organisational Structure of Financial Services Supervision: Part 2" (2002) 17 JIBL 7. 
Nield, Sarah, "Imputed Notice" (2000) Conv 196. 
Nield, Sarah, "To Sever or not Sever: The Effect of a Mortgage by a Joint Tenant" 
(2001) Cony 462. 
Ogilvie, M., "To Be or Not to Be (A Fiduciary): Bertolo v Bank of Montreal" [1987- 
88] 2 BFLR 256. 
Oldham, Mika, "If at First... Undue Influence and the House of Lords" (2002) CLJ 29. 
Orton, Simon, "Financial Ombudsman Decisions: Beyond Challenge" (2005) 16 PLC 
12. 
Ostas, "Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic Model and an 
Empirical Test" (1992) 29 Am Bus IJ 535. 
O'Sullivan, Dominic, "O'Brien and Unconscionability" (1997) 113 LQR 10. 
O'Sullivan, Dominic, "Partial Rescission for Misrepresentation in Australia" (1997) 
111 LQR 16. 
O'Sullivan, Dominic, "Distributing the Risk of Contract Fraud" (2001) 117 LQR 381. 
O'Sullivan, Dominic, "Developing O'Brien" (2002) 118 LQR 337. 
O'Sullivan, Janet, "Rescission as a Self-Help Remedy: a Critical Analysis" (2000) 59 
CIJ 509. 
O'Sullivan, Janet, "Who Dares Whinges: Duress, Undue Influence and the SAS" 
(2003) 62 CLJ554. 
Otto, D., "A Barren Future? Equity's Conscience and Women's Inequality" (1992) 18 
MULR 808. 
Pasparakis, 0.; Dasilva, P., "Independent Legal Advice in Canada" (1996) 3 JIBL 91. 
Paula, "Barclays Bank v O'Brien Revisited: What a Difference Five Years Can 
Make" (1999) 62 MLR 609. 
Pawlowski, Mark; Greer, Sarah, "Constructive Notice and Independent Legal Advice: 
A Study of Lending Institutional Practice" (2001) Conv 229. 
Pawlowski, Mark; Brown, James, "Undue Influence and the Family Home" (2003) 33 
Fam Law 204. 
Pawlowski, Mark, "Cohabitation Contracts: the Sutton Case" (2004) 34 Fam Law 
199. 
119 
Petit, Mark, Jr., "Representing Consumer Defendants in Debt Collection Actions: The 
Disclosure Defence Game" (1981) 59 Texas L Rev 255. 
Phang, Andrew, "Positivism in the English Law of Contract" (1992) 55 MLR 102. 
Phang, Andrew, "The uses of Unconscionability" (1995) 111 LQR 559. 
Phang, Andrew, "Undue Influence Methodology, Sources and Linkages" (1995) JBL 
552. 
Phang, Andrew, "Economic Duress: Recent Difficulties and Possible alternatives" 
(1997) 5 MLR 53. 
Phang, Andrew; Tjio, Hans, "The Uncertain Boundaries of Undue Influence" (2002) 
LMCLQ 231. 
Philip, Morris; Rhoda, James, "The Financial Ombudsman Service: a brave new 
world in "ombudsmanry"? " (2002) PL 640. 
Phillips, John, "Guarantees and Undue Influence- Confusing Signals from the Court 
of Appeal" (1997/8) KCLJ 139. 
Phillips, John, "Setting Aside Guarantees: Another Approach" (2002) 2 OUCL147. 
Poch, Peter; Haas, Martin, "Australia: Banking Regulation- Liability of the 
Supervisory Authority" (2003) 18 JIBL N1. 
Poole, Jill; Keyser, Andrew, "Justifying Partial Rescission in English Law" (2005) 
121 LQR 2005 273. 
Price, N. S., "Undue Influence: Finis Litium? " (1998) 114 LQR 186. 
Price, N. S., "Undue Influence: Finis Litium? " (1999) 115 LQR 8. 
Proksch, Louis, "Rescission on Terms" (1996) 4 RLR 71. 
Radula-Scott, Peter, Robinson, Mary, "Abuse of Power" (2003) 50 Tru & ELI 7. 
Rawlings, H. F., "The Limits of Undue Influence" (1985) 48 MLR 549. 
Reddy, Mike, "Financial Ombudsmen: Swan Songs and the Phoenix" (2001) 1 JAMN 
42. 
Reid, Paula, "Banking: Undue Influence" (2003) 10 CL Pract 168. 
Reid, Val, "The FOS - An Example of Good Practice? " (2005) Legal Action 6. 
Rennie, Robert, "Solicitors' Negligence: Reargued Action" (2002) SLPQ 87. 
340 
Richardson, M., "Protecting Women who provide Security for a Husband's Partner's 
or Child's Business Debts: the Value and Limits of an Economic Perspective" (1996) 
16 LS 368. 
Ridge, Pauline, "Equitable undue influence and wills" (2004) 120 LQR 617. 
Robertson, Andrew, "Knowledge and Unconscionability in a Unified Estoppel"(1998) 
24 Monash UL Rev 115. 
Robson, John, "Undue Influence-The Final Word from the House of Lords? " (2002) 
JHL 19. 
Rocks, Susan M., "Revision of the United States Uniform Commercial Code 
Governing Transactions in Securities and other Investment Property" (1995) BAB & 
FL 25. 
Rosenberg, Robert, "Mortgages: Remortgage - Undue Influence - Whether Bank On 
Inquiry" (2003) 68 QA 23. 
Rosenberg, Robert, "Mortgages: Undue Influence - Independent Advice - Orders for 
Sale" (2003) 68 QA 23. 
Russell, Roseanne, "Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2). The End of a Sorry 
Tale? " (2002) 7 SLT55. 
Samuelson, Pamela, "Licensing Information in the Global Information Market: 
Freedom of Contract Meets Public Policy" (1999) 21 EIPPR 386. 
Santier, Severine, "Commercial Agents Regulations 1993" (1998) 19 Comp Law 
Briefing 248. 
Schutt, Marc, "Austria: Guarantees- Boni Mores Test" (2000) 15 JIBL N70. 
Scott, David, "The UK's Financial Services and Markets Bill: The Regulation of 
Individuals" (2000) 2 JIFM 13. 
Scott, Karen, "Taking the "Undue" out of Presumed Undue Influence? " (2003) 2 
LMCLQ 145. 
Sen, Amartya, "The Possibility of Social Choice" (1999) 89 Am Econ Rev 349. 
Sim, Disa, "Burden of Proof in Undue Influence: Common Law and Codes on 
Collision Course" (2003) 7E&P 221. 
Simmonds, Jeremy, "Banker's Documents and the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999" (2002)17 JIBL 205. 
Simpson, Mark, "Professional Negligence Update; Mortgages and Causation" (1999) 
143 SJ 562. 
341 
Skipwith, Guy, "Banks, Solicitors, Husbands and Wives" (2003) 95 Adviser 40. 
Slawson, David, W., "Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of 
LawMaking Power" (1971) 84 Harv L Rev 529. 
Slayton, "The Unequal Bargain Doctrine" (1976)22 McGill LJ 94. 
Smith, Stephen, A., "In Defence of Substantive Fairness" (1996) 112 LQR 138. 
Stephens, M., "Institutional Responses to the UK Housing Market Recession" 
(1996) 33 Urban Studies 337. 
Stephenson, Justin, "Security for Lending- Independent Legal Notice" (1998) 13 JIBL 
N57-58. 
Stirling, John, "A Changing Duty to Wives" (2003) 5 3/54 Civ PB 7. 
Stone, Elizabeth, "Infants, Lunatics and Married Women: Equitable Protection in 
Garcia v National Australia Bank" (1999) 62 MLR 604. 
Stone, Richard, "Undue Influence/ Misrepresentation" (1995) 15 SL Rev 22. 
Sugar, Simon, "Banking Law: Pre-Etridge (No. 2) Transactions" (2002) 99 LSG 24. 
Sugar, Simon, "Banking Law" (2004) 101 LSG 27. 
Summers, Elizabeth A., "Recent Secured Transactions Law Reform in the Newly 
Independent States and Central and Eastern Europe" (1997) 23 Rev CEE Law 177. 
Summers, Robert S., "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code" (1968) 54 Va L Rev 195. 
Swinton, Ken, "Wilson v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc" (2003) 71 SLG 113. 
Tarr, Anthony A.; Tarr, Julie-Anne, "Some Critical Legal Issues Affecting Insurance 
Transactions Globally" (2001)JBL 661. 
Thomas, Susan Barkehall, "Garcia v National Australia Bank: Would the Real 
Volunteer Please Stand Up? " (1999) JIBL 319. 
Thomson, M. P., "New Wine from Old Bottles" (1994) Conv 233. 
Thomson, M. P., "The Enforceability of Mortgages" (1994) Conv 140. 
Thomson, M. P., "Recent Cases; The Independent Legal Advice" (1997) Conv 216. 
Thomson, M. P., "Constructive Notice of Undue Influence" (1999) Conv 510. 
Thomson, M. P., "Redefining O'Brien" (1999) Conv 126. 
342 
Thomson, M. P., "Disadvantageous Transactions" (2000) Conv 444. 
Thomson, M. P., "Recent Cases; Pleading Points" (2000) Conv 43. 
Thomson, M. P., "Do We Really Need Clogs" (2001) Conv 502. 
Thomson, M. P., "Wives, Sureties and Banks" (2002) Conv 174. 
Thompson, M. P., "Estoppel: Reliance, Remedy and Priority" (2003) Conv 157. 
Thompson, M. P., "Undue Influence Before Etridge" (2003) Conv 314. 
Thompson, M. P., "Replacement Mortgages (Case Comment)" (2004) Conv 399. 
Tiplady, David, "The Limits of Undue Influence" (1985) 48 MLR 579. 
Tjio, Hans, "O'Brien and Unconscionability" (1997) 113 LQR 10. 
Tjio, Hans, "No Stranger to Unconscionability" (2001) JBL Law 299. 
Tottenham, Mark, "Landlord and Tenant - Lease v Licence - Whether Document 
Constituted a Lease Where no Rent Payable" (2003) 8 CPLJ22. 
Tucker, Jeremy, "Wills and Undue Influence: Taking Advantage" (2003) 47 Tru & 
ELI 23. 
Valianti, Demetra, "New Capital Accord (Basel 2)" (2005) Economicos Fileleftheros 
http: //www. phileleftheros. com/main/main. asp? gid=393&id=351073 
Vann, V. J., "Equitable Compensation When Rescission is Impossible: a Response" 
(2003)17 Tru LI66. 
Vigneron, Philippe, "The New Community Directive Concerning the Liberalisation of 
Capital Movements" (1989) 4 JIBL 122. 
Virgo, John, "The Financial Ombudsman Service and Jurisdiction Issues" (2003) CM 
8. 
Waddams, S. M., "Unconscionability in Contracts" (1976) 39 MLR 369. 
Wadsley, Joan, "Bank Lending and the Family Home: Prudence and Protection" 3 
(2003) LMCLQ 341. 
Walden-Smith, Karen, "Give or Take? " (2003) 50 Tru & ELJ 18. 
Watts, Peter, "Developing O'Brien" (2002) 118 LQR 337. 
Whittaker, Bruce; Lam, Jackson, "Australia: security for lending - unconscionable 
transactions" (2002) 17 JIBL N12-13. 
343 
Wightman, John, "Reviving Contract" (1989) 52 MLR 115. 
Williamson, Sharon, "Recent Developments in Contentious Banking Law" (2001) 16 
JIBL 299. 
Wilson, Ian, "The Taking of Security Over Domestic Properties in the U. K. -Royal 
Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2)" (1999) JIBL 115. 
Wilson, John, "Under the Influence" (2003) 153 NLJ252. 
Wilson, Michael, J., "Stop Bad Banking" (2005) 149 SJ78. 
Wolfson, David, "Barclays Bank v O'Brien Revised' (1995) NLJ 22. 
Wong, Simone, "No Man Can Serve Two Masters: Independent Legal Advice and 
Solicitor's Duty of Confidentiality" (1998) Conv 457. 
Wong, Simone, "Revisiting Barclays Bank v O'Brien and Independent Legal Advice 
for Vulnerable Sureties" (2002) JBL 439. 
Yokoi-Arai, Mamiko, "A Comparative Analysis of the Financial Ombudsman 
Systems in the UK and Japan" (2004) 5 JIBL 333. 
Zeckhauser, Richard, J., "Optimal Mechanism for Income Transfer" (1971) 61 Am 
Econ Rev 324. 
344 
Table of Cases 
Australia 
Alati vKruger (1955) 95 C. L. R. 216. 
Asia Pacific International Pty Ltd v Dalrymple (2000) 2 Qd. R. 229. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Plc Ltd 
(2003) 197 A. L. R. 197. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd 
(2002) 189 A. L. R. 276. 
Bank of New South Wales v Flack (1984) A. C. L. D. 249. 
Bank of New South Wales v Rogers (1941) 65 C. L. R. 42 (HC Aus). 
Begbei v State Bank ofNew South Wales Ltd (1994) 16 A. T. P. R. 41-288. 
Behan v Obelon Pty Ltd [1985] 2 H. C. A. 51. 
Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 C. L. R. 362. 
Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 C. L. R. 457. 
Castle Phillips Finance v Piddington (1995) 70 P. & C. R. 592 (CA). 
Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 C. L. R. 447; (1983) 57 
A. W. R. 358 (HC Aus). 
Commonwealth Bank ofAustralia v Khouri (1998) V. S. C. 128. 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Prentice (unreported, Sup Ct, NSW, Barr A. J., 
December 14,1995) (BC 9506814 at 13). 
Diprose vLouth (No. 1) (1990) 54 S. A. S. R. 438. 
Familiar Pty Ltd v Samarkos (1994) 115 F. L. R. 443; [1994] NT SC 22. 
Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd (1998) 194 C. L. R. 395; (1998) 72 A. L. J. R. 
1243; (1999) 62 M. L. R. 604 (HC Aus). 
Goodwin v National Bank ofAustralasia (1968) 117 C. L. R. 173. 
Granfield Pty v Commonwealth Bank (1998) V. S. C. 140. 
Grego v Tasmanian Trustees Ltd (1997) 143 A. L. R. 328. 
Hamilton v Watson (1845) 12 C1. & Fin. 109. 
345 
Latec Investments Ltd v Hotel Terrigal Ply Ltd (1965) 113 C. L. R. 265 (HC of 
Australia). 
Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 C. L. R. 621 (HC Aus. ). 
Micarone v Perpetual Trustees Australia Ltd (1999) 75 S. A. S. R. 1. 
Morris v Wardley Australia Property Management Ltd Court of Appeal unreported 17 
December 1992. 
O'Brien vAustralia & New Zealand Bank (1971) 5 S. A. S. R. 347. 
Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) H. C. A. 36. 
Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 58 S. A. S. R. 184. 
Radin v Commonwealth Bank (1998)1361 F. C. A. 419. 
Skipton Building Society v Clayton (1993) 66 P. & C. R. 223. 
Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 C. L. R. 422. 
Union Fidelity Trustee Co ofAustralia Ltd v Gibson (1971) V. R. 573. 
Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd (1995) 184 C. L. R. 102 (HC Aus). 
Westpac Banking Corporation v Paterson (2001) F. C. A. 556 (Fed Ct (Aus) (Full Ct). 
Wilton v Farnworth (1948) 76 C. L. R. 646 (HC Aus). 
Yerkey vJones (1939) 63 C. L. R. 649 (HC Aus). 
Canada 
A&K Lick-a-Chick Franchises Ltd v Cordiv Enterprises Ltd (1981) 119 D. L. R. (3d) 
440 (SC Nova Scotia). 
Bank of Nova Scotia v Zackheim (1983) 3 D. L. R. (4th) 760. 
Bertolo v Bank ofMontreal (1986) 33 D. L. R. (4d) 610 (Ontario Court of Appeal). 
Brett v Brett (1938) 3 D. L. R. 539. 
Buchanan v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1979) 100 D. L. R. (3d) 624 
(British Columbia Supreme Court). 
Gaertner v Fiesta Dance Studios Ltd (1972) 32 D. L. R. (3 d) 639. 
Griesshammer v Ungerer and Miami Studios of Dancing (1958) 14 D. L. R (2d) 599. 
346 
Harry vKreutziger (1978) 95 D. L. R. (3d)231. 
Isman v Widen (1926) 1 D. L. R. 247. 
Knupp v Bell (1968) 67 D. L. R (2d) 256. 
McKenzie v Bank ofMontreal (1975) 55 D. L. R. (3d) 641. 
Morrison v Coast Finance Ltd (1965) 55 D. L. R. (3d) 710. 
Mundinger vMundinger (1968) 3 D. L. R (3d) 338. 
European Court of Justice 
Bayerische Hypotheken -und Wechselbank AG vDietzinger [1998] E. C. R. 1-1199. 
Ireland 
Buckley v Irwin [1960] NI 98. 
Butler vMiller (1867) IR 1 Eq 195. 
Carroll v Carroll [1998] IEHC 42; [1998] 2 ILRM 218. 
Cooper v Phibbs (1867) L. R. 2 H. L. 149. 
Garvey vMcMinn (1846) 9 IrEq Rep 526. 
Grealish v Murphy [ 1946] IR 3 5. 
Haverty v Brooks [ 1970] IR 214. 
Harrison v Guest (1855) 6 De G, M and G 424. 
Howley v Cook (1873) IR 8 Eq 570. 
Kelly vMorrisroe (1919) 53 ILTR 145. 
Lydon v Coyne [1946] Ir Jur Rep 64. 
O'Flanagan v Ray-Ger Ltd Unreported, Irish High Court, 28 April 1983. 
O'Reilly v O'Connor [2005] IEHC 255. 
Rae v Joyce (1892) LR Ir 500. 
Rooney v Conway [1982] NIJB. 
347 
Slator v Nolan (1876) IR 11 Eq 367. 
Smyth v Smyth Unreported, Irish High Court (Costello J), 23 November 1978. 
Watkin v Watson-Smith, The Times, 3 July 1986. 
New Zealand 
Archer v Cutler [1980] 1 N. Z. L. R. 386 (SC of Auckland). 
Bank ofA/asia v Adams (1889) 8 N. Z. L. R. 119. 
Bowkett v Action Finance Ltd[ 1992] 1 N. Z. L. R. 449. 
Bradley West Solicitors Nominee Co Ltd v Keeman [1994] 2 N. Z. L. R. 111. 
Brusewitz vBrown [1923] 42 N. Z. L. R. 1106. 
Canterbury Farmers' Co-op Association (Ltd) v Lindsay [ 1910] 29 N. Z. L. R. 793. 
Contractors Bonding Ltd v Snee [ 1992] 2 N. Z. L. R. 157 (CA). 
Grant v Grant [1979] 1 N. Z. L. R. 66. 
Harris vRichardson [1930] N. Z. L. R. 890 (CA). 
Keith Richard Mason and Glenys & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd [2002] 
N. Z. C. A. 75. 
Moffat vMoffat [1984] 1 N. Z. L. R. 600. 
National Bank of New Zealand v Macintosh (1881) 3 N. Z. L. R. 217. 
National Mortgage & Agency Co of New Zealand Ltd v Stalker [1933] N. Z. L. R. 1182. 
Nichols vJessup (No. 2) [1986] 1 N. Z. L. R. 237 (HC). 
NZ Bank of New Zealand vMaas-Geesteranus [1991] 3 N. Z. B. L. C. 102 (CA). 
Scales Trading Ltd v Far Eastern Shipping Co Public Ltd [ 1999] 3 N. Z. L. R. 26. 
Ward v The National Bank of New Zealand (1886) 4 N. Z. L. R. 35 (CA). 
United Kingdom 
Abbey National Building Society v Cann [ 1991 ]1A. C. 56. 
Adler v Dickson [1955] 1 Q. B. 158. 
348 
Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson [1990] 1 Ch. 265. 
Akerblom v Price Potter Walker & Co (1880-81) L. R. 7 Q. B. D. 129. 
Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd v Total Oil Great Britain Ltd [1983] 1 W. L. R. 87. 
Allcard v Skinner (1887) L. R. 36; Ch. D. 145. 
Allied Irish Bank v Byrne [1995] 2 F. L. R. 325. 
Al Nakib Investments Ltd v Longcroft [1990] 1 W. L. R. 1390. 
Anderson v Pacific Fire and Marine Insurance Co (1871-72) L. R. 7 C. P. 65. 
AST Sportswear Inc v Majit & Another [2002] E. W. H. C 778. 
Avon Finance Co v Bridger [1985] 2 All E. R. 281. 
Avon Insurance v Swire Fraser Ltd [2000] 1 All E. R. (Comm) 573; [2000] C. L. C. 
665. 
Aqua Leisure Lid v Bammant and Styles (1980), Civil Division, CA, 1977, A 62,15 
May 1980, LEXIS. 
Arrale v Costain Civil Engineer [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 98. 
Astley v Reynolds (1731) 2 Stra. 915. 
Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd [1989] 1 All E. R. 641; 
[1989] Q. B. 833; [1989] 3 W. L. R. 389. 
Backhouse vBackhouse [1978] 1 W. L. R. 243. 
Baden v Societe Generale pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce et de 1' 
Industrie en France SA [1992] 4 All E. R. 161. 
Banco Exterior International v Mann [1995] 1 All E. R. 936; [1995] 1 F. L. R. 602; 
[1995] 2 F. C. R. 282. 
Banco Exterior International SA v Thomas [1997] 1 All E. R. 46; [1997] 1 W. L. R. 
221. 
BankMelli Iran v Samadi Rad [1995] 2 F. L. R. 367 (CA); [1995] 3 F. C. R. 735. 
Bank ofBaroda v Rayarel [1995] 2 F. L. R. 376. 
Bank of Baroda v Shah [1988] 3 All E. R. 24 (CA). 
349 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA vAboody [1990] 1 Q. B. 923; [1989] 2 
W. L. R. 759. 
Bank of Cyprus (London) Ltd vMarkou [1999] 2 All E. R. 707; [1999] 2 F. L. R. 17. 
Bank ofMontreal v Stuart [1911 ]1A. C. 120. 
Bank of Scotland v Bennett [1999] 1 F. L. R. 1151; [1999] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 145. 
Bank of Scotland v Henry Butcher & Co [2001] 2 All E. R (Comm) 691. 
Bank of Scotland v Henry Butcher & Co [2003] E. W. C. A. Civ. 67; [2003] 2 All E. R. 
(Comm) 557. 
Bank of Scotland v Hill [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1081; [2002] 29 E. G. C. S. 152. 
Barclays Bank v Calpan [1998] 1 F. L. R. 532. 
Barclays Bank Plc v Coleman [2000] 1 All E. R. 385; [2000] 3 W. L. R. 405; [2000] 
Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 67; [2001] Q. B. 20. 
Barclays Bank Plc v Goff [2001 ] E. W. C. A. Civ. 635; [2001] 2 All E. R. (Comm) 847; 
[2001] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 189. 
Barclays BankPlc v Kennedy (1988) 58 P. & C. R. 221 (CA); [1989] 1 F. L. R. 356. 
Barclays Bank Plc v Khaira [ 1992] 1 W. L. R. 623. 
Barclays Bank Plc v O'Brien [1993] Q. B. 109 (CA); W. L. R. 593; [1992] 4 All E. R. 
983. 
Barclays BankPlc v O'Brien [1994] 1 A. C. 180 (HL); [1993] 3 W. L. R. 786; [1993] 4 
All E. R. 417. 
Barclays Bank Plc v Thomson [1996] 146 N. L. J. 1778; [1997] 4 All E. R. 816. 
Barron v Willis [1902] A. C. 271 (HL). 
Berry v Glazebrook (1891) 7 T. L. R. 574. 
Beynon v Cook (1875) L. R. 10; Ch. 389. 
Biggs v Hoddinott [1898] 2 Ch. 307. 
Bisset v Wilkinson [1927] A. C. 177. 
Blest v Brown (1862) 3 Gill 450; 66 E. R. 486. 
Boardma v Phipps [1967] 2 A. C. 46 (HL); [1966] 3 W. L. R. 1009; [1966] 3 All E. R. 
721. 
1 Sn 
Bolton v Cooke (1825) 3 L. J. O. S. 87. 
Bolton vMahadeva [1972] 1 W. L. R. 1009; [1972] 2 All E. R. 1322. 
Booth v Salvation Army Building Association Ltd (1897) 14 T. L. R. 3. 
Boustany v Pigott (1993) 69 P. & C. R. 298 (PC). 
Bradshaw v BCTW Hardcastle, GC Lindsay [2002] E. W. H. C. 2816. 
Bridgman v Green (1757) 2 Ves. Sen. 408. 
Bristol & West Building Society v Henning [1985] 1 W. L. R. 778 (CA); [1985] 2 All 
E. R. 606. 
Brocklehurst, Re [1978] Ch. 14; [1978] 1 All E. R. 767; [1977] 3 W. L. R. 96. 
B &S Contracts and Design v Victor Green Publications [1984] I. C. R. 419. 
Bullock v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1955] Ch. 317; [1955] 2 W. L. R. 1; [1954] 3 All E. R. 726. 
Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England (1981) 125 S. J. 528 (HL); Times, July 4,1981. 
Butler v Rice [ 1910] 2 Ch. 277. 
Carapeto v Good [2002] E. W. H. C. 640; [2002] W. T. L. R. 1305. 
Cartwright v Rowley (1799) 2 Esp. 723. 
Castle Phillips Finance Co Ltd v Piddington (1995) 70 P. & C. R. 592 (CA); [1995] 1 
F. L. R. 783. 
Cavendish vStrutt [1904] 1 Ch. 524. 
Central London Property Trusts v High Trees House Ltd [1947] K. B. 130; [1947] 
L. J. R. 77. 
Chaplin & Co Ltd v Brammall [1908] 1 K. B. 233. 
Chater v Mortgage Agency Services Number Two Ltd [2004] 1 P. & C. R. 4; [2003] 
E. W. C. A. Civ. 490; [2003] H. L. R. 61. 
Cheese v Thomas [1994] 1 All E. R. 35 (CA); [1994] 1 W. L. R. 129; [1994] 1 F. L. R. 
118. 
CIBC Mortgages Plc v Pitt [1994] 1 A. C. 200; [1993] 3 W. L. R. 802; [1993] 4 All 
E. R. 433; [1994] 1 F. L. R. 17. 
Cityland and Property (Holdings) Ltd v Dabrah [1968] Ch. 166; [1967] 2 All E. R. 
639; [1967] 3 W. L. R. 605. 
Clark Boyce v Mouat [1994] 1 A. C. 428; [1993] 3 W. L. R. 1021; [1993] 4 All E. R. 
268. 
Clarke vMarlborough Fine Art (London) Ltd [2002] 1 W. L. R. 1731. 
Clef Aquitaine SARL v Laporte Materials (Barrow) Ltd [2001] Q. B. 488; [2000] 3 
W. L. R. 1760; [2000] 3 All E. R. 493. 
Cl4ffordDavisManagementLtdv WEA Records Ltd [1975] 1 W. L. R. 61; [1975] 1 All 
E. R. 237. 
Coldunell Ltd v Gallon [1986] Q. B. 1184; [1986] 2 W. L. R. 466; [1986] 1 All E. R. 
429. 
Combe v Combe [1951 I 1951 ]1 All E. R. 767. 2 K. B. 215; I 
Commission for the New Towns v Cooper Great Britain Ltd [1995] 2 All E. R. 929. 
Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch. 723. 
Cooper v National Provincial Bank Ltd [ 1946] KB 1. 
Cornish vMidland BankPlc [1985] 3 All E. R. 513; [1985] F. L. R. 298. 
Cowdry v Day 1 Giff. 316. 
Crabb vArun DC [1976] Ch. 179; [1975] 3 W. L. R. 847; [1975] 3 All E. R. 865. 
Craig, Re [1971] Ch. 95; [1970] 2 W. L. R. 1219; [1970] 2 All E. R. 390. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All E. R. 144 (CA); [1997] 
C. L. C. 95; [1997] 1 F. L. R. 11. 
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credit Guarantee Dept [1996] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 200; [1996] C. L. C. 11. 
Cresswell v Potter [1978] 1 W. L. R. 255. 
Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 T. R. 320. 
Dailey vDailey [2003] U. K. P. C. 65; [2003] 3 F. C. R. 369. 
Davies v London & Provincial Marine Insurance Co (1878) L. R. 8 Ch. D. 469; 
(1878) 26 W. R. 794. 
D&C Builders Ltd v Rees [1966] 2 Q. B. 617; [1966] 2 W. L. R. 288; [1965] 3 All 
E. R. 837. 
Dent vBennett (183 9) 4 My. & Cr. 269; 41 E. R. 105. 
352 
Derry v Peek (1889) 5 T. L. R. 625. 
Del (mar v Metropolitan and Provincial Bank (1863) 1 Hem. & M. 641; 71 E. R. 281. 
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] A. C. 562. 
Dunbar Bank Plc vNadeem [1998] 3 All E. R. 876. 
Duncan, Fox & Co v North and South Wales Bank (1880) 6 App. Cas. 1. 
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage Motor Co Ltd [1915] A. C. 79. 
Earl ofAylesford vMorris (1872-73) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 484. 
Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc [1998] Q. B. 587; [1997] 3 
W. L. R. 1066; [1997] 3 All E. R. 636. 
Edwards v Meyrick (1842) 2 Hare 60. 
Equity & Law Home Loans Ltd v Prestidge and Brown [1992] 1 W. L. R. 137; [1992] 1 
All E. R. 909. 
Equity and Law Life Assurance Society Plc v McGrath (CA) 9 May 1995 (Lexis 
transcript). 
Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1877) L. R. 3 App. Cas. 1218. 
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper's Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] A. C. 269; [1967] 2 
W. L. R. 871; [1967] 1 All E. R. 699. 
Estate ofBrocklehurst, Re [1978] Ch. 14; [1978] 1 All E. R. 767; [1977] 3 W. L. R. 96. 
Estates Trust Ltd v Byrne [1939] Ch. 441. 
Etridge v Pritchard Englefield [ 1999] Lloyd's Rep. P. N. 702. 
Evans v Blood (1746) 3 Brown Parl. Cas. 632. 
Evans v Llewellin (1787) 1 Cox. 333. 
Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 2 All E. R. 
205; [1983] 1 W. L. R. 399. 
Fairclough v Swan Brewery Co Ltd [1912] A. C. 565. 
Filmer v Gott (1774) 4 Brown Parl. Cas. 230. 
First National Bank Plc v Achampong [2003] E. W. C. A. Civ 487; [2004] 1 F. C. R. 18. 
Forsyth v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2000] S. L. T. 1295. 
353 
Fry v Lane (1889) L. R. 40; Ch. D. 312. 
G&C Kreglinger v New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1914] A. C. 25. 
Geest Plc v Fyffes Plc [1999] 1 All E. R. (Comm) 672. 
Ghana Commercial Bank v Chandiram [1960] A. C. 732 (PC); [1960] 3 W. L. R. 328; 
[1960] 2 All E. R. 865. 
Glanville v Glanville [2002] E. W. H. C. 1587. 
Goldsworthy vBrickell [1987] Ch. 378; [1987] 2 W. L. R. 133; [1987] 1 All E. R. 853. 
Goode Durrant Administration v Biddulph [1994] 2 F. L. R. 551. 
Craig, Re [1970] 2 All E. R. 390. 
Green v Duckett (1882-83) L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 275. 
Greene King Plc v Stanley [2001] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1966; [2002] B. P. I. R. 491. 
Grigby v Cox (1750) 1 Ves. Sen. 517. 
Halifax Mortgage Services Ltd v Stepsky [1996] 2 W. L. R. 230; [1996] Ch. 207; 
[1996] 2 All E. R. 277. 
Hall vBaker (1878) 9 Ch. D. 553. 
Hall v Hall (1868) 1 P. & D. 481. 
Hammond v Osborne [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 885; [2002] W. T. L. R. 1125. 
Hart v O'Connor [1985] 1 A. C. 1000 (PC); [1985] 3 W. L. R. 214; [1985] 2 All E. R. 
880. 
Harvey vMount (1845) 8 Beav. 439; 50 E. R. 172. 
Hatch v Hatch (1804) 9 Ves. Jun. 292; 32 E. R. 615. 
HDakin & Co Ltd v Lee [1916] 1 K. B. 566. 
Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] A. C. 465. 
Hirshfeld v L. B. & S. C. Ry (1876) 2 Q. B. D. 1. 
Hoenig v Isaacs [1952] 2 All E. R. 176; [1952] 1 T. L. R. 1360. 
Hoghton v Hoghton (1852) 15 Beav. 278; 51 E. R. 545. 
Horny v Tate & Lyle Refineries Ltd [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 416. 
354 
Horwood vMillar's Timber and Trading Co Ltd [1917] 1 K. B. 305. 
Howes V Bishop [1909] 2 K. B. 390. 
Huguenin v Baseley (1807) 14 Ves. Jun. 273; 33 E. R. 526. 
Inche Noriah v ShaikAllie bin Omar [1929] A. C. 127; [1928] All E. R. Rep. 189. 
Ingram vLittle [1961] 1 Q. B. 31; [1960] 3 W. L. R. 504; [1960] 3 All E. R. 332. 
Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 Q. B. 29; [1965] 2 W. L. R. 212; [1965] 1 All E. R. 446. 
Irvani v Irvani [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 412; [2000] C. L. C. 477. 
Jennings v Cairns [2003] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1935; [2004] W. T. L. R. 361. 
JLyon &Co Ltd v Secretary of State for the Home Department (1868) L. R. 6 Eq. 655. 
Jobson vJohnson [1989] 1 W. L. R. 1026; [1989] 1 All E. R. 621. 
Kelley v Scott [1981] I. C. R. 241. 
Kings North Trust Ltd v Bell [1986] 1 All E. R. 423 (CA); [1986] 1 W. L. R. 119. 
Knightsbridge Estates Trust Ltd v Byrne [1939] Ch. 441. 
Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 A. C. 122; [2001 ] 
2 W. L. R 1789; [2001] 3 All E. R. 193. 
Lancashire Loans Ltd v Black [1934] 1 K. B. 380. 
Langton v Langton [1995] 2 F. L. R. 890. 
Lee vJones (1864) 17 C. B. (NS) 482; 144 ER 194. 
Leggatt v National Westminster Bank Plc [2001 ]1F. L. R. 563; [2001 ]1F. C. R. 523. 
Levett v Barclays Bank Plc [1995] 2 All E. R. 615; [1995] 1 W. L. R. 1260. 
Levinson v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co Ltd [1977] 3 All E. R. 498; [1977] 3 
W. L. R. 90; [1978] Q. B. 69. 
Lloyds Bank Ltd vBundy [1975] 1 Q. B. 326 (CA); [1974] 3 W. L. R. 501; [1974] 3 All 
E. R. 757. 
Lloyds Bank Plc v Egremont [1990] 2 F. L. R. 351. 
Lloyds TSB Bank Plc v Holdgate [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 1543. 
Lloyds Bank Plc v Waterhouse [1991] Fam. Law 23 (CA). 
355 
Lloyds Bank Plc v Wright Bailey (1995) unreported. 
London General Omnibus Co Ltd v Holloway [1912] 2 K. B. 72. 
Lutchman Ramcoomarsingh v The Administrator General [2002] U. K. P. C. 67. 
Lyon v Home (1868) L. R. 6 Eq. 655. 
MacKenzie v Royal Bank of Canada [1934] A. C. 468 (PC). 
Macklin v Dowsett [2004] E. W. C. A. Civ. 904; [2005] W. T. L. R. 1561. 
Maskell vHorner [1915] 3 K. B. 106. 
Massey vMidlandBankPlc [1995] 1 All E. R. 929; [1994] 2 F. L. R. 342. 
Maynard vMosely (1676) 3 Swanst. 651. 
McKewan v Thornton (1861) 2 F. & F. 594; 175 E. R. 1201. 
r 
Meredith v Lackschewitz-Martin [2002] E. W. H. C. 146?; [2002] W. T. L. R. 1451. 
Middleton v Welles (1785) 2 E. R. 166. 
Midland Bank Plc v Greene [1994] 2 F. L. R. 827; [1995] 1 F. C. R. 365. 
Midland Bank Plc v Kidwai [1995] N. P. C. 81. 
Midland Bank v Perry (1988) 56 P. & C. R. 202; [1988] 1 F. L. R. 161. 
Midland BankPlc v Serter [1995] 1 F. L. R. 1034 (CA). 
Midland Bank Plc v Shephard [1988] 3 All E. R. 17 (CA). 
Midland Bank Plc v Wallace [2002] 2 A. C. 773; [2001] 4 All E. R. 449; [2001] 3 
W. L. R. 1021. 
Mitchell v Homfray (1881-82) L. R. 8 Q. B. D 587 (CA). 
Morgan vJeffreys [1910] 1 Ch. 620. 
Morley v Loughnan [ 1893 ]1 Ch. 73 6. 
Morris v CWMartin and Sons Ltd [1966] 1 Q. B. 716; [1965] 3 W. L. R. 276; [1965] 2 
All E. R. 725. 
Multiservice BookbindingLtd vMarden [1979] Ch. 84; [1978] 2 All E. R. 489; [1978] 
2 W. L. R. 535. 
Mumford v Bank of Scotland [1995] S. C. L. R. 839; [1996] 1 F. L. R. 344. 
356 
National Provincial Bank of England Ltd v Glanusk [ 1913 ]3 KB 335. 
National Westminster Bank Plc v Amin [2002] U. K. H. L. 9. 
National Westminster Bank Plc v Breeds [2001 ] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 98. 
National Westminster Bank v Gill [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
National Westminster Bank Plc v Leggatt [2001 ]1F. L. R. 563; [2001 ]1F. C. R. 523. 
National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [ 1983 ]3 All E. R. 8 5. 
National Westminster Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] A. C. 686; [1985] 2 W. L. R. 588; 
[1985] 1 All E. R. 821. 
Nevill v Snelling (1880) L. R. 15 Ch. D. 679. 
Newbiggin vAdam (1886) 34 Ch. D. 582 (CA). 
Newell v Tarrant [2004] E. W. H. C. 772. 
Newman v Payne (1793) 2 Ves. Jun. 199. 
Niersmans vPesticcio [2004] E. W. C. A. Civ. 372; [2004] W. T. L. R. 699. 
Northern Rock Building Society v Archer [ 1999] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 32. 
North Ocean Shipping Co v Hyundai Construction Co: The Atlantic Baron [1979] 
Q. B. 705; [1979] 3 W. L. R. 419; [1978] 3 All E. R. 1170. 
Norton v Relly (1764) 2 Eden. 286; 28 E. R. 908. 
Nottidge v Prince (1860) 2 Giff. 246; 66 E. R. 103. 
Ormes v Beadel (1860) 2 Giff. 166; 66 E. R. 70. 
O'Rorke v Bolingbroke (1876-77) L. R. 2 App. Cas. 814. 
Osmond v Fitzroy (1731) 3 P. W. M. S. 129. 
Padgham v Rochelle [2003] W. T. L. R. 71; [2002] E. W. H. C. 2747. 
Pao On vLau Yiu Long [1980] A. C. 614; [1979] 3 W. L. R. 435; [1979] 3 All E. R. 65. 
Parker v Bristol and Exeter Railway Co (1851) 6 Exch. 702. 
Peek v Gurney (1873) L. R. 6 H. L. 377. 
Petrou v Woodstead Finance [1986] F. L. R. 158. 
357 
Pinnels Case, The (1602) Co. Rep. 7a. 
Polly Peck International Plc v Nadir (No. 2) [1992] 4 All E. R. 769. 
Poosathurai v Kannappa Chettiar (1919) L. R. 47 Ind. App. 1 (PC). 
Port Caledonia and the Anna, The [ 1903 ] P. 184. 
Powell vPowell [1900] 1 Ch. 243. 
Ramcoomarsingh vAdministrator General [2002] U. K. P. C. 67; [2003] W. T. L. R. 291. 
Randall v Randall [2004] E. W. H. C. 2258; [2005] W. T. L. R. 119. 
Rhodes v Bate (1865-66) L. R. 1 Ch. App. 252. 
Rolled Steel Products (Holdings) Ltd v British Steel Corporation [1986] Ch. 246, 
(CA); [1985] 3 All E. R. 52. 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Clark [2000] S. L. T. 101. 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 1) [1997] 3 All E. R. 628; [1997] 2 F. L. R. 
847. 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [1998] 4 All E. R. 705; [1998] 2 F. L. R. 
843. 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 A. C. 773; [2001] 4 All E. R. 
449; [2001] 3 W. L. R. 1021. 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Wilson [2001 ] S. L. T. (Sh Ct) 2. 
Royal Bank of Scotland Plc v Wilson [2004] S. C. 153; [2003] S. L. T. 910. 
Say v Harwich (1812) 1 Ves & Bea 195; 158 E. R. 76. 
Schroeder Music Publishing Co Ltd v Macaulay [1974] 1 W. L. R. 1308; [1974] 3 All 
E. R. 616. 
Scottish Equitable Life Plc v Virdee [1999] 1 F. L. R. 863. 
Seaton v Heath (1899) 1 Q. B. 782. 
Shephard v Midland Bank Plc [1987] 2 F. L. R. 175. 
Sherwin v Mc Williams [ 1921] 17 Tas. L. R. 94. 
Simpson v Simpson [1992] 1 F. L. R. 610. 
Singla v Bashir [2002] E. W. H. C. 883. 
358 
Skipton Building Society v Clayton (1993)66P. & C. R. 223; [1993] N. P. C. 52. 
Small v Curry (1853) 2 Drewy's 102. 
Smith v Bank of Scotland [1997] S. C. (HL) 111; [1998] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 62. 
Smith v Chadwick (1884) 9 App. Cas. 187. 
Spence v Crawford [1939] 3 All E. R. 271. 
Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No. 2) [2000] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 218; [2000] 1 All E. R. (Comm) 1. 
Steele v Williams (1853) 8 Exch. 625. 
Steeples v Lea [1998] 1 F. L. R. 138; [1998] 2 F. C. R. 144. 
Stone v Compton (1838) 5 Bing (NC) 142; 132 E. R. 1059. 
Sumpter v Hedges (1898) 1 Q. B. 673. 
Sutton vMishcon de Reya [2003] E. W. H. L. 3166; [2004] 1 F. L. R. 837. 
Tate v Williamson (1866) L. R. 2 Ch. App. 55. 
Taylor vJohnson (1882) 19 Ch. D. 603. 
Taylor v Obee (1816) 3 Price 83; 146 E. R. 180. 
Tito v Waddell (No. 2) [1977] Ch. 106; [1977] 2 W. L. R. 496; [1977] 3 All E. R. 129. 
Tool Metal Manufacturing Co Ltd v Tungsten Electric Co Ltd [1955] 2 All E. R. 657; 
[1955] 1 W. L. R. 761. 
Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank ofEngland [1924] 1 K. B. 461. 
TSB BankPlc v Camfield [1995] 1 W. L. R. 430; [1995] 1 All E. R. 951. 
Tufton v Sperni [1952] 2 T. L. R 516; [1952] W. N. 439. 
Turbull & Co vDuval [1902] A. C. 429. 
Turner vBarclaysBankPlc [1997] 2 F. C. R. 151; [1998] 1 F. L. R. 276. 
Tyler v Yates (1870-71) L. R. 6 Ch. App. 665. 
UCB Corporate Services Ltd v Williams [2002] E. W. C. A. Civ. 555; [2002] 3 F. C. R. 
448. 
UCB Home Loans Corporation Ltd v Moore [2002] 2 A. C. 773. 
359 
Underhill v Horwood (1804) 10 Ves. 209. 
Wamsley v Both (1739) 2 Atk 25. 
William Sindall Plc v Cambridgeshire County Council [1994] 1 W. L. R. 1016. 
Williams v Bayley (1866) L. R. 1 H. L. 200. 
WJAIan & Co Ltd v El Nasr Export and Import Co [1972] 2 Q. B. 189; [1972] 2 All 
E. R. 127; [1972] 2 W. L. R. 800. 
Woodchester Equipment Leasing Co Ltd v Capital Belts Ltd, Unreported (April 12, 
1995, CAT No. 335). 
Woods v Scotlife House Loans (No. 2) December 13,2000 unreported. 
Woolwich Plc v Gomm (1999) 96(34) L. S. G. 33; (2000) 79 P. & C. R. 61 (CA). 
Wright v Carter [1903] 1 Ch. 27. 
Wright v Cherrytree Finance Ltd [2001] E. W. C. A. Civ. 449; [2001) 2 All E. R. 
(Comm) 877. 
Wright v Cotias Investments Inc [2000] S. C. L. R. 324 (Outer House). 
Wright v Yanderplank (1856) 8 De GM &G 133; 44 E. R. 340. 
Yorkshire Bank Plc v Tinsley [2004] E. W. C. A. Civ. 816; [2004] 3 All E. R. 463. 
Zamet vHyman [1961] 1 W. L. R. 1442; [1961] 3 All E. R. 933. 
United States 
Adcock v Ramtreat Metal Technology Inc WL 410658 (Wash. App. Div. 1) (2001). 
Allen vMichigan Bell Tel Co 18 Mich. App. 632,171 N. W. 2d 689 (1969). 
Alvah Van Orden Howard and Lucy Marino Howard v Joseph Diolosa and Nanue 
National Bank 241 N. J. Super. 222,574 A. 2d 995 (1990). 
American Home Imp Inc v Maciver 105 N. H. 435,201 A. 2d. 886,14 A. L. R. 3d 324 
(1964). 
American Nursery Prods 115 Wash 2d 223,797 P. 2d 477 (1990). 
Andersons Inc v Horton Farms Inc 166 F. 3d 308 (1998). 
Araiza Olmedo vAshcroft W. L. 2203824 (9th Cir. )(2004). 
-Ac'n 
Atel Financial Corporation v Quaker Coal Company 132 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (2001). 
Azanor vAshcroft W. L. 2203824 (9t' Cir. ) (2004). 
Bal-Fel Inc vBoyd 503 SW 2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. ) (1973). 
Blakely vHousingAuth 8 Wash. App. 204,505 P. 2d 151 (1973). 
Bondy's Ford Inc v Sterling Truck Corporation 147 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (2001). 
Campbell Soup Co v Wentz 172 F. 2d 80 (1948). 
Central Budget Corp v Sanchez 53 Misc. 2d 620,279 N. Y. S. 2d 391 (Civ. Ct. ) (1967). 
Chatlos Atlos Systems Inc v National Cash Register Corp 635 F. 2d 1081 (3`d Cir. ) 
(1980). 
Cheshire Mortgage Services vMontes 223 Conn. 80,612 A. 2d 1130 (1992). 
Cognitest Corporation v Riverside Publishing Company 107 F. 3d 493 (1997). 
Coker Int'l Inc v Burlington Industries Inc 935 F. 2d 267, WL 97487 (4th Cir. ) (1991). 
Deminsky vArlington Plastics Machinery 249 Wis. 2d 441,638 N. W. 2d 331 (2001). 
Dennis Burnham v Superior Court of California, County of Marin 495 U. S. 604,110 
S. Ct. 2105 (1990). 
Donovan vPRL Corporation 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807 (2001). 
Earl of Chesterfield v Janssen (1751) 2 Ves. Sen. 125; 28 ER 82. 
Estate of Frederic Re 599 P. 2d 550 (1979). 
Estate of HA True v Commissioner of International Revenue (2001) W. L. 761280 
(U. S. Tax Ct. ), 82 T. C. M. (CCH) 27, T. C. M. (RIA) 2001-167, (2001) R. I. A. T. C. 
Memo 2001-167. 
E&W Building Material Co v American Savings & Loan Ass 'n 648 F. Supp. 289 
(M. D. Ala. ) (1986). 
Floyd E Coursey and Michael B Coursey v Caterpillar 64 F. 3d 662, W492923 (6t' 
Cir. Mich) (1995). 
FNRoberts Pest Control Co vMcDonald 132 Ga. App. 257,208 S. E. 2d 13 (1794). 
Freeman v Hubco Leasing Inc 324 S. E. 2d 462 (1985). 
Gladden v Cadillac Motor Car Division 83 N. J. 320,416 A. 2d 394 (1980). 
361 
Gorham Savings Bank v Susan MacDonald 710 A. 2d 916 (1998) 
Grow v Grow W. L. 84438 (Va. App. ) (2000). 
Harris v Green Tree Fin Corp 183 F. 3d 173 (3d Cir. ) (1999). 
Harvey Block v Fort Motor Credit Company 286 A. 2d 228,63 A. L. R. 3 d 1,10 UCC 
Rep. Serv. 139, D. C., Jan 17, (1972). 
Helena Chemical Co v Wilkins 18 S. W. 3d 744 (2000). 
Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors Inc 32 N. J. 358,161 A. 2d 69,75 A. L. R. 2d 1 
(1960). 
Honey Dew Associates Inc vM& KFood Corp 241 F. 3d 23 (2001). 
Hume v United States 132 U. S. 406,10 S. Ct. 134,33 L. Ed. 393 (1889). 
Iberia Credit Bureau Inc v Cingular Wireless LLC 379 F. 3d 159, C. A. 5 (La. ) (2004). 
Indianapolis Morris Plan Corporation v Sparks 132 Ind. App. 145,172 N. E. 2d 899 
(1961). 
Ingle v Circuit City Stores Inc 328 F. 3d 1168 (2003). 
Interstate Piping & Controls Inc v Robert-James Sales Inc 315 I11. App. 3d 248,733 
N. E. 2d 718,248 111. Dec. 43 (2000). 
James P Knapp and Pamela K Knapp v American General Finance Inc 111 
F. Supp. 2d 758 (2000). 
Jefrey v Wentraub 32 Wash. App. 536,648 P. 2d 914 (1982). 
JLMlndustries v Nielsen SA W. L. 2382231 (2nd Cir. ) (2004). 
JNErploration & Production v Western Gad Resources Inc 153 F. 3d 906 (1998). 
Jones Leasing Inc v Gene Phillips & Assoc 282 S. C. 327,318 S. E. 2d 31 
(App. )(1984). 
Joseph Rosenfeld v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 108 F. Supp. 2d 156 
(2000). 
Krueger Associates Inc (National Fulfilment Services) v The American District 
Telegraph Company of Pennsylvania 247 F. 3d 61 (2001). 
Lela Bishop v We Care Hair Development Corporation 316 111 App. 3d 1182,738 
N. E. 2d 610,250 111 Dec. 394 (2000). 
362 
Lucille M Couture v Pawtucket Credit Union 765 A. 2d 813 (R. I. ) (2001). 
MA Mortenson Company Inc v Timberline Software Corporation and Softwork. s Data 
Systems Inc 93 Wash. App. 819,970 P. 2d 803 (1999). 
Marshall v Mercury Finance Co 550 So. 2d 1026 (Ala. Civ. App. ) (1989). 
Marybeth Armendariz v Foundation Health Psychcare Services 6 P. 3d 669,99 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 745 (2000). 
Maxwell v Fidelity Fin Servs Inc 184 Ariz. 82,907 P. 2d 51 (1995). 
Michael Haga vMartin Homes Inc W. L. 1133267 (Ohio App. 5 Dist. ) (2000). 
Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Aging v Brookside Nursing 
Center Inc W. L. 1725139 (2000). 
Mobil Oil Corporation v Earhart Petroleum Inc 213 F. 3d 632, W. L. 530351 (4t' Cir. 
(Va. )) (2000). 
Modern Drop Forge Company v Rapid Technologies Inc 94 F. 3d 647, W. L. 453235 
(7th Cir. (I11)) (1996). 
Northwest Acceptance Corp v Almond Gravel Inc 162 Mich. App. 294,412 N. W. 2d 
719 (1987). 
Results Oriented Inc v Crawford 245 Ga. App. 432,538 S. E. 2d 73 (2000). 
Royal Indemnity Co v Westinghouse Electric Corp 385 F. Supp. 520 (S. D. N. Y. ) 
(1974). 
Schroeder v Fageol Motors Inc 86 Wash. 2d 256,544 P. 2d 20 (1975).. 
Standard Oil Company of California v Clyde Perkins 449 U. S. 232,101 S. ct. 488,66 
L. Ed. 2d. 416 (1980). 
Stedor Enter Ltd v Armtex Inc 947 F. 2d 727 (4t' Cir. ) (1991). 
Taylor Investment Corporation v Dennis L Weil 169 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (2001). 
Veliz v Cintas Corp W. L. 2452851 N. D. Cal. (2004). 
Wallace Hardware Company Inc v Bill Abrams 223 F. 3d3 82 (2000). 
Williams v Walker-Thomas Furniture Co 350 F. 2d 445,18 A. L. R. 3d 1297 (D. C. Cir. ) 
(1965). 
Yakinma County (West Valley) Fire Protection District et al v City of Yakima 122 
Wash. 2d 371 (1993). 
363 
Statutes, Directives and Regulations 
European Legislation 
European Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the 
consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises 
European Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts 
Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment 
firms and credit institutions. 
European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC of 20 March 2000 relating to 
the taking up and pursuit of the business credit institutions. 
New Zealand 
Property (Relationship) Amendment Act 2001 
United Kingdom 
Consumer Credit Act 1974 
Consumer Safety Act 1978 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
Insurance Companies Act 1982 
Law of Property Act 1925 
Matrimonial Homes Act 1983 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 
Poor Law Act 1601 
Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 
Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 




Alabama Code (1997) 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 1968,1974 
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act 1971 
Codes of Practice 
The Banking Code-Setting Standards for Banks, Building Societies and other Banking 
Service Providers, (2005) British Banker's Association (et al. ). 
Reports and Official Papers 
Basel Committee Publication, "Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate 
Market Risks" (2005) httpJ/www. bis. org/publ/bcbsl 19. htm. 
Basel Committee Publication "Basel II: International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework" (2005) 
httpJ/www. bis. org/publ/bcbsl 18. htm 
Bernier, Michelle (Commissioner for Regional Policy), "Preparation for the Concours 
for the European Institutions on Structures, Functions and Policies of the European 
Union", (2003) Nicosia, Cyprus. 
Fox, Roland; Economic and Social Cohesion in the European Community: Some 
Preliminary Results. University of Salford, 1993. 
Lord Chancellor's Department; Judicial Statistics, England and Wales (Great 
Britain). London: HMSO, 2004. 
Ministry of Justice, NZ; Relationship Property: A Guide to the Law: Matrimonial & 
de Facto Property Law. Wellington: Ministry of Justice, 2001. 
New Zealand. Law Commission; A New Property Law Act. Wellington, N. Z.: Law 
Commission, 1994. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "House Prices and 
Economic Activity" (1999) Economics Department Working Paper No. 279. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Housing Markets, 
Wealth, and the Business Cycle. " (2005) Economic Outlook. 
Perth [W. A. ]: The Society, Recent Developments in Unconscionability: Papers 
Presented at a Seminar on "Recent Developments in Unconscionability" (1991). 
365 
Shurman, L., "A Fair Banking Code? " (1991) The Chartered Institute of Bankers, 
Ernest Sykes Memorial Lecture. 
Singh, S., "For Love not Money: Women, Information and the Family Business" 
(1995) Consumer Advocacy and Financial Counselling Association of Victoria. 
"The Banking Ombudsman Scheme Annual Report" (1992-3). 
Electronic Databases 
H: \tre\material\Factsheet-Regionalpolicy. doc. 
www. ag. gov. au/agd/WWW/clrHome. nsf/Page/Past 
- 
Inquiries Submissions-Australia 
_ n Digital_Alliance AustralianDigital_Alliance Part_2. htm1 
http: //moneycentral. msn. com/contentBanking/bankruptcyguide/P 114573. asp 
http: //pandora. nla. gov. au/pan/11430/20010621/www. austlii. edu. au/au/journals/MUL 
R/2000/7. html#fn45 
http: //pandora. nla. gov. au/pan/101 15/20040106/www. murdoch. edu. au/elaw/i s sues/v 10 
n2/burke102 text. html#t24 
http: //pandora. nla. gov. au/pan/25078/2002053 I/www. uws. edu. au/law/elderlaw/lawref 
ormsubmission. pdf 
http: //www. austlii. edu. au/au/joumalsavfULR/2001/4. html# 
http: //www. bis. org/bcbsfindex. htm. 
http: //www. cml. org. uk/cml/policy/issues/230. 
http: //www. familylaw. org. nz/media/releaseO5O4O1. asp 
httpJ/www. financial-ombudsman. org. uk. 
http: //www. findlaw. com/ 12international/countries/nz/articles/744. html 
http: //www. hcourt. gov. au/speeches/haynej/haynej_CommercialLawANU. htm 
http: //www. justice. govt. nzJfamily/property 
http: //www. lawcom. govt. nz/-2k 
I CA 
